By Luther Weeks on September 18, 2016
In the last two weeks there was a meeting of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and a hearing of the House Science and Technology Committee on “Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks”. In total there were seven “experts” giving their opinions along with many of the committee members giving theirs. For the most part, solid facts and reason were missing. The general plan seemed to be officials going overboard in reassuring the public.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Security Issues, National, NonScienceNonsense
By Luther Weeks on September 13, 2016
From Freedom to Tinker, Andrew Appel: Security against Election Hacking – Part 1: Software Independence <read>
We have heard a lot lately about the vulnerabilities of our elections to hacking. Both cyberhacking and unsophisticated insider attacks. Andrew Appel describes some common sense approaches to detect and deter error and fraud in our elections, covering three major vulnerabilities:
- Incorrect or unavailable poolbooks.
- Voting machines
- Accumulation of results across polling places and jurisdictions
Posted in Chain of Custody, CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National, Post-Election Audits, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on September 8, 2016
My letter, published in the Courant today:
Many Election Security Risks
The Sept. 6 article “U.S. Fears Russia Hack” [Page 1] provides an inflammatory view of the risks to U.S. elections. Focusing on one potential risk from our current enemy of choice takes the attention off the multitude of risks…
We can do much better in the long run, if the actual risks are not forgotten after November.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National
By Luther Weeks on September 6, 2016
From the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology: Hacking Elections Is Easy <read>. It is the most layperson accessible comprehensive overview of the problems we face protecting our elections that I have seen in a long time. It is 23 pages yet very readable. The main points are:
- We face multiple risks our elections: Registration systems, voting systems, reporting systems, and ballot security.
- We face risks from multiple actors: Nations with interests in manipulating our elections, corporations, U.S. Government agencies, sophisticated hackers, and insiders at all levels.
- For the unsophisticated, Hacking Is Easy. There are simple insider attacks, simple cyber attacks, and kits on the Internet to compromise results or simply disrupt elections.
- Most election officials are of high integrity. Yet, blind trust in all officials, machines, and that hacking is difficult is perhaps our greatest risk.
Just a couple excerpts from the Introduction:
To hack an election, the adversary does not need to exploit a national network of election technology. By focusing on the machines in swing regions of swing states, an election can be hacked without drawing considerable notice. Voter machines, technically, are so riddled with vulnerabilities that even an upstart script kiddie could wreak havoc on a regional election, a hacktivist group could easily exploit a state election, an APT could effortlessly exploit a national election and any corrupt element with nothing more than the ability to describe the desired outcome could order layers of exploits on any of the multitude of deep web forums and marketplaces. Yes, hacking elections is easy…
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National, Reports
By Luther Weeks on September 2, 2016
Earlier this week Secretary of the State Denise Merrill, ROVAC President Melissa Russell and the Manchester CT Registrars of voters talked to NBC Connecticut. We add some annotation to the transcript, in [Brackets].
Even the machines used to digitally tabulate election results aren’t connected to the internet in cities and towns. Melissa Russell, a Bethlehem Registrar of Voters, with the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut reiterated the point that physical record keeping in Connecticut places the state at an advantage. [Not having voting systems connected to the Internet is definitely an advantage. Yet, not so much against local insider attacks, especially when local officials and their leaders are so confident (overconfident?)]
Local registrars, like Jim Stevenson and Tim Becker in Manchester, wonder what a hacker could really get from a hack of even a local election computer. [The answer, known for years is: Even skilled amateurs could change the result printed by the scanner. One method is the widely know Hursti Hack. UConn has articulated others. We are left to wonder why NBC did not interview anyone with expertise to answer the registrars questions. ]
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Security Issues
By Luther Weeks on August 28, 2016
We hear from Richard Clarke, President Obama, Pam Smith, and Secretary of the State Denise Merrill. We annotate Denise Merrill’s recent press conference.
Posted in CT Law, Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Voting, Mail/Absentee Voting
By Luther Weeks on August 22, 2016
A new report from the Electronic Privacy Information Center, articulates some of the risks of losing the the Secret Ballot: Secret Ballot At Risk: Recommendations for Protecting Democracy <Exec Summary> <Report>
We recommend reading the Executive Summary and at least the section of the report covering the history of and the need for the secret ballot, pages 4-9 and the section for your state, e.g. Connecticut pages 54-55.
Our only criticism is that the report does not cover the risks to the secret ballot and democracy posed by photos, most often seen in selfies of voters with the voted ballot taken in the voting booth. Nor does it cover the risks to the secret ballot posed by absentee voting.
Posted in CT, CT Law, Electronic Vulnerability, Reports, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on August 17, 2016
Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, by Kim Zetter covers in detail the discovery, exposure, and detailing of the Stuxnet virus. It is a fascinating, educational, and important read. Relevant to anyone interested in cyber security, war, foreign affairs, and election integrity. There is also a new documentary, ZER0DAYS.
I read the book and then watched the movie. I recommend the book over the documentary, although it is complementary. The book covers Stuxnet and its discovery in much more detail. Yet, the book is accessible to everyone. After reading the book, even the non-technical reader, will have an understanding of what Stuxnet could do, its wider implications for security, and foreign affairs. I am not convinced those that watch the movie will have an anywhere equivalent understanding.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability
By Luther Weeks on August 13, 2016
Donald Trump is visiting Connecticut tonight at Sacred Heart University in Fairfield, while Hillary is visiting Greenwich on Monday for a fundraiser <read>
This provides a great opportunity to discuss a couple of points often touted in favor of the National Popular Vote.
- That presidential candidates will never campaign in Connecticut until we have a national popular vote.
- That candidates only come to Connecticut to take money out of the state.
- And apparently we would benefit from the money they would spend here.
Posted in CT, National Popular Vote
By Luther Weeks on August 11, 2016
- System failures are generally explained away as accidents, usually unique and isolated ones.
- Human systems are vulnerable to failure, especially those dependent on computer systems, especially when there is no manual backup.
- If businesses like airlines, banks, and Federal Government agencies cannot protect their systems, how can state, county, and local systems be expected to be reliable?
Connecticut is not the pick of the litter here, as we said last April:
We sadly await the Election Day when the Connecticut voter registration system is down, especially with no contingency plan for Election Day Registration. Don’t say “Who Could Have Imagined”, we did.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability
