Category: CT Law

Secretary Bysiewicz Orders Expanded Post-Election Audit

Update: 8/20
Checking with Dr. Shvartsman about the Secretary’s “98% or 99% probability”, he said:

Indeed, 10% sample from the population of about 800, counting all CT districts, gives about the same statistical result as 33% sample from the population of about 250, counting only the districts involved in the August primary…there is no inference of any kind to be made about adequacy/inadequacy of the 10% sample. The recommendation was based purely on the basis of the population size being reduced from about 800 to about 250.

In general I agree with Dr. Shvartsman. If we were auditing one race over any reasonable number of districts, then what is important is the sample size so 10% x 800 = 80 and 33% x 250 = 83.

For instance, if we want to do a poll of Connecticut and New York voters, if we sample 1000 voters in each state, the resulting confidence is about the same, even though the number of voters in each state is very different.

And given the nature of Connecticut’s audit law and the interaction of the 10% district selection followed by the random selection of races, it is a wholly different calculation.

Further what the Secretary of the State seemed to be claiming had to do with a proof that the machines were working properly, which is a whole different situation – hard to even define given the nature of the audit.

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Original Post:
Secretary more than triples legislature’s 10% audit mandate for primary, 82 districts in 33 towns to be audited.

Along with several advocates, I participated in the post-election audit drawing this morning. Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz indicated they were “advised by Dr. Shvartsman of UConn” with such a small number of districts that this larger sample would provide “98% or 99% probability” that the machines functioned properly. She also reiterated that the November 2007 post-election audits showed that the machines performed “extremely accurately and securely” the only errors were those of voters filling out ballots incorrectly – We dispute that.

In general I am pleased to learn that the Secretary of the State sees that the current audit law is inadequate and that statistics should play a role in determining the level of post-election audits. On the other hand, I would spend additional and existing post-election auditing/recounting resources in ways that would provide higher levels of confidence more efficiently and effectively. These mechanisms as articulated in our petition include:

  • Variable audits by race, based on the number of districts and originally reported margin (i.e. much lower audit levels for races such as the biggest one in this election, the 4th congressional district primary with a margin over 70%)
  • Dropping the exemption of districts with recounted races from the audits
  • Dropping the exemption of centrally counted absentee ballots from the audits
  • Re-instituting hand-counts for close elections – the Secretary supported them for two elections, but now has gone back to machine recounting – one race in this election in New Britain was won by three votes, such races should be recounted by hand (as of this point we have not verified if this election was recounted by hand or was recounted by machine)
  • Dropping the exemption from the audit of counting ballots that were originally counted by hand – we support auditing all ballots – if the November 2007 audits proved anything, they proved election officials do not have confidence in their ability to count ballots by hand accurately without independent verification;
  • And with a chain-of-custody we can trust, registrars can follow, and that is enforceable.

The Secretary also indicated that this audit would prove that the machines were ready for the November election. Once again, CTVotersCount respectfully disagrees: The memory cards are programmed before each election so one post-election audit is limited in its ability to provide insight into the integrity of another election; This may help verify that the machines generally perform well and may not have been compromised by the mandatory vendor (LHS) maintenance performed on the machines this summer; However, as we have said and UConn reports have shown the machines can be programmed to change results based on all sorts of criteria. This makes real the Computer Science reality that any test cannot be conclusive.

Speaking of UConn and the Secretary of the State’s office, we continue to await the promised memory cards test reports from the February Primary and the legally mandated post-election audit reports from that same primary. So far we must go with the Coalition reports for that primary which indicate that due to procedural lapses the value of those audits remain questionable.

We half agree with the Secretary’s statement today:

“Auditing election results isn’t just a good idea, it’s absolutely essential in order to guarantee the integrity of our elections,” said Secretary Bysiewicz. “As Connecticut prepares for perhaps its highest turnout election in a generation, it is important voters have faith that their vote will be recorded accurately and that’s why the independent audits are so vital.”

Yet, we would prefer to have “confidence” rather than “faith” that everyone’s vote will be recorded accurately.

List of towns and districts:
Continue reading “Secretary Bysiewicz Orders Expanded Post-Election Audit”

CT Irony #3: Passed in 2005: Tougher Audits and Custody for Equipment/Paper We Don’t Use

In 2005 the Legislature passed the Voter Verified Paper Trail Bill. They also passed post-election audits along with a minimum one hundred and eighty day seal on the paper. Unfortunately, they had not anticipated optical scan, limiting the audit to DRE (Touch Screen) equipment. We actually have tougher post-election audits and custody laws on the books that would have applied to DRE than apply to the optical scanners we do have. We are not advocating DRE machines, Connecticut voters have a much safer, auditable, economical voting system with optical scan.

We have pointed out many weaknesses in the optical scan audit law passed in 2007 which applies to optical scan. Among the inadequacies of the law are that we don’t audit enough of the votes, we don’t do it soon enough after the election, and we have a questionable chain-of-custody provision which many believe only lasts fourteen days – with the audits starting on day fifteen. But on the books is a much tougher audit law for DRE’s which does not apply to optical scanners. This law has a much bigger audit, started sooner, audits all races and questions, and with a much longer and clearer chain-of-custody This would be an expensive audit as DRE paper tapes are much more time consuming to audit than paper ballots: Sec. 9-242b. Procedures for use of direct recording electronic voting machines

(5) Not later than five business days after each election in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least (A) two direct recording electronic voting machines used in each assembly district, or (B) a number of direct recording electronic voting machines equal to fifty per cent of the number of voting districts in the municipality, whichever is less. Not later than five business days after a primary in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrar of voters of the party holding the primary shall conduct such a manual audit by designating two or more individuals, one of whom may be the registrar, representing at least two candidates in the primary. The machines audited under this subdivision shall be selected in a random drawing that is announced in advance to the public and is open to the public. All direct recording electronic voting machines used within an assembly district shall have an equal chance of being selected for the audit. The Secretary of the State shall determine and publicly announce the method of conducting the random drawing, before the election. The manual audit shall consist of a manual tabulation of the contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records produced by each voting machine subject to the audit and a comparison of such count, with respect to all candidates and any questions or proposals appearing on the ballot, with the electronic vote tabulation reported for such voting machine on the day of the election or primary…

(6) The individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records contemporaneously produced by any direct recording electronic voting machine in use at an election or primary held on or after July 1, 2005, shall be carefully preserved and returned in their designated receptacle in accordance with the requirements of section 9-266, 9-302 or 9-310, whichever is applicable, and may not be opened or destroyed, except during recanvass or manual audit as set forth in this section, for one hundred eighty days following an election or primary that does not include a federal office, pursuant to section 9-310, or for twenty-two months following an election or primary involving a federal office, pursuant to 42 USC 1974, as amended from time to time.

What we need in Connecticut is a stronger, independent, more comprehensive, more timely post-election audit of all types of ballots cast with a stronger chain-of-custody.

Connecticut Fails Lastest Holt Standard

Hats off again to Representative Rush Holt. Once again he offers emergency legislation to protect our vote. Even this streamlined bill is unlikely to pass. We admire Representative Holt for not giving up. We encourage him to persevere until we have election integrity. Meanwhile Senator Feinstein supports a phony, star-wars expensive, delaying plan. Here in Connecticut, the law our Secretary of the State calls the “strongest” and “toughest” falls far short of the minimum Holt bill standards. <read>

The bill would authorize funding for states that conduct audits that meet basic minimum requirements, including the use of a random selection, the requirement that audits be conducted with independence, at least a 2 percent audit sample, and public observation. All ballots must be included in the audit and they must begin within 48 hours and be completed prior to certification of the result. Only about a dozen states currently conduct audits.


Random Selection: Connecticut has it but the random selection of races is not always required to be public.

Independence: In Connecticut all decisions are made by the Secretary of the State and counting is done by local officials – this completely fails independence.

All Ballots Included: In Connecticut, hand counted ballots, central count absentee ballots, and provisional ballots are excluded. In addition districts with recounts or contests are excluded.

Begin within 48 hours: By law Connecticut audits cannot begin until after 336 hours.

FAQ: Why Bother Auditing Referendums & Questions?

The Connecticut post-election audit exempts, among other things, all referendums and questions. This is a mistake.

Referendums and questions may be the most vulnerable election items open to human attack via programming – often all the elected officials of both parties want the referendums passed – they may go through multiple, failed, low turn-out, budget referendums and say to themselves “if the majority of the voters turned out it would pass” and be tempted to make sure it passes. Or one tax-averse ballot programmer, a high asset individual, or even a single election official may want to make sure a new or higher tax does not pass.

Now we have an example from Puma County, AZ of a potentially corrupt election, possibly changed by the actions of a single individual ordered by an election official. Via BradBlog since the underlying link to the original article seems broken <read>

According to Osmolski’s affidavit :

During that conversation Bryan Crane told me he “fixed” the RTA, or Regional Transportation Authority election on the instructions of his bosses and he did what he was told to do. Mr. Crane expressed his concern about being indicted and said he would like to talk but couldn’t trust anyone.

The affidavit is the latest in a series of red flags concerning the RTA election. Other red flags include: (1) This was a sales tax increase, the type of vote that usually fails, and it looked like it was going down in the days prior to the election; (2) The database on the vote counting computer was erased and replaced a day into the early ballot scanning; (3) Unauthorized vote total summary reports were printed during the counting; (4) A tape of the original ballot layout stored with the Secretary of State — which could have indicated if the vote was flipped — was sent back to the County, which lost it; (5) An investigation into the election completed by the Attorney General’s office was cursory and inconclusive.

I’ll hold judgement on the merits of this particular case at least until the votes are counted, the chain-of-custody broken, or the ballots destroyed, whichever comes first.

Panel In Fairfield – What Do You Want?

Last night I was on a panel in Fairfield with Deputy Secretary of the State Lesley Mara, Dr. Alex Shvartsman from the UConn VoTeR Center, and Michael Kozik of the Secretary of the State’s Office. The event was video taped by the sponsors. If possible I will make the video availabe here. For now, here are my opening remarks, my topic was “What Do You Want”:

Fairfield Panel

Introduction

Thanks to Jody Eiseman for creating this event and to the Fairfield Democratic Town Committee for hosting it. Thanks to everyone of you in the audience for coming tonight.

I want to thank Dr. Shvartsman, Mike Kozik, and Deputy Mara for being here tonight. A bit over three years ago I was on a panel with the previous Deputy Secretary of the State. That panel directly precipitated actions that were instrumental in the passage of the paper ballot bill in 2005 and the eventual rejection of Touch Screen (DRE) voting equipment in early 2007.

CTVotersCount is committed to voting integrity and that our democracy flourishes.

Lest we forget, democracy is dependent on the voting integrity of every district in your town; dependent on the voting integrity of every district in the state; and indeed every district in the nation.

My Topic Tonight
Continue reading “Panel In Fairfield – What Do You Want?”

CT Irony #2: The Closest Races Will Never Be Audited

Nor will they ever be hand-counted. Nor will contested races.

Connecticut’s “strongest in the country” post-election audit law exempts races that are recounted or races that are contested from post-election audits. The law does not require that recounts be manual hand-to-eye counts and the Secretary of the State after some hesitation has lifted her requirement that recounts be manual.

Worse. If one race in a district is contested or subject to recount, the district is entirely exempt from the post-election audit.

  • Example #1: (Actual) When Representative Caruso contested the mayoral primary in Bridgeport, it exempted his race and all the races and districts in Bridgeport from the post-election audit entirely.
  • Example #2: (Theoretical) A state-wide race, such as Governor, Senator, or Attorney General could be close and cause a recount resulting in no post-election audit in the entire state.
  • Example #3: (Theoretical) Candidate A is the apparent winner of a fraudulently stolen race for the Connecticut House that would likely be detected by a post-election audit. But candidate B who lost the Connecticut Senate race in a senate district including the House district can conspire to block the audit of A’s race by contesting the Senate election.

Further Irony: We randomly select races to audit with no exceptions. We will audit/count races where candidates are unopposed, leaving other races unaudited.

Warning: This Elecition Will Not Be Audited

The following report about a recent election in Plainfield raises several issues:

  • The Help America Vote Act does not require electronic voting. All paper balloting for federal elections is OK. But according to this article not in Connecticut.
  • In general we have no problems with all paper ballot elections, although there is attraction to the security of counting by machine followed by a sufficient audit involving a strong chain-of-custody (since errors or fraud would be harder to accomplish, requiring multiple independent mistakes, or coordinated machine and paper fraud.
  • But we do raise a concern with any vote “election”, “primary”, “special election”, “question”, or “referendum” that is not audited. Like every “question”, “special election”, or “referendum” in Connecticut, this one will go entirely unaudited.
  • We have an especial concern with paper ballots that are not audited. We have gone through two major post-election audits and several public hearings where election officials in towns and at the state level have consistently claimed that election officials in Connecticut are unable to reliably count paper ballots.
  • While we believe that paper ballots can be counted accurately by Connecticut election officials, unless the officials believe it is possible and take the appropriate precautions it is very risky. (Actually it should be easier to count during audits rather than on election night with possibly tired election officials who have had a long long day.)
  • In the February Presidential Primary several towns had a shortage of ballots, necessitating hand counting of copy machine ballots — they were never audited. This is a very big vulnerability and loophole in our election laws.

PS: I personally observed the February Presidential Primary Post-Election Audit in Plainfield. Of the twelve audits I haved observed it was one of the most transparent and reliable counts I have seen. So I have no reason to doubt the result in this case.

Plainfield budget clarification: Paper ballot use was OK <original>

By DUSTIN RACIOPPI
Norwich Bulletin
Posted May 20, 2008 @ 05:02 PM
Plainfield, Conn. –

The Board of Selectmen’s decision to not use the electronic voting machine at Monday’s referendum on the $44.4 million budget was not in violation of Connecticut state statues, a spokesman from the Secretary of State’s office said.

It was unclear Monday night whether or not the move, which First Selectman Paul Sweet said was to save money, was in accordance with the statutes.

Adam Joseph, spokesman for Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz, said towns must use the new voting machines for elections, but for referenda they may be used at the town’s discretion.

Both the education and general government budgets failed Monday.

Tell Your Rep You Want Voter Integrity, Not Just Privacy!

Bysiewicz Urges Passage of S.B. 444 – We Urge Amendment #6141

Many of the changes necessary to start Connecticut on the road to stronger, effective audits that were in H.B. 5888 have now been offered as an amendment #6141 by Reps Caruso and Urban to S.B.444:

  • An Independent Audit Board
  • A Stronger Chain-of-Custody for Memory Cards, Optical Scanners and Ballots
  • 100% Independent Pre-Election Testing of Memory Cards

Continue reading “Tell Your Rep You Want Voter Integrity, Not Just Privacy!”

Reform Moves Forward In Connecticut

While Federal reform is delayed, reform moved forward yesterday in Connecticut. The General Assembly Appropriations Committee passed H.B. 5888 with a joint favorable recommendation to the Legislature. On March 19th, the Government Administration and Elections Committee also passed the bill with a joint favorable recommendation.

H.B. 5888, An Act Concerning Revisions To The Optical Scan Voting System, makes one large future leap forward, along with several small and moderate improvements to increase election integrity in the near term. Its most important provision is to create an independent audit board:

Not later than December 1, 2008, the board shall develop standards and procedures for conducting audits of elections and primaries. In developing such standards and procedures, the board shall be cognizant of the current level of science utilized in the area of election auditing. Additionally, subject to any other provisions of law, such standards and procedures shall enable any such audit to commence within forty-eight hours of the time when state election officials announce the final unofficial vote in each district…

An Independent Audit Board will provide an opportunity to dramatically revise our current post-election audits which are inadequate and have proven ineffective in practice.

Another notable provision is for the 100% independent testing of memory cards within the State of Connecticut, prior to their shipment to registrars. This one provision alone will go a long way to prevent errors and fraud, while greatly reducing the burden of “junk” memory cards imposed on registrars:

Not later than October 1, 2008 … the Secretary of the State shall select a separate entity that shall be responsible for the testing of such memory cards: (1) After such programming but prior to shipment to registrars of voters, and (2) after the applicable election. Such testing shall be located within the state. The Secretary of the State shall implement procedures for the secure transport of such memory cards to and from the entities described in this section.

While we would have stronger audits, codified, and started sooner, we fully support the bill as it will move Connecticut forward with an Independent Audit Board, while in the meantime increasing election integrity.

Our thanks to the GAE Committee leadership for holding public hearings across the state < 1 2 3 4 5 >, developing, and supporting this bill. We also thank the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, for her support of the Independent Audit Board which will provide an audit entirely independent of her office.

Much work remains to be accomplished. The most pressing item is passing H.B. 5888 by the full legislature.