By Luther Weeks on May 14, 2012
Some of the smaller Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70′s and 80′s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?
Posted in CT Law, Internet Voting, National, Reports
By Luther Weeks on May 9, 2012
Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?
It seem like just last week that the Legislature mandated email access for all registrars.
We question the constitutionality of the secret vote waiver included in the bill.
Posted in Internet Voting, Mail/Absentee Voting
By Luther Weeks on April 30, 2012
We note two articles this week, from Canada and Switzerland with citizen/scientists’ concerns with Internet voting.
Posted in Internet Voting
By Luther Weeks on April 16, 2012
Kevin O’Neill, Capitol Thinking, interviews the authors of Broken Ballots – Will Your Vote Count, Prof Doug Jones and Dr. Barbara Simons <podcast> When it comes to elections and verifiability, Doug Jones and Barbara Simons are true experts that everyone can understand.
Posted in Internet Voting, National, Post-Election Audits, Recounts/Recanvasses, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on April 10, 2012
Once again the New York Times ignores science and the evidence. While scientists once again, refute the Times.
Voting, alas, has unique characteristics that make internet implementations all but impossible given current technology. The big problem is that we make two demands of it that cannot be met simultaneously. We want voting to be very, very secure. And we want it to be very, very anonymous.
Posted in Internet Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on April 3, 2012
I had a front row seat last Thursday in Santa Fe, to hear Bruce McConnell from the Department of Homeland Security discuss Internet Voting.
Some people think online voting is bound to happen, though, once the kinks are worked out. But as McConnell’s comments show, those who worry a lot about cybersecurity believe that time is a long way away.
Posted in Internet Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on March 29, 2012
Vendor touted in CT and on NPR by West Virginia Secretary of the State comes under fire after Canadian election disrupted by hackers.
Posted in CT, Internet Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on February 25, 2012
Within 48 hours of the system going live, we had gained near complete control of the election server. We successfully changed every vote and revealed almost every secret ballot. Election officials did not detect our intrusion for nearly two business days—and might have remained unaware for far longer had we not deliberately left a prominent clue.
Posted in Internet Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on February 22, 2012
Last week there was a PBS News Hour report on Internet Voting. It was fair and balanced as far as it went, but maybe a bit too fair to non-scientists and vendors touting Internet Voting. At Brad Blog, Earnest A Canning has an excellent piece pointing out some additional information not covered in the short News Hour segment.
Posted in Internet Voting, National
By Luther Weeks on February 15, 2012
Who should we believe? Vendors selling internet voting or computer scientists and government intelligence experts? We point out that the greatest danger to internet voting is insider manipulation, even easier for a single rogue election official or network insider. No need to steal paper ballots and fill them out. No risk of being caught in an audit or recount of voter verified paper ballots. UPDATE: Videos
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Voting
