January, 2017 | CTVotersCount.org

Trick n Tweet: The Age of the Unsound Bite

I was going to write a post discussing the allegations of “widespread illegal immigrant voter fraud”. Yet, voter fraud is not the problem; Russian hacking is not the problem; Immigrants are not the problem; How many attended the inauguration is not the issue.

The problem is that, like Three Card Monte, the controversy takes our our attention off the real issues.

I was going to write a post discussing the allegations of “widespread illegal immigrant voter fraud” which have been widely debunked e.g. <here> <here> <here>. (Basically there is no proof, no anecdotal evidence, and every credible investigation has come up empty looking significant outsider fraud, other than absentee voting fraud). And maybe also cover the lack of evidence for Russian hacking of our election <here>.

Yet, voter fraud is not the problem; Russian hacking is not the problem; Immigrants are not the problem; How many attended the inauguration is not the issue.

The problem is that, like Three Card Monte, the controversy takes our our attention off the real issues, takes our attention off actual analysis, and takes our attention off policies actually being implemented. We should be concerned that congress is baring the OMB from analyzing the financial impact of ending or replacing Obamacare; Concerned that education has been altered, science is being suppressed, and will be altered without expertise, analysis, and debate. Concerned that defense spending is out of control, wasteful, ineffective, and unaccounted, no matter ones views on foreign policy. Concerned as Naomi Kline is that we may be heading steadily toward Disaster Capitalism.

The problems for voting are the real risks of our vulnerable voting systems; the risks from insider manipulation; the disaster that is our voter registration systems; the inequality in our state by state voting systems; and the lack of actual evidence that our elections were correctly or incorrectly decided. And ignoring the low costs of actually strengthening our systems and preforming effective audits to demonstrate or refute the reported results.

Evidence-Based Elections

We favor “Evidence Based Elections”. We recently reread this 2012 paper by Phil Stark and David Wagner, Evidence-Based Elections

It covers at a high level the requirements to provide the public and losing candidates the evidence necessary to convince that its very likely the candidate favored by the voters actually was declared the winner of an election (or determining, if possible, the winner).

Compared to all the states in the Union, Connecticut would rank slightly above average, yet far from approaching credible evidence-based elections. We have paper ballots, inadequate post-election audits, close-vote recanvasses, no compliance audits, and atrociously weak ballot security. This is a case where a rating/ranking should be the result of multiplying the factors, rather than adding them:

Paper Ballots(1.0) x Post-Election Audits(0.3) x Self-Correcting(0.4) x Compliance(0) = 0

We favor “Evidence Based Elections”. We recently reread this 2012 paper by Phil Stark and David Wagner, Evidence-Based Elections <read>

Paper ballots (To date there is no other viable voter-verified record).
Software Independent Voting Systems – the whole system, computer, human etc. can produce an accurate result (independently) even if the computer and software systems are in error.
Compliance Audits – that the election was conducted as intended. e.g. we can trust the paper ballots and the check-in records.
Risk-Limiting Audits – that demonstrate that there is a certain chance that if a contest was wrongly decided, the audit would have detected that. e.g. 90% or 95%.
(A 95% detection risk does not mean that there is a 5% chance that the election was wrongly decided. Only that if there was error or fraud 19 times out of 20 if would be detected e.g. if there was a 95% chance a person would be caught each time they used a cell phone while driving, few would risk it.)
The overall election and canvass process should correct its own errors.

Finally, the authors point to the limitations of certification and testing of election equipment and the advantages of easing the constraints of setting unrealistic expectations for certification requirements.

Sadly, no state has full risk-limiting audits. Only about half have audits at all. Few have compliance audits. About half have close-vote recounts, which provide self-correction when the initially reported results are close.

Compared to all the states in the Union, Connecticut would rank slightly above average, yet far from approaching credible evidence-based elections. We have paper ballots, inadequate post-election audits, close-vote recanvasses, no compliance audits, and atrociously weak ballot security. This is a case where rating/ranking should be the result of multiplying the factors, rather than adding them:

Paper Ballots(1) x Post-Election Audits(0.3) x Self-Correcting(0.4) x Compliance(0) = 0

Secretary of the State Ignores Post-Election Audits as Key in Elections

What can we learn from the press release and calendar?

Elections Officials and the Secretary of the State’s Office work all year. In many towns the jobs are low pay and part time, yet the schedule is year-round and relentless. There are only a few periods when officials can take turns taking vacations attending to personal matters, like medical procedures. Occasionally the job is viewed as cushy, partisan, and thankless.
The Secretary of the State apparently considers post-election audits as not important enough to be included in the schedule.

The Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, has released the Election Calendar for the 2017 Municipal Elections in this press release <read> and calendar <read>

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill announced key dates for 2017 elections. The schedule comprises dates for placement of candidates on the ballot, filing deadlines, availability of absentee ballots as well as timetables for primaries and the general election, among others.
Secretary Merrill, Connecticut’s chief elections official, said, “Local races can be among the most important in terms of direct impact on voters’ lives. Major decisions are made by mayors, town councils and other local legislative bodies…”

What can we learn from the press release and calendar?

Elections Officials and the Secretary of the State’s Office work all year. In many towns the jobs are low pay and part time, yet the schedule is year-round and relentless. There are only a few periods when officials can take turns taking vacations attending to personal matters, like medical procedures. Occasionally the job is viewed as cushy, partisan, and thankless.
The Secretary of the State apparently considers post-election audits as not important enough to be included in the schedule.

In our view, the schedule should include a date for the post-election audit random drawing and dates for the beginning and the end of the post-election audit. Then, officials across the State can plan ahead. Knowing the date for the random drawing, they could know with certainty if they have been selected for the audit or not; knowing the beginning and end of they audit, they can plan a date for a potential audit long in advance, leaving them free to schedule vacations or personal matters for other days.

Will good help be available from Homeland Security, and will Connecticut ask for it?

The Department of Homeland Security has designated Election Infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure. We ask three questions. We would like to see evaluations in Connecticut.

We emphasize the ‘see’ as secret evaluations would do little to provide the public assurance, and likely as not, would be available one way or another to those bent on using them to exploit weaknesses in the system.

The Department of Homeland Security has designated Election Infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure: <read>

By “election infrastructure,” we mean storage facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, and information and communications technology to include voter registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments…

Prior to reaching this determination, my staff and I consulted many state and local election officials; I am aware that many of them are opposed to this designation. It is important to stress what this designation does and does not mean. This designation does not mean a federal takeover, regulation, oversight or intrusion concerning elections in this country. This designation does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.

The designation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure subsector does mean that election infrastructure becomes a priority within the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. It also enables this Department to prioritize our cybersecurity assistance to state and local election officials, but only for those who request it. Further, the designation makes clear both domestically and internationally that election infrastructure enjoys all the benefits and protections of critical infrastructure that the U.S. government has to offer. Finally, a designation makes it easier for the federal government to have full and frank discussions with key stakeholders regarding sensitive vulnerability information.

We ask four questions:

Will the program continue in the Trump Administration? Many Republicans are skeptical of any Federal program and currently doubting foreign interference in our elections,
Will the program actually be meaningful? It could fail by being a whitewash or by being to critical.
Will Connecticut Municipalities and the Secretary of the State ask for reviews?
Will we ever know? Its results might be withheld from the public for reasons of security?

We would like to see such evaluation(s), statewide and locally:

An evaluation statewide of our election programming, memory card protocols, tabulator protocols, voter registration database, vote totalling, post-election audits, and recanvass procedures – not just the laws and procedures, but also their actual implementation.
An evaluation municipality by municipality of ballot and tabulator security.

Video: The Story of the Attempted Presidential Election Audit

Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election

Also, I’m not sure that we at the University of Michigan could hack into all the paper ballots across multiple states sufficient to change the Presidential election. But I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security course could have changed the outcome of the Presidential election this year. It really is that bad, – Alex Halderman

Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election <video>

Alex Halderman and Matt Bernhard discuss the recount efforts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In answer to the first question, about 50min in to the presentation:

Also, I’m not sure that we at the University of Michigan could hack into all the paper ballots across multiple states sufficient to change the Presidential election. But I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security course could have changed the outcome of the Presidential election this year. It really is that bad, – Alex Halderman

The sound varies through the hour long video, yet you will get an interesting and unique inside view of the efforts of citizens and scientists. Including fascinating insights into their discussions with the Clinton, and later the Stein campaigns.