Working Paper: Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity

A new paper articulates the two distinct problems that threaten our elections Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity

Since the 2016 United States (U.S.) presidential election, the issue of social media and disinformation has gained increasing attention as a fundamental threat to the integrity of elections worldwide. Whether by domestic actors, such as candidates and campaigns, or through foreign influence campaigns, the ability of voters to make informed choices based on fair and balanced information has been significantly skewed. This working paper attempts to examine the challenges that this issue poses to electoral integrity and what responses election management bodies (EMBs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) can take to attempt to mitigate the negative consequences. The solutions presented in this paper aim to assist key stakeholders to meet this emergent and mutable threat…

A new paper articulates the two distinct problems that threaten our elections Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity <read> Earlier today I moderated a private discussion of the paper with one of the authors.

Since the 2016 United States (U.S.) presidential election, the issue of social media and disinformation has gained increasing attention as a fundamental threat to the integrity of elections worldwide. Whether by domestic actors, such as candidates and campaigns, or through foreign influence campaigns, the ability of voters to make informed choices based on fair and balanced information has been significantly skewed. This working paper attempts to examine the challenges that this issue poses to electoral integrity and what responses election management bodies (EMBs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) can take to attempt to mitigate the negative consequences. The solutions presented in this paper aim to assist key stakeholders to meet this emergent and mutable threat…

While many aspects of traditional media and elections literature are pertinent to the topic of disinformation, there are many fundamental differences that make thinking in this field unique and potentially require an altered set of analytical tools to help theoreticians and practitioners more accurately navigate this space...

Experts clearly opine that a clear differentiation should be made between cyber threats and cyber-enabled (technology) information operations. The main relevance lies in the proper allocation of resources for tackling each unique set of problems. This is in terms of human expertise, material resources, the strategies to be implemented,and the specific technologies that need to be developed and deployed. The mistake of putting both under the umbrella of cyber threats has been repeatedly made with obvious consequences…

Agents include independent trolls (“human-controlled accounts performing bot-like activities” or harassing others online),9paid trolls, conspiracy theorists, disinformation websites, partisan media, politicians, foreign governments, influential bloggers, activists or government officials, and ordinary users gathered en masse.10Their intents and targets vary; for example, domestic partisan agents may use disinformation to win campaigns through smear tactics, hostile foreign state or nonstate authoritarian agents may intend to structurally undermine democracy by increasing intolerance and polarization, and disaffected anarchic agents may intend to dismantle state institutions and social order. While many are primarily concerned at the moment with automated/inauthentic means of amplifications, there is a growing need to also start addressing the role played by parties, politicians and hyperpartisan media in creating, disseminating and “endorsing” disinformation and divisive contents…

Humans did not evolve to process information and respond rationally; instead, they usemental shortcuts to simplify decision-making. These heuristics combine with another evolved feature, the need to belong to a group, to create vulnerabilities to the kind of systematic manipulation disinformation campaigns use. Our heuristics and biases dispose us to believe information when it is presented in certain ways and wanting to send the proper in-group signals lead people to spread information even if they don’t necessarily trust it…

People are generally more attracted to news with false information than with true information. In a 2018 study on the spread of news stories on Twitter, the MIT Media Lab found that “falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information.”24The truth took “about six times as long as falsehood to reach 1,500 people,” and, controlling for relevant variables, falsehoods were “70% more likely to be retweeted than the truth…

The paper also provides a very good definition of various types of disinformation, misinformation etc.

Unfortunately, as of yet, there is no list of clear solutions. The paper provides a good survey of what is and has been done, and the potential areas that might provide mitigation.

 

 

Senate Intelligence Committee provides report on Russian Hacking

A highly redacted 67 page report: Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 Election. Volume I Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure  With Additional Views

The threat is real. Lack of investigation and exaggeration does not help make the case. The science is clear. Senator Wyden is correct. We need voter marked paper ballots, strong security for those ballots, with sufficient audits and recounts.

A highly redacted 67 page report: Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 Election. Volume I Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure  With Additional Views<read>

Overall I agree with most of the report’s conclusions, yet more so with the minority views of Senator Wyden (page 62). Some of the report’s claims are exaggerated.

Many headlines say that all 50 states were attacked. That is an exaggeration of what the report says. All 50 states may have been pinged or public websites read, yet the report says even that only as speculation. Much of the data in the report does not name states. Actually only Illinois is named.

As I commented on several posts on Facebook: “Several areas where I agree: Paper Ballots need to be protected, effective tabulation audits, and avoid online voting. All of Senator Wyden’s minority report, especially: No real evidence that votes were not changed, Federal standards are in order, we should primarily use voter marked paper ballots and (especially CT) should audit and improve paper Ballot security. Worst of all they all ignore the lack of investigation of the potential NC ePollbook hack.”

Editorial
The threat is real. Lack of investigation and exaggeration does not help make the case. The science is clear. Senator Wyden is correct. We need voter marked paper ballots, strong security for those ballots, with sufficient audits and recounts.

Common Sense: Justified Confidence

“I think the biggest issue facing us is trust in the elections,” said Denise Merrill, Connecticut’s secretary of the state. –  As Feds struggle, states create their own anti-election propaganda programs

Trust and confidence are important – Justified trust and justified confidence. – Luther Weeks, Facebook comment

As we have said before Connecticut is above average in election integrity and security for statewide elections, less so for local elections. Above average, is not saying much. Many states, including Connecticut, have a long way to go to achieve justified confidence. PR alone will not protect us from outsiders and insiders. Will not protect us form loss of confidence in democracy.

Note: This is the fourteenth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut.

“I think the biggest issue facing us is trust in the elections,” said Denise Merrill, Connecticut’s secretary of the state. – CNN: As Feds struggle, states create their own anti-election propaganda programs

Trust and confidence are important – Justified trust and justified confidence. – Luther Weeks, Facebook comment

Every time I hear election officials talk about ‘confidence’ I tend to hear what CNN heard, a desire for the public to be assured at all costs that elections can be trusted.  Whenever I get the chance, either publicly or one-on-one, I point out to officials that we agree, up to a point; I want the public to have confidence, justified confidence. I always remember the first time my wife and I passed out a flyer about election integrity concerns at a public hearing on our flawed post-election audits. An apparently respected registrar said to us:

You shouldn’t be passing that out, you will scare the public. If there is ever a problem, we will fix it in the backroom, just like we did with the lever machines – Respected Registrar who trains Moderators

One caveat, I don’t know that elections officials always intend to imply that weak, PR type of confidence. Sometimes I may be too sensitive, but no matter the intent, the public often hears what CNN heard.

Case in point, the election complaint settlement in Hartford, covered in yesterday’s Hartford Courant: Hartford Registrar of Voters Penalized:

The registrar, Giselle Feliciano, and Martin Allen Jones, a ballot moderator, violated state statute during the Hartford Democratic Town Committee primary in March 2018, according to a June 19 order from the State Elections Enforcement Commission.

Feliciano and Jones agreed to a civil penalty of $750, which will be reduced to $500 if Feliciano repeats a certification class on absentee voting.The settlement was approved by the city’s corporation counsel, and will be paid by the city, according to city communications director Vas Srivastava.It stems from a complaint filed last year by Anne Goshdigian, a challenge slate candidate in the town committee primary, and Thomas Swarr, whose wife Donna Swarr was running on the same challenge slate…

The pair alleged they were trying to watch election officials count absentee ballots at City Hall about 1:30 p.m. March 6, 2018, when Jones said Goshdigian could not be in the room and all others needed to leave as well, including Jones himself.When Goshdigian and Swarr asked for written proof they had to leave the room Feliciano said Goshdigian could not be within a polling place during voting hours. City Clerk John Bazzano was consulted, and he said the room was not a polling place, according to the complaint.

“Feliciano then ‘changed tact,’ and asserted that it was within her authority to remove anyone disrupting the process,” the complaint said. The registrar called the police and had Goshdigian and Swarr removed.

The situation was partially resolved after Donna Swarr spoke with a state’s attorney, who confirmed to her and Feliciano that members of the public could observe absentee ballot counting.

But Feliciano still did not allow Goshdigian to observe the count, according to the complaint. And when Tom Swarr returned to City Hall that evening to observe the final absentee ballot count, he was again denied access .

Swarr said he’s frustrated that the commission’s decision doesn’t address the second incident.

According to the agreement the commission reached with Feliciano and Jones, it “does not believe that there was any untoward intent insofar as the handling of the absentee ballots themselves.” Feliciano admitted she did not know that the law required her to open the count to all members of the public.

“I don’t know how you could say she didn’t understand what the law was when I came back in the evening and was denied again,” Swarr said. And, the commission said it “does find a troubling lack of contrition and/or remorse in the Respondents’ statements in response to the allegations here. Their failure to acknowledge a material error of law in their answers to this matter weighs in the commission’s decision here…

The registrar’s procedural manual on counting absentee ballots also covers, on its second page, who may observe a count.Of what he saw, Swarr said the absentee ballet counting process seemed perfectly secure. However, the lack of transparency gave a false impression that the system was corrupt, he said.

“It’s silly to exclude people and basically create distrust of the system when letting people observe would add confidence in it,” Swarr said. “The lack of particpation is, to me, the greatest threat to Hartford elections. You should be encouraging people to come in and view and build confidence.

The one good thing is that their was a penalty for this violation, yet everything else should leave us all with less than justified confidence in the system:

  • Like many complaints, this one took a stretched-thin SEEC months (15)  after the election to resolve.
  • Although there was a penalty it was not paid by the Registrar or Moderator involved, like the legal defense it was paid by the City – what actual penalty is there in that?
  • The Registrar can save the City almost nothing after tuition and mileage, if she spends a half a day taking an applicable class. Yet the Moderator is not required to be recertified. In the law, the Moderator is just as much, if not more, responsible for following the law here.
  • Sadly, if the Moderator were re-certified he would not be taught about absentee counting  – that is not covered as we recently pointed out to the General Assembly, to no avail, as they cut the moderator certification requirements in half.
  • And perhaps, worst of all, there was no real remedy to the problem. In one of the most partisan election situations, with insiders in charge of an election won by insiders, there was no transparency, no public verification. A complete lack of credibility and a formula for cheating available for the future: Steal some votes, if someone tries to watch and complains, have your city pay a small fine and WIN!

As we have said before Connecticut is above average in election integrity and security for statewide elections, less so for local elections. Above average, is not saying much. Many states, including Connecticut, have a long way to go to achieve justified confidence. PR alone will not protect us from outsiders and insiders. Will not protect us form loss of confidence in democracy.

 

Jimmy Carter says a full investigation would show Trump lost in 2016, we are not so sure.

Former President Jimmy Carter questioned the legitimacy of Donald Trump’s presidency on Thursday, saying he would likely not be in the White House if the Russians did not interfere in the 2016 presidential election.

“I think a full investigation would show that Trump didn’t actually win the election in 2016. He lost the election, and he was put into office because the Russians interfered on his behalf,”

I have the greatest respect for President Carter, especially after his presidency, including his work for election integrity across the Globe. Yet we need actual actions not speculation.

From Politico <read>

Former President Jimmy Carter questioned the legitimacy of Donald Trump’s presidency on Thursday, saying he would likely not be in the White House if the Russians did not interfere in the 2016 presidential election.

“I think a full investigation would show that Trump didn’t actually win the election in 2016. He lost the election, and he was put into office because the Russians interfered on his behalf,”

I am not sure what such an investigation would show. All we know for sure is that there wasn’t a sufficient investigation, before or after the election, thru two administrations. Lots more to investigate in addition to foreign interference.

While its quite possible a though investigation would prove that. There is a lot of question if anything close to enough votes were changed in states that mattered. It might be too late for an investigation to prove anything like that.

More important would have been credible recounts in MI, PA, and WI which were thwarted by election officials and archaic laws intended to protect those same officials. More useful at this point and then would have been a call for investigation and for voter marked paper ballots everywhere.

I am one who believes it is likely that voter suppression small, large, legal and not clearly would have changed the result for Hillary as they would have for Kerry in 2004 and Gore in 2000.

I have the greatest respect for President Carter, especially after his presidency, including his work for election integrity across the Globe. Yet we need actual actions not speculation.

Two and a half years after election possible Russian hack investigated

Almost three years after the first public revelation of hackers’ interference in the 2016 presidential race, the Department of Homeland Security has decided to conduct a forensic analysis of computers used in Durham County during that election,

What we “saw” before smelled more like a cursory cover-up than an investigation.

Politico story by Kim Zetter: Software vendor may have opened a gap for hackers in 2016 swing state  <read>

A Florida election software company targeted by Russians in 2016 inadvertently opened a potential pathway for hackers to tamper with voter records in North Carolina on the eve of the presidential election, according to a document reviewed by POLITICO and a person with knowledge of the episode.

A Florida election software company targeted by Russians in 2016 inadvertently opened a potential pathway for hackers to tamper with voter records in North Carolina on the eve of the presidential election, according to a document reviewed by POLITICO and a person with knowledge of the episode…

Almost three years after the first public revelation of hackers’ interference in the 2016 presidential race, the Department of Homeland Security has decided to conduct a forensic analysis of computers used in Durham County during that election,

We have reported the potential hack and lack of investigation before <Beware of watchdog that does not bark any details> We were told that no votes were changed in 2016, without any analysis of voting machines. We are told that there was nothing to see in NC, without anyone qualified doing the looking. By now the trail is likely quite cold.

What we “saw” before smelled more like a cursory cover-up than an investigation.

The most vulnerable state: Georgia

Electronic election suspicions in Georgia have been there since the dawn of century. Now with Secretary of State Brian Kemp running for Governor, a New Yorker article reviews the recent history of ongoing vulnerability, lack of investigation by the state, and cover-up.

Our Editorial

Has our democracy been stolen in Georgia? Will it continue to be stolen? This is not just a problem for Georgia voters. The Senators and Representatives from each state change the balance in Washington, the Electoral College votes from Georgia count toward who is our President, especially in close elections like 2000, 2004 and 2016. The fully justified suspicion alone undermines confidence in Democracy.

Instead of papering over suspicions, Georgia should be moving to paper ballots and sufficient post-election audits.

Electronic election suspicions in Georgia have been there since the dawn of century. Deserving of chapters in Bev Harris’ book Black Box voting <read> which included the suspicious loss of Senator Max Cleland and the election of Governor Sonny Perdue.

Now with Secretary of State Brian Kemp running for Governor, a New Yorker article reviews the recent history of ongoing vulnerability, lack of investigation by the state, and cover-up: Trump, Election Hacking, and the Georgia Governor’s Race <read>

The indictment also revealed—for the first time—that the Russians had targeted county Web sites in Georgia, looking for election-related vulnerabilities. (The indictment said that the hackers also looked at county Web sites in Iowa and Florida.) In one sense, this was an unremarkable fact: the top cybersecurity official in the Department of Homeland Security, Jeanette Manfra, told Congress in April that Russians hackers had likely targeted every state’s systems in 2016. But, for the past two years, Kemp has been contemptuous of efforts by the D.H.S. to shore up election systems nationally. And, though not going so far as to say that Russian interference is “all a big hoax,” as Trump has, [Secretary of the State and Candidate for Governor Brian] Kemp has been an outspoken advocate of not taking the whole thing so seriously…

Labelling elections as critical infrastructure, Kemp declared, opened the door for the federal government to “subvert the Constitution to achieve the goal of federalizing elections under the guise of security.” Georgia is one of only five states that uses voting machines that create no paper record, and thus cannot be audited, and the Center for American Progress has given it a D grade for election security. But, when D.H.S. offered cybersecurity assistance, Kemp refused it…

The suit was filed on July 3rd. Four days later, the servers at the Center for Election Systems were wiped clean. On August 9th, less than twenty-four hours after the case was moved to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, all the data on the Center’s backup servers were destroyed as well. As the Coalition said in a brief, “The State of Georgia and its officials have the legal, moral, and ethical obligation to secure the State’s electoral system. Sadly—and inexplicably—they appear to lack the will to do so.”

Our Editorial

Has our democracy been stolen in Georgia? Will it continue to be stolen? This is not just a problem for Georgia voters. The Senators and Representatives from each state change the balance in Washington, the Electoral College votes from Georgia count toward who is our President, especially in close elections like 2000, 2004 and 2016. The fully justified suspicion alone undermines confidence in Democracy.

Instead of papering over suspicions, Georgia should be moving to paper ballots and sufficient post-election audits.

Top voting vendor, ES&S, admits lying to public and election officials for years

Article from Mother Board by Kim Zetter: Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States <read>

Wyden told Motherboard that installing remote-access software and modems on election equipment “is the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot boxes on a Moscow street corner.”

I would add that lying about ballot boxes being left on a Moscow street corner is equivalent to flat out lying about the software installed on your products. We should expect more from companies whose hands and integrity upon which our elections depend.

Article from Mother Board by Kim Zetter: Top Voting Machine Vendor Admits It Installed Remote-Access Software on Systems Sold to States <read>

Remote access software can be used to take over a computer from a distant computer for maintenance and trouble-shooting, unfortunately also from fraud.

From the article:

The nation’s top voting machine maker has admitted in a letter to a federal lawmaker that the company installed remote-access software on election-management systems it sold over a period of six years, raising questions about the security of those systems and the integrity of elections that were conducted with them.

In a letter sent to Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) in April and obtained recently by Motherboard, Election Systems and Software acknowledged that it had “provided pcAnywhere remote connection software … to a small number of customers between 2000 and 2006,” which was installed on the election-management system ES&S sold them.

The statement contradicts what the company told me and fact checkers for a story I wrote for the New York Times in February. At that time, a spokesperson said ES&S had never installed pcAnywhere on any election system it sold. “None of the employees, … including long-tenured employees, has any knowledge that our voting systems have ever been sold with remote-access software,” the spokesperson said.

ES&S did not respond on Monday to questions from Motherboard, and it’s not clear why the company changed its response between February and April. Lawmakers, however, have subpoena powers that can compel a company to hand over documents or provide sworn testimony on a matter lawmakers are investigating, and a statement made to lawmakers that is later proven false can have greater consequence for a company than one made to reporters.

Election-management systems are not the voting terminals that voters use to cast their ballots, but are just as critical: they sit in county election offices and contain software that in some counties is used to program all the voting machines used in the county; the systems also tabulate final results aggregated from voting machines.

We point out that because those machines can be used to “used to program all the voting machines”, they can be used to change the software used on those machines and essentially are just as risky to those machines as would be if pcAnywhere were installed on those machines as well.

Wyden told Motherboard that installing remote-access software and modems on election equipment “is the worst decision for security short of leaving ballot boxes on a Moscow street corner.”

I would add that lying about ballot boxes being left on a Moscow street corner is equivalent to flat 0ut lying about the software installed on your products. We should expect more from companies whose hands and integrity upon which our elections depend.

VoteAllegheny Analysis of Election Risks in One County

VoteAllegheny presents a report by Carnegie-Mellon researchers on the vulnerabilities in a single county in a swing state. The biggest takeaway for us is understanding that a top-down analysis of vulnerabilities can yield the most cost-effective areas to focus on preventing election fraud. Where we spend our resources can make a difference in the results!

VoteAllegheny presents a report by Carnegie-Mellon researchers on the vulnerabilities in a single county in a swing state.  The biggest takeaway for us is understanding that a top-down analysis of vulnerabilities can yield the most cost-effective areas to focus on preventing election fraud. Where we spend our resources can make a difference in the results!

As Connecticut spends $5million+ in Federal election security dollars, perhaps an independent study like this one for Connecticut would be the most effective use of the 1st $1.00, pointing to the most cost-effective use of the rest of the $5million+.

The “Real” Lawyers Only Need Apply Rule

As this CTNewsJunkie post implies, it will always be called The Bysiewicz Test <read>

Ambiguously defined in law and only slightly less ambiguously by the Connecticut Supreme Court. All we know for sure is that you have to be a lawyer in CT for at least ten years and have different experience than Susan Bysiewicz had in 2010.  As I commented in on the article:

I always find it interesting that the AG and Judge of Probate are the only offices that have qualifications, as far as I know. They are both related to law. I wonder if the composition of the General Assembly makes the legislature realize how important qualifications are, in just these cases?

There remains no necessary training whatsoever to be Secretary of the State, while some of her employees, but not all, need to be lawyers to give advice to the public, would be candidates, and election officials. That could be going better, but of course, certification by itself does not preclude errors and incompetence, or as Jon Lender puts it Bungling

As this CTNewsJunkie post implies, it will always be called The Bysiewicz Test <read>

Ambiguously defined in law and only slightly less ambiguously by the Connecticut Supreme Court. All we know for sure is that you have to be a lawyer in CT for at least ten years and have different experience than Susan Bysiewicz had in 2010. As I commented in on the article:

I always find it interesting that the AG and Judge of Probate are the only offices that have qualifications, as far as I know. They are both related to law. I wonder if the composition of the General Assembly makes the legislature realize how important qualifications are, in just these cases?

Why is there no requirement that the Comptroller be a CPA with 10 years in practice? How about the Treasurer being an MBA with 10 years managing significant funds? Or that the Secretary of the State has been a Registrar, Municipal Clerk, and served in election administration or as a pollworker for at least 10 elections?

There is no such requirement for Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Or perhaps there should be no qualifications for any office?

The General Assembly and Denise Merrill, agree that to be a pollworker you must be trained before every election and primary; to lead a polling place or the counting of absentee ballots you must be a Certified Moderator; there are no qualifications to be a Registrar of Voters, yet you must become a Certified Registrar to remain a Registrar and be subject to some refresher training each year.

There remains no necessary training whatsoever to be Secretary of the State, while some of her employees, but not all need to be lawyers, to give advice to the public, would be candidates, and election officials. That could be going better, but of course, certification by itself does not preclude errors and incompetence, or as Jon Lender puts it Bungling: Candidate’s Lawsuit Says Bungling By Merrill’s Office Ruined Her Chance At Primary <read>

Ex-State Rep. Vickie Orsini Nardello, D-Prospect, claims in a lawsuit that bungling by Democratic Secretary of the State Denise Merrill’s office has deprived her of running in a 16th State Senate District primary that she qualified for at a convention in May.

Nardello says two Merrill subordinates told her two different things early this month: one, that a technical problem with her primary eligibility form (she’d failed to write “16” in the “Senatorial District” space) had been “resolved” and she was “all set”; and the other that “we are unable to accept your certificate of eligibility” and it’s too late to submit one that’s filled in correctly.

Do you have any examples of incorrectly decided elections, errors, and fraud etc.?

Last month as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists, which I addressed earlier, and then there was this one about actual evidence of incorrectly decided elections, error, and fraud.

Do you have any examples of incorrectly decided elections, errors, and fraud etc.?

In Connecticut there was a question incorrectly decided in New London. Because advocates closely reviewed election data it was obvious that officials counted 50 more voters than voters in one district’s absentee ballots(*).  They demanded a recount and the result was reversed.

The last I heard, the recently replaced municipal clerk in Stamford was under Federal investigation for Absentee Ballot errors. She was reported by the two Registrars…

Last month as I prepared for the MLK Conversation, I wrote up a couple of Frequently Asked Questions, one asked about Conspiracy Theorists, which I addressed earlier <here>, and then there was this one about actual evidence of incorrectly decided elections, error, and fraud.

Do you have any examples of incorrectly decided elections, errors, and fraud etc.?

In Connecticut there was a question incorrectly decided in New London. Because advocates closely reviewed election data it was obvious that officials counted 50 more voters than voters in one district’s absentee ballots(*).  They demanded a recount and the result was reversed.

The last I heard, the recently replaced municipal clerk in Stamford was under Federal investigation for Absentee Ballot errors. She was reported by the two Registrars.

Also a Party Chair in Bridgeport is under SEEC investigation for Absentee Ballot errors.

In fact, absentee skullduggery is pretty common. A couple of years ago an article said that of 17 allegations of Absentee ballot fraud in recent years in Bridgeport, 13 were investigated, validated, and resulted in fines.

In East Longmeadow, MA, a few years ago, in a primary 400 voters were registered in a party without their knowledge by insiders and voted without their knowledge. It swung the primary and the inside perpetrators were punished, with the election reversed.

In that same year a similar thing happened with 3000 votes in Miami/Dade. Officials withheld IP data vital to an investigation, nobody was caught of punished.

In 2002, Don Siegelman, a very popular person in Alabama, ran for re-election, one county obviously manipulated several thousand votes to cause his loss. The county refused to perform a recount or to show the ballots. As Siegleman prepared to run again in  2006 he was subject to a very questionable prosecution, convicted, and spent four years in Federal Prison. He is still under probation, limited in speaking and traveling. Many of the good guys were punished, while many of the bad guys were promoted.  See the recent documentary Atticus v. The Architect is available from the producer or Amazon videos.

*  This would never have been discovered in a post-election audit, as central count absentee scanners are exempt from audit by some flawed theory (held by legislators and election officials) along the lines of “if one machine works correctly someplace at some time, all machines work perfectly all the time.” That is apparently why we don’t continue to inspect cars for emissions, vaccines, or baby food.