National

University of California Red Team Reports to the Secretary of State

This confirms earlier reports on Diebold Optical Scan equipment, including the University of Connecticut report. The vulnerabilities identified in this report should be regarded as a minimal set of vulnerabilities. We have pursued the attack vectors that seemed most likely to be successful. Other attack vectors not described here may also be successful and worth […]

University of Connecticut, Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal

In July, 2007 a similar report was released on the Diebold TSX, which demonstrated that that the state’s choice of Diebold Optical Scan was far superior to the Diebold DRE option, however, the October 2006 report is the one that applies to our voting systems. We identify a number of new vulnerabilities of this system […]

VerifiedVoting.org, Percentage-based vs. SAFE Vote Tabulation Auditing: A Graphic Comparison

This is a complete case for variable audit percentages. Several pending electoral-integrity bills specify hand audits of 2% to 10% of all precincts. However, percentage-based audits are usually inefficient… Percentage based audits can also be ineffective, since close races may require auditing a large fraction of the total –even a 100% hand recount  to provide […]

Page 60 of 60« First...102030...5657585960