Category: Mail/Absentee Voting

A small hole in ballot packages, is a huge gap in security

Last week Kevin Rennie blogged about a letter from the leader of the Municipal Clerks Association sent to the clerks. Information that should have come from the Secretary of the State warning about problems and misinformation about the mailing of ballot packages to voters. Information that should have gone to voters not just clerks: Merrill Failure: 20,000 Voters Will Not Receive Absentee Ballots. Town Clerks Will Try to Solve Primary Crisis. Unglued, Too. Ballots May Fall Out of Envelopes. There is plenty of disappointment in the post and letter, yet I will concentrate on one item of advice to the clerks:

Additionally, I have been informed that the sides of some inner envelopes have not been properly glued shut by the manufacturer; as a result, the voter’s ballot could slip out of the inner envelope while the town clerk is processing the returns into CVRS. This issue is not related to the voter accidentally slicing open the envelope. It is due to poor quality control at the mail house. Please be on the lookout for envelopes that are not sealed on the side. Please tape the defective inner envelopes shut.

This may appear to be insignificant. Yet it is a big deal. There are reasons for an inner envelope, especially in this election.

Last week Kevin Rennie blogged about a letter from the leader of the Municipal Clerks Association sent to the clerks. Information that should have come from the Secretary of the State warning about problems and misinformation about the mailing of ballot packages to voters. Information that should have gone to voters not just clerks: Merrill Failure: 20,000 Voters Will Not Receive Absentee Ballots. Town Clerks Will Try to Solve Primary Crisis. Unglued, Too. Ballots May Fall Out of Envelopes.<read> There is plenty of disappointment in the post and letter, yet I will concentrate on one item of advice to the clerks:

Additionally, I have been informed that the sides of some inner envelopes have not been properly glued shut by the manufacturer; as a result, the voter’s ballot could slip out of the inner envelope while the town clerk is processing the returns into CVRS. This issue is not related to the voter accidentally slicing open the envelope. It is due to poor quality control at the mail house. Please be on the lookout for envelopes that are not sealed on the side. Please tape the defective inner envelopes shut.

This may appear to be insignificant. Yet it is a big deal. There are reasons for an inner envelope, especially in this election.

Outer envelopes are usually opened on election day by election officials of both parties,  supervised by a Polling Place Moderator or a Central Count Absentee Ballot Moderator. In those usual cases everything is under  the observation of multiple officials and open to observation of voters in the polling place or at the central count location. Not this year! The outer envelope is opened by the clerk’s staff and separated from the inner envelope in advance of election day. The purpose is to reduce the work on Election Day.

There are serious unintended consequences:

  • There are no known, published official procedures for the opening of the envelopes by the clerks, no standards for the security of the ballots, and no formal requirements for public observation.
  • CT has very weak to non-existent standards for ballot security. There is no monitoring of such security. Other states have much stronger standards. E.g. in CO all the areas where ballots or election equipment is under video surveillance for weeks before and after an election. (Even so a clerk was caught on video messing with ballots between an election and a recount. An election where she was on the ballot. She won the recount after losing the initial count.) In NM ballots are kept in metal containers, with two padlocks, one key sent to the clerk and one to a judge by different polling place officials.
  • The clerks’ offices also have free access to blank ballots. There are no such ballots available at central count absentee locations.
  • So lets spell it out:
    • The clerks’ staff could examine ballots with open envelopes that were not properly glued and replace them with ballots with votes for a different candidate.
    • They could un-glue additional envelopes and mark them as if they were not originally sealed correctly.
    • The clerks staff, perhaps loan individuals, perhaps others in town hall could access inner envelopes any time after they are opened until they are turned over to the registrars on Election Day.

The vast majority of election officials, clerks, clerks’ staff, and town hall employees are of high integrity. Yet clerks and registrars, even in Connecticut, have committed crimes with absentee ballots and regular ballots. And they are all very trusting of their staffs and often apparently ignorant of the risks of poor ballot security. According to security experts, overconfidence in security is a primary sign of risk.

There are lots of holes in our ballot security. This is just one novel example spelled out for your consideration and concern.

Moreover, the result is deservedly less confidence in the integrity of our elections.

Charles Stewart reminds us that mail-in may disenfranchise more than it adds in turnout

In this COVID crisis, I support mail-in voting for all. However, for years we have been warning of the downsides of absentee voting: It usually decreases turnout, it as a frequent path for insider and political operative fraud, and it disenfranchises. A new paper by MIT Professor Charles Stewart documents that disenfranchisement in the 2016 Presidential Election: Reconsidering Lost Votes by Mail

Conceptually, the paper highlights how differing mail-ballot legal regimes produce lost mail votes in different ways, and at different rates, on account of differing laws, regulations, and practices…That estimate works out to approximately 1.4 million votes in 2016—4.0% of mail ballots cast and 1.0% of all ballots. These estimates are relevant in light of efforts to expand mail balloting in the 2020 presidential election. States that will see the greatest growth in mail ballots tended to have higher lost vote rates than those with vote-by-mail systems. This implies that a doubling or tripling of the number of mail ballots in 2020 will result in a disproportionate growth in the number of lost votes due to mail ballots.

Connecticut is on track to increase its mail-in balloting by 10x to 15x by November. That means 10x – 15x the number of voters disenfranchised by mail-in voting.

 

In this COVID crisis, I support mail-in voting for all. However, for years whave been warning of the downsides of absentee voting: It usually decreases turnout, it as a frequent path for insider and political operative fraud, and it disenfranchises. A new paper by MIT Professor Charles Stewart documents that disenfranchisement in the 2016 Presidential Election: Reconsidering Lost Votes by Mail <read>

Conceptually, the paper highlights how differing mail-ballot legal regimes produce lost mail votes in different ways, and at different rates, on account of differing laws, regulations, and practices…That estimate works out to approximately 1.4 million votes in 2016—4.0% of mail ballots cast and 1.0% of all ballots. These estimates are relevant in light of efforts to expand mail balloting in the 2020 presidential election. States that will see the greatest growth in mail ballots tended to have higher lost vote rates than those with vote-by-mail systems. This implies that a doubling or tripling of the number of mail ballots in 2020 will result in a disproportionate growth in the number of lost votes due to mail ballots.

Disenfranchisement varies by State, based on many factors that include laws and practices.

The calculation of lost votes in mail elections focuses on summing up six quantities:

1. Requests for mail ballots that are not received by the election authorities.

2. Absentee ballot requests that are unfulfilled by election authorities.

3. Absentee ballots transmitted by election authorities that are not received by the voter.

4. Absentee ballots returned by the voter but not received by the election authorities.

5. Returned absentee ballots that are rejected by election authorities.

6. Tabulated mail ballots that fail to record the choice(s) made by the voter, i.e., residual votes.

Connecticut is on track to increase its mail-in balloting by 10x to 15x by November. That means 10x – 15x the number of voters disenfranchised by mail-in voting.

Once again, in this crisis in my opinion, it is worth the loss in votes to do mail-in voting. Yet as always, we caution voters and the General Assembly to look at all the facts in choosing what do to going forward.

 

Courant article on Merrill/Blumenthal press conference raises concerns.

In today’s Hartford Courant a report on yesterday’s press conference: Absentee ballot process smooth so far – Blumenthal wants more election funding <read>

Gabe Rosenberg, a spokesman for Merrill, said the $45 million in additional funding would go toward new voting machines, new tabulators, more ballot boxes, voter education and enhanced cybersecurity. He said the funds, if distributed promptly, could ease a potentially chaotic Election Day in November.“It’s going to take along time to count because we don’t have high-speed ballot counters,” Rosenberg said. “That’s something we could buy with that kind of money.”…

As for the security of the new ballot boxes, Merrill said the receptacles were no less secure than a typical mailbox.“Just think of this as a mailbox,” she said. “The usual way you send back your ballot for 100 years is you send it back in the mail. This is just a fancy mailbox, and it’s here for a reason, because many town halls are still not open for business all the time.”

A crisis in nothing to waste, yet spending $45 million between now and November seems a bit excessive, especially when everything is complicated by COVID-19.

In today’s Hartford Courant a report on yesterday’s press conference: Absentee ballot process smooth so far – Blumenthal wants more election funding <read>

First a note of caution. I have been misquoted by the press, so perhaps some of that applies here.  Here are the disturbing quotes:

Gabe Rosenberg, a spokesman for Merrill, said the $45 million in additional funding would go toward new voting machines, new tabulators, more ballot boxes, voter education and enhanced cybersecurity. He said the funds, if distributed promptly, could ease a potentially chaotic Election Day in November.“It’s going to take along time to count because we don’t have high-speed ballot counters,” Rosenberg said. “That’s something we could buy with that kind of money.”…

As for the security of the new ballot boxes, Merrill said the receptacles were no less secure than a typical mailbox.“Just think of this as a mailbox,” she said. “The usual way you send back your ballot for 100 years is you send it back in the mail. This is just a fancy mailbox, and it’s here for a reason, because many town halls are still not open for business all the time.”

A crisis in nothing to waste, yet spending $45 million between now and November seems a bit excessive, especially when everything is complicated by COVID-19.

  • The first concern is that evaluating and procuring new voting machines is very expensive and time consuming to do well, a long deliberate process. When Connecticut chose the AccuVoteOS machines in use now, the process took abut a year, with several machines evaluated by the UConn Voter Center, followed by public feedback and focus groups of voters, those with disabilities, officials, and technical experts. Even then  Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz made a poor choice. To her credit, quickly changed for the better. Followed by close to a year of education of officials and voters along with pilot use in 25 towns. Not something to do in haste.
  • We do not need high speed scanners. Its a myth that our current scanners significantly slow absentee vote counting. I have led central count absentee vote processing five times. I  also led a polling place where a scanner broke and we had to read 1,500 ballots into another scanner – that was done intermittently in less that two hours while voters continued to scan their votes into that same scanner. Scanning is a small part of absentee processing, perhaps 10%. In Glastonbury. in November 2016. we had less than 20,000 votes for President, 90+% counted in six polling place scanners. If we used six scanners for absentee counting, with a reasonable plan, they could count all the votes in a few hours, overlapped with the other aspects of processing absentees. Glastonbury has at least two scanners already dedicated to absentee counting.  Secretary of the State Merrill has already purchased a reserve supply of AccuVoteOS scanners. Used AccuVoteOS scanners are available at about $40 at auction sites and dealers.
  • Its a big deal to purchase and test high speed scanners. We can’t use just any scanner. We need a high speed scanner made for vote counting.  Not just any vote counting, but compatible with ballots used by our AccuVoteOS.  It would help if they did not require separate programming from the AccuVoteOS scanners and did well with folded or creased ballots.
  • We do not currently audit absentee ballot scanners. Unless that is addressed, this August and November only the scanners in polling places will be subject to audit. Inadequate with uniform scanners, yet all but useless if a different model is used for absentees and counts the majority of ballots in the election.
  • These new ballot boxes are vulnerable and will be targets. Once again, if they are safe from attack, let us see the tests. Other states use them and keep them under video surveillance.

As I have said before, in this crisis I support expanded mail-in voting. Yet we cannot abandon common sense.

Editorial: Update on Expanded Mail-In for CT and Proposals in D.C.

I am normally opposed to expanded mail-in voting in CT because of proven continuous and recent votING fraud by campaigns and insiders in CT (Which is distinct from votER fraud which for all practical purposes does not exist). Yet in this virus situation, I am in favor of no-excuse mail in voting.

Bottom line: If the state can legally do anything it would be best to leave all current systems in place and hire lots of people to do absentee processing and hope each of the 169 clerks and 338 registrars are up to the jobs of hiring, planning, training, organizing and executing (questionable at best given the years of experience with, never cured, Electoin Day Registration lines in some towns).

I am normally opposed to expanded mail-in voting in CT because of proven continuous and recent votING fraud by campaigns and insiders in CT (Which is distinct from votER fraud, which for all practical purposes does not exist).

Yet in this virus situation, I am in favor of no-excuse mail-in voting.

Recent examples of votING fraud in Connecticut: <Stamford> <Hartford> <Bridgeport>
Some other examples <East Longmeadow, MA> <Dade County, FL>

The Secretary of the State has asked Gov Lamont to sign an executive order to permit it.  However, reading between the lines: Since the Gov cannot by executive order override the Constitution, the fix proposed by Sec Merrill would likely be interpreted as an attempt to do that and an expected court challenge would likely succeed.

If they do come up with a fix that passes Constitutional muster about the only reasonable additional change could be relaxing the 48 hour deadline for the initial counting of votes. That poses risks too because recanvasses must be completed by day 8 and the Constitution requires that the results be certified by day 10.

If that is all that is done then local officials would have to plan and execute well a possible 10-15 fold increase in absentee ballots with a similar expansion in what all town clerks must  do prior to the election and registrars before and after. Counting ballots and meeting integrity requirements also involves special (slower) procedures in the age of COVID-19. Of course, we can give up on integrity requirements like two people checking each envelope inside and outside, and two people examining each ballot (I would not recommend against skipping integrity).

In D.C. there have been independent and stimulus bill sections mandating mail-in and early voting in all states. These would be devastating requirements for CT to implement and execute in such a short time-frame by August or November. All but impossible in a normal year, but much tougher in the age of COVID-19. Mail processing vendors, all but required by such proposed laws, are already saying they are all but booked  for November and have no spare capacity. Meeting those same requirements would also require massive changes, equipment and people in Connecticut, with little time for testing, planning and training. In person early voting would also be a similar huge change. All costly and risky to implement in a hurry.

Everyone points to CA, OR, and CO as shining examples. Not necessarily true. CA comes close to meeting all the requirements in these bills. To meet them CA allows 30 days for counting absentees. In the recent primary (much smaller than the general election) they extended the counting an additional 21 days. If that happens in Nov, its likely the CA electors would not be counted in the Presidential election. Hopefully they will do better.

Bottom line: If the state can legally do anything it would be best to leave all current systems in place and hire lots of people to do absentee processing and hope each of the 169 clerks and 338 registrars are up to the jobs of hiring, planning, training, organizing and executing (questionable at best given the years of experience with and never cured, disenfranchising Election Day Registration lines in some towns).

Rant Against Congress’s Plans to Rescue the Election

Both the US House and Senate have proposals to improve our elections in the age COVID-19.  They are huge and dangerous, impossible to implement in Connecticut and many other states by November.

Instead of our usual format here, I will cover them by rants I have posted as comments on Facebook over the last two days. They are just to complex and out of touch with reality to comer in a neat and organized, point by point way.

Both the US House and Senate have proposals to improve our elections in the age COVID-19.  They are huge and dangerous, impossible to implement in Connecticut and many other states by November.

Instead of our usual format here, I will cover them by rants I have posted as comments on Facebook over the last two days. They are just to complex and out of touch with reality to comment in a neat and organized, point by point way.

By my count the Senate bill has eleven significant changes to current election law, procedures, and electronic systems in Connecticut elections. I have not counted the details in the House bill, while it is similar to the Senate bill it has at least two additional very difficult to  implement requirements.

Senate Bill Page Summary <read>  Senate Bill <read> House Bill (start at page 814) <read>

Selected Recent Rants (edited):

As Denise Merrill testified, just one of these changes is too much to do by Nov especially for the biggest election of the cycle. The Election Night Reporting system took about 5 years to get right, if it is now. Motor Voter has taken two years so far, if it is right now. The Senate bill has 11 significant changes we don’t have now including online AB requests, permanent AB for all, count ABs until the day before certification, signature cure also until that date, expanded email ballot delivery for disabled and those that don’t receive it by two days before the election, no exception for a disaster without internet or phone service, expanded (ambiguous) requirements for disabled, 20 days polling place early voting, etc. The House bill adds mandatory signature match for all ABs and days 15 days of early voting that must include the day before Election Day – that is a significant addition, where  the Senate bill provides four days between early voting and election day. The bills would pay for some hardware, software and implementation but I doubt for most of those local costs. We would almost necessarily need epollbooks to integrate the early voting data. Miss one part or screw it up for one voter, the US AG or v ANY citizen can sue for injunctive relief.

I’ll add it’s not 7 months as the AB stuff must be ready in Sept and Early voting in Oct. Plus all this is developed, tested, implemented and executed under COVID-19 separation rules. Unless it passes in time that we need it for the Aug Primary.

Lets not forget this is all being done under the gun of COVID-19. And the Electoral Count Act:

The bills have provisions for ABs that took CA, WA, OR, and CO years to implement. Secretary Merrill testified to the GAE last month that just one of those provisions was too difficult and risky to implement for Nov, I agree. There are several others even more difficult. Meeting those provisions and counting ABs are compounded by precautions for COVID-19. Even in CA where they have years of experience, they have 30 days to count ABs – now they have extended that to 51 days for the recent Primary – for 2020 the Safe Harbor date to report votes for electors is Dec 14, just 41 days after the election – Ask yourself what would happen if the Supreme Court stuck with the strong precedent from 1876 and disqualified the CA electors? And on top of that  CT is starting years behind in procedures, practices, automation, and systems.

What would I recommend?

By executive order of Governor Lamont, allow no-excuse AB, allow counting to go for 9 days not 2, to delay recanvasses until after day 10 – Day 10 is the certification date which is hard baked into the Connecticut Constitution, Registrar/SOTS and Clerk task forces created to plan to get their jobs done within the necessary time constraints, with state funding to cover planning training and the large staffing and supervision challenges for municipalities, including extra overhead for COVID-19. PS: The same for protecting everyone in polling places. Printers added to essential businesses.

 

Testimony on three bills

Last Friday, provided testimony on three bills. As I said in my prepared remarks:

I oppose  S.B.365. As I testified last Friday, we humans have difficulty balancing risks and rewards. This is a case where the added risks outweigh the added convenience.

This bill, while well intended, would remove the valuable fraud detection mechanism of hand-signed absentee ballot applications.

I support  H.B.5414. The bill would have the Judiciary rather than the House or Senate rule on remedies to contested elections

The overall result of systems to adjudicate close elections, as our current system for Senator and Representative, is less trust in the system by the public and candidates.

I would support H.B.5404, IF it were Broadened and Corrected.

My written testimony contains a laundry list of issues such a Task Force should address.

I am concerned that this Task Force needs more time, a significant staff budget to handle all the issues, and also to reimburse experts to provide information, analysis, and suggestions to the committee, in order for there to be a thorough evaluation.

Last Friday, provided testimony on three bills. As I said in my prepared remarks:

(Click on the bill numbers for a link to my testimony, which contains links to each bill’s status page, which links to bill text)

I oppose  S.B.365. As I testified last Friday, we humans have difficulty balancing risks and rewards. This is a case where the added risks outweigh the added convenience.

This bill, while well intended, would remove the valuable fraud detection mechanism of hand-signed absentee ballot applications.

I support  H.B.5414. The bill would have the Judiciary rather than the House or Senate rule on remedies to contested elections

Observing all the meetings or hearings in last year’s Committee on Contested Elections and the overall result on public confidence, I strongly support this bill.

The overall result of systems to adjudicate close elections, as our current system for Senator and Representative, is less trust in the system by the public and candidates.

As I said in answer to a question: It does not need eliminate the House and Senate’s prerogative to decide to seat a member or not. I could be worded so that the courts could adjudicate election issues, leaving the House and Senate with the final review.

I would support H.B.5404, IF it were Broadened and Corrected.

First, I would support this Task Force if some significant changes were made, especially to the charge for the Task Force, and if it was appropriately funded and staffed.

This proposal is limited to one, incorrectly defined, type of Ranked Choice Voting known as Instant Runoff Voting. This proposal defines the study in a way that would be impossible to satisfy.

Secondly, My written testimony contains a laundry list of issues such a Task Force should address.

I am concerned that this Task Force needs more time, a significant staff budget to handle all the issues, and also to reimburse experts to provide information, analysis, and suggestions to the committee, in order for there to be a thorough evaluation.

Finally, The Task Force should entail several, opportunities for expert and public oral and written testimony, noticed well in advance.

Four pieces of testimony on five bills

Last Friday, provided five pieces of testimony on six bills. As I said in my prepared remarks:

The context for my testimony on four bills is that humans are not good at accessing risks. We can focus excessively on minor, all but non-existent, risks. We often minimize rare catastrophic risks and ignore frequent familiar risks.

We also do a poor job of balancing risks and rewards.

This Friday I will be submitting three pieces of testimony on three more bills. The theme also applies to one of them.

Last Friday, provided four pieces of testimony onfive bills.  As I said in my prepared remarks:

The context for my testimony on four bills is that humans are not good at accessing risks. We can focus excessively on minor, all but non-existent, risks. We often minimize rare catastrophic risks and ignore frequent familiar risks.

We also do a poor job of balancing risks and rewards.

(Click on the bill numbers for a link to my testimony, which contains links to each bill’s status page, which links to bill text)

I support S.B.233. It would eliminate a long-standing civil rights violation and unnecessary Election Day Registration work.

It would remove the cross-check requirement that results in massive extra work for officials, delays for voters, and has led to the civil rights violation.

There is no experience of risks from EDR, without cross-checks, in any state.

This Friday I will be submitting three pieces of testimony on three more bills. The theme also applies to one of them.

I oppose S.B.241. This bill is an example of excessive concern for, all but non-existent, risks.

It would require checkers be appointed for all EDR locations and authorize unofficial checkers. Apparently, the proponents are unaware that there are no lists to check in EDR locations.

I oppose S.J.15 and H.B.5278 as written. These bills are examples of ignoring actual risks that occur frequently in Connecticut – proven risks for expanded mail-in voting in Connecticut.

When Connecticut passed the Citizens Election Program, part of the justification was a history of corruption. Similarly avoiding expanded mail-in voting is justified by Connecticut’s ongoing record of campaign and insider voting fraud via absentee.

I do not oppose all early voting. I support in-person early voting. See my testimony for a low-cost early voting method suited to Connecticut.

I caution that contrary to intuition, the best science indicates early voting, in any form, tends to DECREASE turnout.

I support, only if modified. S.B.234.

This Friday I will be submitting three pieces of testimony on three more bills. The theme also applies to one of them.

 

 

 

 

Editorial, Bridgeport Part 2: What could/should we do

Earlier we described the general situation with regard to the recent Bridgeport Primary and some steps in the wrong direction.<read part 1> Today we will discuss some steps that could be taken to prevent these same problems in Bridgeport, Hartford, Stamford, and elsewhere in Connecticut.

Increase Enforcement
Monitor Elections With Independent Monitors
Randomly Audit Absentee Votes, Envelopes, and Applications
Do for Elections What We Have Done for Probate

 

Earlier we described the general situation with regard to the recent Bridgeport Primary and some steps in the wrong direction.<read part 1> Today we will discuss some steps that could be taken to prevent these same problems in Bridgeport, Hartford, Stamford, and elsewhere in Connecticut.

Increase Enforcement:  Over at least the last dozen years all the state watchdog agencies have been under assault by the General Assembly. Faced with an increasing load of complaints the relatively small State Elections Enforcement Agency (SEEC) has been considerably reduced in size. The result has been slower and slower adjudication of cases, while the General Assembly mandated that many cases not dissolved in a year must be dismissed. A start would be aiming to double its size with additional administrative staff, yet mostly more investigators and lawyers.  The sooner the better as it takes years for a lawyer there to be fully knowledgeable and productive. We should also outlaw fines levied on officials being paid by their towns. (Maybe its just me, but when there is a blatant violation it makes no sense for the actual perpetrators not to bare the burden)  In significant cases we would like to see the violators replaced.

Monitor Elections With Independent Monitors: Last year, Bridgeport had a primary rerun twice because of absentee ballot problems.  The second time a monitor said to do it again.  That was a local individual who did a good job as far as we know, yet the answer is truly independent monitors, and not just for a couple primaries. Full time expert monitors should be assigned to repeat violators such as Bridgeport – for multiple years – paid to also get registrar certifications, all at the town’s expense.

Randomly Audit Absentee Votes, Envelopes, and Applications: Connecticut has post-election audits of polling place cast votes. We do not audit the centrally counted absentee ballots or the Election Day Registration ballots. We should go way beyond that and randomly select a % of absentee ballot envelopes, checklists, and applications for signature integrity, and voter interviews to determine how pervasive these problems are in every town across the state. Where necessary enforcement actions and expanded audits undertaken based on violations found.  Towns with a history of abuse should be subject to increased random selection in subsequent years. This should be a truly Independent Audit perhaps under the auspices of the State Auditors of Public Accounts or the SEEC.  The state’s history with the not truly independent post-election audit should be avoided.

Finally, a robust measure of prevention and professionalism that could make a huge difference in Connecticut Elections:

Do for Elections What We Have Done for Probate: Rationalize, Professionalize, Economize.

 

 

Editorial, Bridgeport Part 1: What NOT to do

Remember the 1st law of holes: “When you are in a hole, stop digging!”

The election integrity story in Connecticut lately has been the Bridgeport Primary where Marilyn Moore won the primary for mayor in the polling places and Joe Ganim won the absentee votes by enough to win by a comfortable margin of 270 votes, with an absentee margin of 3 to 1. You can read our Recent News links on our home page for more of the details. Bridgeport is known for absentee problems and a high energy absentee operation, mostly by party insiders who in this case support Ganim the incumbent. Yet the extent of this year’s operation seems to be even greater than usual. Neither campaign is looking very professional at this point.

The questions are: 1) To what extent has this operation resulted in lots of illegal absentee ballots? 2) To what extent did illegal activities change the result? 3) Should there be a rerun of the primary? 4) What should/can be done to prevent this from happening again in Bridgeport or anywhere in Connecticut? 5) What should not be done – what would not help?

We will address what not to do today and what we could do, later in part 2.

 

 

The election integrity story in Connecticut lately has been the Bridgeport Primary where Marilyn Moore won the primary for mayor in the polling places and Joe Ganim won the absentee votes by enough to win by a comfortable margin of 270 votes, with an absentee margin of 3 to 1. You can read our Recent News links on our home page for more of the details. Bridgeport is known for absentee problems and a high energy absentee operation, mostly by party insiders who in this case support Ganim the incumbent. Yet the extent of this year’s operation seems to be even greater than usual. Neither campaign is looking very professional at this point.

The questions are: 1) To what extent has this operation resulted in lots of illegal absentee ballots? 2) To what extent did illegal activities change the result? 3) Should there be a rerun of the primary? 4) What should/can be done to prevent this from happening again in Bridgeport or anywhere in Connecticut? 5) What should not be done – what would not help?

Here are my short answers to the first three questions, we will address what not to do today and what we could do, later in part 2.

  1. We will likely never know how many absentee ballots were issued illegally, how many votes were not completed by voters, and how many voters were intimidated. It is hard work to investigate each absentee vote and harder to prove if a particular vote was illegal.
  2. We will likely never know. There were illegal activities on both sides, yet clearly more on the Ganim side. Yet, maybe they actually won by legal active absentee promotion.
  3. Courts are very reluctant to call for rerun elections.  They are not only costly but bring out a different set of voters, a compressed time for legitimate absentee votes, less time for the election, and a change in voters because other races are not on the ballot.  Its a bit easier in municipal races where the actual election day could be conceivably be postponed as well as requiring additional an additional primary. One standard is proving that enough votes were compromised that the result could have changed. Another standard is any skulduggery or errors. Both are too stringent in our opinion, if you agree then it is a judgement call somewhere in the middle. My decision in this case would be for a rerun with strong, independent monitoring. Perhaps a creative solution, considering reality in Bridgeport would be a separate Mayoral ballot in November with Moore and Ganim with equal positions on the ballot.  Many courts would disagree. In this case, I suspect many would agree to a rerun.

Two things NOT to do:

Remember the 1st law of holes: “When you are in a hole, stop digging!”

Bad Idea #1: It has been suggested, even by the Secretary of the State, that what we need is more absentee voting, no-excuse absentee voting.  That would seem to be almost obviously the wrong thing to do, if you want to reduce absentee abuses. In fact, violating the current law requiring a valid excuse is one of the several frequent abuses in the recent primary. It would be like reducing illegal speeding by doubling the speed limit. There are many states claiming no significant increase in fraud when they went to no-excuse absentee voting.  We are skeptical of those claims, yet even if they are true, they are not Connecticut where we have a steady stream of  proven absentee fraud – including recent fraud in Bridgeport(last two primaries), Hartford, and Stamford. I have said it before, and I will say it again: We justified the Citizens Election Program because of a history of campaign finance problems, similarly we can and should ustify not expanding absenting voting because of a Connecticut record of ongoing of fraud. For more see or testimony in opposition in 2017:

Bad Idea #2: There was a proposal in the last General Assembly to let voters submit absentee ballot applications online, without signatures S.B. 156. One of the key ways fraudulent absentee ballots are created is by fraudulent applications, where voters attest to their excuse. On of the key ways fraud is discovered and proven is hand-writing analysis of those applications. A huge mistake. For more read my testimony against the bill: Would Remove Valuable Fraud Detection/Prosecution Tool.

Perhaps we will hear several more ideas for digging the hole deeper before this is over.

Presidential Assault on Military and Overseas Voters

Costs to mail ballots may skyrocket for civilians, military living overseas

Election officials are growing increasingly concerned that the Trump administration’s trade war with China could make it more difficult and expensive for overseas voters — including those in the military — to cast ballots in the 2019 and 2020 local, state and federal elections…

The deadline for his state and most others to send out absentee ballots for the fall elections, Dearing said, falls a few days before a Sept. 24-25…That makes it difficult to provide voters with guidance about how to return their ballots.

The bottom lines:

  • Election officials are approaching a deadline and have no idea what to tell Military and Overseas voters.
  • Maybe, there will be relatively easy options for Military voters, yet the Military has done a poor job of serving Military voters, especially in training Voting Assistance Officers in the current stable laws.
  • Overseas voters like expats, state department employees, military contractors, and corporate employees overseas, will be hit hardest, with the highest costs, highest hurdles, and likely the least information.

Costs to mail ballots may skyrocket for civilians, military living overseas <read>

Election officials are growing increasingly concerned that the Trump administration’s trade war with China could make it more difficult and expensive for overseas voters — including those in the military — to cast ballots in the 2019 and 2020 local, state and federal elections.

The issue is the pending withdrawal in October by the U.S. from the Universal Postal Union, a group of 192 nations that has governed international postal service and rates for 145 years.

The deadline for his state and most others to send out absentee ballots for the fall elections, Dearing said, falls a few days before a Sept. 24-25…That makes it difficult to provide voters with guidance about how to return their ballots.

If the United States ends up withdrawing from the UPU, overseas citizens may not be able to return their ballots using regular mail service and could have to pay upward of $60 to use one of the commercial shipping services, Dearing said…

Even if there is a disruption in international mail service, overseas military members and their dependents will be able to vote using military delivery channels, she said.

And some overseas citizens can vote electronically, although 19 states do not allow electronic return of ballots, according to the National Council of State Legislatures.

Another option for overseas voters, Kerr said, would be to drop off their ballots at a U.S. embassy or consulate, where U.S. postal rates will apply.

The bottom lines:

  • Election officials are approaching a deadline and have no idea what to tell Military and Overseas voters.
  • Maybe, there will be relatively easy options for Military voters, yet the Military has done a poor job of serving Military voters, especially in training Voting Assistance Officers in the current stable laws.
  • Overseas voters like expats, state department employees, military contractors, and corporate employees overseas, will be hit hardest, with the highest costs, highest hurdles, and likely the least information.