Author: Luther Weeks

Secretary of the State Ignores Post-Election Audits as Key in Elections

What can we learn from the press release and calendar?

  • Elections Officials and the Secretary of the State’s Office work all year. In many towns the jobs are low pay and part time, yet the schedule is year-round and relentless.  There are only a few periods when officials can take turns taking vacations attending to personal matters, like medical procedures. Occasionally the job is viewed as cushy, partisan, and thankless.
  • The Secretary of the State apparently considers post-election audits as not important enough to be included in the schedule.

The Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, has released the Election Calendar for the 2017 Municipal Elections in this press release <read> and calendar <read>

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill announced key dates for 2017 elections. The schedule comprises dates for placement of candidates on the ballot, filing deadlines, availability of absentee ballots as well as timetables for primaries and the general election, among others.
Secretary Merrill, Connecticut’s chief elections official, said, “Local races can be among the most important in terms of direct impact on voters’ lives. Major decisions are made by mayors, town councils and other local legislative bodies…”

What can we learn from the press release and calendar?

  • Elections Officials and the Secretary of the State’s Office work all year. In many towns the jobs are low pay and part time, yet the schedule is year-round and relentless.  There are only a few periods when officials can take turns taking vacations attending to personal matters, like medical procedures. Occasionally the job is viewed as cushy, partisan, and thankless.
  • The Secretary of the State apparently considers post-election audits as not important enough to be included in the schedule.

In our view, the schedule should include a date for the post-election audit random drawing and dates for the beginning and the end of the post-election audit.  Then, officials across the State can plan ahead.  Knowing the date for the random drawing, they could know with certainty if they have been selected for the audit or not; knowing the beginning and end of they audit, they can plan a date for a potential audit long in advance, leaving them free to schedule vacations or personal matters for other days.

Will good help be available from Homeland Security, and will Connecticut ask for it?

The Department of Homeland Security has designated Election Infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure. We ask three questions.  We would like to see evaluations in Connecticut.

We emphasize the ‘see’ as secret evaluations would do little to provide the public assurance, and likely as not, would be available one way or another to those bent on using them to exploit weaknesses in the system.

The Department of Homeland Security has designated Election Infrastructure as Critical Infrastructure: <read>

By “election infrastructure,” we mean storage facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process, and information and communications technology to include voter registration databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage the election process and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments…

Prior to reaching this determination, my staff and I consulted many state and local election officials; I am aware that many of them are opposed to this designation.  It is important to stress what this designation does and does not mean.  This designation does not mean a federal takeover, regulation, oversight or intrusion concerning elections in this country.  This designation does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.

The designation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure subsector does mean that election infrastructure becomes a priority within the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. It also enables this Department to prioritize our cybersecurity assistance to state and local election officials, but only for those who request it.  Further, the designation makes clear both domestically and internationally that election infrastructure enjoys all the benefits and protections of critical infrastructure that the U.S. government has to offer. Finally, a designation makes it easier for the federal government to have full and frank discussions with key stakeholders regarding sensitive vulnerability information.

We ask four questions:

  • Will the program continue in the Trump Administration? Many Republicans are skeptical of any Federal program and currently doubting foreign interference in our elections,
  • Will the program actually be meaningful? It could fail by being a whitewash or by being to critical.
  • Will Connecticut Municipalities and the Secretary of the State ask for reviews?
  • Will we ever know?  Its results might be withheld from the public for reasons of security?

We would like to see such evaluation(s), statewide and locally:

  • An evaluation statewide of our election programming, memory card protocols, tabulator protocols, voter registration database, vote totalling, post-election audits, and recanvass procedures – not just the laws and procedures, but also their actual implementation.
  • An evaluation municipality by municipality of ballot and tabulator security.

We emphasize the ‘see’ as secret evaluations would do little to provide the public assurance, and likely as not, would be available one way or another to those bent on using them to exploit weaknesses in the system.

Video: The Story of the Attempted Presidential Election Audit

Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election

Also, I’m not sure that we at the University of Michigan could hack into all the paper ballots across multiple states sufficient to change the Presidential election. But I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security course could have changed the outcome of the Presidential election this year. It really is that bad, – Alex Halderman

Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election <video>

Alex Halderman and Matt Bernhard discuss the recount efforts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In answer to the first question, about 50min in to the presentation:

Also, I’m not sure that we at the University of Michigan could hack into all the paper ballots across multiple states sufficient to change the Presidential election. But I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security course could have changed the outcome of the Presidential election this year. It really is that bad, – Alex Halderman

The sound varies through the hour long video, yet you will get an interesting and unique inside view of the efforts of citizens and scientists. Including fascinating insights into their discussions with the Clinton, and later the Stein campaigns.

Connecticut pre-election voting machine testing now less reliable

Over the the last few weeks, we have learned that in the November Election, registrars have substituted a less effective form of pre-election testing that is less likely to catch errors in ballots or election equipment. There are at least two problems

Over the the last few weeks, we have learned that in the November Election, registrars have substituted a less effective form of pre-election testing that is less likely to catch errors in ballots or election equipment.

Pre-election testing in Connecticut used to involve feeding about twenty-five hand-voted test ballots of every type to be used by a scanner and checking the results.  In general, pre-election testing is not a panacea – it cannot test every case, cannot detect every possible error, and cannot prevent clever hacks for recognizing the difference between a test and a real election.  Yet, pre-election testing can detect many errors in ballot printing, memory card programming, or hardware problems.

For the November 2017 election, a new voting machine for those with disabilities was introduced statewide.  One of its features is printing a vote on a standard ballot that can be scanned along with other ballots. It would have been advisable to have several test ballots of every type voted using the two voting methods designed for those with disabilities, a touch screen and an interface for sight impaired.  That would be quite an undertaking.

Instead of a test of the user interface, officials used a special IVS test function which directly printed out test-ballots, bypassing the user interface.  Then they used those test ballots to test their acceptance and results on the AccuVote-OS scanners.  Sounds useful and helpful.  It is.  Yet, apparently, from our discussions that was the extent of testing or the majority of testing of the IVS and the AccuVote-OS in many towns.  There are at least two problems:

First, such a test does not completely test the IVS.  It certainly tests that the IVS understands the ballots, yet there is no guarantee that either of the interfaces would correctly display and record the votes for each candidate and contest on the ballot.  Perhaps, for instance it displays or says the wrong names for State or local offices, such as State Representative, Registrar, or Probate Judge.  It would still record the vote in a correct position on the ballot.

Second, such a test does not completely test the AccuVote-OS. The problem is that the IVS does not fill in the bubbles on the ballot in the way a voter is supposed to fill them in.  For each vote, the IVS makes a black square about twice as wide as the wide dimension of the oval. Those votes should certainly be counted by the AccuVote-OS. However, their being counted is no guarantee that a voters proper vote would be counted.  What if the location of the bubble was incorrectly programmed?  A transposition, an incorrect number etc. could cause some bubbles, especially partially filled in bubbles to not be counted by the AccuVote-OS, while all the IVS voted “bubbles” would be counted.

We did not do a formal survey.  We talked to several registrars and it seems they did little, if any, testing beyond the canned IVS test.

 

 

Lessons from the “recount”. What would have happened here?

The Nation, hopefully, learned some lessons about our existing “recounts” after the November Election.  We learned some disappointing lessons in three states.  We likely would have learned similar lessons in the other states that have recounts.  Remember that only about half the states have recounts at all.  What might we have learned about Connecticut’s recanvasses?

We recommend three articles and comment on Connecticut’s recanvasses.

Our best guess is that Connecticut would rank close to Pennsylvania.  Observed variations and poor recanvass procedures, with courts sooner or later. stopping or blocking the recanvass.

The Nation, hopefully, learned some lessons about our existing “recounts” after the November Election.  We learned some disappointing lessons in three states.  We likely would have learned similar lessons in the other states that have recounts.  Remember that only about half the states have recounts at all.  What might we have learned about Connecticut’s recanvasses?

We recommend three articles and comment on Connecticut’s recanvasses.

From the Washington Post: Jill Stein has done the nation a tremendous public service <read>

To start, we must recognize that what we saw in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania were recounts in name only. Though more than 161,000 people across the nation donated to the effort — and millions more demanded it with their voices — every imaginable financial, legal and political obstacle was thrown in the way of the recounts…

n an election tarnished by unreliable, insecure and unverifiable voting machines, ordinary Americans should at least be able to make sure their votes are counted, especially in states with razor-thin margins.

Beyond the obstacles to the recounts themselves were the irregularities and anomalies we uncovered while counting. The recounts did not confirm the integrity or security of our voting system; they revealed its vulnerability…

During the course of our representation, we consulted some of the world’s leading experts in computer science and cybersecurity. They all agreed on two fundamental points: First, much of our voting machinery is antiquated, faulty and highly vulnerable to breach; second, it would be irresponsible not to verify the accuracy of the vote to the greatest extent possible…

The campaign to verify the vote should be nonpartisan. Stein has done the nation a real service in demanding these recounts. By refusing to surrender in the face of significant resistance and criticism, she has exposed problems in our voting system and shown a way forward for reforms that will protect our democracy in a new age of vulnerability.

From the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Candice Hoke compares Pennsylvania to Ohio: Pennsylvania’s voting system is one of the worst <read>

State officials don’t know if our elections have been hacked, and they don’t seem to care

…Experts in election technology have pointed out that most Pennsylvania counties — including Allegheny — use e-voting systems that have been outlawed by most states. The chief reason? The omission of voter-approved paper printouts that can be recounted and that allow for audits to check on the accuracy of the electronic machines. Even when voting systems are aged and vulnerable to hacking or tampering, durable paper ballots combined with quality-assurance audits can ensure trustworthy results.

Cuyahoga County [Ohio]election officials, like many around the nation, have learned that, even though their voting machines are certified and function perfectly one day, on another day they may fail to count accurately. Software bugs — especially from updates, malware and errors in programming — can lead to unpredictable inaccuracies. Cuyahoga County now conducts an audit after every election, using paper ballots, which most Pennsylvania counties are unable to do.

Paper ballots plus audits assure voters their choices have been accurately registered and that no partisan tampering, hacking or software glitches have affected the results of an election. Election officials can evaluate the accuracy of electronic voting systems and correct any tabulation problems. And no adversary — not even a foreign nation with sophisticated espionage capabilities — can manipulate elections results with e-invasions…

Unfortunately, Pennsylvania does not provide any of these assurances to voters, candidates, political parties or the nation. Instead, Pennsylvania law mandates little transparency or accountability when it comes to its computer-generated election tallies — something no business organization would tolerate in its information systems…

And yet, in Pennsylvania those officials close off all avenues by which forensic checks for evidence of tampering or miscounts could occur, then claim that no such evidence exists and that therefore Pennsylvania election systems are secure and accurate. This is utter nonsense. And it defies core principles of cyber risk management.

From a losing State Senate candidate in Colorado: Despite Jill Stein, Election Integrity Should Not Be A Partisan Issue  <read>

The recount in Wisconsin financed by two losing candidates, Jill Stein and Hillary Clinton, was a total farce, but hopefully it will not also become a tragedy. That could happen if the partisan motivation behind that episode gives election integrity concerns and complaints a bad name…

I have seen some of those weaknesses and vulnerabilities up close and personal. In Colorado on November 8, I lost my own race for re-election to the Colorado State Senate by 1,478 votes out of 81,774 ballots cast, or less than 2%. Our Republican judges and poll watchers observed numerous irregularities, and we can prove some fraudulent votes were cast. I did not demand a recount because the errors and fraud do not appear to be on a large enough scale to affect the outcome. Nonetheless, those weaknesses leave me with less than 100% confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the final count.

If there were 270 Republican ballots with questionable signatures, and Republicans are only 34% of registered voters, that means there were probably over 800 ballots with questionable signatures in that one legislative district alone. The Colorado Voter Group, a watchdog organization promoting election security, believes our signature verification system is inadequate and wide open to abuse.

What if Connecticut was one of the close states?

In summary, we don’t know exactly what would happen.

  • Unlike other states, Connecticut has no law for citizens to call for a recount.  They could always go to court and attempt with evidence to get a judge to order a recount.  That would likely end up in appeals court and likely the Supreme Court.
  • Unlike other states, we do not have a recount – the word does not appear in our statutes.  We have a recanvass which is something like a machine recount.
  • Our close-vote recanvass is at the 0.5% margin typical in other states. Yet is limited to margins of under 2000 votes.  So in this past November election by our calculatinsthat would be a margin of about 0.12%.
  • Unlike recounts in other states, our recanvasses are not closely observable by the general public. The law is a bit ambiguous, yet there are only a very limited number of observers allowed to each candidate and party, at most two each.  So, a town could easily have a recanvass with twenty-five teams of counters, with a Jill Stein, Hillary Clintion, and Donald Trump limited to two close observers each. Hardly enough to closely observe ballots marks counted at 25 tables.
  • Unlike recounts in other states, parties and candidates have no standing to object to the proceedings or to participate and dispute the counting of particular ballots.  In practice party lawyers observe the process to find procedural errors to take to court and call for a “recount”.  The last time that happened, the result was a repeat recanvass, with a party lawyer put in charge (it was a primary).  The only difference was that he sat and watched while essentially the same process was repeated.
  • In practice, the recanvasses vary in their interpretation and adherence to the law from town to town.  Recall that was one of the Supreme Court’s objection to the Florida recount in Gore v. Bush – that it was unfair, because it was not uniform across Florida Counties.

Our best guess is that Connecticut would rank close to Pennsylvania.  Observed variations and poor recanvass procedures, with courts sooner or later. stopping or blocking the recanvass.

Amid national election concerns, Connecticut goes the wrong way

CT Mirror Viewpoints

Last week, without public notice, seven Connecticut municipalities conducted electronic “audits” under the guidance of the UConn Center for Voting Technology and the Secretary of the State’s Office, using the Audit Station developed by the Voter Center.
There is a science of election audits. Machine-assisted audits can offer efficiency and ease of use, but any audit process needs to be transparent and provide for independent public verification of the results.

CT Mirror Viewpoints <read>

About half the states, including Connecticut, have both paper ballots and post-election audits. Because our audits were transparent and publicly verifiable, Connecticut Citizen Election Audit observers have been able to reveal multiple flaws in the process and in the official reporting of audit results. Earlier this year, however, the General Assembly unanimously cut Connecticut’s the audits from 10 percent of districts to 5 percent.

Now there is more bad news: our already inadequate audits have been partially replaced by electronic “audits” which are not transparent and not publicly verifiable. Instead, we now have “black box voting” augmented by “black box auditing.”  This should satisfy only those with blind trust in computers and blind trust in insiders with access to the “audit” computers.

Last week, without public notice, seven Connecticut municipalities conducted electronic “audits” under the guidance of the UConn Center for Voting Technology and the Secretary of the State’s Office, using the Audit Station developed by the Voter Center.

There is a science of election audits. Machine-assisted audits can offer efficiency and ease of use, but any audit process needs to be transparent and provide for independent public verification of the results. Machine-assisted manual audits in California and Colorado demonstrate how this can be achieved.  Public verification begins with publicly rescanning the ballots and providing the public with a computer readable list of how each ballot was counted. Then selecting a small random sample of the ballots and comparing the actual voter verified ballots to the record of how the machine counted them.

It is puzzling that the UConn Voter Center, the General Assembly, and the Secretary of the State have consistently chosen to ignore the peer-reviewed science which would provide an actual audit, appropriately trusted, even faster, and even less work for local officials.

Compare existing election audits to professional audits.  Professional audits include examining a sample of original documents such as receipts from vendors or signed checks.  Such audits are performed by individuals independent of those accountable for doing the original job. Public verifiability is critical to post-election audits, because they are performed by those responsible for conducting the election itself, protecting the original ballots, evaluating and recommending the election equipment.

The new Connecticut system ? including equipment and procedures ? involves rescanning, with officials reviewing scanned images of every ballot and how it was interpreted by the system. But, scanned images are not photographs: they are as vulnerable as other computer data, subject to machine errors, tampering, and human error.  Connecticut’s electronic “audits” do not verify that the ballot images correspond to the ballots. Ballots are the only evidence verified by voters.

Last week local officials reviewed each of the images for approximately one to three seconds. At that speed, it was difficult to verify that even one race of five displayed was accurately interpreted by the system. It would be more efficient, accurate, and trustworthy, to sample the paper ballots as in Colorado and California and compare them to the system interpretations.

The new system is being presented as much more economical for municipalities with less work and stress for local officials.  When and if it is working properly, without errors and unhacked, it could be much more accurate than the disorganized, inconsistent hand counting that is frequently performed in Connecticut.

A solution is at hand. The UConn Audit Station is capable of providing the kind of machine-assisted manual audits that would meet the requirements of sound science for election audits. It could provide transparent, publicly verifiable audits that are independent of the software, hardware, and the officials who are responsible for the audit and the election.

Amid national concerns for election integrity and calls for stronger audits nationwide, Connecticut is positioned to be a leader in election auditing. Our manual audits were a good start, with some flaws.

The Secretary of the State and the UConn Voter Center should work with national experts to develop procedures that take full advantage of the Audit Station, to deliver efficient and trustworthy election audits. Until then our manual audits should continue. Voters and the General Assembly should insist upon transparent and publicly verifiable elections.

Luther Weeks is Executive Director of the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit.

[Election] law is an ass

State and Federal have ruled that Jill Stein does not have standing to call for a recount in Michigan.

Our Opinion: The Michigan law[and or this ruling] is an ass, every single voter in the United States has an interest in the vote in every  state, in every municipality, and that the vote of each voter is counted and totaled accurately. Each of those plays a part in selecting our President and the majorities in the U.S. House and Senate.

State and Federal have ruled that Jill Stein does not have standing to call for a recount in Michigan.

Our Opinion: The Michigan law[and or this ruling] is an ass, every single voter in the United States has an interest in the vote in every  state, in every municipality, and that the vote of each voter is counted and totaled accurately. Each of those plays a part in selecting our President and the majorities in the U.S. House and Senate.

For more details and further outrage see:

<John Bonifaz on Democracy Now>

Alternet: 7 Election Integrity and Cyber Security Experts Say Stopping Michigan Recount is a Corrupt Exercise of Power <read>

“Americans will never know the truth about what happened.”

Make no mistake, a travesty has occurred. On Wednesday in courtrooms and government boardrooms across the state, a series of legal dominos fell on Stein’s statewide presidential recount. In state legal venues, the linchpin was a three-member appeals court of Republican judges who ordered a state vote canvassing board to shut down the recount. That board then voted to reverse its earlier decision allowing the recount to start. Later Wednesday evening, a federal court judge lifted his prior restraining order preventing Michigan officials from calling off the recount. On Thursday, Michigan counties had suspended the recount. “It’s stopped,” said the receptionist answering the phone at the Wayne County Election Division in Detroit.

What follows are seven statements from election integrity activists and computer security experts who supported the recount.

We would also add that this is just the normal partisan corrupt process of deciding elections in the U.S., since our founding, see: <Ballot Battles>

How Do We Know Without Recounts?

We have all seen many articles and posts on the recounts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.  We are likely to see many more.  For now, here are a few points about the recounts:

  • I am entirely in favor of  thorough post-election audits and recounts.
  • I am entirely in favor of the recounts initiated by Jill Stein.
  • Even if there is no change in the state winners, Election Integrity has won already
  • Yet, maybe we will not win that much in the end
  • All the objections to the recounts are partisan

We have all seen many articles and posts on the recounts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.  We are likely to see many more.  For now, here are a few points about the recounts:

I am entirely in favor of  thorough post-election audits and recounts.  

Jill Stein and those who have contributed to her fund are doing a service to democracy and for all voters. We should have routine audits and recounts after every election.  Currently only about half of states have post-election audits and routine close-vote recounts. Neither is sufficient alone.  An audit finding discrepancies, that if widespread, would change the winning candidate(s)  should result in a full recount.  Close vote recounts alone are insufficient.  Without audits we cannot be sure that the results are not off more than the trigger for recounts.  At a minimum audits should be risk-limiting, subject all ballots to audit,  check the entire totaling process, and assess ballot security.  Audits should also cover the registration and checkin process.

With new techniques such as single ballot auditing and ballot polling audits, post-election audits can be quite economical.  With detailed election reporting, auditing the total result can also be accomplished efficiently.

I am entirely in favor of the recounts initiated by Jill Stein. 

She and those who have contributed donations and time to the project are doing a service to our Democracy and every voter.  Since apparently, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania lack post-election audits the recounts are necessary.  At least, in Pennsylvania, the margin is now so close that a close-vote recount and checking of all totals should be automatic.

Even if there is no change in the state winners, Election Integrity has won already

The initiation of the recounts have already highlighted the lack of integrity in the current system.  We now know that it is hard to get recounts in these three states; that the recount laws, at least in Wisconsin, are inadequate to cause a “real” adversarial recount as we saw in Minnesota in the Coleman-Frankin recount; in Pennsylvania the law for recounts is ungainly requiring affidavits by three voters in each polling place in a short time; and highlighting the impossibility of really auditing unverifiable DRE, touch-screen, voting machines.

Yet, maybe we will not win that much in the end

Still I am skeptical that the audits will result in real change toward national minimum standards for voter-verified paper ballots along with sufficient audits and recounts.  Perhaps if the recounts reverse the result in one state or at least show a significant level of change in the numbers that will be enough to result in enforceable Federal minimum standards, or failing that reform in a number of states.

All the objections to the recounts are partisan

Lets start by conceding that Jill Stein and the Green Party hope to gain from doing this service.  What candidate or politician does something without a hoped partisan gain?

The initial complaints against the recounts came apparently from Hillary supporters.  To me, it seemed that they blame Jill Stein for Hillary’s loss as well as Bernie supporters.  Whenever there is a close election the apparent looser has many individuals and groups to blame, while the apparent winner has many to thank.  The closer the election the more small factors can directly contribute to the result.

Now the Trump team is objecting to the recounts, (after campaigning on maybe not accepting the initial result).

Thus has it always been. See our review of Ballot Battles.

Some Coverage:

Robert Koehler via Common Dreams: Vote Recount vs the Media Consensus <read>

In other words, the American president is essentially determined every four years by a sort of quick-draw consensus of corporate media conglomerates, not by a cautiously precise hand count of the votes that have been cast

There is evidence already for suspicion in Pennsylvania: Walter Mebane Jr. via the  Washington Post:  New evidence finds anomalies in Wisconsin vote, but no conclusive evidence of fraud <read>

Walter Mebane has a unique way of analyzing elections for suspicious results.  He analyses the digits in the numbers reported at a low level. The lowest digits should fall into a certain, non-random pattern in most elections.  If there is wide manipulation of data it is very difficult to mimic those expected patterns.  His analysis points to suspicion in Wisconsin.  Yet, for now its a bit less than “where there is smoke, there is fire.”

An article in Time supports better election night reporting data: How the Wisconsin Recount Could Help Fix American Elections  <read>

And this on the importance of election security by David Dill via Scientific American: Election Security Is a Matter of National Security <read>

It is not good enough to say, “We can’t prove fraud.” In every election we need evidence that vote counts are accurate

What Do YOU [still] Want? Eight+ Years and Not Counting.

In the summer of 2008 I was on a panel in Fairfield, CT. I opened with remarks on “What Do You Want”. I said voters want five things and what Connecticut could do about them in the short run (three steps over two years).  The two years  passed and little changed, so in 2010 I repeated the post as What Do YOU [still] Want?  Here we are in late 2016 and little has changed for the better:

In the summer of 2008 I was on a panel in Fairfield, CT. I opened with remarks on “What Do You Want”. I said voters want five things and what Connecticut could do about them in the short run (three steps over two years).  The two years  passed and little changed, so in 2010 I repeated the post as What Do YOU [still] Want?  Here we are in late 2016 and little has changed for the better:

  • We have a different Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill.
  • In the last eight years, the science of auditing has progressed such that we could have much better audits at lower cost.
  • Only about half the states have post-election audits of any type.  Experts debate if even one or two have effective, sufficient audits.
  • Connecticut’s post-election audits remain insufficient, unreliable and ineffective.
  • Earlier this year, the General Assembly has cut those insufficient audits in half.  The only state we know that has actually cut back on post-election audits.

What I said in 2008 remains true today

My topic for the next few minutes is simple. It is: “What Do You Want”.

Let us begin with a quote from Colorado’s Secretary of State, Mike Coffman whose words inspired this talk and a quote from our own Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz.

Secretary Bysiewicz sent a letter in March to voters like you, who signed our petition last year. She said, in part: “We still have a lot of work to do and we need concerned citizens like you to stay involved…I share your belief that we should make our audit law the strongest in the nation and that its size and scope is adequate to achieve its goals…”

In June, Colorado’s Mike Coffman gave his view, of activists like CTVotersCount, “I think they have a fundamental belief that anything electronic, as it relates to voting, is evil and undermines our political system,”…”They believe in a world of conspiracy theories and are highly motivated. No matter what I do, so long as it leaves some form of electronic voting intact, it will be wrong by their standards.”

I agree with both of them. With Secretary Bysiewicz that we still “have a lot of work to do”; With Secretary Coffman, that voting advocates are “highly motivated”.

However, I do not believe that “anything electronic” is “evil” nor do I have a goal of eliminating “anything electronic” from voting.

So, What Should You Want?

Most fundamentally, five things:

  • That the ballot is secret, votes cannot be bought, coerced, added, lost, or modified
  • That your vote is counted, counted accurately, and counted exactly once
  • That everyone’s vote is counted accurately and reflected in the election results
  • That everyone has confidence that everyone’s vote is counted accurately
  • That, failing any of the above, appropriate corrective action will be taken

You deserve no more and no less. Democracy requires no less. Do you want anything less? Do you believe democracy can exist and flourish with less?

I’m open to any solution that will ensure Democracy. Whatever we can implement that ensures Democracy and is most efficient for officials and most convenient for the voters, I will support it.

So, Where Do We Go From Here?

We do not have a blank slate. We have just spent millions of dollars on purchasing the most cost effective, most voter verifiable, and auditable type of electronic voting system available, that meet Federally mandated requirements.

I could talk of the long term, realistically six to ten years off. But Democracy cannot wait. There are real risks now. There are actions we can take over the next two years to ensure Democracy in Connecticut – to lead the way for the Nation. Yes, I said two years, if we start now, taking decisive action, with the equipment we have.

The Short List

Let me finish with the short list of what we need to do now, over the next two years. The three items I think of when Secretary Bysiewicz says “We still have a lot of work to do”:

First, an element of prevention. Each of our elections is programmed in Massachusetts by contractors; Contractors over which we have little, if any, oversight. UConn has developed an outstanding program to independently test the memory cards to detect many potential errors or fraud. 100% of our memory cards need to be tested independently in Connecticut with that program; before the cards are shipped to election officials; before the cards are used in any election.

Second, an element of detection and confidence: We need strong post-election audits to detect errors and fraud. Our current audits are insufficient, unreliable and ineffective. Our audits should be based on the current science of election auditing and recognized post-election audit principles.

Third, a solid chain-of-custody to make credible elections and audits possible. We need to protect and account for ballots before, during, and after the election. Ballots, memory cards, and optical scanners must be protected from illegal modification or covert access whenever they could be compromised.

Would you trust chain-of-custody standards less than those we require for evidence in criminal cases?

In Summary

You are committed to the proposition that Democracy survive and flourish. We have serious work to do. It can happen in Connecticut. Voting Integrity, like the Constitution, can start here in the Constitution State and spread to the Nation.

CTVotersCount is dedicated to pursuing  “What You Want”.  As a great teacher said “Anything worth doing is worth failing at, and failing at, and failing at…until you succeed”

Post-Election Audit Drawing

5th Graders at the Glastonbury-East Hartford Magnet School assisted Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, in randomly drawing 38 districts for the post-election audit.

We will update later with the complete list of towns and districts.

Drawing Marking Map Complete Map

5th Graders at the Glastonbury-East Hartford Magnet School assisted Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, in randomly drawing 38 districts for the post-election audit.

We will update later with the complete list of towns and districts.

Drawing Marking Map Complete Map

Press Release with towns and districts to be audited <read>