Faith in Technology: Drilling, Driving, and Voting

“Deep anxiety aroused by the deaths in the water and on the interstates is calmed by the ameliorating belief that technology will save us, and if not now, soon. After all, the promise of technology is in the better life to come.”

Food for thought. As states and voters consider Internet for voting, based on faith in vendors that say it works, and ignoring the vast majority of independent technologists and studies that say it is unproven and risky, we point to this cautionary tale: Why Do We Worship at the Altar of Technology? <read>

If there is one true religion in the US, it leads us to worship at the altar of technology. Christian or Jew, Muslim or atheist, we accept the doctrine of this shared faith: that technology provides the main path to improving our lives and that if it occasionally fails, even catastrophically, it will just take another technology to make it all better. It is this doctrine that connects BP’s Deepwater Horizon and Toyota’s sudden acceleration debacles – and the responses to them…

Of course, corporations don’t see this as their first mission, operating as they do on cost containment and profit maximisation, not cutting-edge technology as an end in itself. But their customer base has been convinced that each time they buy a new car, they are buying the future and lucky that the world’s smartest geologists and engineers are helping fuel their experience of it. Never mind that the technology they are largely buying is media and telecom gadgetry

As the article points out oil and automobiles are linked by more than technology. The analogy to voting also breaks down in another way — when it comes to voting technology, vendor profit maximization is directly linked to the technology.

Our response to BP and Toyota’s failures expose the danger in our faith. Deep anxiety aroused by the deaths in the water and on the interstates is calmed by the ameliorating belief that technology will save us, and if not now, soon. After all, the promise of technology is in the better life to come.

Recall the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) designed to use technology to save us from the alleged problems with punch-cards and lever machines, yet effectively providing us with new expensive voting equipment left vulnerable to the same risks as our previous voting systems, error and fraud.

In fact, like oil and automobiles, the problem with voting is not the technology. The problem is believing that technology itself is the source of the problems, the only necessary component of a solution, and fervent faith that the proposed next technology is the solution.

[We cannot help but point out the related natural human tendency to avoid responsibility. We seldom read that a driver drove off the road, into a house, or a tree. It seems it was almost always the car that went off the road.]

What Do YOU [still] Want?

You are committed to the proposition that Democracy survive and flourish. We have serious work to do. It can happen in Connecticut. Voting Integrity, like the Constitution, can start here in the Constitution State and spread to the Nation. “Anything worth doing is worth failing at, and failing at, and failing at…until you succeed”

Looking on the right hand column of CTVotersCount we feature “This Week Past Years”. This week in 2008 there was a panel in Fairfield. I opened with remarks on “What Do You Want”. I said voters want five things and what Connecticut could do about them in the short run (three steps over two years). The two years have passed and little has changed:

My topic for the next few minutes is simple. It is: “What Do You Want”.

Let us begin with a quote from Colorado’s Secretary of State, Mike Coffman whose words inspired this talk and a quote from our own Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz.

Secretary Bysiewicz sent a letter in March to voters like you, who signed our petition last year. She said, in part: “We still have a lot of work to do and we need concerned citizens like you to stay involved…I share your belief that we should make our audit law the strongest in the nation and that its size and scope is adequate to achieve its goals…”

In June, Colorado’s Mike Coffman gave his view, of activists like CTVotersCount, “I think they have a fundamental belief that anything electronic, as it relates to voting, is evil and undermines our political system,”…”They believe in a world of conspiracy theories and are highly motivated. No matter what I do, so long as it leaves some form of electronic voting intact, it will be wrong by their standards.”

I agree with both of them. With Secretary Bysiewicz that we still “have a lot of work to do”; With Secretary Coffman, that voting advocates are “highly motivated”.

However, I do not believe that “anything electronic” is “evil” nor do I have a goal of eliminating “anything electronic” from voting.

So, What Should You Want?

Most fundamentally, five things:

That the ballot is secret, votes cannot be bought, coerced, added, lost, or modified

That your vote is counted, counted accurately, and counted exactly once

That everyone’s vote is counted accurately and reflected in the election results

That everyone has confidence that everyone’s vote is counted accurately

That, failing any of the above, appropriate corrective action will be taken

You deserve no more and no less. Democracy requires no less. Do you want anything less? Do you believe democracy can exist and flourish with less?

I’m open to any solution that will ensure Democracy. Whatever we can implement that ensures Democracy and is most efficient for officials and most convenient for the voters, I will support it.

So, Where Do We Go From Here?

We do not have a blank slate. We have just spent millions of dollars on purchasing the most cost effective, most voter verifiable, and auditable type of electronic voting system available, that meet Federally mandated requirements.

I could talk of the long term, realistically six to ten years off. But Democracy cannot wait. There are real risks now. There are actions we can take over the next two years to ensure Democracy in Connecticut – to lead the way for the Nation. Yes, I said two years, if we start now, taking decisive action, with the equipment we have.

The Short List

Let me finish with the short list of what we need to do now, over the next two years. The three items I think of when Secretary Bysiewicz says “We still have a lot of work to do”:

First, an element of prevention. Each of our elections is programmed in Massachusetts by contractors; Contractors over which we have little, if any, oversight. UConn has developed an outstanding program to independently test the memory cards to detect many potential errors or fraud. 100% of our memory cards need to be tested independently in Connecticut with that program; before the cards are shipped to election officials; before the cards are used in any election.

Second, an element of detection and confidence: We need strong post-election audits to detect errors and fraud. Our current audits are insufficient, unreliable and ineffective. Our audits should be based on the current science of election auditing and recognized post-election audit principles.

Third, a solid chain-of-custody to make credible elections and audits possible. We need to protect and account for ballots before, during, and after the election. Ballots, memory cards, and optical scanners must be protected from illegal modification or covert access whenever they could be compromised.

Would you trust chain-of-custody standards less than those we require for evidence in criminal cases?

In Summary

You are committed to the proposition that Democracy survive and flourish. We have serious work to do. It can happen in Connecticut. Voting Integrity, like the Constitution, can start here in the Constitution State and spread to the Nation.

CTVotersCount is dedicated to pursuing “What You Want”. As a recent teacher said “Anything worth doing is worth failing at, and failing at, and failing at…until you succeed”

Damn the science; Damn the integrity; If it feels good do it!

The troops are supposed to be fighting for Democracy, our right to speak freely and even to protest wars if we choose. So, why do we deny or mislead them into compromising their voting anonymity? Compromising our right that everyone’s vote be anonymous?

New York Times: States Move to Allow Overseas and Military Voters to Cast Ballots by Internet <read>

At least thirty-three states are planning on allowing military and overseas voters to cast ballots by Internet, email, or fax. What could possibly go wrong?

The vote could be hacked to be changed
The vote could be hacked to determine how someone voted
But also, even for of a threat, someone in Town Hall or the County may have to receive the votes and they can see how someone voted

From the Times:

Nearly three million overseas and military voters from at least 33 states will be permitted to cast ballots over the Internet in November using e-mail or fax, in part because of new regulations proposed last month by the federal agency that oversees voting…

Initial steps have been taken to address the problem. In last year’s Defense Department authorization bill, several provisions were added, including one requiring all states to provide military voters with ballots at least 45 days before the election.

It also allowed states to initiate pilot programs for testing the use of Internet voting, but some states have misinterpreted that as requiring such systems.

Most of the states that have created pilot programs for Internet voting will allow voters to send completed ballots as an e-mail attachment. Others use fax, which used to be limited to phone lines. But because of the growing use of voice-over-Internet phone service, faxes are increasingly being sent on the Web.

We appreciate the goal of the MOVE Act but have been disappointed in the Internet pilot provisions. Its even worse that states are misinterpreting the flawed provisions as a mandate for possible chaos and compromise.

We have also signed the Computer Technologists’ Statement on Internet Voting, which warns against using unproven technologies. To the Time’s credit, some critics are quoted in the article along with some pertinent facts:

Cybersecurity experts, election officials and voting-integrity advocates, however, have raised concerns about the plan. They point out that e-mail messages can be intercepted, that voting Web sites can be hacked or taken down by malicious attacks, and that the secrecy of ballots is hard to ensure once they are sent over the Web.

“The commission’s decision basically takes the hazards we’ve seen with electronic voting and puts them on steroids,” said John Bonifaz, legal director of Voter Action, a nonprofit voting rights group that sent a letter last month to the Election Assistance Commission, the agency that released the proposed guidelines… Critics of the increased use of Internet voting say the commission is violating federal law by not allowing enough time for public comment on the guidelines and by circumventing the technical board that is supposed to review any such new regulations…

Critics of the new guidelines say they are flawed because they allow voting machine vendors to do some of the performance and security testing themselves. The results of those tests will then be submitted to the commission for certification.

Most security experts support the idea of using the Internet for registering to vote and for accessing blank ballots, but not for transmitting completed ballots.

Some lawmakers have vowed to slow the shift toward Internet voting.

Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Democrat of New York, and Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas, are working on legislation to establish a two-year moratorium on the electronic submission of ballots until stronger security standards are established.

Representative Rush D. Holt, Democrat of New Jersey, has a bill pending that would in effect ban Internet voting.

The Defense Department decided last year not to create its own Internet voting system until it first receives recommendations from a technical advisory committee that was created by the Help America Vote Act, which Congress passed in 2002…

Richard A. Clarke, a cybersecurity expert and the former counterterrorism chief under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, said he remained skeptical about ballots being sent over the Internet.

“The ultimate solution is for some foundation or organization to put up a large cash prize and take actual voting systems that will be used and allow anyone to try to hack them,” he said.

Sadly the misguided attitude of many election officials is “anything for the troops, if it makes them happy”. Would they support feeding their children all fast food if it made them happy? Or letting the troops go without helmets if it made them happy? Or those heavy vests?

“We have nothing but positive things to say about our experience,” said Pat Hollarn, who retired last year as supervisor of elections for Okaloosa County, Fla., which has allowed voters to cast ballots via e-mail since 2000. Ms. Hollarn said she continued to support expanded Internet voting…

Chris Whitmire, a spokesman for the South Carolina Election Commission, said that his state had been receiving ballots by e-mail and fax since 2006 and that he had heard no complaints from voters who chose those methods.

“What we do hear is thanks from voters who previously couldn’t get their ballots returned in time,” he said, explaining that voters receive a blank ballot attached to an e-mail message, print it, mark it by hand, scan it and send it back to be counted.

Johnnie McLean, the deputy director for administration at the North Carolina State Board of Elections, which has offered overseas and military voters the option to use e-mail or fax for their ballots since 2006, said that when she gets a call from a soldier overseas who has missed deadlines but wants to vote, she is glad she has the e-mail option.

“Even though there are security issues,” Ms. McLean said, “those soldiers are real happy, too, that they don’t have to lose their right to vote.”

Update: UOCAVA Pilot Program Testing Requirements: Comments Submitted <read>

Several individuals and groups have submitted comments on the internet pilot program. Most are critical of the programs lack of appreciation for the risks of Internet, email, and fax voting, while several others point to the lack of consideration for voters with disabilities. We note that Jeremy Epstein starts with analogies similar to our example of fast food:

Almost everyone likes chocolate cake, but that doesn’t mean it’s nutritious. So it is with Internet voting – we know that it’s popular as a concept, but that doesn’t mean it’s a good idea, any more than drunk driving might be – it’s a thrill, but it’s dangerous to both the driver/voter and society.

For those who wonder if I have the troops interest in mind, all I can do is to claim that I do. By the way, here is a photo of yours truly protecting South Korea from invasion by North Korea at Camp Kaiser, Korea circa 1970.

States Move to Allow Overseas and Military Voters to Cast Ballots by Internet

What could a Secretary of the State Do?

Much of what we hear from candidates is proposed cheerleading and leadership from the bully pulpit: the bills they would propose to the legislature, the leadership they would provide to improve the business climate, encourage voting, and voting integrity in Connecticut. However, there are items that the Secretary of the State can do on their own initiative to improve business registration, public access to information, and the election process.

Much of what we hear from candidates is proposed cheerleading and leadership from the bully pulpit: the bills they would propose to the legislature, the leadership they would provide to improve the business climate, encourage voting, and voting integrity in Connecticut. Don’t get me wrong these are useful and legitimate roles for the Secretary of the State. However, there are items that the Secretary of the State can do on their own initiative to improve business registration, public access to information, and the election process.

When I talk to candidates for Secretary of the State, one of my main themes is what they could do on their own authority as Secretary of the State to improve election integrity and public confidence.

Here is my initial list of items, which may be expanded:

Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site, while increasing the integrity of the post-election audit
- e.g Military and Overseas Voters (Added 4/4/2010)
Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested
Improve documentation and training for election officials, in substance and format
Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

We recognize that everything costs money, however, most of these items are relatively modest items that appear to be within the authority of the Secretary of the State.

Further Details

Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site

In a PEW study the Connecticut site ranked 48th out of 50 states. We could debate if we should be higher in the rankings, or instead work to emulate and surpass the top ranked states.

The process of accumulating voting results in Connecticut is an error-prone three step process of addition and transcription, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office, and to the web. Citizens have identified errors large and moderate – errors of a magnitude which could change election results, the initiation of recanvasses, or ballot access. See <here> <here>

Without reliable, publicly posted results, post-election audits cannot be accomplished which inspire confidence and provide integrity. A trusted audit requires selecting districts for audit against previously posted results. Since we audit against optical scanner tapes, and the tape results are not posted, then we fail to meet that requirement.

What can be done?

Post copies of the original documents: All district and central count absented ballot Moderator’s’ Reports and copies of scanner tapes should be faxed to the Secretary of the State’s Office and posted on the SOTS web site. (We know this is easily possible since the SOTS web site has recently included images of all local ballots, and is capable of the quick addition of press releases)
Post detailed and summary data: The SOTS could use temporary employees or outsourcing to input and double check the input of all that data, then post it to the web site in human and downloadable formats.
Side benefit: A free public audit: As a byproduct the public, candidates, and parties could check and audit the data at no cost to the state. To do that today would involve visiting town halls across the state and performing all the calculations done today by hand – efficient auditing of selected districts is not possible because detailed data is not currently posted.
Consider using the Overseas Vote Foundation facility for empowering military and overseas voters, now in use by seven states. This is an example of what could be done to empower all voters. (Added 4/4/2010)
Improve post-election audit integrity: Stop accepting reports showing wild discrepancies as extremely accurate and make all audit investigations public and transparent. (added 7/31/2010) <Extremely Accurate> <Audit Reports>

Another area of irritation and loss of integrity in the post-election audits is that while the Secretary of the State’s Office is able to post ballots for every municipality, they are not provided with a reliable list of polling districts in those municipalities. By requiring the faxing of district Moderator’s Reports and posting them, this uncertainty would be eliminated.

Another problem is public notification of audit dates, times and locations. By procedure (unfortunately not by law), registrars are required to inform the Secretary of the States’s Office three days in advance of the local audits. If these dates were posted by the SOTS Office within 24 hours of receipt, then the public, candidates, and parties would have much better access to actually observing audits.

Beyond audits, having centralized voting district locations and assisting voters in finding their polling place would help the public and partially relieve that burden from towns.

Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested

Currently, before each election, memory cards are programmed in Massachusetts by our distributor, LHS Associates. The cards are shipped to local election officials for pre-election testing. There are two problems:

We have no effective supervision over the process. One of the risks is insider fraud or intimidation of those who program and ship memory cards.
The process is not perfect, and the memory cards are physically unreliable. Extra effort is required when bad cards are discovered by the Registrars and new cards need to be ordered and shipped. See <UConn Report.>

What can be done?

Perform the programming in Connecticut: In other states (outside of New England) large counties program their own cards and often perform programming at a fee for small counties. We have paid for two machines which we can use to program the cards. They could be used by state employees or outsource the programming within Connecticut.
Independently test the cards nearby the programming: UConn has developed, at taxpayer expense, a program to eliminate many causes of error in the cards and easily detect bad cards with “junk” data. Currently this program is underutilitzed in no non-random testing of cards selected by local officials after pre-election testing and after the election. We can exploit this program to 100% pre-test the cards, enhancing integrity and reducing wasted effort by local officials when they discover “junk” cards.
Side Benefit: Jobs: It might be small, yet every job moved back to Connecticut would be a benefit to the state. Like large counties in other states, we might provide the service to other states in New England – we could compete with LHS for business and with the added advantage of the UConn testing program. Perhaps we could expand beyond New England to service other states.

We also note a large cadre of very part-time election officials, many of whom served as lever mechanics and later as vendor trained optical scan technicians. We expect that several of these same individuals could quickly train to meet the seasonal demand for programming and testing, and appreciate the opportunity for work and public service. It would not take many.

Improve documentation and training for election officials, in substance and format

The current Secretary of the State and her staff have worked to improve documentation and training. This work should continue and be taken to a new level.

What can be done?

Update and improve the value of manuals: The Moderator Manual, the Absentee Ballot Moderator, the Recanvass Manual and the Post-Election Audit Procedures were modified after the commitment to optical scanners. They need to be updated and expanded based on experience. They need to be rewritten and edited by professional technical writers to make them more effective as training and reference documents. For instance,
- The Absentee Ballot Moderator’s Manual still calls for multiple counting throughout the day, but only one count is necessary with optical scanners.
- The Post-Election Audit procedures should provide more details in several areas: Counting incomplete bubbles, counting write-in votes, exactly what levels of differences should call for recounting and investigation, and help with accurate and efficient counting methods.
- The Recanvass Manual should also cover details of counting incomplete bubbles, counting for voter’s intent, voter identifiable ballots, and the role of designated observers.
- There may be value in following the examples of other jurisdictions in creating observer manuals for post-election audits and recanvasses.
Improve and expand certification: The Secretary has begin efforts for Registrar Certification and Training to complement the current Moderator Certification and Training. The Registrars job is much more involved than that of a Moderator, yet Registrars have no formal training and certification program (And currently there is no requiremen for Registrars to be certified Moderators or to attend training. Moderators are supposed to be certified, yet that is not enforced – these are issues for the Legislature and an example of where the Secretary of the State could be an effective cheer leader)

Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

One responsibility of the Secretary of the State’s Office is to advise election officials on proper procedures according to law, regulations, procedures, and directives. We have heard registrars complain that the advice given depends on who one talks to, and on what day. We have no way of determining if that is true or how prevalent the problem is. The uncertainty and over-reliance on verbal communication should be eliminated.

We hear the same from committee political treasurers. In fact it is the subject of a proposed law before the Legislature. The law would require the State Elections Enforcement Commission to follow-up with a written version of any verbal advice within ten days. <H.B. 5470> However, it is difficult to write law that distinguishes from a simple inquiry from one that provides a critical distinction that the caller must rely on to avoid error and avoid potential fine or jail time.

What can be done?

All directives should be in writing and publicly available. Like any laws, regulations, and procedures there is usually some ambiguity, unanticipated situations, new regulations can take years to be approved, and problems which must be overcome. The Secretary of the State Office from time to time must issue directives to cover these situations. Such directives should be in writing and posted publicly.
All substantial advice and rulings should be recorded in writing. The current Secretary of the State’s Office keeps track of all citizen inquires. The Office should keep track of all official inquires, and summarize any significant election advice and rulings for future reference.
Economies of Scale: Perhaps the state would be best served by a common system, that tracked similar advice for the Secretary of the State’s Office and Elections Enforcement. Perhaps we should use the same or similar laws, and the same system for all agencies that have a similar requirement. The Environmental Protection Agency comes to mind. What do other agencies do today? What do other states do? We have only one Freedom Of Information law for all agencies. Perhaps we need a uniform law for agency directives, rulings, and advice? There will always be a need to consider economies of scale vs. excess bureaucracy – but the third option is to search for the ways that increase economy of scale, increase democracy, while also streamlining bureaucracy. Once again, the Secretary cannot change the law alone, but could cooperate with other agencies to produce efficiency and provide leadership in going beyond requirements of the law.

This list would be a good start. Perhaps we will update and add to it over time.

Testimony: Rescanning On Same Type Scanner Would Gut Post-Elecition Audit

The current bill is based on three assumptions, all of which are erroneous because:
1. A count by an identical scanner and memory card is NOT equivalent to a manual count.
2. The audits DO NOT cost too much.
3. People in Connecticut CAN count votes accurately

Friday was the public hearing on S.B. 364 proposed by the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC). It would replace the manual hand count post-election audit by a rescanning by the same model of ES&S/Premier/Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scanner with a duplicate memory card.

Here is the prepared introduction to my testimony:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am Executive Director of CTVotersCount and Executive Director of the Connecticut Citizens Election Audit Coalition. I have personally observed twenty-five (25) post-election audits. Today, I am speaking for CTVotersCount. (I am also a certified moderator and a retired computer scientist)

I am opposed to the current Senate Bill 364 which would gut the current post-election audit law by eliminating the manual count and substituting an almost useless recount by the same type of machines and duplicate memory cards.

Instead, CTVotersCount recommends our alternative bill which would clarify the ballot chain of custody, make the audit procedures enforceable, while improving the efficiency and integrity of the audit – without increasing costs.

The current bill is based on three assumptions, all of which are erroneous because:

1. A count by an identical scanner and memory card is NOT equivalent to a manual count. In the words of a League of Women Voters Report:

An audit count that simply repeated the original counting procedure, whether electronically or by hand, would add little value to the election-validation process.

2. The audits DO NOT cost too much. Based on municipality requests for reimbursement to the State and citizen observations, the costs of the 2008 audit are estimated at $82,000 and the cost of the 2009 audit at less than $41,000. (Under our proposal the 2008 audit would have likely have cost 20% to 30% less than it did.)

3. People in Connecticut CAN count votes accurately. Officials in other states have regularly counted paper ballots quite accurately with less than 1/8^th difference rate as Connecticut officials, at a lower cost. The keys are better methods, documentation, training, and organization.

My written testimony includes details supporting estimates for the costs of the audits, the ability of people to count votes accurately, and the advantages of our proposed alternative bill.

I have also delivered testimony to the committee from several computer scientists from Connecticut and around the country attesting to the fallacy of auditing by identical computers and the costs of manual counting in other states.

In summary: Saving money is an important goal, yet the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered. Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and election systems because it costs money? Or should we continue because they protect the value of our investments in infrastructure, save lives, and protect Democracy?

Thank you.

My complete testimony.

Fortunately the Committee did not have to rely exclusively on my testimony and experience observing post-election audits:

Two Coalition Post-Election Audit Observers gave a real-world voters’ view of the current process and its limitations: Tessa Marquis and Mary Rydingsword.
Christine Horrigan and the Connecticut League of Women Voters testified in opposition to the current bill.
Out-of-state experts who provided testimony that audits don’t cost that much and that using similar machines and memory cards is of little value: David L. Dill, Jeremy Epstein, Candice Hoke, Peter G. Neumann, and Barbara Simons, along with two Computer Scientists from Connecticut, the President and a member of TrueVoteCT who lent their names to the testimony: Michael Fischer and Ralph Morelli <testimony>

There is a sound technical basis for verifying electronic vote tallies by manually counting a sample of precincts or vote subtotals. As computer scientists and election experts, we know very well that there is no reliable way to ensure that a security-critical computer system, such as a vote scanner, is free of malicious software that can change votes — or is even bug-free, for that matter.

It has been shown time and time again that there is a clever way to defeat every defense that has been invented. Furthermore, basic errors and gross security holes have been exposed in every existing voting device examined by computer security professionals to date. Errors are routinely detected in elections – and many smaller errors are probably missed. In 2008, hand-counted tabulation audits have discovered errors that led to incorrect vote totals. Computers can greatly increase the convenience and accuracy of elections – but only if we double-check the results independently of the hardware or software by hand counting a randomly selected sample of the ballots.

A special thanks to Barbara Simons for her own independent testimony: <testimony>

Senate Bill 364 appears to be based on the flawed premise that simply rerunning paper ballots through vote counting scanners used for the initial count can replace the manual audits currently required by law. Unfortunately, this assumption is wrong. Because the proposed rescan is not an audit, it will not achieve the goals for which the manual audit was intended. I urge the legislature to retain the manual hand counts in the existing audit legislation.

Also Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, testified her opposition to the bill.

Our hope, based on the overwhelming opposition to be bill, based strongly on well established science, is that the bill will either be completely rewritten based on our recommendations or not moved forward by the Committee.

We also note that the testimony on this bill and other election bills considered, resulted in interest by the Committee and important discussions of the details of how incorrectly marked ballots are counted, the importance of careful recanvasses, and the ballot chain-of-custody.

We expect that in a few days all of the written and verbal testimony will be available <here> and <here>

Another instructive issue:

In other testimony we agree with Registrars who testified for improvement/removal of the quirks in Connecticut law which require multiple moderators in each polling place when more than one party has a simultaneous primary. And perhaps with even less justification, in elections, officials can be recruited from any town to serve in another, in Presidential primaries too, yet in local, state, and other Federal primaries all officials must come from the town of the polling place.

The basic problem is that our election statutes are a hodgepodge. Some sections apply to primaries, others Federal elections, others state elections, others local elections, others local primaries, others referendums etc.

As partially covered in our proposed revisions (see our proposed bill in our testimony) there is a need for clarifying, consolidating, and rationalizing the ballot chain-of-custody. The law has different rules for moving and preserving absentee ballots, polling place ballots cast in all paper elections, and polling place ballots cast in optical scan elections. That last item covering the majority of ballots and elections, polling place ballots cast in optical scan elections, is a hodgepodge of unclear language partially reflecting lever machines and ballot boxes, while reverencing a hard to follow chain of law leading to sections referencing absentee ballots. It seems to be more of a chain-of-confusion and ambiguity than a chain-of custody we can rely on or expect officials to understand!

A 74 page bill is being considered to fix some of the continuing reverences in the law that remain focused on lever machines and are inappropriate for optical scanners. Between mixing lever machines and scanners, even DRE’s (which have not been used in Connecticut), incomplete recanvass laws, and chain-of-custody laws, there remain plenty of issues to address in the future.

Hearing On Public Financing – Ad Hoc Testimony On Voting Integrity Issue

I debated testifying. The hearing was about the Citizens Election Program. IRV [Instant Runoff Voting] was really off topic. However, this was the first time to my knowledge that IRV has come up in the Legislature. Perhaps with a few words I could express an alternative view before a large number of legislators take a position; so that they would know that there are alternative views and significant concerns.

Yesterday the Government Administration and Elections Committee held hearings on proposed fixes to the Citizens Election Program which has been ruled unconstitutional and is currently under appeal. You can read the details at CTMirror and CTNewsJunkie. As the systems stands now there is great uncertainty. For now the program continues under the current law, but the appeals court could rule at anytime confirming the law or more likely ruling it unconstitutional. In the event the law is ruled unconstitutional the legislature would have seven days to fix the law to maintain the program, but the fate of a fix and its details would remain unknown leaving uncertainty until it is fixed.

Officially the state’s position is that the law is constitutional. The Legislature and Governor can act now to fix the law, yet that would seem to have the same effect as a ruling that the law is unconstitutional. The result is ongoing uncertainty for candidates now as they contemplate what might happen if they choose to participate in the program.

Ad Hoc Testimony On Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)

We went to the hearing to listen, with no intention of testifying. We focus our efforts on voting integrity. While I personally support the Citizens Election Program we see no voting integrity implications positive or negative. However, Representative Linda Schofield brought up the issue of Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) in her testimony. She urged the committee to consider adding IRV to the bill and stated the benefits she found in research on IRV. After her testimony I gave her my card and asked to discuss the reasons some are concerned with IRV. Later another advocate expressed support of IRV in his testimony. A committee member, Representative Peggy Reeves, asked Representative Schofield an important question: Could our current optical scanners handle an IRV election?

I debated testifying. The hearing was about the Citizens Election Program. IRV was really off topic. However, this was the first time to my knowledge that IRV has come up in the Legislature. Perhaps with a few words I could express an alternative view before a large number of legislators take a position; so legislators and advocates would know that there are alternative views and significant concerns. I was the last speaker after a long day, accepting the Chair’s generous offer for anyone to testify who had not signed up. My goal was to be brief and not waste anyone’s time. Hopefully we will have a transcript in a few days. I made the following points:

Like many people, I initially thought IRV was a good idea – something that would promote democracy and improve participation. Yet, after more reading and understanding I found significant concerns.
It is difficult to determine the winner and verify the result particularly when votes are close. It may be feasible for races in a single district or a single small jurisdiction, yet gets much more difficult and complicated when elections cross jurisdictional boundaries.
IRV requires more work and knowledge on the part of voters. Imagine a several page ballot replacing what we now fit on a one-sided ballot. Where IRV has been used, voters do not understand it. (Not to mention quite a bit of extra work and knowledge required of election officials as well).
There are theoretical problems with IRV actually delivering the desired/claimed benefits. In practice such problems have frequently occurred.

For more background and details on concerns with IRV refer to our post, IRV: Not So Fast, Not So Simple.

Update: Rep. Schofield called me the next day; we had a very good discussion. She was completely open to considering additional information, as I am.

IRV: Not So Fast, Not So Simple

Tutorial information about Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) and associated concerns.

We have several concerns with Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). At first it seems simple and appealing, however, a closer look reveals concerns and unappreciated consequences, including:

IRV can be confusing and difficult for voters to understand. It can result in a much bigger ballot, requesting voters to rank multiple candidates and not make a mistake. A single race may take an entire ballot that today can handle an entire municipal election or a combined state and Federal election.
IRV does not solve the problems it is intended to fix. It claims to prevent the “wrong” candidates from being elected by providing a runoff until one candidate has over 50% of the votes. In reality, sometimes it does and sometimes it does not. IRV can cause different candidates to be elected than real runoff voting and different candidates to be elected than when the leading candidate from the first round is selected. Often IRV awards a race to a less popular candidate than these other methods.
IRV is complex and time consuming to count, especially in races covering multiple polling places. This is because elimination requires exact information on each ballot ranking be centrally counted or each round centrally counted. Each round is critical to the final result, thus each round may require all absentee ballots and provisional ballots be counted and perhaps require a manual recount to determine the eliminated candidate.

This last point is covered in an editorial from Minnesota – counting a municipal race my take eight weeks and involve spreadsheet calculations <read>

Minneapolis won’t have the assistance of scanning machines to tabulate votes if no candidate receives over half of the first choices, delaying results for up to eight weeks. Since Minnesota does not certify machines that can count ranked choice ballots, and because cities are prohibited from using non-certified machines, city elections workers must hand-count each ballot. Fortunately, the city attorney has assured elections officials that they can use Microsoft Excel to help tally. Otherwise, votes would still be being sorted well into 2010.

Update: It did not take 8 weeks to count. Perhaps because of IRV voters stayed away: <read>

What if they gave an election and nobody came? Well, almost nobody came to the City Election last Tuesday. R. T. Rybak got 73 percent of the vote for Mayor, but that was only 33,217 votes. That’s the smallest amount a winning candidate has gotten running for Mayor since 1910. Rybak’s total was less than 15 percent of the number of registered voters. In the last three municipal elections the LOSING candidates for Mayor polled almost as high as Rybak’s winning total

Update: But it is eight days and some races are still being counted <read>

Several races may be announced Wednesday, the paper says, but the closest council races, in the Fourth and Fifth Wards, won’t come until a later batch of counting.

Update: 17 days past the election and still counting<read>

But the biggest surprise for O’Connor and the elections staff has been how quickly the hand count process has gone. Originally, O’Connor expected that they wouldn’t be ready to announce unofficial winners until December. But they’ve been able to do so several weeks earlier than planned.

Here are some video’s that graphically explain IRV:

A clear explination of IRV, what could go wrong, what the MN Supreme Court said and what happened in Aspen Colorado <video>
A more detailed version of how a candidate can loose by gaining support <video>
We often think of IRV for a single candidate, but it can be used when we vote for several people for town council. Yet its not simple. Here is one way of counting the votes <video>
Third parties tend to like the idea of IRV. Watch this video to be disapointed <video>

Update: 3/3/2010 Burlington voters repeal IRV <read>

A raucus celebration at Norm’s Grill in the new North End Tuesday night marked a victories end to the YES on 5 campaign in Burlington. A mix of Democrats and Republicans celebrated the defeat of Instant Runoff Voting.

After a debate that brought out big names like Bernie Sanders and Howard Dean urging a NO on 5 vote, Burlington residents voted to repeal IRV by a vote of 3972 to 3669, a margin of only 303 votes.

“It was a grass roots effort and we’re really proud of the people that worked on this, we’re ecstatic,” said IRV opponent Chuck Seleen while celebrating the victory.

Wards 4 and 7 were the only two to vote YES on 5. Both had much higher voter turnout than the other wards. Mayor Bob Kiss says that is a sign most of the city still supports IRV and he suggests the city continues the discussion and possibly have yet another vote on IRV.

“This is a modest voter turnout. I think a bigger voter turnout might have a different result and particularly in the case because if you have two wards that are voting very heavily and I think other wards are more modest so if we heat up that debate we might get a better view of Burlingtonians’ real view on IRV,” Kiss said at City Hall moments after the results were tallied.

Several city councilors and election observers have suggested the IRV vote is a referendum on Kiss and his administration, as it tries to deal with the mess of Burlington Telecom. Kurt Wright, who was elected back to the city council, Tuesday, by defeating incumbent democrat Russ Ellis, says it is time Kiss gets the message.

Two comments:

Saying “Wards 4 and 7 were the only two to vote YES on 5. Both had much higher voter turnout than the other wards.” is pure spin. With equal lack of usefulness one could say that say that if more voters had come out in other districts it might well have gone down further.

Apparently Howard Dean changed his mind from his statement on this video.

Update: Report: Ranked Choice Voting Causes Confusion, Fatigue In SF’s District 10 <read>

The new system produced some surprising outcomes, and in the wake of the results there has been a flurry of criticism and praise of how RCV plays out for voters.

Letters TO and FROM the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz

Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, mailed a detailed letter to each voter who signed CTVotersCount.org petition. We respond.

Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, mailed a detailed letter on January 23rd, to each voter who signed the CTVotersCount.org petition. We responded on February 2nd with a follow-up letter to Secretary Bysiewicz.

Secretary Bysiewicz letter: <Page1> <Page2>

Our response text: <.pdf>

TO: The Honorable Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz
CTVotersCount Petition Signers

We have all received the attached letter from Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. We thank the Secretary of the State for taking the time to respond to us in a such thoughtful and detailed letter, addressing our petition.

There is much to applaud in the letter and in the operation of the Secretary of the State’s Office.

We applaud the openness of the Secretary of the State’s Office, their willingness to listen to citizens, their willingness to meet with advocates, and their efforts to improve the election and post-election audit process. We especially appreciate the Office’s and Deputy Lesley Mara’s cooperation in supporting the start and ongoing efforts of the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition, specifically in letting us know the dates of audits scheduled by towns and responsive sharing of the audit reports. Your work with UConn on voting security studies and memory card testing is truly unique and valuable.

Like the Secretary of the of the State’s Office, CTVotersCount works with several national, state, and Connecticut groups to improve voting integrity. We appreciate Deputy Mara’s review of the “Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits” to which we contributed and endorse.

We agree to disagree whether the audits as performed are “inaccurate, unreliable, and ineffective” and that our audit law is the “strongest in the country”.

We agree “that all audit activities should occur in public”. We note disappointment that our request at the meeting on January 16^th and via email, to have the audit follow-up site visits opened to public observation and notification provided to us, was not acted upon.

We join with you, Secretary Bysiewicz, in standing for the criticality of continuing the audits. We appreciate your support of our petition requests to perform the audits sooner, 100% memory card pre-testing, and the institution of an independent audit board. There are many additional items that we remain committed to as listed in our petition, the Coalition recommendations, the Principles and Best Practices, and the recently released “League of Women Voters Audit Report”.

We also join with you, Secretary Bysiewicz, in recognizing that audits are a small price to pay to provide integrity and confidence to the voters of Connecticut.

Sincerely,

Luther G. Weeks
Executive Director

CC: The Honorable M. Jodi Rell, Governor
Co-Chars and Members, Government Administration and Elections Committee