2019 | CTVotersCount.org

How Dumb Do They Think We Are?

Or are they dumber than we think?

No matter what you think about early voting, we find one argument by Senator Looney and Senator Flexer in a recent editorial completely irrelevant and misleading.

Or are they dumber than we think?

No matter what you think about early voting, we find one argument by Senator Looney and Senator Flexer in a recent editorial completely irrelevant and misleading: Senate Republicans should have supported early voting <read>

Our Republican colleagues in the Connecticut Senate, as well as Republicans nationally, often cite potential fraud as a reason not to enact early voting. However, the facts around voter fraud are simply not on their side. In 2014,the Washington Post published a comprehensive study that found 31 credible instances of impersonation fraud from 2000 to 2014. Even an analysis conducted by the National Republican Lawyers Association —a national organization of Republican lawyers —found only 332 alleged cases of voter fraud nationwide from 1997 through 2011. This is out of hundreds of millions of ballots cast.

What they have said is true, there is little if any votER fraud. Yet that point is irrelevant to the issue.

The problem is that their is plenty of votING fraud especially by Absentee Ballot, and right here in Connecticut. The problem is not the voters it is campaign and official insiders putting their fingers on the scale, RIGHT HERE IN CONNECTICUT, regularly. <e.g. here>

Editorial
We should expect more from the leader of the Senate and the Chair of the elections committee. They should know more, run their editorials past people that know more, and not try and pull the wool over our eyes. We should be able to rely on their words.

Beware: The Gospel of Internet Voting

LA Times article features the entrepreneur behind Internet voting pilots vs. Science: The vote-by-phone tech trend is scaring the life out of security experts <read>

With their playbook for pushing government boundaries as a guide, some Silicon Valley investors are nudging election officials toward an innovation that prominent coders and cryptographers warn is downright dangerous for democracy…
As seasoned disruptors of the status quo, tech pioneers have proven persuasive in selling the idea, even as the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine specifically warn against any such experiment…

Tusk is certain participation in elections would surge if the technology were widely permitted, even though studies in some of the few places around the world that have tried the method revealed no big turnout boost

Crusade, Gospel, Genie seem appropriate to describe entrepreneur Tusk. Its a blind disregard for evidence, science, and the scientists, including yours truly, warning of the risks of Internet voting

LA Times article features the entrepreneur behind Internet voting pilots vs. Science: The vote-by-phone tech trend is scaring the life out of security experts <read>

With their playbook for pushing government boundaries as a guide, some Silicon Valley investors are nudging election officials toward an innovation that prominent coders and cryptographers warn is downright dangerous for democracy…
As seasoned disruptors of the status quo, tech pioneers have proven persuasive in selling the idea, even as the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine specifically warn against any such experiment.
The fight over mobile voting pits technologists who warn about the risks of entrusting voting to apps and cellphones against others who see internet voting as the only hope for getting most Americans to consistently participate on election day…
Bradley Tusk is using the same tactics in this personal crusade that he used to advance tech startups. He has bet a significant share of the fortune he built off his equity stake in Uber that the gospel of mobile voting will spread so fast that most Americans will have the option of casting their ballots for president by phone as soon as 2028.
He has already persuaded the state of West Virginia and the City of Denver to start tinkering with voting by phone, and hopes to move quickly from there.
“What we learned at Uber is once the genie is out of the bottle, it can’t be put it back in,”…
Tusk is certain participation in elections would surge if the technology were widely permitted, even though studies in some of the few places around the world that have tried the method revealed no big turnout boost

Crusade, Gospel, Genie seem appropriate to describe Tusk. It is a blind disregard for evidence, science, and the scientists, including yours truly, warning of Internet voting:

The entrepreneur frames the fight as one pitting reformers against special interests invested in a low turnout that makes lawmakers unaccountable and easy to corrupt. He talks of the security concerns as if they are a sideshow. Sure, the scholars raising them are earnest, he said, but their approach to the challenge bewilders him. He likens them to people whose only solution to making a swimming pool safer is to fill it with concrete.That prospect alarms some of the nation’s most prominent election-security thinkers, who see in Tusk a formidable adversary with an intimidating public relations tool kit. They say he and other promoters for the projects are misleading election officials about how secure the systems are.
“There is wide agreement among computer security experts that this is problematic,” said David Dill, a professor emeritus in computer science at Stanford. “It disturbs me that officials are getting enthusiastic about this voting technology without talking to the people who have the expertise to evaluate its security.”
The National Academies report warns that the risks of this and other forms of internet voting are “more significant than the benefits.”

Read the full article for more details behind Tusk’s quest and the warnings from scientists.

The Case Against Trusting Democracy to BMDs

Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) are under consideration by several states for use for all in-person voting. They have paper ballots, “What could possibly go wrong?”. A recent paper makes the case that they cannot be audited or trusted to provide accurate results. The paper recommends that they should be limited to use by voters that need accessibility: Ballot-marking devices (BMDs) cannot assure the will of the voters

not only is it inappropriate to rely on voters to check whether BMDs alter expressed votes, it doesn’t work.

Yet, this paper has been very controversial in election integrity circles. Advocates for those with disabilities argue that everyone should vote the same way on the same equipment, because that is what is needed to provide equality, to incentivize and cause better BMDs that meet everyone’s needs including those for evidence based elections.

..paper ballots provide no assurance unless they accurately record the vote as the voter expresses it. Voters can express their intent by hand-marking a ballot with a pen, or using a computer called a ballot-marking device (BMD),which generally has a touchscreen and assistive interfaces. Voters can make mistakes in expressing their intent in either technology, but only the BMD is also subject to systematic error from computer hacking or bugs in the process of recording the vote on paper, after the voter has expressed it. A hacked BMD can print a vote on the paper ballot that differs from what the voter expressed, or can omit a vote that the voter expressed…

Research shows that most voters do not review paper ballots printed by BMDs, even when clearly instructed to check for errors. Furthermore,most voters who do review their ballots do not check carefully enough to notice errors that would change how their votes were counted…There is no action that a voter can take to demonstrate to election officials that a BMD altered their expressed votes, and thus no way voters can help deter, detect, contain, and correct computer hacking in elections. That is, not only is it inappropriate to rely on voters to check whether BMDs alter expressed votes, it doesn’t work.

The entire paper is readable and makes a complete case for its conclusions.

Simply stated Georgia, Pennsylvania, and other states seeking accurate, credible elections need paper ballots, sufficient post-election audits, ballot protection, and Voter-Marked Paper Ballots. BMDs are insufficient and cost several times more.

Editorial

We completely agree with the paper’s conclusions. Overall there is nothing new here, except an extensive review and clarification of older and recent work.

We are sympathetic to the needs of those with disabilities. We need better interfaces and BMDs to serve them better. Yet, spending triple on inadequate equipment is not the path forward.

As long as we have absentee voting, we will have voter marked paper ballots, as long as BMDs use multiple interfaces, all voters will not vote the same way.

Better that money and effort be spent on research and innovation, than on excessive purchases of inadequate equipment. Where is the incentive for vendors to innovate when election officials can be, all but, mandated to buy the inadequate equipment on the market? The only incentive would be for multiple rounds of modestly better BMDs followed by multiple rounds of expensive replacements.

Robert Mueller Showed How U.S. Elections Broke in 2016. Here’s How to Fix Them

Quite inclusive article from TIME: Robert Mueller Showed How U.S. Elections Broke in 2016. Here’s How to Fix Them <read>

Here’s what experts say would strengthen American elections against future attacks.

I fully agree, except possibly with one item on the list.

A pretty inclusive article from TIME: Robert Mueller Showed How U.S. Elections Broke in 2016. Here’s How to Fix Them <read>

Over a nearly two-year investigation, Special Counsel Robert Mueller has shown the sheer breadth of the Russian effort to meddle in the 2016 election.

From hacking into campaign email systems to using social media to stir up voters, the Russian effort hit at a number of soft spots in the American electoral system.

Experts say Russia didn’t stop there either, using similar strategies to attempt to influence the 2018 elections, and, they expect, the 2020 elections as well. They also warn that Iran and China may be mulling similar influence operations too.

Here’s what experts say would strengthen American elections against future attacks.

Use paper ballots
Secure online voter rolls
Audit elections
Stop the spread of fake news
Make social media ad-buying more transparent
Improve technology policy

I fully agree, except possibly with “Stop the spread of fake news”, where the devil may be in the details. Any attempt to squash free speech may backfire.

An Election Bill Crib-Sheet

This year I submitted testimony on a total of twenty-three bills. Fortunately, many were easy for us to understand and quite redundant. The General Elections and Administration Committee passed a total of one-hundred and eighteen bills. To me, they should have been much more selective in choosing bills to hear and those to pass. Although most of my testimony opposed bills, some of it was followed by the Committee. We are pleased to support seven bills passed by the Committee and oppose eight.

Here is a crib-sheet to help in understanding critical election bills (Those with “*’ are those where we submitted testimony):

H.B.5417 Oppose – Task Force to study blockchain for the registration database. An over-hyped technology in search of an undefined problem.*

H.B.5816 Support – Eliminates the archaic inner absentee ballot envelope.

H.B.5817 Oppose – Will add work to checkers, increase staffing and lines. Unnecessary, and burdensome.*

H.B.5820 Oppose – Task Force to study Ranked Choice Voting (RCV). Study too limited, RCV incorrectly defined.*

H.B.6047 Support – Multi-color ballots for multi-district polling places.*

H.B.6063 Oppose – More than one ballot in inner envelope. Dangerous, prevents legally required tracking of absentee ballots an important check on double voting. Instead consider passing H.B.5816.*

H.B.6876 Support – No change for scanning documents by cellphone etc. Current charge is exorbitant.*

H.B.7160 Oppose – One of several poor to harmful Election Day Registration Bills Instead, pass S.B.1049.

H.B.7321 Support – Increases voting security and audits.

H.B.7383 Support – Strengthens Freedom of Information for database data.

S.B.156 Oppose – Absentee ballot requests w/o signature. Signatures have helped catch frequent fraud in Connecticut.*

S.B.265 Oppose – Reducing Moderator Certification. We need more training, not less. Watch the meetings of the Commission on Contested Elections on CT-N for examples of insufficient training.*

S.B.1036 Support – Study regionalization of election administration.

S.B.1046 Oppose – Election Day Registration in polling places. Makes the current civil-rights violation worse without solving problems. Instead, pass S.B.1049.*

S.B.1049 Support – By far the best Election Day Registration bill. Removes arduous cross-check, and eliminates civil-rights violation.*

As we have said before, we aim for a balance between voting integrity, serving voters, and costs, in that priority order.

Book Review: Bad Blood, Fantasyland, (and Blockchains)

I recently read Bad Blood by John Carreyrou. I could not put it down. Not surprising since it has been on the NYTimes best seller list for months and its the only book I have noticed on Amazon with a full five star rating – with currently just over two-thousand reviews. But for me it was more than that. It brought back memories of a good portion of my career in the eighties and nineties, along with my last fifteen years concerned with electronic voting.

All reminiscent of Kurt Andersen’s book: Fantasyland: How America Went Haywire: A 500-Year History. To me, just like the California Gold Rush, minus the gold.

It details the creation, life, and death of Silicon Valley startup Theranos. Theranos was started by Stamford drop-out Elizabeth Holmes. She had an idea for a blood test that would take only a drop of blood and quickly provide an analysis that conventionally took much more blood and much more time. It was a great idea, yet science said it was impossible and she never was able to develop a solution. What she did develop was a large following of famous board members a huge kitty of venture capitol, two large losing customers. A large, harmful group-delusion. Along the way she created a phony test that likely killed people. All reminiscent of Kurt Andersen’s book: Fantasyland: How America Went Haywire: A 500-Year History. To me, just like the California Gold Rush, minus the gold.

The read brought back memories. As I said earlier this year in testimony on a bill in the Connecticut General Assembly to propose a Task Force to study blockchains to solve an undefined problem with our voter registration system:

I have a 35-year career building, evaluating, purchasing and implementing computer systems and new technology.For 9of those years I was a Director of Strategic Planning for the Travelers Computer Science Division and for 8 years worked for two start-ups, designing, developing, and marketing data communications software to large enterprises and government agencies.I keep up with election technology and security issues, daily exchanging ideas with nationally recognized experts in computer science and computer security.

This is bill represents a classic mistake – a “hot” technology solution in search of an undefined problem. This proposal defines no problem and limits the solution to one over-hyped technology. Better to have the problem clearly defined and then solicit proposals to solve the problem – solutions technical and otherwise.

The way to solve problems is to define the problem, create a team of experts on the subject matter, with technical problem solvers, and experts who have solved similar problems for other states and nations – then let them brainstorm, evaluate and propose effective solutions.

If there is a problem to be solved, it is likely there is a solution – if so, it almost certainly does not depend on blockchains, and likely does not need any “hot” technology.

The amazing thing is people, smart people, keep falling for the same old things. As Carreyrou points out many smart people hired by Theranos had questions from the start. Many quit along the way. Some paid a high price for exposing the company, others dared not take the risk. At least initially Holmes was likely deluded herself.

I worked for a similar, much smaller, startup in 1997. A product that hardly worked – likely all but impossible to create – impossible with the minimal skills of those developing it. I had some doubts the day I walked in the door – I was an expert in the problem and its value, yet I said “maybe they know something I don’t.” I needed a job. Most, if not all of the rest of the fifty or so employees were not so knowledgeable. The founder was as he described it a “serial entrepreneur”. His actual M.O. was taking venture capitol, failing, and saying in the ashes he had discovered a better idea and attracted more venture capitol. I left after eleven sad, ridiculous months. Sad because so many in the company were hurt – fortunately no customers lost much. The boss, said lack of sales was our fault as we needed to find more sophisticated customers who would appreciate the value of our cumbersome product.

Believe me Blockchains are another over-hyped technology with little if any value. Scientists I trust say that <read>. I have studied it enough to agree with them. And based on all my experience the hype smells just like many things I have seen before. The bill is still alive in the General Assembly, lets hope it dies or at least the Task Force sees through the hype.

Its all the same as that Theranos Bad Blood. Just another journey in Fantasyland. Both good reads and cautionary tales.

National Academy of Sciences study: Blockchain may make voting more vulnerable

While the General Assembly contemplates how Blockchain might solve some undefined problem in our voter registration system, we point to a National Academy of Sciences study Securing the Vote, Protecting American Democracy:

The blockchain abstraction, once implemented, provides added points of attack for malicious actors…Furthermore, blockchain protocols generally yield results that are a consensus of the miners/stakeholders. This consensus may not represent the consensus of the voting public. Miners/stakeholders with sufficient power might also cause confusion and uncertainty about the state of a blockchain by raising doubts about whether a consensus has been reached.

While the General Assembly contemplates how Blockchain might solve some undefined problem in our voter registration system, we point to a National Academy of Sciences study Securing the Vote, Protecting American Democracy <view> starting on page 103:

While the notion of using a blockchain as an immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology does little to solve the fundamental security issues of elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional security vulnerabilities. In particular, if malware on a voter’s device alters a vote before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know of the alteration. Blockchains are decentralized, but elections are inherently centralized. Although blockchains can be effective for decentralized applications, public elections are inherently centralized—requiring election administrators define the contents of ballots, identify the list of eligible voters, and establish the duration of voting…

As they point out lists of eligible voters is also a central function, subject to the same limitations to “to solve the fundamental security of elections.

While it is true that blockchains offer observability and immutability, in a centralized election scenario, observability and immutability maybe achieved more simply by other means. Election officials need only, for example, post digitally signed versions of relevant election-related reports for public observation and download. Ballots stored on a blockchain are electronic. While paper ballots are directly verifiable by voters, electronic ballots (i.e., ballots on a blockchain)
can be more difficult to verify. Software is required to examine postings on blockchain. If such software is corrupted, then verifiability may be illusory. Software independence is not, therefore, achieved through posting ballots on a blockchain…

The blockchain abstraction, once implemented, provides added points of attack for malicious actors…Furthermore, blockchain protocols generally yield results that are a consensus of the miners/stakeholders. This consensus may not represent the consensus of the voting public. Miners/stakeholders with sufficient power might also cause confusion and uncertainty about the state of a blockchain by raising doubts about whether a consensus has been reached…

Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to them. In the particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary authorization. Blockchains do not provide ballot secrecy.

Five pieces of testimony on six mostly ridiculous bills

Yesterday the GAE Committee is hearing testimony on another raft if bills. I spoke on four pieces of testimony on five bills. What brings them together is that they are all but ridiculous and unworkable given existing tried and true election law.

I was not going to testify orally on H.B.7392 as I thought it was so outrageous that everyone would testify against it. Apparently not. Many believe it was just like last year’s bills. It is much worse. In his testimony, Michael Brandi from the State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC) saw the same problems I saw – it precludes anyone but the Secretary of the State, Registrars and political operatives from seeing voter registration records, not even the SEEC or polling place officials, let alone voter integrity groups. Not surprisingly the media is getting it wrong too (E.g.), since most of the testimony has yet to be posted by the Committee.

The bills, and links to my testimony, The first four are the ones I covered orally in my three minutes. (Take a look at all the testimony <here>, best to look by bill number than by date)

H.B.6063 A well-intended bill that would be a disaster for tracing absentee ballots and voting integrity.

S.B.268 and H.B. 6048 Inconsistent with EDR Law and A Wasteful Unfunded Mandate aimed at solving the mythical all but non-existent problem of votER fraud. Would all but kill EDR.

H.B.7160 Well-intended, but would provide for volunteer student election officials as young as 13. Would they actually be held to account for following the law? On the other hand, includes the best EDR provisions yet!

H.B.7392 At best a poor public policy idea undermining confidence in our elections and democracy.

S.J.14 Yet another constitutional amendment for absentee voting.

Three pieces of testimony on six bills

On Wednesday the GAE Committee held testimony on another raft if bills. I was out of town but submitted testimony on several bills.

The bills, and links to my testimony, in priority order: (Take a look at all the testimony <here>, best to look by bill number than date)

H.R.161 and S.J.27 A good and a not-so-good bill on Early Voting

S.B.1046, S.B.1049, and H.B.6059 One good and a couple of not-so-good Election Day Registration bills. In addition to those previously heard.

S.B.1050 A slightly improved Rank Choice Voting Task Force bill.

On Wednesday the GAE Committee held testimony on another raft if bills. I was out of town but submitted testimony on several bills.

The bills, and links to my testimony, in priority order: (Take a look at all the testimony <here>, best to look by bill number than date)

H.R.161 and S.J.27 A good and a not-so-good bill on Early Voting

S.B.1046, S.B.1049, and H.B.6059 One good and a couple of not-so-good Election Day Registration bills. In addition to those previously heard.

S.B.1050 A slightly improved Rank Choice Voting Task Force bill.

Four pieces of testimony on five bills, including Blockchain and RCV

On Wednesday the GAE Committee held testimony on another raft if bills.

The bills, and links to my testimony, in priority order: (Take a look at all the testimony <here>, best to look by bill number than date)

On Wednesday the GAE Committee held testimony on another raft if bills.

The bills, and links to my testimony, in priority order: (Take a look at all the testimony <here>, best to look by bill number than date)

H.B.5417 A proposed study to use blockchain to solve some undefined problem in voter registration. I opposed, perhaps the only one in the room who is a computer scientist. In summary, if someone wants to sell you or asks you to invest in blockchain – Run. Run fast and keep your eye on your wallet and passwords! In addition to my own testimony on how to solve problems (i.e. define the problem then look at all cures), I provided an article by a true expert.

H.B.5820 A proposed study to evaluate Ranked Choice Voting. I opposed unless the bill is corrected and the study is broadened. I provided a laundry list of items that should be considered by a Task Force.

S.B.156 and S.B.195 Two proposals to no linger require signatures on absentee ballot applications. Opposed based on Connecticut’s history of absentee ballot votING fraud, by political operatives and insiders. Those signatures are a key component of proving fraud.

H.B.6876 To cut the onerous cost of scanning public records by cell phones and other meetings. Supported, along with every other person supporting Freedom of Information. Opposed by officials who gain revenue from the fees. copying a single document costs $20.