Category: Chain of Custody

In Washburn’s World: Election Records Would Be Public

“I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any of the election records are a secret.’

Blog post: The GAB: The Johnny Yoo of Election Administration <read>

I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any of the election records are a secret.

We agree.

GAB provides legal cover to clerks so that the clerks may destroy election records which the clerks deem too inconvenient to preserve and retain.

In order to set the context for the last two years on this matter I will show my fundamentalist, Christian roots and begin with a creedal statement:

  • I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any election records are secret.
  • I believe ballots are not secret, but anonymous.
  • I believe the content of a removable memory card used by a voting machine during an election is an election record as that term is used in state and federal law.
  • I believe that ALL of the content of a removable memory card is an election record.
  • I believe the contents of a removable memory card contain an admixture of some or all of the following:
    • programming,
    • ballot “images”1,
    • audit logs,
    • event logs,
    • vote totals at various levels of aggregation,
    • “ballot definition files”2,
    • audio files,
    • screen text,
    • page/screen layout,
    • whole, mountable file systems.
  • I believe the above list is likely incomplete because the exact contents of a removable memory card are secret and vigorously protected as trade secrets.
  • I believe election records should not be secret.
  • I believe election records are records that should have an “absolute right of access“. Under current law some election records in whole or in part are not even open records, much less records with an “absolute right of access“.
  • I believe the contents of a removable memory card used to aid in the administration of an election should be preserved and retained by jurisdictions for the same length of time as the jurisdiction is required to preserve and retain the poll registration lists used to administer the same election.
  • I believe state law, WI Stats. 7.23(1)(g), requires the contents of a removable memory card used by a voting machine in the administration of an election be preserved and retained for 22 months
  • I believe federal law, Title 42, Chapter 20, Subchapter II, § 1974, for federal elections, requires the same; preservation and retention for 22 months
  • I believe state law, WI Stats. 7.24, requires the backups made of the contents of a removable memory card pursuant to WI Stats. 7.23(1)(g) remain in the custody and control of the election official for the entire retention period.
  • I believe the contents of a removable memory card used in a voting machine is MORE important than the voter poll lists used in the same election. This is because the contents of the memory card actively and directly determine how the election is administered, where the poll books do not. If nothing else (and there is more), the contents of the removable memory card control how or if marks on the paper ballot or touches on the touch screen will be recognized and to whom votes will accrue based on those marks or touches. These are the election officials’ duties under WI Stats. 7.50 even if those duties have been delegated to an inscrutable black box.

The Government Accountability Board (GAB), its staff, and the clerks who head the Wisconsin Towns Association, Wisconsin County Clerks Association, and the Wisconsin Municipal Clerks Association do not agree with most, if any, of the above credos.

I object to the notion that there can be such things as secret election records.

Detroit: The Limitations of Paper Ballots and Recounts

The value of paper ballots and recounts depends on the chain-of-custody and the integrity of election officials. Bev Harris reports in a letter the almost unbelievable, sad situation in a Detroit Mayoral race recount

The value of paper ballots and recounts depends on the chain-of-custody and the integrity of election officials.  Bev Harris reports in a letter the almost unbelievable, sad situation in a Detroit Mayoral race recount: <read>

From: Bev Harris
Subject: BBV Bulletin: DETROIT – CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION REQUESTED FOR ELECTIONS VIOLATIONS

…Ex-candidate Tom Barrow has filed a formal request for investigation along with stunning documentation of chain of custody breach in the recent Detroit mayoral election. Black Box Voting has been in close contact with Barrow, and we will be reviewing additional documents related to this case. The allegations are fascinating…

the full complaint and its accompanying Exhibit provides a pretty good primer for citizens and candidates who want to watchdog elections. Full details of the 79-point complaint…

#13 – Throughout the day, O’Hara, McDonald and Butler reported observing numerous individuals with large bags and back packs entering and remaining in the absentee counting station area. They also reported that at 8pm, the counting room security completely broke down and the general public was permitted to freely access the restricted access areas

# 23 – three people from ES&S, (the voting equipment computer company) had just signed in at 7:55 am along with one more individual from Premier. [note that the location uses ES&S machines, but not Premier machines; why were technicians entering the building, and why was anyone from Premier there at all?] …

# 44. … notwithstanding the seal differences, nearly all of the cases opened were disallowed and deemed not able to be recounted because there were significant discrepancies between the number of voters in the poll books and the number of voter ballots in the case along with other violations. # 48. Now broadly suspicious, Complainant without anyone’s knowledge created his own informal security system to reveal to him of any breaches to the building after hours…

# 74. Finally, on Monday, December 21, 2009, Complainant and his Team arrived at the recount location to obtain an explanation of why numerous time clocks on numerous polling computers showed dates and times which seemingly indicated that the polls had been electronically closed hours before the statutory required 8pm poll closing time…

# 76. Complainant immediately confronted county recount election staff who called the weekend security guard. After speaking with the guard in full sight of the room of observers, Ms Cynthia Hawthorne, explained to the room of over 30 people that the guard just admitted to her that 2 people had indeed come to the door, the door was opened and the guard invited the strangers in and allowed them to tour the “secure” area … Footnote # (10) Indeed, precinct 20-04 [certified as having hundreds of ballots] was an empty case with no voted, unused or spoiled ballots inside.

Detroit seems blatant, however, it takes just one failure in ballot integrity to bring an election result into question.  We have  our own chain-of-custody issues in Connecticut as well: <Haddam> <Coalition Audit Report>

Voters, Voter Action: Win In Pennsylvania Supreme Court

voters have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit.

Voter Action Press Release <read>

PENNSYLVANIA STATE SUPREME COURT ALLOWS VOTING RIGHTS CASE TO PROCEED

Dec 18 2008 | State’s Highest Court Denies Pennsylvania Secretary of State Permission to Appeal Lower Court Ruling in Voters’ Favor Case Challenging the Use of Electronic Voting Machines Now Moves Toward Trial PHILADELPHIA, PA – Pennsylvania voters challenging the continued use of unverifiable electronic voting machines in their state won another major round on Tuesday when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a ruling allowing their case to proceed toward trial. The state’s highest court, in a one-sentence order, denied the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s petition seeking permission to appeal a lower court ruling decided in the voters’ favor. In April 2007, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had ruled that voters have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit…

“Across the country, states are realizing that electronic voting systems cannot be trusted,” says Michael Churchill, senior counsel with the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and another lawyer for the voters in this case. “Like voters in other states, Pennsylvania voters have a right to a voting system which will properly count their votes.

I am not a lawyer ,but to me, this is an important decision and precident.  If this decision holds,  it would presumably mean that Pennsylvaina voters are entitled to a lot more than reviewing the source code of DRE voting systems.  Voting systems include the entire process of voting, not just the electronic systems.  If  systems  “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” are unacceptable, then systems with inadequate audits with no way for citizens to verify their paper ballots were counted accurtely would also seem to be inadequate.  Of course this would only apply to Pennsylvania, and be most valuable as a precedent to citizens of other states depending on the language in their constitutions vs. Pennsylvania’s.

More On Chain-Of-Custody

Last month we commented on reports of chain-of-custody problems in Haddam and on a Courant Editorial on the need for two people of opposing parties whenever ballots are accessed. The problem goes deeper. We sent the following letter to the Courant in the interest of using the breach in Haddam as an educational opportunity.

Last month we commented on reports of chain-of-custody problems in Haddam and on a Courant Editorial on the need for two people of opposing parties whenever ballots are accessed. The problem goes deeper.  We sent the following letter to the Courant in the interest of using the breach in Haddam as an educational opportunity.  I will post it here, since the time has passed for its potential publication (and the Courant will not publish letters previously published elsewhere) :

To the Editor,

The voters of Connecticut should be concerned with the chain-of-custody of ballots as stated in your editorial, “Only One Party Observed Haddam Vote Count” (Nov 23, 2009).  Ballots are required to precisely determine the outcome of close elections and to provide credibility to post-election audits.  This particular case is unique in that the breach became public and that it may be a violation of the law.

The law requires that ballots be sealed for fourteen days after an election.  Ironically, the post-election audits cannot begin until the fifteenth day after an election.  Audit observers have regularly reported violations of chain-of-custody procedures.  In Connecticut, election regulations and procedures cannot be enforced.

For voters to have confidence there must be no opportunity for compromise; it is critical that ballots be protected from clandestine access.   Ballots are usually sealed in bags or containers, however, more protection is needed.  Los Alamos scientists have reported that such a seal can be defeated and replaced with a counterfeit in a median of 43 seconds.   In Connecticut, ballots are often held in a room with single key access, with the key available to either registrar, frequently to any official in the Registrars’ Office.  The storage is often a room in town hall, the Registrars’ Office, or a hallway cabinet. In other states, ballots are held in vaults, with video surveillance, and uniformed guards

Clearly stronger chain-of-custody protections for our ballots are required.

Luther Weeks

References:

Coalition Citizen Election Audit Coalition reports showing chain-of-custody lapses:
http://www.CTElectionAudit.orgIn particular: http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/?page_id=74

Los Alamos scientists’ report: https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/TamperIndSeals.mht

Courant: Ballot Access Should Require Two People Of Opposing Parties

“The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

We believe that ballots cannot be trusted unless there is a strong chain of custody, one critical part of that is that all access should be by at least two people and of opposing parties, and opposing interests in primaries.  The Courant is right on in their editorial covering the Haddam situation <read>

when town offices were closed for Veterans Day, head election moderator Marge DeBold, a Democrat, found a clerical error in the absentee vote count that added an additional vote to Ms. Houlton’s total. That extra vote would throw the results into a tie, which would require a runoff election. The following day, Democratic Registrar Pat Hess authorized Ms. DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and amend the recount.

But there were no Republicans present. That was wrong…

Mr. Harris, the initial winner of the recount, summed it up well: “The process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

The Courant’s earlier coverage and our comments <read>  Coaliton reports documenting breaches in the chain of custody <read> The issue goes beyond a documented instance of two people from the same party accessing the ballots.  The issue includes the risks of single individuals having access to a single key needed to access the ballots – leaving them vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Chain-Of-Custody Education In Haddam

A tight Board of Education race in Haddam provides an example four understanding chain-of-custody and recounts vs. recanvasses.
* The chain-of-custody is important and its enforcement is important
* Every vote is important, counting every vote accurately, transparently, and credibly is critical to democracy
* Recounts and recount laws are important

A tight Board of Education race in Haddam provides an example four understanding chain-of-custody and recounts vs. recanvasses.  Courant story: Dispute Over Recount In Haddam Board Of Education Race <read>

Republicans said they plan to call the secretary of the state’s office today to ask officials to investigate confusion about the vote for a seat on the board of eduction. Democrats, who say there is no confusion, called a meeting Tuesday evening to sort out the issue. A dozen Democrats and Republicans met, but left without reaching a consensus.

Democrats say the following occurred:

The unofficial vote count after the Nov. 3 election showed Republican Chester Harris beating Democratic incumbent Sabrina Houlton by one vote. Because of the slim margin, the town held a recount Nov. 10, which showed the same result.

The next day, when town offices were closed for Veterans Day, election head moderator Marge DeBold, a former Democratic first selectman, was reviewing the election information and found a clerical error. She noticed that next to Houlton’s name on the absentee vote count were four tally marks and the number “3.” DeBold said she realized that someone had miscounted the marks as three instead of four.

The next day, DeBold told Democratic Registrar Pat Hess what she had found. Hess authorized DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and to amend the recount.

Hess said Tuesday that she knew representatives from both parties needed to be present during all vote-counting procedures, but the GOP registrar could not attend that morning and they wanted to get the new tallies quickly to file the proper paperwork with the secretary of the state’s office. She said there was no intentional wrongdoing.

The additional vote for Houlton meant the race was a tie. State law mandates that the town must hold a runoff election between tied candidates. The election will be Tuesday.

Earlier Tuesday, GOP Town Chairman Kenneth Gronbach alleged that the three Democrats — DeBold, Hess and Huffstetler — had tampered with votes.

“This isn’t Afghanistan. This is the United States of America,” Gronbach said. “It’s a conspiracy. The vote was changed; sealed documents were opened and altered.”

By Tuesday evening, he said he wasn’t accusing anyone of fraud, but would file a complaint with the State Elections Enforcement Commission and would file an injunction to prevent Tuesday’s election. He said that the last legal step in the process was the initial recount, and that its result is the one that should count.

Houlton argued that the mistake needed to be fixed, adding, “If that’s what the voters really want, then the runoff will speak to that.”

Harris said the issue “is that the process was corrupted. When you go by yourselves, just you two, it gives the appearance of impropriety.”

We also viewed a news report on WFSB-TV last night covering a meeting of Haddam officials and  the actual hashmark sheet involved.

What can we learn from this?

  • The chain-of-custody is important and its enforcement is important
  • Every vote is important, counting every vote accurately, transparently, and credibly is critical to democracy
  • Recounts and recount laws are important

The chain-of-custody is important and its enforcement is important

The credibility of the election process is dependent on a strong chain-of-custody to protect the ballots and associated election materials so that recanvasses, recounts, and post-election audits will be accurate and trusted.   In Haddam we have a classic situation where the evidence of the election has been called into question.  There are two additional problems here.  First, even if there was no tampering with votes or hashmark sheets candidates and the public cannot trust the process, lose faith in their government, and have to settle for a new election.

A new election is a fine solution for an actual election tie, and would be a necessary remedy for a compromised election.  But it is not as good for a compromised election as performing the original election as intended.  A new election is costly to candidates and taxpayers.  Also it brings out a different group of voters and may or may not produce the same result as ab original election with integrity would have.

Unfortunately, in Connecticut, election laws, regulations, procedures and common sense are often not followed.  The Coaltion Post-Election Audit Reports have documented many lapses in procedures, including the chain-of-custody.   It is quite possible that in this case there was a violation of state law subject to enforcement, as the registrar points out “Hess said Tuesday that she knew representatives from both parties needed to be present during all vote-counting procedures”.  In our experience most violations of  the chain-of-custody are not discovered, not enforced, and not enforceable.  Part of the problem is that, in Connecticut, only laws are enforceable, leaving regulations and procedures unenforceable – our ballots are only protected by law for fouteen days after the election, such that violations of procedures and common sense observed during the post-election audits are not enforceable.

The actual problem goes much deeper than this incident and the law.  Common sense would imply that access to ballots should require at a minimum: access by two individuals with opposing interests, logging of all access, and systems to assure that violations of such access were prevented.  In many states counties run elections and hold ballots in vaults, covered by 24×7 survelence and guards etc.  In Connecticut, in most towns (according to Coalition surveys) either registrar has access to a key to ballot storage; in many towns any employee in the registrars’ office has such access; in others additional town employees including school janitors.  The seals used for ballots in Connecticut can be compromised in a matter of minutes or seconds – they are useful but do not protect the ballots sufficiently when they can be accessed by individuals for extended periods.

Two years ago, I asked a security expert if I was being too hard in expecting Connecticut to follow stronger chain-of-custody procedures.  He pointed out that officials should not want such open access as it would open them to potential questions of tampering – that they would be unable to refute.  Case in point Haddam, even though many will trust the word of the officials, there will always be a lingering doubt.

Every vote is important, counting every vote accurately, transparently, and credibly is critical to democracy.

Time to reiterate the importance of every vote, the accuracy of every registration, the work to make sure every voter has a full opportunity within the law to vote, counting every absentee vote, every qualified provisional ballot, military and overseas ballot.

Also making sure that every effort is expended to properly reject ballots and unqualified voters and votes.  To take reasonable steps to prevent fraud, such as avoiding internet voting, and penalizing fraud.

To voters:  Make sure you vote.  Carefully consider the risks of absentee voting or mail-in voting before you subject your vote to the added risk of fraud or error in such votes.

Recounts and recount laws are important.

I did not attend and can find no specific news reports of the Haddam ‘recount’, but unless it was unusual it likely conformed to the Connecticut close vote ‘recanvass’ law and procedures.  As we have pointed out in the past there is a huge difference between a recount as conducted in some other states and the ‘recanvass’ conducted in Connecticut.  <Our Comparison w/Minnesota>

Recanvasses may sufice to uncover significant transcription and arithmetic errors and a poorly tuned scanner.  But when it comes down to one or two ballots in a district or perhaps a handfull in a town recanvass procedures may not be accurate enough.  Here we have a one or zero ballot margin.  In the Haddam race, just like a recent recanvass we attended that was judged a tie, one ballot can make a difference.  One hashmark made under the wrong candidate.  One vote misspoken or misunderstood.  One apparent undervote that was actually a vote for a candidate.  One ballot with identifying markings, but missed – such ballots should not be counted in Connecticut.  One overvote not detected when counting ballots in multi-vote races.  Every part of the process should be verified by two people to avoid simple errors like an incorrect count of hasmarks, transcription, or addition errors.  The only reliable way we know is for mutiple officials to check every ballot on both sides, with candididate representatives watching; multiple officials checking every aspect including tallying. It is not a matter of official integrity or misconduct, it is to count with a level of precision equal to the closeness of the election.

Aspen Ballots, An Issue For Us All

We side completely with the activists, they are on the side of democracy, integrity, and transparency of government. Beyond a CD ballots should be made available to the public, the actual ballots should be made available to the public.

05/17/2013 [Most] ballots [finally] made available: Ballot images from 2009 election online for public inspection <read>

Marks, who on Thursday said she has not spent much time examining the images posted online, wondered why the city withheld 129 ballots and if officials plan to attempt to make contact with voters who cast them since it’s illegal to make distinguishing marks on a ballot.

“How did they get counted in the first place?” Marks asked. “The idea of a secret ballot is that no one — no one — should have an identifiable marking.”

One of the city’s main arguments against releasing the ballots is that it could encourage the practice of voters leaving marks on their ballots in a corrupt cash-for-votes system.

The city had previously fought disclosure of the ballot images all the way to the Colorado Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. Marks won a judgment from the Colorado Court of Appeals in September 2011, which found that the ballot images qualified as public records.

The Court of Appeals directed the City Clerk to withhold ballots that contained markings that could identify a voter, including all write-in votes.

12/28/2009: Letter to the editor: One dozen excuses <read>

Mayor Ireland just sent an intriguing e-mail to the “voting rights community” titled “Why we don’t need your help in running our elections and why a recount is not needed.” It probably wasn’t written to amuse, given the personal attacks in it, but recipients surely chuckled…

4. Election-integrity advocates are destructive nitpickers! Although the pre-election software test tabulated the candidate with the fewest votes as the winner, 15 hours was plenty of time to reconfigure the software before the polls opened…

10. The early voting ballot box at City Hall, accumulating 32 percent of the votes, was sometimes unlocked. Why audit these ballots now? Any possible mischief already happened. An audit now would be meaningless.

12/19/2009: Bev Harris makes the case for public access to ballot images <read>

Concealed vote counting systems have been deemed unconstitutional by the German high court, which ruled in March 2009 that no public election can conceal any essential step in the election from the public. The German Constitution was formed according to requirements provided by the U.S. after WW II. Principles of public sovereignty over government are embedded into our Declaration of Independence (the document which provided much of the argumentation for women’s suffrage), and are also recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…

a precedent will be set which can alleviate some frustrations with computerized voting processes.

9/17/2009: Good news ballots will not be destroyed just yet <read>

9/1/2009 Aspen heats up.  From the RedAnt <read>

Aspen citizen Millard Zimet  filed the formal complaint  with Aspen’s Election Commission questioning whether Aspen conducted a secret ballot election in May 2009.

Reading the complaint, it seems that Mr. Zimet has a strong argument that it was not a secret election.

The post also points to a series of emails between Aspen Mayor Mick and Kathy Dopp who has articulated the inadequacies of Instant Runoff Voting as used in Aspen.

********

Aspen Colorado held an IRV (Instant Runoff Voting) election.  A CD was made of all the ballots.  Activists would like access to the CD to perform a post-election audit, but the city objects.  An editorial by activitst leading the charge <read>

If there is a law that actually says we the people cannot see our anonymous ballots, and if it says the permanent record of this groundbreaking and unique election in Colorado history should be destroyed, then such a law should be changed. If somehow the laws to which the City has alluded apply, we are confident that election integrity advocates will lobby to change them. The public will and we hope the City Council will understand the need to view a disk of the ballots, at any time for any reason…

The City of Aspen is trying to translate the requirement for destruction as a message about how dangerous the ballots are. These ballots are only dangerous to a small group- anyone who might fear the revelation of fraud or non-accidental error. After the write-in handwriting and any stray marks are removed or redacted, reviewing ballot images can only safeguard, not endanger voter privacy and confidence. .

Aspen wrote in its election press release: “By making the rankings and all other election data public, everyone had the opportunity to double-check the IRV tallies themselves.” We like the sound of that. Will Aspen now look for ways to hide that data from the public instead of enthusiastically joining the general trend towards more transparency in government?

Another article from the Aspen city public relations director <read>

After thorough and significant review, the city attorney has concluded that the release of the ballots, or their images, would violate state law. Colorado, along with every other state in the country, began to guarantee the secret ballot to its citizens at the end of the 19th century. Every state and almost all jurisdictions have adopted laws and rules to ensure that ballots are cast in absolute privacy and remain secret even after the election is completed.

The editorial refutes this position:

You alone might be able to recognize your own ballot from the way you have voted, if you remember the many rankings on your ballot. The protection of the anonymity of the ballot is demanded by the Colorado Constitution as the city has pointed out. If the city has counted any ballots containing identifying marks in any election, it has violated the law. Should the voters be able to learn whether this has happened? The city says you are not allowed to find out- by law. The city says trust: but don’t verify.

Our opinion:

We side completely with the activists, they are on the side of democracy, integrity, and transparency of government.  Beyond a CD ballots should be made available to the public, the actual ballots should be made available to  the public.

  • The ballots are the actual public record of the vote.  The public needs assurance that the CD matches the actual votes.
  • We believe activists are correct in their interpretation of ballot secrecy – if it is identifiable then its not a legal vote.
  • We have the same issue in Connecticut and many other states.  Here ballots must be kept under seal by law for 14 days after the election, then stored for twenty-two months (federal elections) or six months (other elections), and then destroyed.  There is no explicit opportunity in the law for the public to access the ballots.
  • Meanwhile there are indications that the ballots in Connecticut may show that the reported election results for third parties were incorrect.  That Working Families Party cross-endorsed candidates were short changed.  That the Green Party candidate for President was also short changed.  Only the ballots can say and provide satisfaction that the election was correctly reported.
  • Where laws don’t allow public review of ballots, they should be changed.

Some states provide access.  Here our hats are off to Ohio law.  It made possible the investigation by citizens of questionable results.

Update: 02/25/2010:  <read>

What can we say but “Good Grief, Aspen!”

The memorandum by the Defendant appears to seek to impair the discovery of facts in the course of the litigation.  The Defendant is arguing that the Plaintiff is attempting to contest the election outside of legal time constraints and making suggestions about that motive.  Defendant is also appears to be making the argument that benefit to the public interest is not among the possible  reasons to inspect ballot images, and that testimony by TrueBallot may show “errors and irregularities” which may be of interest, but not relevant to the case at bar. On the other hand, the possibility of learning about “errors and irregularities” does seem to me to be a reason to inspect the ballot images.

Update: 3/11/2010 – Case Dismissed – Public Cannot See the Ballots. Harvey Branscomb’s Comments <read>

Civilized society normally keeps ample records of how it makes decisions–much more so now with inexpensive digital record-keeping–allowing historians as well as the general public to help policy makers with productive improvements. Election policy too would benefit from guidance by similarly complete historical records. Instead, hundred year old laws are being interpreted to require consistent destruction of all records…

The court appears to have decided that Marilyn Marks, the plaintiff, has no viable argument, yet the court has not yet heard that argument. The judge acted only two days before a vital deposition was to be taken. This blocked a long-fought-for opportunity to obtain valuable information from the election contractor TrueBallot. That deposition would have informed the court and the public on the relationship of ballot images to the paper originals. It would have given a good indication of how beneficial to the public those images could be.

Update: 4/18/2010: Criticism of Caleb Kleppner Guest Editorial in Aspen Times Sept. 17, 2009: Aspen Election Transparency <read>

Two views of election transparency:  An OpEd, Annotated:

[Caleb Kleppner]Whether you like IRV or hate IRV, Aspen’s election was a model of transparency and verifiability, and American elections would be improved if they incorporated elements of Aspen’s election.

HB[Branscomb]>; I do not agree that Aspen was a “model” but I do agree that American elections would benefit from  more transparency and verifiability such as what Mr. Kleppner’s company provides.  For Aspen to become a model for a superior election, it is necessary to look at the details and come clean about the defects of this innovative election and to avoid making these mistakes again, whether you like or hate IRV.

Caleb Kleppner is a vice president at TrueBallot Inc., which has run elections for municipalities, labor unions, associations, state Democratic and Republican parties, and others over the past 15 years.

HB>; Harvie Branscomb is a Board Member of Coloradans for Voting Integrity, a Trustee of the Colorado Voter Group, and appointed by the Democratic Party to be Eagle County Canvass Board member.

Update 10/25/2010: Aspen Daily News: Do Away With IRV <read>

Phoenix: Ballots Missing – Integrity and Confidence Also Missing

“If we are correct,” Risner wrote in his Monday letter to the Attorney General’s office, concerning the absence of as many as 19,000 paper ballots, as estimated by observers of the counting in Phoenix, “the question arises as to what happened to those ballots.” The latest mystery adds still more fuel to the already high-stakes, long-sought hand-count, and raises new questions in the nearly three-years long

Update 4/22/2009: Attorney General says Original Result ‘Affirmed”, but questions remain <BradBlog>

However, when a reporter asked about that quote from our report last week, during today’s press conference, Goddard admitted they did not examine the tapes.

“The two things we wanted to hear, we didn’t,” J.T. Waldron, a documentary filmmaker who has been covering the years-long struggle for transparency in the RTA election, told us after the conference. “First, they admit they didn’t look at the poll tapes. Second, they admit that they didn’t do any forensic examination of the ballots” to see if they were legitimate. Critics have pointed out that Pima County has, since the 2006 election, purchased a ballot-on-demand printer and could have printed out ballots to match any ‘fixed’ ’06 ballot counts. The originals were printed by an offset printer, rather than ink-jet, as used in the ballot-on-demand system, and a forensic examination of a sample of ballots, with a microscope, might have revealed any such tampering.

“He said he didn’t have enough evidence to justify a forensic examination of the ballots,” Waldron noted.

Sad,  that with a bit more transparency, we might have confidence in the assessment.

**********
Update 4/16/2009:  AP Article also quoted in BradBlog follow-up:

What may be of even greater concern is the voting machines in Pima County, which includes Tucson, are similar to those used in 12 of Arizona’s 15 counties and in hundreds of jurisdictions across the country.
If it turns out the election was rigged by manipulating Diebold Elections Systems (now Premier Election Solutions Inc.) computer election programs, as some fear, it will show weaknesses in electronic balloting that could endanger the democratic process.

We would emphasize that we should not “fear, it will show weaknesses in electronic balloting that could endanger the democratic process”.  We should welcome the information so we can take action.  And even if it turns out this particular election was not rigged and had no errors, we should be worried that the real risks and dangers to democracy are ignored.

**********Original Post

Two stories on the recount of a 2006 election in Arizona currently underway.  AZCentral has a good background article, Vote probe raises fears over ‘fix’ <read>

Under the scrutiny of criminal investigators, election workers in Phoenix have spent the past week in a painstaking recount of 120,821 ballots that were cast three years ago for a Pima County transit tax.

The primary objective is to determine whether someone rigged the election by tampering with the optical-scan polling machines in Pima County, transforming “no” votes into “yes” votes…

And, no matter what happens with the recount, state Attorney General Terry Goddard said he is convinced the equipment jeopardizes election integrity.

“These (Premier) systems are very, very bad,” Goddard said. “(They) are not state of the art in terms of security. They are not state of the art in terms of transparency.”

Chris Riggall, a spokesman for Premier, said his company uses the most advanced technology available and urges clients to establish security protocols. Although there are internal safety features to prevent and detect tampering, Riggall added, those must be supported by external controls over election workers who handle the equipment.

“You can manipulate any voting system devised by man,” he said, noting that even paper ballots are subject to fraud…

During an initial investigation, the Attorney General’s Office hired an independent company to analyze the machines. Experts at iBeta Software Quality Assurance found a number of “irregularities” and determined that the Premier system had “fundamental security flaws.”

They reported that a trained technician could have altered the vote and removed all evidence of the crime. However, they concluded that human error was a more likely culprit than fraud because evidence of tampering had not been erased.

The Attorney General’s Office dropped the case in 2007, but the Democratic and Libertarian parties continued private investigations and filed lawsuits for election record…

Former Pima County employee Zbigniew Osmolski filed an affidavit in July alleging that he was in a Tucson lounge when Crane admitted that he had “fixed the RTA election on the instructions of his bosses” and was fearful of indictment…

Risner noted that, according to sworn courtroom testimony, Crane routinely took voting data home during elections and had his office computer connected to the GEMS system. He also claimed that Crane purchased a hacking device before the election, one with “no other purpose than to illegally alter the programming of precinct voting machines.”

Now for the latest disturbing part from Brad Friedman, ‘Thousands of Ballots’ May be ‘Missing’ from AZ’s Criminal Investigation Ballot Count in Phoenix<read>

“If we are correct,” Risner wrote in his Monday letter to the Attorney General’s office, concerning the absence of as many as 19,000 paper ballots, as estimated by observers of the counting in Phoenix, “the question arises as to what happened to those ballots.” The latest mystery adds still more fuel to the already high-stakes, long-sought hand-count, and raises new questions in the nearly three-years long investigation into the 2006 election results.

If the ballots are indeed missing, did they ever actually exist? Was the Diebold electronic ballot box stuffed? Have ballots been surreptitiously removed by someone for some reason?

As we have said there is no reason to be confident that referendums are not subject to skull duggery: FAQ: Why Would Anyone Steal A Referendum?

Reminder: We’re Better Off With Optical Scanners

OpEd News reminds us that it could have been much worse. A picture is worth a 1000 words!

For those who question the costs of our post-election audits, OpEd News reminds us that it could have been much worse. We could have been stuck with touch screens (DREs) which would have cost much more, are less safe even with a paper trail, and are much harder and more expensive to audit. A picture is worth a 1000 words! <read & view photo>

Also note that the November 2008 audit cost Connecticut about $0.06 per ballot cast.  That is a small price to pay when a typical high-turn-out election in Connecticut costs towns in the range of $5.00-$10.00 per ballot cast.   My polling place is a mile and a half away, so it costs me close to $1.00 round trip just to drive to vote.

A look back:  Hartford Courant Editorial, December 7, 2006:  A TrueVote Vindication, Connecticut owes TrueVote CT a debt of gratitude. <read>

CTVotersCount Testimony To The GAE Committee

Update: We provide Testimony Response & Clarification

The primary issues needing your attention are the post-election audits, ballot chain-of-custody, and the reporting of election results…As you consider the current audit laws and other bills before the committee effecting voting integrity and security, we encourage you to seek the best advice of legal experts, computer experts, security experts, and the experience of other states…What often is an attractive idea, also often has risky unintended consequences as well…

We want every citizen’s vote to be counted!
To be counted accurately!
And to be counted only once!

Update: 3/09/2009, comments on Secretary of The State’s Testimony <read>

Update: 2/24/2009, we provide Testimony Response & Clarification <read>

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The Government Administration and Elections Committee (GAE) held a public hearing on several elections bills on February 18, 2009.  CTVotersCount testified in favor of HB-6441 to improve the integrity of elections, while cautioning the committee about the voting integrity risks of several other bills.  The full testimony contains 17 pages of the most pertinent exhibits and references to additional supporting details <full testimony>

Update: Most of the testimony from yesterday is online <here>. Several citizens supported HR-6441 and the problems it addresses.  Others addressed concerns with the costs, effort, and details of the bill.  I am preparing a detailed response to some of the concerns raised including some suggested revised text for the bill.

Summary of my Testimony:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am the Executive Director of Connecticut Voters Count and the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition. Today I am representing Connecticut Voters Count. My testimony does not necessarily represent the views of the Coalition or its other members.

I am a Certified Moderator and have personally observed eighteen (18) post-election audits in municipalities across the state. I am also a retired computer scientist and software engineer involved in voting integrity since 2004.

I am here again to ask that you improve the election laws to provide real confidence to the voters of Connecticut. The primary issues needing your attention are the post-election audits, ballot chain-of-custody, and the reporting of election results.

Currently we have a weak chain-of-custody for ballots, dependent on unenforceable procedures that are often violated. We need stronger, enforceable protection for the ultimate record of our votes.

The election results posted on the Secretary of the State’s web site are inaccurate, difficult to check, and provide no confidence that critical results are correctly certified. These results are accumulated by an error prone three step process of transcription and addition, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office. Advocates from across the state have found obvious errors almost everywhere they have looked.

Based on five public hearings last year and on the Coalition reports of four post-election audits, we continue to conclude that the audits as performed are inaccurate, unreliable, and ineffective. Fortunately, we can make the audits much more effective, without counting more ballots.

We remain committed to an Independent Audit Board, relieving the Secretary of the State, towns, and registrars of the audit work. However, in these fiscally challenging times we have also proposed text for HB-6441 which would make significant improvements without significant fiscal impact.

Even though most members of the GAE are lawyers, when the committee drafted campaign finance law, you sought the advice of The Brennan Center for Justice. As you consider the current audit laws and other bills before the committee effecting voting integrity and security, we encourage you to seek the best advice of legal experts, computer experts, security experts, and the experience of other states.

We don’t claim that our proposed text is perfect. One contributor is a lawyer. I am a computer expert. Yet, we turn to the collective work and experience of many others. Attached to my testimony are references endorsed by nationally recognized groups and individuals, used for drafting HB-6441. The Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits created by a variety of experts, endorsed by the Brennan Center for Justice, Common Cause, Verified Voting, the American Statistical Association, CTVotersCount, TrueVoteCT and others; and a similar document from the League of Women Voters, U.S.

We urge you to seek and follow the advice of recognized subject matter experts and the experience of other states as you consider improving our voting systems. What often is an attractive idea, also often has risky unintended consequences as well.

Summary
We want every citizen’s vote to be counted!
To be counted accurately!
And to be counted only once!

Thank you.