Author: Luther Weeks

Americans Elect – A license to steal the presidency?

This is seriously dangerous. If you don’t join Americans Elect, their vote could determine the President. If you do join Americans Elect, the vote could be manipulated in the backroom or by hackers. Or the self-appointed board could override the actual vote.

We have written before of Americans Elect it seems the real story gets more and more suspect, more and more dangerous. A new story/investigation in Irregular Times: Americans Elect: A Corporation and a Political Party <read>

This is seriously dangerous. If you don’t join Americans Elect, their vote could determine the President. If you do join Americans Elect, the vote could be manipulated in the backroom or by hackers. Or the self-appointed board could override the actual vote.

In July of 2011, Americans Elect Chief Operating Officer Elliot Ackerman declared, “The key delineation to make is that we’re not a party.” These unequivocal claims are contradicted by Americans Elect’s observable behavior; Americans Elect has registered as a political party in a number of states…

Why does it matter whether Americans Elect is or is not a political party? As a registered 501c4 corporation, Americans Elect can hide the sources of unlimited funding from the American people. If it declared itself to be a political party, it would have to follow the rules for political parties, which include significant limitations to how much money they may take from individuals and mandate disclosure of them. Americans Elect is simultaneously using party status to get on the ballot for 2012 and sloughing off party status to avoid contribution requirements…

There are three elections envisioned by the Americans Elect bylaws, two of them taking place online. The first election is to select an Americans Elect presidential nominee, and only registered Americans Elect Delegates (see below) will be able to participate. The second election is the presidential election on Election Day 2012, one in which the Americans Elect nominee will be on the ballot in all 50 states and in which every registered voter in America will be able to participate as usual. The third election will take place after the November presidential election if no candidate wins a majority of electoral votes. In that circumstance, Americans Elect will hold another online vote of its Delegates to decide whether the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate will be given the electoral votes won by Americans Elect’s candidate. This third election would allow Americans Elect to throw the presidency to either party, a powerful position to hold. Americans Elect needs to win just one state in order to occupy that powerful position and trigger a third election…

In the top tier of Americans Elect is the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors and only the Board of Directors appoints its own members and corporate officers. The Board of Directors and its appointed designates write the rules for the Americans Elect elections and may overrule all actions of Employees. The Board of Directors may overrule nearly all actions of Delegates and writes the rules within which Delegates “independently” make a presidential nomination, constraining Delegates’ choices. The Board of Directors is the only body in the entire Americans Elect system to make procedural decisions by democratic majority vote, making it the swiftest means for Americans Elect to take political action…

Another reason why Americans Elect needs to disclose information about its origins, funding and activities is its unfortunate history. It’s not just that Americans Elect is currently making claims that don’t match the observable facts; there’s a history of misrepresentation, misdirection and malfunction in Americans Elect’s previous effort under the name Unity08

These are just some snippets. The full details in the article demonstrate the dangers.

 

Rich Sivel 1952 – 2011

Director of TrueVoteCT – Unstoppable Activist – Friend

Richard Franklin Sivel Jr. <obit>

Rich was instrumental in the Voter Verified Paper Record law and selection of Op Scan in Connecticut, , a post-election audit observer for the Coalition. The Obituary is really wonderful without being overblown. I had lunch with him earlier this year: Everything great! 1st grandchild; mother still in PA.

Director of TrueVoteCT – Unstoppable Activist – Friend

 

San Francisco voters have trouble with ranked-choice elections.

We have often articulated our concerns with Instant Run-Off Voting also often called Ranked-Choice Voting. This article from the New York Times provides some further confirmation of our concerns

From the New York Times: Analysis Finds Incorrect Use of Ranked-Choice Voting  <read>

We have often articulated our concerns with Instant Run-Off Voting also often called Ranked-Choice Voting. We have three concerns:

  • It requires more knowledge and expertise by voters, it can be confusing, and result in very large ballots
  • It can be difficult to calculate winners, recount, and audit, especially as more districts and jurisdictions are included in the same race
  • In theory and frequently in practice it does not provide the benefits claimed – like conventional voting, with more than two candidates, the winner is a crap-shoot.

This article provides some further confirmation of our concerns:

Despite a $300,000 educational campaign leading up to last month’s elections, including a new smiley-face mascot, publicity events, and advertising on buses and in newspapers, only one-third of voters on Nov. 8 filled out all three choices in all three races, according to an analysis released this week by the University of San Francisco.

Under the city’s system, voters were asked to rank their top three choices for mayor, sheriff and district attorney.

Perhaps the analysis’ most troubling finding is that 9 percent of voters, mostly in Chinatown and southeastern neighborhoods like the Bayview, marked only one choice for each office, either because they considered only one candidate suitable or because they did not know how to fill out their ballot correctly.

Many advocate or assume voters can rank all the candidates and claim that their will be more candidates in the race. Presumably the more to rank or choose from the more challenging for voters and those working to educate and encourage voters. And it does not seem to reduce the opportunities for candidates and voters to look to the system and manipulation to explain the result:

Mr. Latterman, an associate director of the Leo T. McCarthy Center for Public Service and the Common Good at U.S.F., said voters in neighborhoods with large black or Asian populations tended to vote for different candidates than residents in other parts of the city. But the Nov. 8 election was the first time researchers saw a geographic or perhaps ethnic difference in how people used ranked-choice voting.

The findings indicate one of two things, Mr. Latterman said: Either campaigns tried to manipulate the results by focusing on specific groups of people or there is not a clear understanding of how to use the system.

A recent Bay Citizen analysis revealed that 16 percent of ballots in the mayoral race — those of more than 31,500 people — were filled out correctly but were discarded when all of their chosen candidates were eliminated from the race. San Francisco does not allow voters to rank all the candidates on the ballot.

Our past posts on IRV <Index>

 

Concern with electronic skulduggery is Right, Left, and Center

Hackers threaten Presidential Primary. The particular threat may or may not be real. Yet, being concerned with electronic skulduggery is Right, Left, and Center

AP, via Yahoo: Iowa GOP worried by hacker threat to caucus vote <read>

As the article points out the particular threat may or may not be real, but as those quoted in the article point out, cyber threats to voting are real:

With two weeks remaining before Iowa kicks off the 2012 campaign with its first-in-the-nation presidential caucuses, the state Republican Party is taking steps to secure its electronic vote collection system after receiving a mysterious threat to its computers…

state authorities have not taken any actions since the call to “peacefully shut down” the caucuses does not amount to a crime, said Jim Saunders, director of the Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center at the state’s Department of Public Safety…

The GOP is also encouraging the party activists who run the precinct votes to use paper ballots instead of a show of hands, which has been the practice in some areas. The ballots would provide a backup in the event of any later confusion about the results…

Drew Ivers, chairman of Texas Rep. Ron Paul’s campaign in Iowa and a member of the state GOP central committee, said party officials and consultants will also monitor for any hacking threat using software and other methods, but added, “How do you stop a hacker? That’s the question.”…

Among the early voting states, the hacking concerns have most spooked officials in Iowa. In New Hampshire, whose primary is one week after the Iowa caucuses, officials rely on a mostly manual process that uses paper and is less vulnerable to an attack on computer systems, said Assistant Secretary of State Anthony Stevens. In South Carolina, which follows 11 days later, State Election Commission spokesman Chris Whitmire said he was not aware of any concerns.

But Douglas Jones, a computer science professor at the University of Iowa who has consulted for both political parties, said the Iowa Republican Party is right to be concerned about the security of their computer systems. The Internet, he said, is “becoming more and more like the Wild West.”

Voting machine investigation leads to serious issues and cover-up

This is serious stuff. The words that come to mind are: Illegal, unacceptable, unconscionable, ridiculous, unconstitutional, and undemocratic.

Brad Friedman articulated the details last week  <read>

Forensic Analysis Finds Venango County, PA, E-Voting System ‘Remotely Accessed’ on ‘Multiple Occasions’ by Unknown Computer

Battle for independent election investigation rages in rural Republican county, pitting renegade Election Board against County Commission, giant E-Vote firm ES&S…

What is wrong in this situation?

  • Illegal software found on vote accumulation machine
  • On several occasions the system was accessed remotely, unauthorized
  • Evidence of an illegal flash drive mounted on the system
  • The log shows out of sequence events
  • The Election Board that should be leading the charge to get to the bottom of the problem is fighting to cover-up the evidence and avoid investigation
  • The vendor, ES&S who should be offering to assist in the investigation is keeping the code secret and suing the investigators to stop, to keep the evidence hidden
  • There is no paper record of the votes such that investigators and citizens can determine if votes or elections were comprised

This is serious stuff. The words that come to mind are: Illegal, unacceptable, unconscionable, ridiculous, unconstitutional, and undemocratic.

Hats off to the citizens of Pennsylvania who fight for voting integrity, the researchers at Carnegie-Mellon, and the interim Election Board.

According to the Initial Report from a landmark independent forensic audit of the Venango County, PA, touch-screen voting system — the same system used in dozens of counties across the state and country — someone used a computer that was not a part of county’s election network to remotely access the central election tabulator computer, illegally, “on multiple occasions.” Despite the disturbing report, as obtained by The BRAD BLOG and posted in full below, we may never get to learn who did it or why, if Venango’s County Commissioners, a local judge, and the nation’s largest e-voting company have their way. And that’s not all we won’t get to find out about.

The battle for election integrity continues in Venango, with the County Commissioners teaming up with e-voting vendor Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S) on one side, and the county’s renegade interim Republican-majority Board of Elections on the other. The Commissioners and ES&S have been working to spike the independent scientific forensic audit of the county’s failed electronic voting machines that was commissioned by the interim Board of Elections. Making matters worse, the Board has now been removed from power by a county judge, a decision they are attempting to appeal as the three-person board and their supporters continue to fight the entrenched establishment for transparency and accountability in the rural Western Pennsylvania county…

Omaha-based ES&S, which had issued no objections prior to the start of the study, but changed its mind quickly after it began (as we detailed in an Exclusive report in late October) has now hardened their position, sending threatening legal letters to both the county and the two computer scientists. The e-voting firm has warned them they are likely to face a lawsuit if they do not agree to complete confidentiality and if results of their analysis are released publicly without their prior review and approval…

There were real, not just theoretical, concerns motivating the investigation in the first place:

As the analysis finally began, Election Integrity advocate Marybeth Kuznik, founder of the non-partisan watchdog organization VotePA.us explained that the Board was calling for the investigation after the county had experienced “numerous reports of vote-flipping, candidates missing from screens, write-ins missing, and high undervote rates in their May 17 Primary.”

While reporting on the Venango Board’s efforts to get their analysis under way during one of our regular fill-in stints as guest host for the nationally syndicated Mike Malloy Show in late October, we received an unexpected call from Adams to offer more details on why his Board had sought the forensic audit.

“It started with an election in 2008 when the machines were basically showing a large number of undervotes,” he explained. “And then there were candidates for positions in the county and they had zero votes, but there was like 250 or 260 undervotes.”

“Wait a minute, there were people who had zero votes on the ballot? Is that normal?” we interrupted to ask.

“No. No, it is not normal,” he responded directly, describing the anomaly as “a red flag.” When pressed to explain why he believed the the County Commissioners and their legal representatives had been working so hard for months to keep the audit from happening, Adams told us bluntly: “They know there’s something wrong.”

This provides one more reason to scrap unverifiable election systems without a voter verifiable paper record in favor of more economical, auditable optical scan technology. But that is not enough!

  • Every state, every ballot should be subject to sufficient post-election audits. But that is not enough!
  • Strong security and chains of custody is needed for ballots.
  • And a total audit of voting systems and election systems should be required: e.g. Do pollbook counts match ballot counts? Are voters given a fair opportunity to vote? Are absentee ballots properly secured and submitted? Is there any evidence of machine tampering or irregularities?

Do instructions on the ballot exaggerate the ZigZag effect?


Take a look at the back page of a Connecticut Sample Ballot <look at the 2nd page here>

It is likely that the example shows two columns and rows is designed to be as simple as possible and by showing two candidates selected in different parties is intended to be fair (at least to the two dominant parties). But it would suggest, at least subconsciously, to some voters that voting in a ZigZag is particularly appropriate.

Note also that the vote for one example looks very similar on the instructions with two rows and columns, also showing a ZigZag pattern.

The ZigZag Conjecture – Another reason to scrap our lever-like ballots

With anecdotal evidence and rational speculation, we introduce the ZigZag Conjecture which may randomly “help” determine election winners and losers in Connecticut.

With anecdotal evidence and rational speculation, we introduce the ZigZag Conjecture which may randomly “help” determine election winners and losers in Connecticut. We doubt we are the first to suggest such an effect. Perhaps someone has or will use statistics to study it.

Our Lever-Like Ballots

Like several states, Connecticut does uses a ballot design that could be best described as a the “face of a lever machine on paper”, with boxes for each candidate’s name and bubble. It takes up a lot of space, when there are a lot of parties and unaffiliated candidates. It can include a lot of blank space when some parties only offer a few candidates.  For examples see the ballots from November 2011 <view>  It can include a lot of blank space when some parties only offer a few candidates or there are unaffiliated candidates, for example <here> and <here (be sure and scroll down)>

Party order is specified by the State (the current Governor’s party 1st). Candidate order in vote for multiple races is selected randomly by lottery.

It used to be that you had to use a party lever to vote in Connecticut. Vivian Kellems took care of that, eventually the party levers were removed, and now you cannot vote for a party without filling all the bubbles.

Other states use a clearer ballot that wastes less space, such as this sample from Minnesota <view> It takes away the party emphasis, presumably it would take a voter a bit longer, a bit more care, and preparation to register a party line vote.

The ZigZag Conjecture

Conjecture: Many voters vote in ZigZags: voting from left to right across the ballot they want to vote for a mix of candidates, unaffiliated and from various parties. In vote for multiple races many tend to vote for one candidate in each column, even thought they could vote for more than one in the same column.This can hurt candidates in certain locations on the ballot.

Anecdotal Evidence:

  • This possibility first came to our attention when one particular candidate was unexpectedly the lowest vote getter in a vote for multiple race. It was quickly suspected that the cause was her location on the ballot directly below the highest vote getter in the race.
  • Observing a post-election audit in another town, officials were wondering why a traditional high vote getter did not lead his party in the election. Inspecting the ballot and the results he was located above the highest vote getter in the other party.
  • A similar anecdotal cases were seen in that election and others

Certainly these anecdotes are not conclusive. Perhaps a statistical study could be performed evaluating a large number of local elections to determine the extent to which results support this conjecture. Since ballot position is completely random within a party, if the conjecture were false then we would expect in each municipality on average each party candidate would receive and average number of votes for their party without regard to candidates in the same column – if a statistically significant correlation were shown  based on candidates in the same column between the higher vote getters  in each party vs. the lower vote getters in the other dominant party, then the ZigZag conjecture would be supported.

Other possible problems and implications.

Additional research might include:

  • Does the ZigZag Hypothesis apply between races as well as in a single race?
  • Does the ZigZag Hypothesis increase or drop-off from left to right in a race or across the ballot?
  • Does the first column in a race or ballot effect the direction of the entire ZigZag – or is there correlation between columns?
  • Is it advantageous to be to the right and above or below a high vote getter?
  • Are less informed, less interested voters, especially in local races, more likely to ZigZag in a well intended attempt at fairness and balance?
  • Would successful efforts toward higher turn-out through convenience actually increase the ZigZag effect, bringing more less informed voters to the polls?

Our own speculation would be yes to all of these questions, adding more weight to the need to scrap our lever-like ballot design.

UPDATED: What is “statistically insignificant”?

There is no agreed upon level of difference that would be considered “statistically insignificant” in Connecticut.

In another nearby town officials are concerned about the cost of audits.

Update:  One of the Greenwich Registrars has commented on the first story below and corrected some misinformation.

by Fred DeCaro III
12:46 pm on Sunday, December 4, 2011

It is a shame that poor “reporting” and the absence of fact-checking led Mr. Weeks to comment on this story.

The “reporter” of this story simply copied from a Greenwich Time story, including mistakes in that story.

First, he places the term “statistically insignificant” in quotes. This is not a quote from me, but a quote from the Greenwich Time news story the “reporter” copied from.

Second, because the “reporter” did not verify anything, and merely copied from Greenwich Time, he copied their erroneous statement that 1,250 ballots were hand counted. There were 2,500 ballots counted by hand, and the discrepancy was .36%, which is under the threshold mentioned by Mr. Weeks, who is a well-respected CT election watchdog.

Most disturbing to me personally is when the “reporter” uses inflammatory language and says “the registrars reportedly decided that since the discrepancy was “statistically insignificant” that they wouldn’t bother to take the time to investigate the error.”

Not only is the phony quote used again, but the word choice of “wouldn’t bother to take the time” makes it seem like we didn’t care about the discrepancy.

Together as Republican and Democrat Registrars we made the decision that spending an additional $240 an hour of taxpayer money (with a minimum of 2-3 more hours necessary) to research this matter would not enhance public confidence in the process. I doubt very many Greenwich taxpayers would disagree with that decision.

Greenwich Patch: Voting Machine Audit Takes Nine Votes From Marzullo <read>

A state-mandated hand recount of votes cast in the Nov. 8 election in two of Greenwich’s polling places to determine the accuracy of the new electronic voting machines on Thursday reportedly revealed that Democratic Selectman Drew Marzullo received a “statistically insignificant” nine fewer votes than were originally tabulated by the machines…

The registrars reportedly decided that since the discrepancy was “statistically insignificant” that they wouldn’t bother to take the time to investigate the error

Revised comments: There is no agreed upon level of difference that would be considered “statistically insignificant” in Connecticut. The nine votes out of 2,500 in this case represents just 0.36% of the votes which is approaching the 0.5% threshold for a recanvass. To me anything over that threshold or anywhere near it is significant. Especially since we do not even consider differences in the audit attributable to scanners’ inability to read voters’ intent. We could benefit by established standards for accepting counts and for triggering further investigations.

In another Fairfield County town, officials are concerned about the cost of audits. The Daily Weston: Weston Officials Blast State’s Election Audit <read>

“Am I happy about this? Of course I am not happy about it. This is ridiculous, it’s an unfunded mandate,” said First Selectman Gayle Weinstein…

The purpose of the audit is to make sure voting machines are working correctly, Merrill said. “With this audit, we now must take the step of checking the machine totals from Nov. 8 to ensure the accuracy of our optical scanners. We are committed to making sure Connecticut voters have continued confidence that their votes were recorded accurately, and that’s why these independent audits are so vital.”

The actual hand counting of the three races, Weinstein said, will happen Saturday at Town Hall. But she said the audit is unfair because the town must pay poll workers to spend the day counting votes. Weinstein estimates the audit could cost taxpayers $2,500.

“We have to sit here and count each ballot by hand. I can’t believe it,” said Laura Smits, the Democratic registrar of voter. “I am hoping we get this finished in one day, but who knows. This is costing us a lot of money.”

We were in Weston to observe the audit. It was very well conducted and efficient. If we had not read the article beforehand, we would have never guessed there was any official in Weston concerned with cost. All seemed concerned with performing the audit as intended.

The audit likely cost a bit less than $2500, perhaps $1,500, which would have been about $0.60 per ballot, or about $0.06 per ballot cast in the election statewide given the 10% audit. Perhaps also around 7% of the costs of the ballots printed for the election statewide or less than 1% of the cost of running the election statewide. See <Election Costs $ – Democracy? Priceless!>

Scanners like ours: Optical scanner counts differ for same ballots

There should be an investigation, however, we suggest that determining the cause is not a complete cure. I could happen again. It could have happened in the past. Maybe in Connecticut.

Brad Friedman reported the story last week <read>

A close race on election night. Rescanned to check but the other candidate won. Then they did a hand count and confirmed the original result. UT like Connecticut is fortunate to have chosen optical scanners with voter completed paper ballots. But we need to verify the accuracy of scanners with audits, recanvasses, and recounts.

The first “recount” of Provo’s Municipal Council District 1 ballots — carried out on the same op-scan systems that tallied them in the first place — was held yesterday, only to be abruptly called off when the results were found to be “extremely in favor of the opposite candidate.”…

“The numbers were varying too much,” Utah County Chief Deputy Clerk/Auditor Scott Hogensen tells the Deseret News about the District 1 race. “It became obvious the machines weren’t counting things correctly.”

But whether the Diebold op-scanners tallied the ballots inaccurately on Election Day or during the so-called “recount” remains unknown at the moment.

According to Deseret News, “Morrow said she asked for the recount to be done by hand in the first place but the request was denied.”…

two hand-counts on Wednesday have now confirmed the accuracy of the original optical-scan count giving the election victory to Gary Winterton after all. The “recount” on the same op-scan systems seem to have been inaccurate, while the original count was accurate. We still don’t know why, of course.

It was not a small, trivial difference, we are talking over 700 votes!

No word yet on why the second scanner might have miscounted. There should be an investigation, however, we suggest that determining the cause is not a complete cure. No matter the cause:

  • It could happen again in Utah or Connecticut
  • Another time it might be the original scanner, not the second one, and/or election day officials making the error
  • It might be far enough off that there is no automatic recount or recanvass
  • It might not be the machine, it might be procedures, yet exonerating the machine does not provide comfort, whatever the cause it can happen again in Utah or Connecticut
  • Perhaps it has happened before – maybe last year in Connecticut one or more of the differences between hand counts and machine counts might not have been human errors as assumed by the Secretary of the State’s office. <read>

We leave with this further item from Brad illustrating the tendency for officials to leap to unfounded, yet assuring conclusions based on assumptions:

Amusingly, and for reasons unknown, [Utah County Chief Deputy Clerk/Auditor Scott] Hogensen told Deseret News that, according to the paper, he “does not believe machine malfunctions affect the outcome of any other races in the county.”

This has happened a couple of times before with other scanners. <one example><another>

Secrecy vs. Anonymity of ballots

From Aspen we have a discussion of the value of anonymous ballots and the meaning of the secret ballot. What voting free from coercion requires is the secret casting of ballots and the ongoing safeguarding of those ballots along with the anonymity of the voter associated with each ballot.

Recently we discussed the distinction between integrity and confidence. From Aspen we have a discussion of the value of anonymous ballots and the meaning of the secret ballot. What voting free from coercion requires is the secret casting of ballots and the ongoing safeguarding of those ballots along with the anonymity of the voter associated with each ballot <read>

Before 1947, Col­orado bal­lots were marked with unique num­bers and were not anony­mous. Vot­ers might mark their bal­lots in secrecy, but their votes were trace­able through delib­er­ate num­ber­ing. A 1947 con­sti­tu­tional amend­ment out­lawed any marks on bal­lots that make them trace­able. This rev­o­lu­tion­ary change facil­i­tated effec­tive pri­vacy of Col­oradans’ vot­ing process and is the foun­da­tion of our civil right to expect our votes to remain secret. This vot­ing method — some­times referred to as the “secret bal­lot” — iron­i­cally does not allow for secrets on ballots.

How­ever, oppo­nents of elec­tion trans­parency talk end­lessly about “secret bal­lots.” Hate to tell you, there’s no such thing. “Secret bal­lots” have no place, indeed no mean­ing, in our elec­tion law. Vot­ers are enti­tled to pri­vacy while vot­ing and a sys­tem designed to pre­vent trac­ing a bal­lot to a voter. These safe­guards ensure NO ONE learns how any­one else voted. They ensure what every­one wants: Nobody knows how I voted.

We agree with the writers. When lawmakers use the word secret ballot we believe the actual intent is that the identity of the voter should always remain secret, which is equivalent to anonymous ballot, not that ballots remain secret. In fact, in order to perform publicly observable audits, recounts, racanvasses, or to make ballots public requires that they not be secret. In fact, if non-transparent audits, recounts, or recanvasses or any official review of ballots is allowed then ballots would not be secret – they would be available for officials to inspect but kept from the voters.

In the Connecticut Constitution we have, in Article 6 Section 5:

The right of secret voting shall be preserved.

Obviously consistent with anonymous ballots, rather than preserving ballots in secret.

Update: 04/17/2012: On to the Colorado Supreme Court <read>