By Luther Weeks on February 28, 2013
Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw
Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts
The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:
- Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
- Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
- Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
- Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “We found significant, unexplained errors, for municipalities across the state, in the list of districts in the random drawing. This random audit was highly flawed from the start because the drawing was highly flawed.”
Cheryl Dunson, President, League of Women Voters of Connecticut, stated,, “Two years ago, the Legislature passed a law, at the Secretary of the State’s request, which was intended to fix inaccuracies in the drawing. For whatever reason, errors in the drawing have dramatically increased.
Weeks added, “Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work. This year one town investigated discrepancies and found errors to correct in their election procedures – that is one value of performing the audits as intended.”
Without adherence to procedures, accurate random drawings, a reliable chain-of-custody, and transparent public follow-up, when discrepancies are reported, if there was ever a significant fraud or error it would not be recognized and corrected.
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Posted in CT, CT Skulduggery and Errors, Post-Election Audits, Reports
By Luther Weeks on December 14, 2012
A recent, paper by the Risk Limiting Audit Working Group, endorsed by The American Statistical Association, articulates and outlines various types of post-election audits, their requirements, and relative advantages.
We cannot help but think that our Coalition audit reports contributed to statements in the section entitled: Trustworthy audits: the virtue lies in the details:
Posted in CT, National, Reports
By Luther Weeks on October 25, 2012
The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project has released a thorough, comprehensive, and insightful new report timed to the 2012 election. We find little to quibble with in the report. We agree with all of its recommendations.Several items with which we fully endorse were covered in this report which sometimes are missing from the discussion or often underemphasised.
The report itself is 52 pages, followed by 32 pages of opinions of others, including election officials, advocates, and vendors, some of whom disagree with some aspects of the report. Every page is worth reading. The report is not technical. It covers a wide range of issues, background, and recommendations.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Voting, Mail/Absentee Voting, National, National Popular Vote, Post-Election Audits, Reports
By Luther Weeks on September 4, 2012
Once again, we applaud Dr. Alexander Shvartsman and his team for developing the technology to perform these innovative tests, the diligence to perform the tedious tests, and the fortitude to report the facts. Compliance by officials leaves much to be desired:
Prior to the primary 110 out of 598 districts sent cards, that is 18.5% compliance
After the primary 105 out of 598 districts sent cards, that is 17.6% compliance,
however, only 49 of those cards were used in the election, a compliance rate of 8.2%
Posted in CT, Post-Election Audits, Reports
By Luther Weeks on June 14, 2012
Once again, the report is “Flawed by a lack of transparency, incomplete data, and assumed accuracy”
Posted in CT, Post-Election Audits, Reports
By Luther Weeks on June 13, 2012
Use of good tools must go hand-in-hand with good use of tools
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National, Reports
By Luther Weeks on May 14, 2012
Some of the smaller Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70′s and 80′s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?
Posted in CT Law, Internet Voting, National, Reports
By Luther Weeks on March 12, 2012
Given the many members, the brief meetings, and the lack of representation of all interests, we were skeptical when the Task Force was convened. To our delight, we find that we can offer endorsement of each of the twenty-one recommendations in the report.
There is a lot to do in all the recommendations. It will take time, money, and deliberate work with everyone at the table. Our hope is that each of the recommendations will be thoroughly explored, evaluated, and acted upon, that none get overlooked.
Posted in Chain of Custody, Costs, CT, CT Law, Mail/Absentee Voting, Post-Election Audits, Recounts/Recanvasses, Reports
By Luther Weeks on October 25, 2011
Most projects start out slowly, and then sort of taper off.
- Augustine’s Law #XL
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, Reports
By Luther Weeks on October 5, 2011
“Over the past century, our nation expanded the franchise and knocked down myriad barriers to full electoral participation. In 2011, however, that momentum abruptly shifted.”
Posted in Mail/Absentee Voting, National, Reports
