Rush Holt: Confidence In Voting Act of 2008

Will the third Act be the charm? Rush Holt to introduce the “Confidence In Voting Act of 2008”.

As drafted, CTVotersCount.org fully supports the bill and will work for its passage. (Read on for our reasons for supporting this bill and what it means for Connecticut)

Thursday Alternet reported Rep. Rush Holt to Push for Paper Ballots and Vote Count Audits for 2008 <read>. In early Fruday afternoon Brad Friedman followed up with Holt Takes Another Stab At Election Reform <read> and a <.pdf draft> of the proposed bill

The First Act

At least two years ago Representative Rush Holt introduced a bill to require paper ballots and audits of Federal elections. In the spring of 2006 I joined a group of citizens from across the country for two lobby days sponsored by Verified Voting, Common Cause, and VoteTrust USA to meet with representatives to urge co-sponsorship of the original “Holt bill”. I joined the New England delegation lobbying the five of the six representatives from New England (four from CT and two from MA) who had not signed on as one of the 169 co-sponsors. Some signed on immediately, some in a few weeks, and in one district only after the 2006 election. The eventual result was co-sponsorship by more than 220 representatives and by each of the five representatives from Connecticut.

Continue reading “Rush Holt: Confidence In Voting Act of 2008”

New York Times: Broken Polls

New York Times Editorial, Broken Polls <read>

Election officials hate to admit how vulnerable their voting systems are to errors and vote theft. ..
Election officials across the country should be asking the sort of tough questions Ms. Brunner and Mr. Coffman have. In 2000, the nation only confronted the flaws in its voting technology after a presidential election was irreparably harmed. With just under a year to go before the next presidential election, the time to fix these problems is now.

History Lesson from Bob Fitrakis: 1980, 1984, 1988

Bob Fitrakis is author of How the GOP Stole America’s 2004 Election & Is Rigging 2008, with Harvey Wasserman. He has an interesting blog post covering recent history of electronic election suspicions.

It is 1984 plus 1980 and 1988. It is not George Orwell fiction, but George Bush reality.

Behind Every Bush — There’s A Rigged Election <read> Excerpts below:

Take the following quote from the Manchester Union Leader from the 1980 Iowa caucus: “The Bush operation has all the smell of a CIA covert operation . . . strange aspects of the Iowa operation [include] a long, slow count and then the computers broke down at a very convenient point, with Bush having a six percent bulge over Reagan.”

In 1984, President Reagan signed National Security Directive Decision NSDD245. A year later, the New York Times explained the details of Reagan’s secret directive: “A branch of the National Security Agency is investigating whether a computer program that counted more than one-third of all the votes cast in the United States in 1984 is vulnerable to fraudulent manipulation.”

The actual computer voting machines were introduced on a grand scale in New Hampshire’s 1988 primary. The results are predictable – former CIA director George H. W. Bush wins a huge upset over Dole and the mainstream for-profit corporate media refuses to consider election rigging.

Here’s the Washington Post’s account of the bizarre and unexplainable election results when touchscreens were first used: In 1988, H.W. Bush was trailing Dole by 8 points in the last Gallup poll before the New Hampshire primary. Bush won by 9 points. The Washington Post covered the Bush upset with the following headline: “Voters Were a Step Ahead of Tracking Measurements.”

Diebold/Primier DOJ Investigation, CO and CA Conflicts Of Interest

Another excellent report by Brad Friedman covering the DOJ investigation of Diebold/Premier along with a blatant conflict of interest by the Secretary of State of Colorado <read>

Excerpts below. Continue reading “Diebold/Primier DOJ Investigation, CO and CA Conflicts Of Interest”

Brad Friedman Interviews Ohio Secretary Of State — Discusses Concerns With Central Scan Solution

In a follow-up to the Ohio voting machine reports and the dramatic action of Ohio’s Secretary of State, Jennifer Brunner, Brad Friedman interviews her about the report, her critics, and concerns with the solution of central count optical scan. <read>Â

Note:  Connecticut does use central count optical scan, only for absentee ballots.  Perhaps less of an issue here because we do not have election officials in place who have flagrantly violated election laws.  Yet, we would be much more comfortable if the central count optical scanners were included in the post-election audits.

JB: I had been concerned because I saw the reaction that Debra Bowen had in California, that she experienced, but we had the benefit in Ohio of seeing some of the things that she faced in looking at what we could do to prevent some of that. And part of what, I think, helped us was that we conducted parallel independent testing. So we not only used the academic researchers but we used corporate scientists and they did the same type of security testing in what we would call a parallel independent method. So we had additional validation.

The way that I analyzed the situation was that I looked at the spectrum of people who were interested in these issues, started from the voting activists, with the voters more in the center who’ve been more concerned about what their election experience and the integrity of the system, and then to Board of Elections officials and voting machine manufacturers. And understanding that, perhaps, the academic scientists would have greater credibility with the activists, while the corporate scientists might have greater credibility with the election officials and the manufacturers, and that if we compared the results of the two and they’re similar and identical that actually we will gain the confidence of the public in what our results were.

BB: And [those results were] largely identical from both the academic and corporate testers?

JB: They were largely identical. The only difference is that the academic researchers were also performing source code review on all three systems. And so there was, there was an additional dimension to the report of the academics. But the interesting thing is, is that the corporate scientists, which was the company from Columbus called MicroSolve, basically looked at this as a computer-based system — industry standards for computer security — and the systems that we have, that have been certified here in Ohio, performed miserably.

BB: And I asked [the critics from Brennan Center and elsewhere] about that yesterday. They had a conference call on some of these issues. And I shared with them, some of your responses. And they said, well, while they understand them, the risks you [refer to] are sort of understandable, if you’re talking to computer scientists, but not to election administrat[ration experts], who understand how it works, and that the risks you take with central-based counting are far outweighed with precinct-based counting because if there is some of the [inappropriate] access and the viruses and so forth that you suggest, it’s far more decentralized.

I did try to hold their feet to the fire on the point that you had made to me. And they said there was still no comparison in [the safety added by] doing precinct-based counting, that most of the chicanery happens when there’s transport of these ballots back to the County. The chain of custody sort of disappears at that point and, as you know, many of the counties — and the bad guys who did some pretty questionable things in ’04 — are still running things in places like Warren County and elsewhere.

Doesn’t that concern you? And their criticism, we’re talking about a lot of well-known election integrity and administration experts, like Larry Norden from Brennan Center, Candice Hoke from CSU and so forth. Are you hearing those complaints about your recommendations?

JB: … but let me focus first on the issue of security. What I think is being missed by a lot of these academic folks, who often times focus on one particular issue in the election process, is that there is the potential to inject malicious software into a system — and I’m talking purely computer security at this point — but these are computer-based systems.

hey operate from a server, there is firmware in machines that are in the polling places, they can be tampered with, they can be penetrated, and if there is malicious software, like a virus put into the system, it can not only affect the machines at the polling places, it can affect the tabulation that occurs at the server and it can also affect future elections if it’s not detected, because we go back to the question of risk. And first of all we need to know if it’s detectable, second of all if it’s recoverable, if it can be recovered from. And I think that they’re not grasping the severity of the risk to the system from a purely computer-based standpoint.

BB: Well, some of the folks I have talked to are, you know, computer experts, and I gotta tell you, Jennifer, that I was the one, remember, who gave the Diebold touch-screen system to Princeton for the study that revealed how easy it was to insert a virus on these systems.

And I gotta tell ya, looking at it — and certainly as a ten-year computer programmer myself — I’m really concerned about the transparency that gets lost when we centralize things as opposed to the decentralized counting. So I do hope you’ll continue to talk with them about it, because these folks who I’ve talked to, I believe do understand the computer-related risks that we’re talking about. But [they] understand that there needs to be, that there is mitigation [of those risks], in the more public precinct-based counting.

Harvey Wasserman on New Ohio Voting Report: “The 2004 Election Was Stolen? Finally We Have Irrefutable Confirmation”

Harvey Wasserman on Democracy Now! covers the gamut of issues in Ohio and the implications of the Ohio Report on top of reporting and research over the last several years. <listen> The Ohio Report adds to the overwhelming evidence from the Brennan Center for Justice, The Carter-Baker Commission, the Conyers Report, California Reports, and from Dr. Shvartsman of the University of Connecticut.

How can the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz , members of the legislature, and registrars continue to consider rolling back manual recounts and audits? How long can the Hartord Courant insist that “no one appears to have figured out how to tamper with the machines” while it calls for independent auditing of electric meters?

Perhaps the most frustrating and dangerous of all is the failure of any prosecution for the blatant destruction of the evidence in the majority of Ohio counties. If we do not require that the law be followed, if there is not penalty for blatant error on the part of election officials, what hope do we have?

Update:  Transcript now available excerpts below <read>

Continue reading “Harvey Wasserman on New Ohio Voting Report: “The 2004 Election Was Stolen? Finally We Have Irrefutable Confirmation””

Ohio Report: Eliminate Precinct Count Optical Scan

Report recommends votes central count optical scan voting <read>

Update: The Free Press discusses the report and we point out implications for Connecticut. Read after the following update.

Update: Microsolve Executive Summary Report <read>

To summarize, if you are concerned about the safety of your medical records or credit card information – the threat to your right to choose your own government is much, much, much more vulnerable and real.

These vulnerabilities demonstrate the capability for attackers who gain access to specific components of the system to influ- ence and tamper with the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the elections process. Generally speaking, the vulnerabilities identified in the study stem largely from the lack of adoption of industry standard best practices that have been developed for the IT industry over the last several years…

MSI did not have access to the source code of the applications nor to any specific “insider information” other than data that was publicly available from the vendor and from the Interet. MSI was provided with access to the systems in an unrestricted manner for the purposes of testing. This access to he systems was used to identify the vulnerabilities of the system. Obviously, attackers would not be given such wide access to the systems in question, thus we take this intoconsideration when we discuss the identified issues. However, it should be noted that access could likely be obtained by determined and/or well-resourced attackers through a variety of means ranging from bribery and breaking-and-entering to social engineering and outright coercion. Histoy has shown that determined attackers often find powerful ways to gain access to their targets.

All three vendor systems reviewed have serious gaps in compliance with even the most basic set of in- formation security guidelines used by systems in industries such as finance, insurance, medical care, manufacturing, logistics and other global commerce. Given the extremely valuable data that these systems process and the fact that our very democracy and nation depend on the security of that data, much work remains to be done by all three vendors. Adoption of best practices and implementation of additional controls to create a defense-in-depth security posture are critical to enhance the security of these systems.


Continue reading “Ohio Report: Eliminate Precinct Count Optical Scan”

LHS Drops Support For 41 Mass Communities

Worcester Telegram: Election technology needs update, Vendor won’t service city’s current system <read>

City Clerk David J. Rushford said LHS Associates of Methuen, the company that provides technical support for the city’s election system, has indicated it will cease providing such support for the generation of Accu-Vote System machines used by the city as of July 1.

Continue reading “LHS Drops Support For 41 Mass Communities”

Diebold Attempts To Avoid Election Transparency Laws

In a last-minute filing, e-voting equipment maker Diebold asked a North Carolina court to exempt it from tough new election requirements designed to ensure transparency in the state’s elections. Diebold obtained an extraordinarily broad order, allowing it to avoid placing its source code in escrow with the state and identifying programmers who contributed to the code…”The new law was passed for a reason: to ensure that the voters of North Carolina have confidence in the integrity and accuracy of their elections,” said EFF Staff Attorney Matt Zimmerman. “In stark contrast to every other equipment vendor that placed a bid with the state, Diebold went to court complaining that it simply couldn’t comply with the law. Diebold should spend its efforts developing a system that voters can trust, not asking a court to let it bypass legal requirements aimed at ensuring voting integrity.”

<read>

Comparing Voting Computers To Electric Meters

We often hear voting computers compared to ATMs. We have debunked< the notion that Voting Computers can be trusted like ATMs. Today an article by the Courant's consumer watchdog, George Gombossy, Once Again Meter Madness, has me considering how Connecticut’s Voting Computers and Electric Meters are the same and different.

Update:  Courant Editorial calls for Independent Audit <read>

We often hear voting computers compared to ATMs. We have debunked the notion that Voting Computers can be trusted like ATMs. Today an article by the Courant’s consumer watchdog, George Gombossy, Once Again Meter Madness, has me considering how Connecticut’s Voting Computers and Electric Meters are the same and different.

I suggest reading Gombossy’s article 1st and then returning here for the comparison: <read>
Same: Voting computers and electric meters are complex pieces of equipment that the ordinary citizen and voting official do not understand.

Different: The case of an electric meter is often transparent with a counter you can read that records usage by the customer. Voting computers have internal meters controlled by software that nobody can see or read as votes are accumulated.

Same: Both are sealed with tamper evident seals.

Different: Meter seals are there to keep the customer from stealing electricity. Voting Computer seals are there to keep insiders from stealing democracy.

Same: Meters are read and audited by employees of the electric company that is charged (no pun intended) with charging customers accurately. Voting computers are read and audited by election officials charged with running elections with integrity.

Same: When their electric meters are audited, the customer may be restricted to standing at a distance which precludes the actual observation of the function of the meter. When voting computers are audited the public may be restricted to standing at a distance which precludes the actual observation of the marks on the ballots being counted and the results being tabulated.

Different: The Courant’s watchdog has spent several columns investing and bringing the important issue of electric meter accuracy to the attention of the public. The Courant’s editorial page has, in the face of contrary evidence, touted the accuracy of our voting computers.

Different: The Attorney General is calling for independent testing of a suspect electric meter that has passed two tests by the electric utility. The Secretary of the State, some registrars, and at least one State Representative are considering calling for the elimination of manual recounts of our voting computers, even as some of those recounts and audits show differences in the voting computer results and the manual hand count of the voters intent.

Same: Just because many electric meters are tested and work, it does not mean that all electric meters will work correctly all the time. Just because many voting computers are tested and work, it does not mean that all voting computers will work correctly all the time.

Different: When your electric meter does not work, you get an odd, suspect, transparent bill that can be a trigger to you or the electric company to look for an explanation. When your voting computer flips votes, unless it is audited carefully, nobody will ever know.

Different: All electric meters of the same model are the same unless there is a mechanical flaw in one meter. Voting computers are programmed separately for each election, each district, and each race – each is a unique opportunity for error or fraud involving many voting computers.