Category: Post-Election Audits

My Testimony Friday On Risk Limiting Audit Bill

Friday I submitted testimony on AN ACT IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RISK-LIMITING AUDITS WORKING GROUP.

The bill was almost the same as last year’s bill so my testimony was easy. Copy and make a few adjustments.

As I say in the testimony, I am generally in favor of Risk Limiting Audits, yet this bill is was off the mark and cannot easily be saved.

There were other bills with 260 speakers. There were only four submitting testimony on this bill. I am glad I did not take the time to testify in person.

Random Audit Drawing – First to use 10-sided die, rather than barrel

After several years of our asking, Secretary Thomas uses 10-sided die for drawing. This is much more fair, transparent, and random than drawing slips from a barrel. The Secretary gets our applause for this change.

Here are the districts chosen, from the Press Release:

…

This time there were a number of medium and large cities with recanvasses, exempt from the audit. So a higher percentage were chosen from the remaining towns. Also we believe Fairfield is exempt based on a highly publicized recanvass, so at least Suffield will be added from the alternates: <read>

After several years of our asking, Secretary Thomas uses 10-sided die for drawing. This is much more fair, transparent, and random than drawing slips from a barrel. The Secretary gets our applause for this change.

Here are the districts chosen, from the Press Release:

List of polling places to be audited: 

  • Killingly—District 5 – Board of Education Central Office Cafeteria
  • Norwalk – District 1-3 – Kendall School
  • Fairfield – District 133-5 – Fairfield Warde High School
  • Thompson—District 1 – Thompson Library, Louis P Faucher Comm. Ctr
  • East Haven – District 4 – Overbrook School
  • Goshen – District 1 – Camp Cochipianee
  • Trumbull – District 5 – Frenchtown School
  • Greenwich – District 10 – Glenville School
  • Waterbury – District 4-1 – Chase School Gym
  • Wallingford – District 9 – Park and Recreation Department
  • Norwich – Precinct 6 – AHEPA – 110 Community Room
  • Norwalk – District 2-1 – S. Norwalk School/Columbus School
  • New Fairfield – District 2 – New Fairfield Senior Center
  • Southington – District 4 – Kennedy School
  • Stamford – District 915 – Dolan Middle School
  • Bridgeport – Absentee Ballot Counting – Margaret Morton Government Center
  • Bristol – Absentee Ballot Counting – Bristol City Hall, Room G-1
  • Wolcott – Absentee Ballot Counting – Wolcott Town Hall
  • Wallingford – District 4 – Dag Hammarskjold Middle School
  • Torrington – District 2 – Coe Park
  • Waterbury – District 3-5 – Carrington School Gym
  • Waterbury— Absentee Ballot Counting – Waterbury City Hall, Cass Gilbert Conference Room
  • Putnam – District 2 – Town Hall Municipal Complex
  • Waterbury – District 1-1 – Kennedy High School Gym
  • Wallingford – District 1 – Pond Hill School
  • Pomfret – District 1 – Pomfret Community School
  • North Canaan – District 1 – Town Hall McCarthy Room
  • Stratford – District 1 – Lordship School
  • Wallingford – District 8 – Wallingford Senior Center
  • Darien – District 1-1 – Municipal Building
  • New Britain – District 7 – School Apartments
  • Wallingford – Absentee Ballot Counting — Town Hall, Room 315
  • Windsor – District 4 – Windsor Town Hall
  • Washington – District 1 – Town Hall, Main Hall
  • Bridgeport – District 132-2 – Bassick High School
  • New Canaan – Absentee Ballot Counting – Town Hall, Second Floor, Meeting Room
  • Newtown – District 3-6 — Reed Intermediate School Cafetorium
  • West Hartford – District 3 – West Hartford Town Hall Auditorium
  • East Haven – Absentee Ballot Counting – East Haven Town Hall

Alternates: 

  • Suffield – District 1 – Suffield Middle School
  • Coventry – Absentee Ballot Counting- Coventry Town Hall Conference Room
  • Beacon Falls – District 1 – Laurel Ledge School
  • Guilford – District 2 – Abraham Baldwin School
  • Trumbull – District 6 – Middlebrook School
  • Westport – District 2 – Saugatuck Elementary School
  • Danbury – District 5 – War Memorial
  • Bethel- District 1 – Bethel Municipal Center
  • Griswold – District 1 – Griswold High School
  • Coventry – District 2 – Coventry High School
  • Bridgeport – District 134-2- Blackham School
  • West Hartford – District 4-2 – Charter Oak International Academy – Gym
  • Plainville- District 2 – Our Lady of Mercy Parish
  • Cornwall – District 1 – Town Hall
  • Manchester – AB Counting- Manchester Town Hall

This time there were a number of medium and large cities with recanvasses, exempt from the audit. So a higher percentage were chosen from the remaining towns. Also we believe Fairfield is exempt based on a highly publicized recanvass, so at least Suffield will be added from the alternates: <read>

Activists for hand-counting ballots don’t acknowledge drawbacks: More mistakes, time, and money

We have said it before, we will say it again: The best protection is machine counting in polling places on election night followed by sufficient post-election audits and recounts. <for example>

A recent article in Votebeat: Activists for hand-counting ballots don’t acknowledge drawbacks: More mistakes, time, and money

Years ago a minority of liberals wanted only hand-counts now its election-denying conservatives.

It seems that those who have never tried have opinions that are not informed by sufficient facts.

We have said it before, we will say it again: The best protection is machine counting in polling places on election night followed by sufficient post-election audits and recounts. <for example>

A recent article in Votebeat: Activists for hand-counting ballots don’t acknowledge drawbacks: More mistakes, time, and money <read>

Years ago a minority of liberals wanted only hand-counts now its election-denying conservatives.  From the article:

Despite widespread coverage of the follies of hand-counting ballots, the quest to expand use of the method continues. This year alone, there have been 16 bills in 8 states that would ban the use of tabulators. It’s a really bad idea. And so, Votebeat has decided to compile a list of our favorite cold-hard evidence.

I’m sure many of you already understand the broad strokes of this: years of evidence and basic common sense shows that hand-counting is less accurate, more time consuming, and significantly more expensive than using tabulators. Still, the same arguments continue to motivate local officials and activists to attempt to upend elections systems. Let’s go through them here, point by point.

Contrary to the article, I assert that hand-counting can be quite accurate, yet it takes a lot to do that. A good plan with lots of double checking, high quality people, and high quality supervision. That is why when I led teams in the 25,000 ballot Citizen Recount of Bridgeport, I used teams of four supervised by a fifth person. Yet, even then for many of the counts we could compare to original machine counts of ballots and votes to further check everything and pursue any differences.

It seems that those who have never tried have opinions that are not informed by sufficient facts.

Editor’s Note: I have been publishing less lately. Mostly because, it seems, there is less novel to discuss.

Testimony opposed to six bills on RCV and RLAs

On Monday I testified against five bills on Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and one on Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs),

As I said,

I am not opposed to the concepts of Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs) or Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) but I am opposed to all six of these bills as they are insufficiently detailed. They also provide no guarantees of transparency..

Both of these concepts involve detailed technical and computational issues. Neither are as simple as looking at marks on ballots and simply counting votes. Officials, candidates, the public, and the SEEC need to know exactly what is expected of officials, so they can perform as expected and such that all can determine if they are doing what is required, uniformly across the state…

 

On Monday I testified against five bills on Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and one on Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs),

As I said,

I am not opposed to the concepts of Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs) or Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) but I am opposed to all six of these bills as they are insufficiently detailed. They also provide no guarantees of transparency..

Both of these concepts involve detailed technical and computational issues. Neither are as simple as looking at marks on ballots and simply counting votes. Officials, candidates, the public, and the SEEC need to know exactly what is expected of officials, so they can perform as expected and such that all can determine if they are doing what is required, uniformly across the state.

Just like we need paper ballots to avoid trusting voting machines and software, we need transparency to judge all the counting and calculating required for RCV and RLAs.

In both RCV and RLAs the counting rules details are critical. Especially, in close contests, where the result is dependent on the nuances in the rules.

Here is a link to my complete testimony, also including a link to extensive comments on the RLA bill <read>

Nov 2022 Post-Election Audit Report

From the Press Release:

Watchdog Group: 24 Audits Since 2007 with Little Improvement

Independent Observation and Analysis of Connecticut’s Nov 2022 Post-Election Audit

HARTFORD: We conclude, based on citizen observations and analysis of official municipal post-election vote audit of the November 2022 election, that it failed to meet basic audit standards

After 16 years with disappointing, locally performed, hand-count audits, we recommend replacement of all local hand-count audits with sufficient and efficient electronically assisted manual audits utilizing the UConn Audit Station.

The non-partisan Connecticut Citizen Election Audit has provided volunteer observation and post-election audit reports since the adoption of optical scanners statewide in 2007. Without the hours and mileage incurred by these volunteers after every election nobody but a few election officials would know the actual quality of the audits performed, while officials would have less motivation toward credible audits.

<Press Release .pdf> <Full Report pdf> <Detail data/municipal reports>

From the Press Release:

Watchdog Group: 24 Audits Since 2007 with Little Improvement

Independent Observation and Analysis of Connecticut’s Nov 2022 Post-Election Audit

HARTFORD: We conclude, based on citizen observations and analysis of official municipal post-election vote audit of the November 2022 election, that it failed to meet basic audit standards

After 16 years with disappointing, locally performed, hand-count audits, we recommend replacement of all local hand-count audits with sufficient and efficient electronically assisted manual audits utilizing the UConn Audit Station.

The non-partisan Connecticut Citizen Election Audit has provided volunteer observation and post-election audit reports since the adoption of optical scanners statewide in 2007. Without the hours and mileage incurred by these volunteers after every election nobody but a few election officials would know the actual quality of the audits performed, while officials would have less motivation toward credible audits.

  • The audits were not conducted and reported as required by law. The Secretary of the State’s Office continues to fail to take responsibility for that failure by local officials.
  • Human error was still considered an acceptable explanation of differences between machine and manual counts. This defeats the purpose of the audits.
  • Weaknesses in ballot chain-of-custody and security procedures necessary for confidence that ballots were not tampered with between the election and the municipal audit counting sessions.
  • The short schedule for audits and dates for electronic audits not announced sufficiently in advance cause both registrars and the Citizen Audit to scramble to conduct and observe audits – they should be added to the annual election calendar months in advance.
  • There were at least three municipalities with new registrars, neither of which had previously performed audits. This resulted in various failures to follow procedures and in one case failure to allow transparency required by the procedures.

The public, candidates, and the Secretary of the State should expect local election officials to be able to organize audits and produce accurate, complete audit reports. The public should expect the Secretary of the State’s Office to take the lead in ensuring that the audit is scheduled in advance, complete, and publicly verifiable.

We are pleased with the following developments:

  • Electronic audits again included random manual verification comparing some paper ballots to Cast Vote Records produced by the audit station.
  • There was a significant reduction in incomplete forms.

We emphasize that this report does not question any election official’s integrity.

All reports and backup data are available online at: https://www.CTElectionAudit.org.

<Press Release .pdf> <Full Report pdf> <Detail data/municipal reports>

Random Drawing of Districts for November 2022 Post-election Audit

On Thursday Secretary of the State Mark Kohler led the drawing of districts for audit.

Here is a list of the selected districts <press release>

On Thursday Secretary of the State Mark Kohler led the drawing of districts for audit.

Here is a list of the selected districts <press release>

A flawed new version of Risk Limiting Audit bill moves forward in the General Assembly

Last month I wrote about S.B.472 for Risk Limiting Audits, despite all but unanimous testimony that the bill was highly flawed, a flawed substitute was passed shortly thereafter by the General Administration and Elections Committee. Last week that revised bill became available on the web, allowing public scrutiny. There is a Word version and a .pdf version, the .pdf version has a fiscal note and an Office of Legislative (OLR) analysis.

It is revised from the original with some improvements, yet remains ambiguous and confusing, although now it may be closer to an actual Risk Limiting Audit. I question if the person(s) who wrote this updated bill had or took advantage of review by anyone familiar with the science of Risk Limiting Audits. Considering the fiscal note and the OLR Analysis, it seems to me that the description in some cases reads things into the bill that do not seem to be reflected in the bill. In particular, it assumes costs and roles for UConn that are not clear in the bill. Costs and roles that would be consistent with the prototype last year, but not obvious in the bill that would become law.

Last month I wrote about S.B.472 for Risk Limiting Audits, despite all but unanimous testimony that the bill was highly flawed, a flawed substitute was passed shortly thereafter by the General Administration and Elections Committee. Last week that revised bill became available on the web, allowing public scrutiny. There is a Word version and a .pdf version, the .pdf version has a fiscal note and an Office of Legislative (OLR) analysis  (Read it here.)  Read our testimony on the original bill and that of others (Here.)

It is revised from the original with some improvements, yet remains ambiguous and confusing, although now it may be closer to an actual Risk Limiting Audit. I question if the person(s) who wrote this updated bill had or took advantage of review by anyone familiar with the science of Risk Limiting Audits. Considering the fiscal note and the OLR Analysis, it seems to me that the description in some cases reads things into the bill that do not seem to be reflected in the bill. In particular, it assumes costs and roles for UConn that are not clear in the bill. Costs and roles that would be consistent with the prototype last year, but not obvious in the bill that would become law.

There are some welcome changes:

  • This version delays a full RLA until 2024 rather than 2022. This will allow time for planning, especially important since we will have a new Secretary of the State (SOTS) in January 2023. This also provides time for future revisions to the law prior to Nov 2024.
  • This version makes a complete new section for RLAs from the existing and continuing 5% audit which still applies to all primaries and odd-year elections. This makes the bill easier to read and perhaps contributes to its improvements, clarity and perhaps facilitating clarity in future improvements. Yet it copies text that is appropriate to the existing audits but not for RLAs.
  • It seems to have better, if imperfect, definitions of RLAs, closer torecognized standard definitions.
  • It arguably requires that manifest creation be open to the public.

Yet, in my reading, there remain new and old problems:

  • It continues the lack of specific notice requirements. In every very case where something is open to the public, there should a clear notice requirement specifying how far in advance each event should be notices (e.g. 48 hours) and where the notice will appear (e.g. a specific place on the SOTS Web.)
  • Like the original it has no requirements for close public observation, software independence, and public access to information critical to verifying the audit. It should clearly require standard, recognized statistical evidence, the review of samples of actual paper ballots, and public access to algorithms and data necessary to independently verify the results of the audit.
  • It continues the ambiguous requirements that UConn report on the audit, send the report to the SOTS and the SOTS file it with the State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC). The weakness is that the current law and this bill provide no deadline for such filing. Many reports of audits since 2008 have yet to be published by UConn, published by the SOTS, or filed with the SEEC. Also in practice these are not independent reports. The UConn Voter Center is dependent on the SOTS for its budget and in practice draft reports are reviewed by the SOTS Office and revised by UConn before they are accepted.
  • It continues the ambiguous language that candidates can use evidence from the audit to challenge an election in court until seven days after the audit is complete, yet provides no definition of completion of the audit. It would seem that an audit is not complete until a report is filled and published by the SEEC. If so, given history, candidates could challenge an election for years after. See Sec. 4 Section 9-323 (page 11) and Sec. 5. Section 9-324 (page 13) and Sec. 6. Section 9-328 (page 15) or Sec. 7. Subsection (a) of section 9-29a (page 16).
  • It requires that presidential electors, all statewide offices including one U.S. Senator, a randomly chosen Congressional race, and 5% of General Assembly offices be audited in even years. Precluding audits of any other offices in even years, such as Judge of Probate and Registrar of voters from any audit.
  • It continues the current flaw in the law that exempts questions from audit. I wonder if anyone would have any concerns if the Early Voting or No-Excuse Absentee Voting questions were to pass or fail by small margins? Would those be concerns be magnified realizing they were exempt from the audit?
  • Recanvassed races (CT’s hand and machine recounts) are included in the RLAs. General Assembly races that have been recanvassed are automatically included in the 5% that are subject to RLA. I wonder if they realize that such races, since they are close, will often end in a complete hand recount? If the intent is to hand-recount all such races, why not do the hand recount instead of the recanvass?
  • The timing of ballot manifest creation seems to be part of the process of the initial close of the polls on election night and is specified as open to the public – an improvement over the original bill. However, other laws allow counting to be interrupted and completed within 48 hours, without any public notice requirements for the date, time and location of where counting will resume.
  • While the non-binding Fiscal Note and OLR Analysis added below the bill seems to indicate that UConn will be part of conducting the audit, the bill mirrors the requirements of the existing 5% audit, where the SOTS creates the procedures for the RLA, the Registrars conduct the RLA submitting results to UConn, who submits a report to the SOTS.
    • It is hard to imagine the Registrars (two independent D and R election officials in each of 169 towns) coordinating a state wide RLA, including escalation, and results without some body coordinating the state wide calculations, decision making, and declaring the final result.
    • It seems the Registrars determine if the audit meets the risk limit or not and then based on that the SOTS shall order a manual recount. See Section 1 (e).

Perhaps some of these concerns can be cured/overridden by procedures issued by the SOTS. See Section 1 (d). However one should question if the SOTS can write binding procedures, opinions, or declarations which contradict the text of state law.

Testimony on two election bills. One poorly written, the other needing more.

Yesterday I submitted testimony on two bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee. Unfortunately I was unable to testify in person. It was not for a lack of trying. I had submitted testimony and signed up for the hearing two days in advance, yet only one of my two testimonies was posted in time for the hearing and neither I nor the committee staff could get me the link to testify. Its happened before this year and last, yet only for this committee – in the past the staff was able to correct the problems. In one case not much was lost except to my reputation as the committee still called may name when I was supposed to testify.

S.B.472 Would change our existing 5% audit, adding risk-limiting audits. Unfortunately it is a highly flawed bill. I submitted the most detailed testimony, articulating its many flaws new and existing. Fortunately the testimony, so far, us unanimously against the current bill, with more on the way. Overall no harm done that I could not speak. It would seem that its is very unlikely to move forward this year.

H.J.114 The Constitutional Amendment to provide for no-excuse absentee voting. In this case, not being able to testify in person and my testimony not being up hurt. I am likely the only person speaking and submitting testimony asking that the bill remove another unfortunate restriction in the Constitution that will bite us along the way with absentee voting and/or ranked choice voting. Of course we can wait and learn our lesson the hard way.

Yesterday I submitted testimony on two bills before the GAE (General Administration and Elections Committee.) Unfortunately I was unable to testify in person. It was not for a lack of trying. I had submitted testimony and signed up for the hearing two days in advance, yet only one of my two testimonies was posted in time for the hearing and neither I nor the committee staff could get me the link to testify. Its happened before this year and last, yet only for this committee –  in the past the staff was able to correct the problems. In one case not much was lost except to my reputation as the committee still called may name when I was supposed to testify.

S.B.472 Would change our existing 5% audit, adding risk-limiting audits. Unfortunately it is a highly flawed bill. I submitted the most detailed testimony, articulating its many flaws new and existing. Fortunately the testimony, so far, us unanimously against the current bill, with more on the way. Here is the testimony so far: <read>. Overall no harm done that I could not speak. It would seem that its is very unlikely to move forward this year.

H.J.114 The Constitutional Amendment to provide for no-excuse absentee voting. In this case, not being able to testify in person and my testimony not being up hurt. I am likely the only person speaking and submitting testimony asking that the bill remove another unfortunate restriction in the Constitution that will bite us along the way with absentee voting and/or ranked choice voting. Of course we can wait and learn our lesson the hard way. Here is all the testimony so far, now including mine: <read>

I thank all the nationally recognized experts in Risk Limiting Audits and advocates from around the country who testified in person and submitted testimony.

Also a shout out to Chris Prue and ROVAC for catching a civil rights issue that we opposed last year and was a section of another bill being heard this yesterday, the testimony by Chris Prue: <Video 4:04 in>

A provision of the Freedom to Vote Act reduces credibility, defying common sense

There is a lot that needs to be improved in our elections. The current bill before Senate and House, the Freedom to Vote Act, is well intended yet in at least one provision it actually makes elections less secure, less likely to provide public confidence. This is a change from previous bills H.R.1 and all version of S.1.

This new provision would prevent observers from within eight feet of ballots until after certification. That would make it impossible for observers to actually see that votes were counted and totaled accurately in audits and recounts (recanvasses in CT).

There is a lot that needs to be improved in our elections. The current bill before Senate and House, the Freedom to Vote Act, is well intended yet in at least one provision it actually makes elections less secure, less likely to provide public confidence. This is a change from previous bills H.R.1 and all version of S.1.

This new provision would prevent observers from within eight feet of ballots until after certification. That would make it impossible for observers to actually see that votes were counted and totaled accurately in audits and recounts (recanvasses in CT).

From page 298:

‘‘(1) I N GENERAL.—A person who is serving as a poll observer with respect to an election for Federal office may not come within 8 feet of
‘‘(A) a voter or ballot at a polling location
during any period of voting (including any period of early voting) in such election; or
‘‘(B) a ballot at any time during which the processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, or certifying voting results is occurring.

Like other provisions it is well intended but has unintended consequences. Observers need to be closer to observe ballots being adjudicated, votes determined and counted. Without public verifiability, justified confidence in elections is not possible.  We have covered the details of this before in our editorial series: Common Sense, specifically Justified Confidence and Public Transparency and Verifiability.