Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit. I emphasize Citizen Audit - since our founding over 250 Connecticut citizens have volunteered to observe post-election audits, perform independent election audits, and produce independent audit reports – that is over 700 volunteer days, all in pursuit of election integrity.

Since post-election audits are performed by the same officials responsible for elections, to be trusted and credible, such audits must be open, publicly verifiable, and independently observed by citizens.

Most election officials work hard and are of high integrity. Many perform an accurate, open, and observable audit, while maintaining ballot security. Other officials resist the audit, do a sloppy job of counting, and provide questionable, unverifiable ballot security¹.

I draw your attention to the attached original detailed text of the bill submitted to LCO which was summarized as S.B. 540. It is a streamlined version of past bills. It will provide transparent, publicly verifiable audits, establish minimum standards for ballot security, and require publicly verifiable electronic audits. The total cost statewide would be approximately $30,000 spread over three years²; dwarfed by just the interest on the $6,500,000 bonding designated for improving elections in 2015; dwarfed by the $1,000,000+ spent each year for printing the ballots this law is intended to protect; dwarfed by the $100,000+ spent each year on post-election audits it would make transparent and credible.

Ballot preservation is crucial to credible recanvasses, recounts, and audits. Ballot security law in Connecticut is inadequate and ambiguous. In practice, ballot security falls far short of the common sense standards set by Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, in unenforceable audit procedures³. The statute has not been updated to recognize that optical scanners require paper ballots. The ambiguous law is widely interpreted by officials to mean that ballots need to be sealed for only 14 days after an election – the day prior to the commencement of post-election audit! S.B. 540 would fix that by setting minimal standards, more workable than those in the Secretary’s procedures.

¹ For examples and see the Citizen Audit’s post-election audit observation reports: http://CTElectionAudit.org
² Municipalities that actually have elections, referendums, or primaries less than 60 days apart would need to purchase one extra ballot bag for the first instance of such election, primary, or referendum, for each district, a few may need two or more. Cases include special elections and associated primaries, consecutive referendums, and run-offs. These are generally smaller turn-out. Smaller, sealable, bags are available for under $30.
³ http://ctelectionaudit.org/2016/AuditProcedure201605.pdf

“Whenever ballots are outside of secure storage they should at all times be under the supervision of at least two election officials of opposing parties (or candidates in a primary): This includes when they are stored and transported from the polling place after the election: When they are transported to the audit facility and room; and during and after the audit until they are returned to the secure storage.

Ballots, memory cards, and tabulators must remain under seal and in secure storage from the time of pre-election testing until they are no longer needed for potential audits or audit investigations and they are released by the Secretary of the State.”
Some critical aspects of post-election audits are not required to be open to public observation. In other cases, there is no minimum advance notice defined, except in unenforceable audit procedures from the Secretary of the State. The procedures are frequently ignored, even by the SOTS Office. S.B. 540 would fix that with enforceable, workable sufficient notice requirements.

The law requires that UConn produce audit reports after every election and primary, there is no requirement for timely reports. The reports are intended to determine if our scanners and systems are working accurately, so that corrective actions can be taken between elections. Only one report has been completed since November 2011⁴. S.B. 540 would fix that.

Ironically, after an election that highlighted the importance and weaknesses in post-election audits across the country, especially in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin⁵ - For the first time, after the November 2016 election, registrars, the SOTS Office and UConn conducted entirely machine based post-election audits. That made Connecticut the first state ever to replace transparent, publicly verifiable audits with hidden, unverifiable “black box” audits. That should satisfy only those with blind trust in computers and officials⁶. S.B. 540 would fix that, with Machine-Assisted Manual Post-Election Audits, i.e. manual audits of the electronic audits with methods based on the science of Evidence Based Elections⁷. Performed appropriately, such audits would be approximately the same level of effort as the current electronic audits, with even less drudgery for officials.

For the voters of Connecticut, I urge you to enact S.B. 540, providing common sense ballot security, transparent, publicly verifiable and credible electronically assisted post-election audits.

Thank You

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⁴ Not posted to the SOTS or UConn websites and verified through an FOI to the SEEC that none have been filed there, at least since the Nov 2011 election. SOTS web: https://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/ct-sots/ (Note do not confuse memory card audits with the legally required post-election audit reports.)

⁵ http://ctvoterscount.org/video-the-story-of-the-attempted-presidential-election-audit/

⁶ Machine Retabulation is Not Auditing: http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/retabNotAudit13.pdf

⁷ Evidence Based Elections: http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/evidenceVote12.pdf
CTMirror Viewpoints: Amid national election concerns, Connecticut goes the wrong way

December 15, 2016, by Luther Weeks

About half the states, including Connecticut, have both paper ballots and post-election audits. Because our audits were transparent and publicly verifiable, Connecticut Citizen Election Audit observers have been able to reveal multiple flaws in the process and in the official reporting of audit results. Earlier this year, however, the General Assembly unanimously cut Connecticut’s the audits from 10 percent of districts to 5 percent.

Now there is more bad news: our already inadequate audits have been partially replaced by electronic “audits” which are not transparent and not publicly verifiable. Instead, we now have “black box voting” augmented by “black box auditing.” This should satisfy only those with blind trust in computers and blind trust in insiders with access to the “audit” computers.

Last week, without public notice, seven Connecticut municipalities conducted electronic “audits” under the guidance of the UConn Center for Voting Technology and the Secretary of the State’s Office, using the Audit Station developed by the Voter Center.

There is a science of election audits. Machine-assisted audits can offer efficiency and ease of use, but any audit process needs to be transparent and provide for independent public verification of the results. Machine-assisted manual audits in California and Colorado demonstrate how this can be achieved. Public verification begins with publicly rescanning the ballots and providing the public with a computer readable list of how each ballot was counted. Then selecting a small random sample of the ballots and comparing the actual voter verified ballots to the record of how the machine counted them.

It is puzzling that the UConn Voter Center, the General Assembly, and the Secretary of the State have consistently chosen to ignore the peer-reviewed science which would provide an actual audit, appropriately trusted, even faster, and even less work for local officials.

Compare existing election audits to professional audits. Professional audits include examining a sample of original documents such as receipts from vendors or signed checks. Such audits are performed by individuals independent of those accountable for doing the original job. Public verifiability is critical to post-election audits, because they are performed by those responsible for conducting the election itself, protecting the original ballots, evaluating and recommending the election equipment.

The new Connecticut system – including equipment and procedures – involves rescanning, with officials reviewing scanned images of every ballot and how it was interpreted by the system. But, scanned images are not photographs: they are as vulnerable as other computer data, subject to machine errors, tampering, and human error. Connecticut’s electronic “audits” do not verify that the ballot images correspond to the ballots. Ballots are the only evidence verified by voters.

Last week local officials reviewed each of the images for approximately one to three seconds. At that speed, it was difficult to verify that even one race of five displayed was accurately interpreted by the system. It would be more efficient, accurate, and trustworthy, to sample the paper ballots as in Colorado and California and compare them to the system interpretations.

The new system is being presented as much more economical for municipalities with less work and stress for local officials. When and if it is working properly, without errors and unhacked, it could be much more accurate than the disorganized, inconsistent hand counting that is frequently performed in Connecticut.

A solution is at hand. The UConn Audit Station is capable of providing the kind of machine-assisted manual audits that would meet the requirements of sound science for election audits. It could provide transparent, publicly verifiable audits that are independent of the software, hardware, and the officials who are responsible for the audit and the election.

Amid national concerns for election integrity and calls for stronger audits nationwide, Connecticut is positioned to be a leader in election auditing. Our manual audits were a good start, with some flaws.

The Secretary of the State and the UConn Voter Center should work with national experts to develop procedures that take full advantage of the Audit Station, to deliver efficient and trustworthy election audits. Until then our manual audits should continue. Voters and the General Assembly should insist upon transparent and publicly verifiable elections.
Machine Retabulation is not Auditing
Mark Lindeman, Ronald L. Rivest, and Philip B. Stark
24 March 2013

- A post-election vote tabulation audit checks election results by manually inspecting some voter-verified records (usually paper ballots). A well-designed audit can produce strong evidence that election outcomes are correct—and can correct incorrect outcomes.

- The principle of evidence-based elections says that an election should provide convincing evidence that election outcomes are correct. True audits allow observers to see directly how well the voting system performed, which can provide such evidence.

- Some claim that election results can be checked by machine retabulation, in which ballots are rescanned on other equipment. Machine retabulation may happen to catch some errors, but it is not really an audit. Machine retabulation relies on the false assumption that two machines can’t both be wrong.

- Some claim that retabulation adequately checks the voting system because it is “independent” of the voting system. But a retabulation system could be misconfigured in the same way as the voting system, could misinterpret some ballots in the same way, or could be subverted to cause it to report the same incorrect results. Two unaudited machine counts are not necessarily better than one.

- Some claim that retabulation can adequately check the voting system results provided that the two sets of vote counts match in sufficient detail. This is like claiming that if two expense reports list the same expenses, both must be right and there is no reason to look at any receipts.

- Some claim that retabulation itself can be “audited” by comparing ballot images produced by the retabulation system with the system’s interpretation of those images. At best, this tests internal consistency: whether two parts of the retabulation system agree with each other. It does not test whether the system correctly interpreted the ballots. At worst, a subverted retabulation system could pass this test, yet misreport every vote. This is not an audit. It cannot confirm that the election outcome is correct.

- A well-designed retabulation system can help in a machine-assisted audit. In a machine-assisted audit, the retabulation system produces an interpretation of votes on each ballot (a Cast Vote Record, or CVR) that can be matched with that ballot. The CVRs are exported from the retabulation system. Observers verify that these exported CVRs produce the same electoral outcome (winners, etc.) as the voting system. Then observers compare a random sample of actual ballots against the corresponding CVRs. This comparison is between actual ballots and CVRs, not between digital images of ballots and CVRs. A machine-assisted audit can produce strong evidence that election outcomes are correct. Retabulation cannot, even if the CVRs are checked against the digital images of the ballots.

- There is currently no way to audit votes cast online, and there is little prospect for the foreseeable future. Despite claims about “military grade encryption,” Internet voting does not create a durable, voter-verifiable record against which the results can be checked. While votes cast on the Internet could be retabulated, they cannot be audited. Both NIST and the Department of Homeland Security agree that secure online voting does not currently exist, and—if it is possible at all—is a long way off.

* Viterbi Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT
  Professor, Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley
(As submitted to the Legislative Commissioners Office (LCO))

To enhance the transparency and public verifiability of post-election audits based on the science of post-election auditing, while reducing effort required for local officials; to provide timely notification of public events and filing of mandatory reports; and technical revisions of statutes to recognize that polling place voting includes paper ballots that must be secured.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. Section 9-320f (a) and (b) of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017):

(a) Not earlier than the fifteenth day after any election or primary and not later than two business days before the canvass of votes by the Secretary of the State, Treasurer and Comptroller, for any federal or state election or primary, or by the town clerk for any municipal election or primary, the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit or, for an election or primary held on or after January 1, 2016, an electronic audit authorized under section 9-320g of the votes recorded in not less than five per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable.

[Such audit shall be noticed in advance and be] Not later than three business days prior to any manual or electronic audit, the registrars shall give notice of such audit to the public and notify by electronic mail or telephone any elector requesting such notification.8 In the case of electronic audits such public notice shall be given by the Secretary of the State. Each such audit shall be open to public observation. Any election official who participates in the administration and conduct of an audit pursuant to this section shall be compensated by the municipality at the standard rate of pay established by such municipality for elections or primaries, as the case may be.

(b) The voting districts subject to an audit described in subsection (a) of this section shall be selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State and such selection process shall be noticed three business days in advance by the Secretary of the State and shall be open to the public. The offices subject to an audit pursuant to this section shall be included in the open selection process and, (1) in the case of an election where the office of presidential elector is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (2) in the case of an election where the office of Governor is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (3) in the case of a municipal election, three offices or twenty per cent of the number of offices on the ballot, whichever is greater, selected at random by the municipal clerk, and (4) in the case of a primary election, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office, if any, but in no event less than twenty per cent of the offices on the ballot, selected in a random drawing by the municipal clerk.

Section 2. Section 9-320f (d) of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017):

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8 To assure that interested parties can realistically have an opportunity to observer the audit counting.
(d) The manual or electronic audit described in subsection (a) of this section shall consist of the manual or electronic tabulation of the paper ballots cast and counted by each voting tabulator subject to such audit. Once complete, the vote totals established pursuant to such manual or electronic tabulation shall be compared to the results reported by the voting tabulator on the day of the election or primary. The results of such manual or electronic tabulation shall be reported on a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State which shall include the total number of ballots counted, the total votes received by each candidate in question, the total votes received by each candidate in question on ballots that were properly completed by each voter and the total votes received by each candidate in question on ballots that were not properly completed by each voter. Such report shall be filed within forty-eight hours with the Secretary of the State who shall immediately forward such report to The University of Connecticut for analysis. The University of Connecticut shall within one-hundred-and-twenty days after the election or primary file a written report with the Secretary of the State regarding such analysis that describes any discrepancies identified. After receipt of such report, the Secretary of the State shall file such report with the State Elections Enforcement Commission.

Section 3. Section 9-320f (d) of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017):

(i) If the audit officials are unable to reconcile the manual or electronic count from an audit described in subsection (a) of this section with the electronic vote tabulation and discrepancies from the election or primary, the Secretary of the State shall conduct such further investigation of the voting tabulator malfunction as may be necessary for the purpose of reviewing whether or not to decertify the voting tabulator or tabulators in question or to order the voting tabulator to be examined and recertified pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. Any report produced by the Secretary of the State as a result of such investigation shall be filed with the State Elections Enforcement Commission and the commission may initiate such further investigation in accordance with subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 9-7b as may be required to determine if any violations of the general statutes concerning election law have been committed. Such investigations shall be noticed by the Secretary of the State three business days in advance and shall be open to the public.

Section 3. Section 9-320g of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017):

Authorization of electronic equipment by Secretary of the State for conduct of an audit. Notwithstanding any provision of this title, the Secretary of the State, in consultation and coordination with The University of Connecticut, may authorize the use of electronic equipment for the purpose of conducting any audit required pursuant to section 9-320f for any primary or general election held on or after January 1, 2016, provided (1) the Secretary of the State prescribes specifications for (A) the testing, set-up and operation of such equipment, and (B) the training of election officials in the use of such equipment; and (2) the Secretary of the State and The University of Connecticut agree that such equipment is sufficient in quantity to accommodate the total number of audits to be conducted;

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9 Some local reports from past audits have not been filed for months or years.
10 Some reports from past audits have yet to be produced, going back to 2008. Only one report has been filed since the report for the November 2011 Election.
and (3) **Such tabulation shall tabulate all votes for all contests on the ballot and shall produce an electronic cast vote record for each ballot recording each vote assigned by the retabulation on each ballot, with a means of associating the ballot with the cast vote record by the sequence in which the ballot was scanned or by a unique identifier added to each ballot. Such process shall result in the export of all cast vote records, made available for review and in a standard computer readable form for public observers present at the audit and later transmitted in such electronic form to the Secretary of the State. Immediately following such export and public cast vote record availability, the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit of the retabulation, by randomly selecting original ballots and comparing the manual interpretation of the marks on the ballots to the associated cast vote records. The registrars of voters shall record, for each ballot selected any difference between the manual interpretation of such ballot and the associated cast vote record, and identifying the circumstances, if any, that might account for such difference including, but not limited to, an improperly marked ballot, and in the case of originally manually counted ballots a possible difference in interpretation of voters’ intent. The number of ballots randomly selected for the manual audit shall be twenty or one percent of the ballots selected for all districts audited in the municipality in the counting session, whichever is greater, provided the total number of ballots randomly selected for such manual audit shall not exceed sixty. The results of the retabulation shall be reported on a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State that shall include the total number of ballots counted, the total votes received by each candidate for office so audited or in favor/against each question so audited, a printed record from the retabulation machine, a copy of the original election or primary tabulator record, and a record of the manual comparison of randomly selected ballots, identifying any differences between the manual interpretations and the retabulation interpretations of the markings of such ballots. Nothing in this section shall preclude any candidate or elector from seeking additional remedies pursuant to chapter 149 as a result of any information revealed by such process.**

Sec. 4. Section 9-309 of the general statutes and section 23 of Public Act 15-224 are repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017):

Upon the close of the polls, the moderator, in the presence of the other election officials, shall immediately lock the voting tabulator against voting and immediately cause the vote totals for all candidates and questions to be produced. The moderator shall, in the order of the offices as their titles are arranged on the ballot, read and announce in distinct tones the result as shown, giving the number indicated and indicating the candidate to whom such total belongs, and shall read the votes recorded for each office on the ballot. The moderator shall also, in the same manner, announce the vote on each constitutional amendment, proposition or other question voted on. The vote so announced by the moderator shall be taken down by each checker and recorded on the tally sheets. Each checker shall record the number of votes received for each candidate on the ballot and also the number received by each person for whom write-in ballots were cast. The moderator shall make a preliminary list from the vote totals produced by the tabulators and shall prepare such preliminary list for transmission to the Secretary of the State pursuant to section 9-314, as amended by this act. After such preliminary list has been transmitted to the Secretary of the State, the canvass may be temporarily interrupted, during which time the moderator shall (1) return the keys for all tabulators to the registrars of voters, (2) seal the tabulators against voting or being tampered with, (3) prepare and seal individual envelopes for all (A) write-in ballots, (B) absentee ballots, (C) moderators' returns, and (D) other notes, worksheets or written materials used at the election, **(4) seal the**
materials and ballots in approved containers and seals and for such period, as described in section 9-310 (b), as amended by this act, store all such tabulators and envelopes in a secure place or places directed by the registrars of voters. Such temporary interruption, resumption of counting and unsealing may resume no earlier than 9:00am the day after the election, primary or referendum, and no later than one hour after the registrars of voters post the date time and location of such resumption at the main entrance of their office and at the main entrance to town hall, whichever is later. At the end of such temporary interruption, the moderator shall receive such keys from the registrars and shall take possession of and break the seal on all such tabulators and envelopes for the purpose of completing the canvass. The result totals shall remain in full public view until the statement of canvass and all other reports have been fully completed and signed by the moderator, checkers and registrars, or assistant registrars, as the case may be. Any other remaining result of the votes cast shall be publicly announced by the moderator not later than forty-eight hours after the close of the polls. Such public announcement shall consist of reading both the name of each candidate, with the designating number and letter on the ballot and the absentee vote as furnished to the moderator by the absentee ballot counters, and also the vote cast for and against each question submitted. While such announcement is being made, ample opportunity shall be given to any person lawfully present to compare the results so announced with the result totals provided by the tabulator and any necessary corrections shall then and there be made by the moderator, checkers and registrars or assistant registrars, after which the compartments of the voting tabulator shall be closed and locked. The moderator shall seal the materials and ballots in approved containers and seals and for such period, as described in section 9-310 (b), as amended by this act, In canvassing, recording and announcing the result, the election officials shall be guided by any instructions furnished by the Secretary of the State.

Section 5. Section 9-310 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017)

Sec. 9-310. Sealing of tabulator and ballots by moderator. (a) As soon as the count is completed and the moderator’s return required under the provisions of section 9-259 has been executed, the moderator shall place the sealed tabulator in the tabulator bag, and so seal the bag, and the tabulator shall remain so sealed against voting or being tampered with for a period of fourteen days, either sixty days or fourteen days prior to the use of such tabulator at a subsequent election, primary, or referendum whichever is less except as provided in section 9-309 or 9-311 or pursuant to an order issued by the State Elections Enforcement Commission.12

11 The current statute was never updated after the advent of optical scanning, to recognize that polling place voting with a tabulator involves paper ballots that must be preserved.

12 This is less stringent that current law, in the case of an election, primary, or referendum etc. closely following another election etc. It is less stringent in the often ignored, Secretary of the State’s Official Audit procedures which state:

“Whenever ballots are outside of secure storage they should at all times be under the supervision of at least two election officials of opposing parties (or candidates in a primary): This includes when they are stored and transported from the polling place after the election; When they are transported to the audit facility and room; and during and after the audit until they are returned to the secure storage. Ballots, memory cards, and tabulators must remain under seal and in secure storage from the time of pre-election testing until they are no longer needed for potential audits or audit investigations and they are released by the Secretary of the State. This includes districts not selected for audits, since the ballots and equipment may be needed for further investigations. Tabulators should remain under seal and in secure facilities, even between elections. The exceptions to these procedures are for use of ballots and the equipment for pre-election testing, election, and auditing requirements.”
(b) The moderator shall place all cast ballots in container(s) approved by the Secretary of the State, or as many such containers as may be necessary, and affix a numbered and tamper-evident seal approved by the Secretary of the State, or as many such seals as may be necessary, upon such container or containers. The moderator shall record such seal number or numbers in the moderator’s return, and the ballots shall remain so sealed against tampering with for a period of sixty days\(^{13}\) after the election, primary, or referendum, except when ballots or materials are required to be accessed in compliance with other applicable laws, court order, or pursuant to an order issued by the Secretary of the State, or the State Elections Enforcement Commission. When containers are unsealed, they must be opened and be in the presence of both registrars of voters or a representative of each registrar, until such ballots and materials are resealed in approved containers using approved seals as described in this paragraph. Once resealed the broken seals, new seals, date and times of unsealing, date and times of resealing, reason for access, and the signatures of the registrars or their representatives shall be recorded on a form approved by the Secretary of the State, which shall be filed with the municipal clerk, who shall record the date of its receipt and file it with the associated moderator’s return.

(e) If it is determined that a recanvass is required pursuant to section 9-311 or 9-311a, immediately upon such determination the tabulators, [write-in] all ballots, absentee ballots, moderators’ returns and all other notes, worksheets or written materials used at the election shall be impounded at the direction of the Secretary of the State. Such package shall be preserved for one hundred eighty days after such election and may be opened and its contents examined in accordance with section 9-311 or upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. At the end of one hundred eighty days, unless otherwise ordered by the court, such package and its contents may be destroyed. Any person who unlocks the voting or operating mechanism of the tabulator or the counting compartment after it has been locked as above directed or breaks or destroys or tampers with the seal after it has been affixed as above directed or changes the indication of the counters on any voting tabulator within fourteen days after the election or within any longer period during which the tabulator is kept locked as ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction or by the State Elections Enforcement Commission in any special case, except as provided in section 9-311, shall be imprisoned for not more than five years. Any tabulator may be released in less than fourteen days, for use in another election, by order of a court, if there is no disagreement as to the returns from such machine and no order directing impoundment has been issued by the State Elections Enforcement Commission.

Sec. 5. Section 9-309 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2017)

Upon the close of the polls, the moderator, in the presence of the other election officials, shall immediately lock the voting tabulator against voting and immediately cause the vote totals for all candidates and questions to be produced. The moderator shall, in the order of the offices as their titles are arranged on the ballot, read and announce in distinct tones the result as shown, giving the number indicated and indicating the candidate to whom such total belongs, and shall read the votes recorded for each office on the ballot. The moderator shall also, in the same manner, announce the

\(^{13}\) Ballots should be preserved under seal, at least until there is no need for investigations based on official audit report analysis by UConn. Even with this proposed revision, seals and security as customary in Connecticut is inadequate and should be addressed and strengthened more at some point in the future (e.g. Ballot access should require two officials of opposing interests to access stored ballots; a third party should log all such access; and physical security mandated which would sufficient to provide confidence that unauthorized access would likely to be detected.)
vote on each constitutional amendment, proposition or other question voted on. The vote so announced by the moderator shall be taken down by each checker and recorded on the tally sheets. Each checker shall record the number of votes received for each candidate on the ballot and also the number received by each person for whom write-in ballots were cast. The moderator shall make preliminary list from the vote totals produced by the tabulators and shall prepare such preliminary list for transmission to the Secretary of the State pursuant to subsection (a) of section 9-314, as amended by this act. After such preliminary list has been transmitted to the Secretary of the State, the canvass may be temporarily interrupted, during which time the moderator shall (1) return the keys for all tabulators to the registrars of voters, (2) seal the tabulators against voting or being tampered with, (3) prepare and seal individual envelopes for all (A) write-in ballots, (B) absentee ballots, (C) moderators’ returns, and (D) other notes, worksheets or written materials used at the election, (4) seal the materials and ballots in approved containers and seals and for such period, as described in section 9-310 (b), as amended by this act, and ([4]5) store all such tabulators and envelopes in a secure place or places directed by the registrars of voters. Such temporary interruption, resumption of counting and unsealing may resume no earlier than 9:00am the day after the election, primary or referendum, and no later than one hour after the registrars of voters post the date time and location of such resumption at the main entrance of their office and at the main entrance to town hall, whichever is later. At the end of such temporary interruption, the moderator shall receive such keys from the registrars and shall take possession of and break the seal on all such tabulators and envelopes for the purpose of completing the canvass. The result totals shall remain in full public view until the statement of canvass and all other reports have been fully completed and signed by the moderator, checkers and registrars, or assistant registrars, as the case may be. Any other remaining result of the votes cast shall be publicly announced by the moderator not later than forty-eight hours after the close of the polls. Such public announcement shall consist of reading both the name of each candidate, with the designating number and letter on the ballot and the absentee vote as furnished to the moderator by the absentee ballot counters, and also the vote cast for and against each question submitted. While such announcement is being made, ample opportunity shall be given to any person lawfully present to compare the results so announced with the result totals provided by the tabulator and any necessary corrections shall then and there be made by the moderator, checkers and registrars or assistant registrars, after which the compartments of the voting tabulator shall be closed and locked. The moderator shall seal the materials and ballots in approved containers and seals and for such period, as described in section 9-310 (b), as amended by this act. In canvassing, recording and announcing the result, the election officials shall be guided by any instructi