A recent article in Barons by respected scientists: Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust
Here’s what an evidence-based election would look like:
Voters hand-mark paper ballots to create a trustworthy, durable paper vote record. Voters who cannot hand-mark a ballot independently are provided assistive technologies, such as electronic ballot marking devices. But because these devices are subject to hacking, bugs, and software misconfiguration, the use of such ballot-marking devices should be limited.
Election officials protect the paper ballots to ensure no ballot has been added, removed, or altered…
Commentary in Barron’s this week Elections Should be Grounded in Evidence, Not Blind Trust <read>
Even though there is no compelling evidence the 2020 vote was rigged, U.S. elections are insufficiently equipped to counter such claims because of a flaw in American voting. The way we conduct elections does not routinely produce public evidence that outcomes are correct.
A recent article in the Journal Inquirer is at best misleading: Paper Ballots Integral to Connecticut Election Security <read>
Connecticut has some good election integrity practices, yet there are gaps and vulnerabilities.
Full disclosure, I am a resident of Glastonbury and have been a poll-worker here since 2013 and prior to that from 2008 in Vernon, Connecticut. I take no pleasure in writing this post. Yet, even when people you know and appreciate provide, in your opinion, inaccurate or uninformed information to the public, it is not appropriate to ignore it. There is some good information in this article, yet it is not entirely accurate.
I absolutely agree that Voter Marked Paper Ballots like we have in Connecticut are the widely recognized basis of election security and integrity. Yet they are just a start.
Last week Kevin Rennie blogged about a letter from the leader of the Municipal Clerks Association sent to the clerks. Information that should have come from the Secretary of the State warning about problems and misinformation about the mailing of ballot packages to voters. Information that should have gone to voters not just clerks: Merrill Failure: 20,000 Voters Will Not Receive Absentee Ballots. Town Clerks Will Try to Solve Primary Crisis. Unglued, Too. Ballots May Fall Out of Envelopes. There is plenty of disappointment in the post and letter, yet I will concentrate on one item of advice to the clerks:
Additionally, I have been informed that the sides of some inner envelopes have not been properly glued shut by the manufacturer; as a result, the voter’s ballot could slip out of the inner envelope while the town clerk is processing the returns into CVRS. This issue is not related to the voter accidentally slicing open the envelope. It is due to poor quality control at the mail house. Please be on the lookout for envelopes that are not sealed on the side. Please tape the defective inner envelopes shut.
This may appear to be insignificant. Yet it is a big deal. There are reasons for an inner envelope, especially in this election.
States and the Federal Government are pumping millions into cybersecurity and new voting systems. That is all good, especially when the new systems are for Voter Marked Paper Ballots and Ballot Marking Devices for those with disabilities. Yet ultimately, it can provide a false sense of security. No matter how strong the cybersecurity and the quality of software, based on Turing’s Halting Problem, it is impossible to secure a computer system from errors and hacking. it is also impossible to secure systems from insiders and others with physical access.
I testified in my capacity as Executive Director of the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit. I was the only member of the public providing testimony.
Why are post-election audits and paper ballots a critical component of protecting our elections? “[D}data protection involves prevention, detection, and recovery”. Cybersecurity and other measures protecting voting equipment and voting systems are primarily prevention measures and to a lesser degree detection measures. No matter how much effort we put into cybersecurity, software testing, and hardware maintenance there will always be a significant level of vulnerability.
Paper ballots, sufficient post-election audits, and recounts provide a primary means of detecting cyber, software, human, and hardware failures. They also provide a means of recovery. They provide for, so called, software independent verification of election results, resulting in justified public confidence.
Connecticut will have available somewhere around $5 million to spend on election security in the new “omnibus” appropriations bill. Woefully inadequate for states that should be replacing touch-screen voting with all paper ballots. etc., for a state that already has paper ballots, a lot can be accomplished.
Denise Merrill is already thinking about how to spend it: CTMirror: Omnibus has millions to strengthen CT voting system against cyber attacks.
Secretary Merrill asked me for suggestions in a brief conversation a couple of weeks ago. At the time, off the top of my head, I suggested and we briefly discussed three things. After consideration I would suggest some more things. Security is not just cyber security and training officials. It also requires physical protection of ballots, physical protection of voting machines, and understanding the situation before determining the training needed.
On Thursday the GAE Committee held testimony on most election bills this year. (There was one last week and a couple more will be on Monday). For once, I was able to support more bills than I opposed!
Opposition and support by the Secretary of the State and Registrars was mixed. In addition to supporting and opposing various bills, I offered several suggestions for improvement. And one suggestion for radical improvement.