CT

Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

Did new elected Representative committ multiple voter fraud?

Elected initially to the Legislature last month, Christina Ayala, has been arrested for a hit-and-run shortly after the election, arrested for a domestic dispute, and then ordered to move to the district before being sworn in, is no under investigation for illegally voting and registering in that district. Also under investigation is her mother, the Registrar of Voters.

Risk Limiting Audits: Why and How

A recent, paper by the Risk Limiting Audit Working Group, endorsed by The American Statistical Association, articulates and outlines various types of post-election audits, their requirements, and relative advantages.

We cannot help but think that our Coalition audit reports contributed to statements in the section entitled: Trustworthy audits: the virtue lies in the details:

Others Weigh In On Election Reforms

Last week Secretary of the State Denise Merrill weighed in at her press conference on, as the Courant headlines, how “Reforms Could Boost Voter Participation”. Also weighing in was Melissa J. Russell, President of ROVAC (Registrars Of Voters Association, Connecticut).

Aug 2012 Primary Audit Observation Report

Coalition finds 31% of Official Audit Reports Lack Critical Data

Municipalities failed to report data critical to audit evaluation. Increasing numbers choose paper only elections, avoiding scanners and audits.

The report highlighted concerns with two increasing trends:

  • An increase in missing and incomplete official reports. There are 16 of 52 (31%) reports with errors making it impossible to determine if machines had functioned properly. What basis is there to trust audits, with this significant level of error in reporting?
  • Up up to 19 towns avoided optical scanners and audits by conducting paper only elections. Such voting is not audited, not transparent, and error prone based on past observations of hand counts.

We conclude, based on our observations and analysis of official audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State, that the August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence.
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Review detail data and municipal reports>

75 Districts randomly selected for Nov post-election audit

Selected Districts

 

On Monday the Secretary of the state randomly selected 75 districts for post-election audit. I assisted by actually selecting the districts from slips of paper in a raffle barrel. You might find the Secretary’s list easier to read in the press release. <Press Release>

Basic and Bold Steps To Improve Connecticut Elections

We offer the following short list of items for improvement without breaking the bank. Basic steps that cost little, should almost be assumed. Bold steps that could transform the system, and transcend knee-jerk half steps.

Looking forward to the Good, the Bad, or the Ugly in election reform?

There were many problems! Will we learn anything? Will be do anything? Will we help or aggravate the situation? As they say some you win, some you lose, and some are rained out. (At least Sandy did not rain this one out, but it could have been different. Next time it could be different…for better or for worse.)

Imagine this election as a National Popular Vote Agreement election. Then lots more people would be worried about NJ, both pushing for more to vote by any means possible, charging officials with not complying, and others charging all sorts of irregularities.

What We Worry? What Could Go Wrong On Election Day?

America’s elections are run entirely on the honor system. What could possibly go wrong?

A Tale in two Courant Editorials

Where we disagree with the Courant, is that we believe ballots deserve the same level of protection as money and supplies, that the need for verification applies equally to private employees, public employees, and public officials. We are not so sure of trust part of ‘trust but verify’, we would ‘verify sufficiently to deter and trust’.

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