Internet Voting

Which, if any, of Connecticut’s 169 towns would be secure for Internet voting (let alone email and fax voting)?

Some of the smaller Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70′s and 80′s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Campaign finance bill hacked, with risky email and fax voting provision, passed

Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?
It seem like just last week that the Legislature mandated email access for all registrars.
We question the constitutionality of the secret vote waiver included in the bill.

International concerns with Internet voting

We note two articles this week, from Canada and Switzerland with citizen/scientists’ concerns with Internet voting.

Basics you need to know about election integrity in fifteen minutes

Kevin O’Neill, Capitol Thinking, interviews the authors of Broken Ballots – Will Your Vote Count, Prof Doug Jones and Dr. Barbara Simons <podcast> When it comes to elections and verifiability, Doug Jones and Barbara Simons are true experts that everyone can understand.

The Times and Internet Voting they are not a changing

Once again the New York Times ignores science and the evidence. While scientists once again, refute the Times.

Voting, alas, has unique characteristics that make internet implementations all but impossible given current technology. The big problem is that we make two demands of it that cannot be met simultaneously. We want voting to be very, very secure. And we want it to be very, very anonymous.

DHS Expert: Internet voting not secure

I had a front row seat last Thursday in Santa Fe, to hear Bruce McConnell from the Department of Homeland Security discuss Internet Voting.

Some people think online voting is bound to happen, though, once the kinks are worked out. But as McConnell’s comments show, those who worry a lot about cybersecurity believe that time is a long way away.

Online voting vendor, Scytl’s system worries experts in Canada

Vendor touted in CT and on NPR by West Virginia Secretary of the State comes under fire after Canadian election disrupted by hackers.

How All the votes were lost in D.C.

Within 48 hours of the system going live, we had gained near complete control of the election server. We successfully changed every vote and revealed almost every secret ballot. Election officials did not detect our intrusion for nearly two business days—and might have remained unaware for far longer had we not deliberately left a prominent clue.

Internet Voting, more problems beyond the News Hour report

Last week there was a PBS News Hour report on Internet Voting. It was fair and balanced as far as it went, but maybe a bit too fair to non-scientists and vendors touting Internet Voting. At Brad Blog, Earnest A Canning has an excellent piece pointing out some additional information not covered in the short News Hour segment.

“Military Grade Security” for elections is a non sequitur

Who should we believe? Vendors selling internet voting or computer scientists and government intelligence experts? We point out that the greatest danger to internet voting is insider manipulation, even easier for a single rogue election official or network insider. No need to steal paper ballots and fill them out. No risk of being caught in an audit or recount of voter verified paper ballots. UPDATE: Videos