Category: Internet Voting

Hacked newspaper recommends online voting

They also forget absentee voting fraud in Connecticut, while their print edition confuses tech-savvy with technical expertise.

Hartford Courant editorial supports Secretary of the State’s and Governor’s initiative, while asking for more: State Changes Will Make It Easier To Vote – New Initiatives: State officials want to increase voter participation <read>

January 19, 2012

Although 14 states have taken steps to make it more difficult to vote — by requiring identification that some people don’t possess, for example — Secretary of the State Denise Merrill, with the backing of Gov. Dannel P. Malloy, is pushing Connecticut in the other direction.

Good for them. Voting is the essence of democracy. Making it easier to vote will increase a citizen’s stake in government.

Ms. Merrill unveiled her package of reforms on Monday, the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who called ballot access a bedrock civil right. The secretary of the state noted that in Connecticut nearly one-third of eligible voters are not registered, barely 30 percent of registered voters turned out in last fall’s municipal elections, and only 57 percent voted in the statewide and congressional elections in 2010.

That’s a worrisome dropoff in participation. Cynicism over partisan gridlock in Washington may have something to do with paltry voter participation, but so do antiquated election laws and practices.

As an antidote to voter malaise, Ms. Merrill proposes that Connecticut law allow Election Day registration, no-excuse absentee voting and online voter registration. She also proposes to increase criminal penalties on those who tamper with voting equipment or who interfere with, threaten or intimidate voters. Those are good changes — for starters. She and lawmakers should consider online voting and various forms of early voting as well.

Changes to absentee voting will take a constitutional amendment, but should be pursued. This is one promising avenue to increased voter participation. So is Election Day registration. Ms. Merrill says that in the nine states that have some form of Election Day registration, turnout has improved an average of 8 to 10 percent.

Opponents of these worthy efforts to improve access to the ballot raise the specter of fraud. That hasn’t been what experience teaches.

[Emphasis ours]

The Courant seems a bit forgetful. Online voting is risky.

We also note that the Courant makes two common errors in the final sentence of the editorial. I guess they, like the New York Times, question the obligation to present actual facts in the paper:

  • According to the best science available, early voting including non-excuse absentee voting do NOT increase voter turn-out (it DECREASES IT). Similar information was provided to the Secretary of the State’s Election Performance Task Force.
  • While there are few instances of votER fraud that many fear from election day registration and online registration, there are plenty of instances after most elections of the more dangerous votING fraud with absentee ballots. Even in the Courant’s state and backyard there is a hi story of fraud and allegations of fraud.<See here here here>

While we are at it, there is an relationship between what goes on in Washington and Hartford; between what goes on in the news section and the editorial section of the paper. In a blog entry yesterday Courant Reporter Daniela Altimari asks: How Tech-Savvy is the State’s Congressional Delegation? <read>

Sadly tech-savvy, meaning that representatives use iPads or listen to iTunes can be confused as Altimari points out at the end of the post:

Owning an iPad and a Netflix membership doesn’t mean you know the ins and outs of DNS filtering and the other complex technical issues surrounding SOPA. But if you are in a position of voting on potentially ground-breaking legislation with far-reaching implications, a grasp of how the Internet works is key.

Sadly this last paragraph was dropped from the print edition of the paper, leaving most readers with the impression that tech-savvy and consumerism are equivalent. As we said in a comment on the blog post:

Using an iPad or listening to iTunes is certainly not equivalent to understanding Internet. Sort of like confusing Dr. Mel [legendary CT meteorologist 1945-2012]  with a person who uses a snowblower. Sadly there remains only one Scientist in all of the U.S. Congress, Rep Rush Holt, unless one considers medical doctors and dentists. I can’t help but note that PIPA sounds like a tribute to Ted Stevens who famously referred to the Internet as a series of tubes. (Actually Stevens may have been unfairely ridiculed here as data communications experts often explain bandwidth variations in terms of garden hoses, fire hoses, and rivers – there is a pretty direct analogy – Stevens may at least have attepted to talk to experts)

The Courant hits some good points, yet ironically misses the mark on election accountability

Starting the year with a focus on accountability, the Courant Editorial Board overlooked integrity when it editorialized on elections. They also presented some ideas that we can and have supported

Starting the year with a focus on accountability, the Courant Editorial Board overlooked integrity when it editorialized on elections. They also presented some ideas that we can and have supported <read>

Voting. Voters report to one of hundreds of precincts on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, unless they have a specific reason to apply for an absentee ballot. The system worked well when more women were at home and more people walked to the polls.

Should it be tweaked to fit the needs of the 21st century? Secretary of the State Denise Merrill thinks so, and she is right. With the technology available today, there’s no reason that online registration should not become the norm — and, as soon as it can be adequately secured, online voting. A voter should be able to get an absentee ballot for any reason.

We agree that online line registration is a good thing that can save money, increase convenience, and increase integrity.

But when it comes to unlimited absentee balloting and online voting we disagree.

After every election we hear stories from around the country of absentee ballot fraud. Here in Connecticut we have had several charges, prosecutions, and penalties in our largest cities involving absentee voting fraud.

We recently had a symposium hosted by the Secretary of the State with national experts pointing out the risks of online voting, even if it were restricted to military and overseas voters. Fortunately the Courant called for waiting until “as soon as it can be adequately secured” – that will likely be a long time away given that it would require the repeal of a major theorem of computer science.

It may be possible for towns to save money by using regional voting centers. Instead of voting on Tuesdays, how about weekend voting? Voting by mail may make sense. The idea is to have a robust debate over what will work best in Connecticut.

Perhaps we should have that robust debate – a robust debate with everyone at the table – more than a couple of op-eds at the Courant. If security is a concern and the debate includes election integrity advocates and security experts -with complete, fair coverage in the new media, old media, and  extensive legislative hearings we expect we would find it too risky for democracy.

Voting on weekends instead of Tuesday would, in our opinion, need to start with a U.S. Constitutional amendment. There is a reason for an set national day for Federal elections – so that all states vote on the same day, such that voting does not continue after partial results are known. There other issues to consider with weekend voting <see>.

Regional voting centers would be convenient. The convenience would come at a considerable price – perhaps towns would save money if the State paid for it. In our opinion, it would require a Connecticut Constitutional Amendment to allow the State to take over some of the town by town responsibility for voting. Watch for debates along the lines of redistricting debates about the number and locations of the regional voting centers.

Registrars. If voting is dragged into the 21st century, it then behooves us to ask if each and every town needs to continue spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on two registrars of voters. Would one nonpartisan registrar do the trick for a town — or even a regional registrar?

At the very least, the legislature must eliminate a quirk in the law that has caused Hartford to have three registrars. The law says the candidates for registrar of voters who garner the highest and second-highest number of votes win the posts. But if a major-party candidate — Democrat or Republican —- is not among the top two finishers, that candidate must also be named a registrar.

In 2008, a Working Families Party candidate outpolled the Republican registrar, meaning that both of them, along with the Democrat, are all registrars. The cost of the extra registrar approaches a quarter-million dollars, money the city can ill afford to waste. Change the law.

We agree with evaluating regional registrars – we support professional civil service election management – “doing for elections what we have done for probate”. It would also require a Constitutional Amendment and effective, deliberate planning.

But as we have pointed out before there are good reasons when registrars are political having the check and balance of two individuals of opposing parties. We also see the original logic in having three registrars in situations like Hartford. And as we have pointed out before there is no reason why Hartford had to increase total salaries and staffing just because a third registrar was elected.

Americans Elect – A license to steal the presidency?

This is seriously dangerous. If you don’t join Americans Elect, their vote could determine the President. If you do join Americans Elect, the vote could be manipulated in the backroom or by hackers. Or the self-appointed board could override the actual vote.

We have written before of Americans Elect it seems the real story gets more and more suspect, more and more dangerous. A new story/investigation in Irregular Times: Americans Elect: A Corporation and a Political Party <read>

This is seriously dangerous. If you don’t join Americans Elect, their vote could determine the President. If you do join Americans Elect, the vote could be manipulated in the backroom or by hackers. Or the self-appointed board could override the actual vote.

In July of 2011, Americans Elect Chief Operating Officer Elliot Ackerman declared, “The key delineation to make is that we’re not a party.” These unequivocal claims are contradicted by Americans Elect’s observable behavior; Americans Elect has registered as a political party in a number of states…

Why does it matter whether Americans Elect is or is not a political party? As a registered 501c4 corporation, Americans Elect can hide the sources of unlimited funding from the American people. If it declared itself to be a political party, it would have to follow the rules for political parties, which include significant limitations to how much money they may take from individuals and mandate disclosure of them. Americans Elect is simultaneously using party status to get on the ballot for 2012 and sloughing off party status to avoid contribution requirements…

There are three elections envisioned by the Americans Elect bylaws, two of them taking place online. The first election is to select an Americans Elect presidential nominee, and only registered Americans Elect Delegates (see below) will be able to participate. The second election is the presidential election on Election Day 2012, one in which the Americans Elect nominee will be on the ballot in all 50 states and in which every registered voter in America will be able to participate as usual. The third election will take place after the November presidential election if no candidate wins a majority of electoral votes. In that circumstance, Americans Elect will hold another online vote of its Delegates to decide whether the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate will be given the electoral votes won by Americans Elect’s candidate. This third election would allow Americans Elect to throw the presidency to either party, a powerful position to hold. Americans Elect needs to win just one state in order to occupy that powerful position and trigger a third election…

In the top tier of Americans Elect is the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors and only the Board of Directors appoints its own members and corporate officers. The Board of Directors and its appointed designates write the rules for the Americans Elect elections and may overrule all actions of Employees. The Board of Directors may overrule nearly all actions of Delegates and writes the rules within which Delegates “independently” make a presidential nomination, constraining Delegates’ choices. The Board of Directors is the only body in the entire Americans Elect system to make procedural decisions by democratic majority vote, making it the swiftest means for Americans Elect to take political action…

Another reason why Americans Elect needs to disclose information about its origins, funding and activities is its unfortunate history. It’s not just that Americans Elect is currently making claims that don’t match the observable facts; there’s a history of misrepresentation, misdirection and malfunction in Americans Elect’s previous effort under the name Unity08

These are just some snippets. The full details in the article demonstrate the dangers.

 

If banks loose billions online, why would we leave democracy to online voting?

Even if ecommerce transactions were safe, the security technology underpinning them would not suffice for voting. In particular, the voting security and privacy requirements are unique and in tension in a way that has no analog in the ecommerce world.

If banks loose billions online, why would we leave democracy to online voting?<.pdf>

This is a very fair question, and it deserves a careful, thorough answer because the reasons are not obvious. Unfortunately it requires substantial development to explain fully. But in brief, our answer is in two-parts:

  1. It is not actually “safe” to conduct ecommerce transactions online. It is in fact very risky, and more so every day. Essentially all those risks apply equally to online voting transactions.
  2. The technical security, privacy, and transparency requirements for voting are structurally different from, and actually much more stringent than, those for ecommerce transactions. Even if ecommerce transactions were safe, the security technology underpinning them would not suffice for voting. In particular, the voting security and privacy requirements are unique and in tension in a way that has no analog in the ecommerce world.

The rest of this essay expands upon these two points in order.

Beware: Americans Elect – We were just too optimistic

We were just too optimistic, yet prophetic when we suggested the founders might not be happy with anything but their type of candidate.

In July we posted about Americans Elect a new third party aimed directly at the center of politics as defined by Tom Friedman: Friedman predicts 2012 Presidential candidate via Estonia-like Internet voting system <read> Sadly we were just plain too optimistic when we said things such as:

This is  reminiscent of the article on Estonian voting we covered yesterday. No mention of any transparency in the development, testing, and operation of the actual system. Rather than quoting independent technical experts, we see the system pronounced safe by the architect. Did Ronald Reagan say “Trust Me”?  Of course not. Actually it sounds like something Bernard Madoff might have said. President Reagan actually said “Trust But Verify”…

Or maybe the process is not “hijacked” but the people create a party platform close to some of the results we have seen in some recent polls? A platform of banning guns, protecting Social Security, universal health care, and decriminalization of pot? (Remember when Obama asked his supporters to vote on initiatives after the election? Not much publicity after they voted pot decriminalization as the top priority). What is scary is the potential for insiders to actually hijack the process by disqualifying or discrediting such votes. Or outsiders successfully attacking the system undetected.

No mention here of the possibility of candidates being chosen such as Dennis Kucinich, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, or, Pat Roberson forbid, Michael Moore, Keith Olberman, or Ralph Nadar.

It does not sound transparent financially or electorally. Yet, I can see why almost everyone would want to sign-up to promote their favorite type of candidates and party platform.

We were just too optimistic, yet prophetic when we suggested the founders might not be happy with anything but their type of candidate. So now we have an article from Politico confirming our worst fears and them some. Democracy deficit at Americans Elect? <read>

Rather than gush about this group, I fear many aspects of it: its secrecy; the uncertain security for its Internet election and, most important, the lack of democracy in its system for electing a presidential nominee.

While it is providing voters a path to choose a presidential ticket through the democratizing force of the Internet, the process can, in fact, be overruled by a small board of directors, who organized the group. This board is to have unfettered discretion in picking a committee that can boot the presidential ticket chosen by voters if it is not sufficiently ?centrist and even dump the committee if it doesn’t like the direction it’s heading...

Campaign finance reformers have already condemned Americans Elect for switching its organizational status under the Tax Code from political organization to 501(c)(4) social welfare organization. This change allows an organization to shield its donors…

Kahlil Byrd, the president of Americans Elect, told NPR that the group does not disclose donors because they fear retribution…Who is going to throw a Molotov cocktail through the window of a radical centrist?

Perhaps one reason Americans Elect is hiding the names of its donors is that people might draw conclusions about the group’s interests based on the contributors — especially given the rumor that most of its money comes from the hedge fund industry...

Despite the veneer of democracy created by having ?delegates? choose a presidential candidate through a series of Internet votes, the unelected, unaccountable board of Americans Elect, funded by secret money, will control the process for choosing a presidential and vice presidential candidate — who could well appear on the ballot in all 50 states.

Update: 05/01/2012 Yet another silent majority of almost none starts biting the dust. We are not surprised.

Americans Elect Cancels its First Primary Ballot — not enough Actual People want their Candidates <read>

Well, most Americans don’t agree. As the Pew Research Center documented in a poll last December, most Americans don’t buy centrist talk. Most Americans — three out of four of them — believe there is “too much power in the hands of a few rich people and large corporations”. Most Americans believe the “country’s economic system unfairly favors the wealthy.” Most Americans “believe Wall Street hurts the economy more than it helps.” These are not centrist positions. They’re not Americans Elect’s positions. The few financiers of Americans Elect whose names have been leaked out are Wall Street money managers and hedge fund operators. Americans Elect spokeswoman Ileana Wachtel last week declared of her organization: “No one at AE can dispute that Mr. Peterson’s message is the right one.” “Mr. Peterson” is billionaire Pete Peterson, who wants to cut social security, cut medicare, cut medicaid and make this country safer for big business.

Senator not impressed by Science and Online Voting Symposium

[Senator] Kane was unable to attend the Oct. 27 panel discussion, but dismissed the warnings from computer scientists. We hope he at least took the time to review the videos of the symposium online.

On October 27th, the Secretary of the State held a Symposium on Online Voting with experts from around the country and the world. Not in attendance was the Senator who sponsored this year’s Online Voting bill, Senator Kane.  The Senator continues to dispute the arguments of the computer scientists. Today’s report from the Waterbury Republican-American: Online voting on minds of lawmakers – Secretary of the state scraps idea; cites security concerns<read>

We hope he at least took the time to review the videos of the symposium online.

Lawmakers came close to requiring that state election officials implement online voting this year, with an eye toward allowing military personnel overseas easier access to the ballot box.

A Watertown lawmaker plans to make a fresh attempt in the next regular session.

Computer scientists who took part in an Oct. 27 panel discussion organized by Secretary of the State Denise Merrill said, unanimously, such a system cannot possibly be secured…

Sen. Robert J. Kane, R-Watertown, said in a telephone interview Friday he remains a proponent to online voting, and plans to introduce new legislation that would require the state to open an electronic ballot box accessible over the Internet.

Kane was unable to attend the Oct. 27 panel discussion, but dismissed the warnings from computer scientists.

“We, as you know, transfer millions of dollars every day via the Internet, via the computer,” Kane said, referring to the use of online systems by banks and financial markets. “Just think about all the commerce that gets done. If we can do that, why can’t we allow our military personnel who are fighting for our country, serving oversees, the ability to vote online for the elections they are defending when they defend our country?”

Shvartsman said banks generally accept a 2 percent loss to online fraud, and there are other key differences between banking and voting systems.

Rivest said the most important difference is the fraud can be identified in a banking system, because there are statements and other records that can be used to verify transactions after the fact, and identify errors or malicious intrusions. That is not possible in a voting system designed to protect the secrecy of each individual’s vote.

As I said in the first comment on the article:

Sad that in the name of serving soldiers we risk the very democracy they serve to preserve.

Also overlooked in [Senator] Kane’s approach are many non-military overseas voters including: State Department staff, Volunteers serving in places such as Haiti or Darfur, Peace Corps volunteers, business people, oil rig employees, missionaries, and military contractors.

There is a much better, more cost effective solution with much lower risk. Provide military and overseas voters with ballots and absentee applications online that can be printed and mailed in a single envelope. The military even provides free express mail, and a special $25 rate is available in most countries for all overseas voters. This system has proven to be effective.

Hopefully, the legislators who attended the Symposium or view it online will understand science or trust the scientists.

Secretary of the State’s Online Voting Symposium

An excellent panel of experts on voting technology and the challenges of overseas voting. Credit is due to the panelists, the Secretary, and those who contributed behind the scenes in making this event possible. John Dankowski, of Connecticut Public Broadcasting did an exemplary job of moderating a very civil, thorough debate. If only typical panels and Legislative hearings could be more like this format, interactive, civil, and informative.

On October 27th, the Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill held an ‘Online Voting Symposium’ at Central Connecticut State University (CCSU) in New Britain. We were there with our amateur video. The Connecticut Television Network (CT-N) was also there. When CT-N videos become available we will also post them here.

Summary

This is was an exceptional panel of experts on voting technology and the challenges of overseas voting. Credit is due to the panelists, the Secretary, and those who contributed behind the scenes in making this event possible. John Dankowski, of Connecticut Public Broadcasting did an exemplary job of moderating a very civil, thorough debate. If only typical panels and Legislative hearings could be more like this format, interactive, civil, and informative.

On a rainy/snowy night with competing demands at the State Capitol, we were pleased that several Legislators attended. In total about eighty people attended with a good mixture of registrars of voters, town clerks, and advocates. We expect many more will watch our videos or the videos and replays on CT-N.

Secretary Tennant of West Virginia, a proponent of online voting, was outnumbered four to one by the other panelists. Dankowski provided her a fair opportunity to respond and challenge the other panelists.

The Panelists

Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat
President & Co-Founder of Overseas Vote Foundation
The Overseas Vote Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization established in 2005 that helps overseas and military voters participate in federal elections by providing public access to interactive web services. 4.75 million individuals visited OVF’s 17 voter services sites in 2008.

Natalie Tennant
West Virginia Secretary of State
In 2010, West Virginia launched a piloted an online voting initiative for military members and overseas citizens for the primary election. Tennant has testified before Congress on the success of the state’s pilot program and her office has recently issued a report detailing the ways in which voters benefitted.

Assistant Professor, University of Michigan
Halderman, a computer science professor, led a team from the University of Michigan to successfully penetrate and manipulate the internet voting system Washington D.C. planned to use for military and overseas voters for the general election in 2010
 
Ron Rivest
Professor, M.I.T.
Rivest is a cryptographer and a member of the Election Assistance Commission’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee.  In 2006 he published his invention of the ThreeBallot voting system, which incorporates the ability for the voter to discern that their vote was counted while still protecting their voter privacy.
 
Alex Shvartsman
Director of UConn Center for Voting Technology Research
The mission of the VoTeR center is to advise state agencies in the use of voting technologies and to investigate voting solutions and voting equipment to develop and recommend safe use procedures for their usage in elections.

Videos (may take a bit to load into post) (click video to go to page allowing larger views)

 

 

My Two Cents
The panel covered most issues surrounding online voting during close to one-hundred minutes. The time flew by, well focused, and engaging. There is always more that could be said, more details, and additional important points which could have been discussed. Here are some additional points that I would like to have seen raised or had more emphasis.
  • Voting challenges and solutions should not be limited to military voters. As a veteran I appreciate the service and the challenges to voting for soldiers. All overseas voters should have effective access to voting. Many face similar challenges, many deserve our thanks, while all should be able to have their votes counted. Consider some examples: Volunteers and NGO staff in Darfur and Hati; Business representatives in China, South America, and Africa; Oil rig workers; Merchant Marine; State Department employees; Military contractors; and Peace Corps volunteers.
  • Insider attacks are easier and more effective than external threats. Like most panels the focus was on outsider attack, yet the risk of a single insider is likely greater. An insider likely needs much less sophisticated means, has more opportunity, and ready means to attack, in less detectable ways.
    • The government believes, a singly Army Private could have accessed and stolen government documents from many agencies. Whether they have the correct suspect or not, they seem quite convinced that it is possible. Many election officials, government technologists, contractors, and vendor employees would have similar opportunities to compromise online voting systems.
    • Ironically, driving home I caught snippets of the rebroadcast of the day’s John Dankowski show, Where We Live. The subject was Art Theft. One of the main contentions was that almost all museum art theft is accomplished by unsophisticated insiders – typically low paid security guards with access, using unsophisticated means.
  • The possibility of error. Online voting systems could have errors which lose votes irretrievably or mis-classify them. Without the paper records votes can be lost or changed, with or without detection, yet without recourse.
  • The confusion of the possibility of  a ‘secure’ government network, with reality and what is on the table. Panelists discussed the possiblity of a non-public Intenet, a highly secure, government network for online voting, using highly secure computers and servers as well. Even though a perfect system is impossible, such a network would be much safer than systems using individual’s computers, the public Internet, or a regular government Internet – many of us might agree such a system was ‘good enough’.  Yet we should not confuse that possibility with what was actually the subject of the symposium, what is being actually proposed around the country, or what is reasonable:
    • Neither the Federal Government, Connecticut, or any state is actually seriously considering such a system. For starters it would be hugely expensive, require agreement to let the military handle all such voting for every jurisdiction, along with huge investments and operating expense on the part of the Federal Government and each election jurisdiction.
    • It would likely have to be a huge network with a huge number of locations and secure computers, separate from other Military networks, especially if it were used to serve all overseas voters.
    • Remember that anecdotal extreme cases of voting challenges include front line troops in Afghanistan, relief workers in the most challenging conditions, Peace Corps volunteers in remote villages etc. It is hard to imagine a secure, expensive, network reaching in all such environments. We cannot lose sight of realistic means to solve the real challenge we started out to address.
Other Coverage
The Hartford Courant <read>
New Britain Herald <read>
Connecticut Network (CT-N) <video>
Waterbury Republican and Senator Kane <read>

Where Common Sense fails: Do insider attacks require a sophisticated conspiracy?

In this post, we address where Common Sense fails. Where what seems obvious to individuals and election officials is often counter to the facts or science. Those that are unfamiliar with technology and a specific area of science often overestimate how difficult or easy specific things are to accomplish.

Note: This is the fifth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous> <next>

We frequently hear versions of the following comments, often from election officials:

“It would take a very sophisticated operation to steal an election. Computer experts with access to the election system.”

“Our staff is trusted and they don’t have that level of expertise.”

“You are a conspiracy theorist, you just don’t trust election officials, and the security of our voting machines”

To some of these charges I plead guilty and with others items beg to disagree:

  • I do believe in the existence and possibilities of fraud by conspiracy, yet in the case of election integrity argue that compromising an election does not require the existence of a conspiracy of the sort implied by the current definition of conspiracy theory. In fact, individuals have been convicted or exposed for small to moderate size conspiracies.
  • I do trust most election officials. The problem is that many election officials express and request blind trust of all election officials. This despite regular instances of errors by officials, and occasional successful prosecution of various election officials for criminal violations. Unless election officials are cut from a different class than other citizens and public officials, some of the time, some of them will make errors, and others will comitt fraud, sometimes without prosecution, and sometimes undetected.
  • It does not require a sophisticated operation to steal an election. Fraud would not necessarily require computer experts with access to the election system.

In this post, we address where Common Sense fails. Where what seems obvious to individuals and election officials is often counter to the facts or science. Here we have to be careful trusting our own initial views and those of honest officials, we need to be open to the idea that we may not individually have all the answers -willing to listen to, if not completely trust, scientists and the facts. (We are not just talking about elections here, but many other areas which are critical to democracy and life.)

Those that are unfamiliar with technology and a specific area of science often overestimate how difficult or easy specific things are to accomplish. As we often confuse conspiracy and conspiracy theory, we often confuse the meanings of theory, between the common meaning of theory and a scientific theory. They are as different as a Pat Robertson theory of earthquakes and the germ theory of disease.

For instance, people often think technologists can do anything such as solve the nuclear waste problem, cure all cancer, make smoking safe, produce clean coal, or provide safe internet voting. These are all hard problems that have, so far, eluded teams of the best scientists. I frequently recall a friend in middle school, in the late 1950’s, who had no concerns with smoking, saying “By the time I get lung cancer in 30 or 40 years, science will have a cure”.

Once even “scientists” believed with the right recipe sea water could be turned into gold. In the dark ages of the 1950’s it was believed it would be possible to predict the weather and the economy, if only we had enough data and the right programs. Since then, with the advent of Chaos Theory, we have learned both are impossible, yet that fact has provided us the opportunity to deal with the economy and weather more rationally and realistically. Since the 30’s or 40’s we have also known that it is impossible to prove that any computer software/hardware system is accurate and safe – there is no recipe possible. (And thus it is also impossible to build a computer or communications system that is provably safe. In practice, we can see from failed attempts of government and industry that the best systems are, in fact, regularly compromised, providing practical as well as theoretical reasons to avoid trusting any computer/communications system.)

On the other side, many things are much easier than the public and many elections officials believe. Smart individuals and small groups continue to create computer viruses and hack into the best systems of the most sophisticated government agencies and industries. On the easy side, the U.S. Government believes, apparently with good reason, that a single Army Private could access and steal a huge number of confidential documents from many Federal agencies. (That he was a low level insider with lots of access, just emphasizes how vulnerable systems are to a single insider and that it would take steps in addition to a safe computer system, even if that were possible, to protect us from an insider.)

How often have we each gone to an expert with what we viewed as a tough problem, only to have it solved quickly and inexpensively? For example: Recently, my condominium unit needed a new main shut-0ff valve. The maintenance staff and I believed it would be a big job requiring service interruption to dozens in my neighborhood requiring a shut-off of a valve in the street. Enlisting the help of a general plumbing contractor, the contractor simply froze my pipe while installing a new valve.

When it comes to election machine hacking, online voting, and conventional stealing of votes it is relatively easy in many jurisdictions to compromise the vote, especially when it only requires a single insider. Some attacks take extensive technical knowledge which many hackers possess and could help or intimidate a single insider to execute or could simply get a job in election administration. Other attacks take very little technical expertise. When officials misjudge how easy it is for attacks to be accomplished, when officials don’t understand technology, it makes it all the easier for a single trusted insider.

One company, LHS, programs all the election memory cards for Connecticut and other states. LHS’s President said that we are safe from hacked cards because he has no employees with software expertise (including himself). There are several fallacies in this:
— How would he know if a particular employee has technical expertise?
— It is not all that hard to miss-program memory cards.
— A single employee could gain outside technical help or be intimidated to do what an outsider demands.

Similarly, many election officials would claim we are safe because they do not have computer experts on their staff. Once again, how would they know how much it would take and what a person does not know?

As for outsider attacks, one example: To our knowledge, in only one instance, a Internet voting system was subjected to a open, public security test. It was compromised extensively and quickly. Even if it had not been compromised so easily or was subjected to a more extensive test it would hardly be proven safe, hardly be safe from attack by insiders.

In our view, the best we can do realistically is voter created paper ballots, counted in public by machine, a printout of results in public, followed by a secure ballot chain of custody, followed by effective independent post-election audits, and where necessary complete recounts.  All transparent.

Finally, we need to emphasize the requirement for a “secure ballot chain-of-custody” or at least a reasonably secure system making it difficult for single insiders to compromise ballots. For those with blind trust in security seals we provide presentations by an expert <view> and examples of quick  seal compromise by that same expert and an amateur <read>

Online Voting: Hartford Courant hacked?

Was the “online tampering” done by outside hackers? Or was it an insider? Does the Courant have the expertise to determine the cause in this instance and actually create effective controls to prevent future online voting attacks? If so, the editors should be advising the likes of the Department of Defense, banks, and Google.

We note a small correction box in today’s Hartford Courant:

CORRECTION

  The results of a Buzz question on Senate Candidate Linda McMahon that ran on courant.com last week and in print Sunday were exaggerated due to apparent online tampering. Controls have been put into place to prevent improper manipulation of Buzz results.

Checking the Sunday edition we see that in answer to the question, “Can Linda McMahon win a Senate seat in 2012?” The poll said Yes 6%, No 94%.  And in the four polls the total votes for the other three were 456, 1,759, and 2,588, while in the McMahon poll there were 14,348 votes.

Was the “online tampering” done by outside hackers? Or was it an insider? Does the Courant have the expertise to determine the cause in this instance and actually create effective controls to prevent future online voting attacks? If so, the editors should be advising the likes of the Department of Defense, banks, and Google.

Hopefully Connecticut’s registrars will not be forced by the legislature to provide online voting. According to Secretary of the State Merrill, one-third of registrars do not even have web access. On October 27th the state will have the opportunity to hear from experts on the risks of online voting and the other options for serving military and overseas voters.

Outlining a possible rigirous evaluation of Internet voting. And the ATM Fallacy, once again.

The third FVAP UOCAVA workshop ended with a general agreement on a plan to move forward with a substantial project to evaluate the potential and security issues with Internet voting.

As a bonus we also recommend the same author’s recent post on the ATM fallacy

On August 5th and 6th, the third FVAP UOCAVA workshop on was held in San Francisco, a couple of days prior to the EVT/WOTE workshop in that I attended.  I talked to many of the participants in both conferences. They all reported that the workshop ended with a general agreement on a plan to move forward with a substantial project to evaluate the potential and security issues with Internet voting.

We are fortunate that one attendee, Jeremy Epstein has written a post outlining the proposal on the Freedom To Tinker blog: A review of the FVAP UOCAVA workshop <read>

We have nothing much to add to the Freedom To Tinker post, it is well worth the read. There are details to be worked out. At the minimum the outline suggests the types of rigorous open review and testing that should be required of such a critical system, especially one where this is wide disagreement between officials, advocates, and members of the technical community. We especially agree that states are moving much too fast with a lack of rigor:

In the meantime, there’s little doubt that some states will continue to move forward on the existing insecure solutions. We believe, and expect that most other computer scientists will agree, that this is a case to let science take its course before moving into implementation. We hope that FVAP will speak out publicly against such ill-advised experiments.

As a bonus we also recommend  the same author’s recent post on the ATM fallacy : Yet again, why banking online .NE. voting online <read>

One of the most common questions I get is “if I can bank online, why can’t I vote online”.

He examines a recent report on banking security, providing its implications for online voting, concluding:

Unsaid, but of course implied by the financial industry list is that the goal is to reduce fraud to a manageable level. I’ve heard that 1% to 2% of the online banking transactions are fraudulent, and at that level it’s clearly not putting banks out of business (judging by profit numbers). However, whether we can accept as high a level of fraud in voting as in banking is another question.

None of this is to criticize the financial industry’s efforts to improve security! Rather, it’s to point out that try as we might, just because we can bank online doesn’t mean we should vote online.

For other answers, read our classic posts on the same subject:
FAQ: We all trust ATM’s. Why don’t you trust voting machines?
E-Voting Is Very Different From E-Banking
Or as it is known around here, Myth #8