Luther Weeks | CTVotersCount.org

UConn Report: Batteries and officials failing faster than previously reported

Most projects start out slowly, and then sort of taper off.
– Augustine’s Law #XL

Most projects start out slowly, and then sort of taper off. – Augustine’s Law #XL

Last week, the University of Connecticut (UConn) released a report on memory card testing covering 2007 – 2010. The results from 2007 until pre-election testing for August 2010 had been previously published, we expected to see the 2010 results much sooner. <report>

From the Conclusion, our comments in brackets [ ]:

Correctness of Card Programming: The audits determined that 100% of the cards actually used in the election [and actually submitted to UConn for testing] showed correct programming in terms of both the election description data and the executable code on the cards. In the case of the pre-election cards, in all cases where small discrepancies in the election description data were discovered, these differences were due to the very late changes, such as candidate name changes, substitutions, and race changes.

Audit Coverage: The number of memory cards submitted for audits fell substantially in 2010. We understand that in some cases districts were advised to not submit cards for audit in an apparent effort to occlude the fact that memory cards were duplicated. It is recommended that the SOTS Office encourages the districts to always submit one out four cards for pre-election audit and all of their used cards for post-election audit. The number of cards examined by the audits needs to be substantially increased in future elections to provide a better statistical basis for the overall election landscape in Connecticut. Not only this will help ensure proper programming of the cards, but it will also help address the reliability problem of the memory cards…

This dramatic drop in card submission renders most of the other statistics in the report unreliable and questionable. As UConn states, officials may be avoiding sending in duplicated cards; they could be choosing to send in more “junk data” cards as they are useless in the election; or avoiding sending in “junk data” cards assuming. incorrectly, it would reflect badly on them . Without public drawings we have no indication that cards are selected randomly, or that officials actually understand that they should be. Without accurate data it is hardly worth reviewing and making decisions based on the statistical analysis of the partial data.

Cards submitted by officials to UConn — Memory cards submitted by officials to UConn (Out of about 800 districts and 3500 cards)

As we have noted in the past, because the cards are not actually and publicly randomly selected, in addition to making it impossible for the reported results to be statistically accurate, it also provids an easy loophole for errors and skulduggery to be covered-up.

An earlier UConn report indicated that the problem was old batteries and that replacing batteries regularly might solve the “junk data” problem. Apparently this is not always so, with some cards quickly draining the batteries:

Continuing with the Conclusions:

This data loss is most likely caused by the weak batteries on the cards (however, as of this writing it is not clear how long a fresh battery lasts in a memory card). We are continuing to examine this issue. Increasing audit coverage will enable us to obtain and evaluate more cards that failed in search for a solution. In particular, we know that some cards drain batteries much faster than most; when we identify such cards it is recommended that they are removed from circulation. Longer term solution may be to develop replacement cards that use non-volatile memory technology…

Memory Card Duplication: In recent elections more then 6% of the cards [selected and submitted by officials] were involved in duplication. We note that the only authorized entity to provide card programming for election in Connecticut is LHS Associates. There is no guarantee that cards duplication done by the districts correctly reproduces data and programming on the copy cards. Additionally, if duplicated cards are not submitted for audits it increases the risk of using incorrect cards in elections. It is recommended that the SOTS Office reinforces its policy that prohibits card duplication…

Adherence to Election Procedures: The technological audits established that the districts do not always adhere to the established pre-election procedures. Most notably, in recent elections over 6% of the memory cards are duplicated by the districts, a practice that is not permitted by the SOTS Office. Additionally, some districts do not prepare all of their cards for elections and/or prepare for elections by running elections instead of running test elections. It is recommended that the SOTS Office reiterates the importance of following the prescribed election procedures. Lastly, some districts send cards for pre-election audit before they test the cards, while other districts send cards after they test the cards. For the pre-election audit to be most effective, it is recommended that districts uniformly send cards after the cards are tested and prepared for elections.

Overall, we applaud the report and the work of the UConn Voter Center. We are disappointed in the data submitted by election officials and the lack of progress in effectively addressing memory card problems. We are sympathetic to officials for the problems bad memory cards cause, yet our sympathy ends when they do not play their part in providing cards needed for UConn to make detailed and accurate assessments. We note that the lack of cooperation happened in the Bysiewicz Administration. We hope that the Merrill Administration will elicit more cooperation and encourage production of more timely reports for both memory cards and post-election audits.

For memory card testing to be useful and reach the potential of the exemplary testing developed by UConn, the program needs to be well defined and mandatory, enforceable, and enforced. The program should be mandated by law and/or all memory cards required to be sent through UConn in both directions from and to registrars, never to and from LHS, the vendor responsible for programming the cards. Or as we have recommended, the cards should be programmed in Connecticut, co-located with an independent testing function using the UConn developed test.

Bridgeport: Early ballots bring victories, sometimes fraud

In Bridgeport, a hallmark of Democratic Party politics has been the aggressive use of absentee ballots — so aggressive, in fact, that more than a dozen consent decrees have been signed since 1988 with the State Elections Enforcement Commission stemming from allegations of wrongdoing by party operatives.

CTPost article: Absentees: Early ballots bring victories, sometimes fraud <read> The article discusses the pursuit of absentee votes in the recent primary, the history of absentee ballot fraud in Bridgeport, and the Secretary of the State’s comments for early voting in preference to absentee voting.

“Goal: 1,200 absentee applications,” read a sign hanging in Mayor Bill Finch’s campaign headquarters last month.

By the time polls opened at 6 a.m. on Sept. 27, that goal had been surpassed — more than 1,300 applications were turned in and nearly 900 ballots returned. Before the first paper ballot was marked, Finch already had a 420-vote lead over Democratic challenger Mary-Jane Foster on Primary Day, the fruits of a well-organized absentee ballot operation.

“We, the politicians, we will do whatever we can to get that vote,” said Lydia Martinez, an East Side city councilwoman who for years has led the most successful absentee ballot operations in the city. “You can give transportation to people. You can call people to ask if they got their absentee ballot. I do have a record of who votes by absentee every year. I’ve been doing this for 30 years. I know who the people are.”

In Bridgeport, a hallmark of Democratic Party politics has been the aggressive use of absentee ballots — so aggressive, in fact, that more than a dozen consent decrees have been signed since 1988 with the State Elections Enforcement Commission stemming from allegations of wrongdoing by party operatives.

Nearly all the cases involved a Democrat helping someone apply, vote or submit their absentee ballot.

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill said she’d like to make reforms that could prevent absentee voter fraud. She said the problems could be resolved if Connecticut took advantage of new technology. One area she is considering is keeping electronic copies of voter signatures on file so they could be compared to what appears on the ballot or application.

Additionally, she is proposing a constitutional amendment that would allow the state to explore methods of increasing voter turnout by such practices as early voting, thus eliminating reasons for voting by absentee ballot.

Connecticut is one of 15 states, including New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, that do not allow early voting and require valid reasons for voting by absentee ballot. Nearly 30 states allow voters to cast an absentee ballot without Connecticut’s required excuses of being out of town, working, disabled or sick on election day. In Oregon and Washington, voting is done entirely by mail.

“No system is going to be perfect,” Merrill said. “Think of how elaborate the process is now and you still get allegations of fraud.”

Too Many Registrars? Or Too Little Thought?

We agree that Connecticut would likely be better off with regional, civil-service, professional election administration. Such a change requires much thought and planning, just like the consolidation of Probate Court. That is not what the Courant is proposing. The Editorial Board also demonstrates a great lack of creativity suggesting that each registrar in Hartford must be paid $80,000 and have a deputy. As we have suggested before, three registrars could each be part time, paid less, and/or do the job with fewer deputies.

The history of voting in the United States is a series of knee-jerk reactions. Punch cards and lever machines to prevent problems with paper ballot skulduggery; Costly, hackable touch screens replacing levers and punched cards after the 2000 debacle in Florida. Once again, the Hartford Courant is ready for immediate knee-jerk action.

Editorial, Three Hartford Registrars Is $200,000 Too Many – Odd law burdens Hartford with unnecessary costs <read>

Wouldn’t you know, Hartford’s three registrars of voters can’t get along and are squabbling among themselves. This is not new, but things have gotten so bad that Mayor Pedro Segarra has offered to serve as a mediator to resolve disagreements.

This problem could be permanently resolved if the legislature would get off its keister. The city shouldn’t have three registrars. It does because of a quirk in state election law.

The law says the candidates for registrar of voters who garner the highest and second-highest number of votes win the posts. But if a major-party candidate — Democrat or Republican — is not among the top two finishers, that candidate must also be named a registrar.

In 2008, Urania Petit petitioned her way onto the Hartford ballot as a registrar candidate for the Working Families Party, and then outpolled the Republican registrar, Salvatore Bramante. The result is that both of them, along with Democrat Olga Iris Vazquez, all became registrars. A registrar in Hartford makes $80,000 per year. Add costs for staff, benefits, computers, etc., and each registrar costs the city about $200,000.

This is too stupid for words. The city is in dire fiscal straits and it has to waste $200,000 on a completely unnecessary job. That spending could go toward parks or public works employees, police officers, reading consultants — or it could be eliminated to lower the budget. If Hartford is going to waste money, why not at least make it fun and drop it in small bills from a plane over the city?

The legislature needs to change the law in its next session. Hartford could do just fine with one professional, nonpartisan registrar. It certainly doesn’t need three

We agree that Connecticut would likely be better off with regional, civil-service, professional election administration. Such a change requires much thought and planning, just like the consolidation of Probate Court. Actually changing election administration would require much more planning since it would involve not just consolidation, but a complete change in the system. Such a change would have to account for many changes in the law, the Connecticut Constitution, new ways of oversight, integrity considerations, and a significant transition plan.

That is not what the Courant is proposing here. They want the Legislature to do something to change Hartford to a single appointed registrar. Who would do the appointing? Who would watch out for the interests of voters along with candidates and parties of opposing interests? Which cities would this apply to? Or would each small town need to somehow appoint a person to a very very part time job? How could qualified candidates be found and vetted? What guarantee would there be of such candidates being available and actually being appointed?

The Editorial Board also demonstrates a great lack of creativity suggesting that each registrar in Hartford must be paid $80,000 and have a deputy. As we have suggested before, three registrars could each be part time, paid less, and/or do the job with fewer deputies.

Reference the recent issue in Hartford and our past editorials. <Hartford Registrars: Fighting Disrupts City Office> <Let us consider doing for Elections what we have done for Probate> <Downsizing Newspaper Recommends Downsizing Registrars>

Good, Timely News: Military Voting Jumped Last Year

Partially implemented MOVE Act resulting in more military voting and registering than the general populace!

As Connecticut considers risky, expensive online voting, we have urged fully exploiting and complying with the MOVE Act, posting applications and ballots online and allowing for single envelope express return of ballots. Now we have proof that conventional safe, economical solutions are working.

Washington Post Article <read>

Buoyed by a new law requiring states to make absentee ballots more accessible to military troops serving overseas, troops voted at a higher rate than the general population in last year’s midterm elections, according to a new report.

Overall, 46 percent of the military voted in the 2010 midterm elections, a 21 percentjump from the 2006 midterms and slightly higher than the 45.5 percent of the general population that cast ballots last year…populace

Voter registration last year among troops also was higher than the general public; 65 percent of Americans registered to vote in 2010, but 77 percent of troops registered.

Voting more vulnerable than ATM’s – That’s not saying much

No reason to say “It can’t happen here”.

If voting machines are attacked, especially if it is switching votes, how would we know? At least with ATM’s there is money missing. Story from Hartford Courant today sounds technically similar to the recent demonstration of stealing votes by inserting hardware into a voting machine. Although the banking application often needs a camera and uses wireless communication – stuff not necessary in skimming votes. Sadly neither are really news, not technically challenging, it is simple to understand:

Thieves Make Withdrawals In Istanbul After Grabbing Debit Card Information in New England <read>

The customers — about 150, according to Webster — were victims of a “skimming” scheme in New England perpetrated by an international fraud ring. The thieves used an electronic device to read data off magnetic strips of debit cards inserted in some ATMs operated by Webster Bank and at least two other banks. A small camera recorded customers punching in their PINs…

Typically, the skimmers fit right over the slot where the card is inserted, looking very much like part of the ATM. The camera can be hidden in a brochure holder or concealed behind a mirror that looks like the security camera. The devices are readily available on the Internet, some for as little as a “few hundred dollars.

No reason to say “It can’t happen here”. But at least we have voter verified paper ballots to audit, recanvass, and recount!

Hartford Registrars: Fighting Disrupts City Office

Squabbling between the city’s three [registrars of voters] has become so disruptive that Mayor Pedro Sagarra wrote them a formal letter asking them to work out their differences. He even offered to personally convene a meditation session to help

Hartford Courant, Fighting Disrupts City Office – Help Offered For Registrars <read>

Squabbling between the city’s three [registrars of voters] has become so disruptive that Mayor Pedro Sagarra wrote them a formal letter asking them to work out their differences. He even offered to personally convene a meditation session to help resolve them.

In his letter, sent Oct 4 to Democratic Registrar Olga Iris Vazquez, Republican Registrar Salvatore Bramante and Working Families party Registrar Urania Petit, Segarra noted the special dynamic involved in having a registrars’ office with three political parties represented.

On the other hand we would think that three registrars offer the opportunity to vote on disagreements, rather than the need for the normal two registrars to agree on everything. Two registrars is no guarantee of dust-up free election administration, see <here> <here> <here>

We are not so sure the problem is with all three registrars, perhaps the problem involves two registrars, with perhaps only one causing the problem. Only the registrars and a neutral mediator could know for sure:

Petit said the incident that likely prompted Segarra’s letter occurred several weeks ago when a meeting was scheduled between the corporation counsel’s office and the registrars office to discuss plans for the November election. A few days before the meeting, Petit said, Vazquez sent an email that she wouldn’t be attending if Petit was going to attend.

That type of dispute has been the norm since she took office, Petit said.
[The other registrars declined comment on the current situation]

Here is an example of another dust-up from 2009 in Hartford <read>

The Courant would rather see one registrar, in place of two or three in each town. We support the current law, but suggest that Hartford could easily reduce hours and salaries to compensate for three people doing the job, with the squabbling being an example of wasting the taxpayers money. <read>

We would like to see the state move to regional professional election administration, to do for elections what we have done for probate. But until that should happen we support the current system that provides one registrar for each major party and one or two additional registrars if they receive more votes than the major party candidates:

Hartford is dominated by the Democratic party, so the party needs and deserves a Democratic registrar
Hartford participates in state-wide elections and Republican voters state-wide need a Republican registrar in Hartford to watch out for that party’s interests in those elections.
Hartford’s second largest vote getting party is the Working Families Party, they deserve and need a registrar to watch out for their interests.

In Hartford, sometimes it seems that one Democratic registrar is not enough to watch out for the interests of all Democratic voters <read>

Bridgeport Post-Election Audit Drawing

Yesterday three districts were drawn for the post-election audit of the Bridgeport Primary. Due to a court order delaying the primary, following the law required a separate drawing of 10% of the districts in Bridgeport. Since there were twenty-three districts in the election three districts plus an alternate district were randomly selected for audit.

Each district was represented by a slip of paper placed in a bowl. Each of four individuals present selected one of the districts. The Secretary of the State’s Press Release: <read>

Justice John Paul Stevens: Bush v. Gore, “frivolous”

Stevens recalls talking to fellow Justice Stephen Breyer about Bush’s suit – and them both agreeing that, “the application was frivolous… To secure a stay, a litigant must show that one is necessary to prevent an … irreparable injury. Bush’s attorneys had failed to make any such showing.”

Tom Hartman covering Justice Stevens’ new book <read>

According to a new book by former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens – the lawsuit brought to the high court in 2000 by George W. Bush regarding the recount in Florida was “frivolous” and should never have been heard. In his book “Five Chiefs” – Stevens recalls talking to fellow Justice Stephen Breyer about Bush’s suit – and them both agreeing that, “the application was frivolous… To secure a stay, a litigant must show that one is necessary to prevent an … irreparable injury. Bush’s attorneys had failed to make any such showing.” Yet – the High Court took up the case anyway – and as well all know, stopped a recount in Florida that would have proven Al Gore was the actual winner of the 2000 Presidential Election. Not to mention that Justice Clarence Thomas’s wife was working on the Bush transition team at the time – and Justice Scalia’s son was working for a law firm representing Bush at the time. Not only was the Bush presidency defined by corruption – it was birthed by corruption as well.

For more background see our testimony earlier this year, <read page 6>

since the founding, close election controversies have all been decided in seemingly partisan decisions by Congress, special commissions, or the Supreme Court.

Where Common Sense fails: Do insider attacks require a sophisticated conspiracy?

In this post, we address where Common Sense fails. Where what seems obvious to individuals and election officials is often counter to the facts or science. Those that are unfamiliar with technology and a specific area of science often overestimate how difficult or easy specific things are to accomplish.

Note: This is the fifth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous> <next>

We frequently hear versions of the following comments, often from election officials:

“It would take a very sophisticated operation to steal an election. Computer experts with access to the election system.”

“Our staff is trusted and they don’t have that level of expertise.”

“You are a conspiracy theorist, you just don’t trust election officials, and the security of our voting machines”

To some of these charges I plead guilty and with others items beg to disagree:

I do believe in the existence and possibilities of fraud by conspiracy, yet in the case of election integrity argue that compromising an election does not require the existence of a conspiracy of the sort implied by the current definition of conspiracy theory. In fact, individuals have been convicted or exposed for small to moderate size conspiracies.
I do trust most election officials. The problem is that many election officials express and request blind trust of all election officials. This despite regular instances of errors by officials, and occasional successful prosecution of various election officials for criminal violations. Unless election officials are cut from a different class than other citizens and public officials, some of the time, some of them will make errors, and others will comitt fraud, sometimes without prosecution, and sometimes undetected.
It does not require a sophisticated operation to steal an election. Fraud would not necessarily require computer experts with access to the election system.

In this post, we address where Common Sense fails. Where what seems obvious to individuals and election officials is often counter to the facts or science. Here we have to be careful trusting our own initial views and those of honest officials, we need to be open to the idea that we may not individually have all the answers -willing to listen to, if not completely trust, scientists and the facts. (We are not just talking about elections here, but many other areas which are critical to democracy and life.)

Those that are unfamiliar with technology and a specific area of science often overestimate how difficult or easy specific things are to accomplish. As we often confuse conspiracy and conspiracy theory, we often confuse the meanings of theory, between the common meaning of theory and a scientific theory. They are as different as a Pat Robertson theory of earthquakes and the germ theory of disease.

For instance, people often think technologists can do anything such as solve the nuclear waste problem, cure all cancer, make smoking safe, produce clean coal, or provide safe internet voting. These are all hard problems that have, so far, eluded teams of the best scientists. I frequently recall a friend in middle school, in the late 1950’s, who had no concerns with smoking, saying “By the time I get lung cancer in 30 or 40 years, science will have a cure”.

Once even “scientists” believed with the right recipe sea water could be turned into gold. In the dark ages of the 1950’s it was believed it would be possible to predict the weather and the economy, if only we had enough data and the right programs. Since then, with the advent of Chaos Theory, we have learned both are impossible, yet that fact has provided us the opportunity to deal with the economy and weather more rationally and realistically. Since the 30’s or 40’s we have also known that it is impossible to prove that any computer software/hardware system is accurate and safe – there is no recipe possible. (And thus it is also impossible to build a computer or communications system that is provably safe. In practice, we can see from failed attempts of government and industry that the best systems are, in fact, regularly compromised, providing practical as well as theoretical reasons to avoid trusting any computer/communications system.)

On the other side, many things are much easier than the public and many elections officials believe. Smart individuals and small groups continue to create computer viruses and hack into the best systems of the most sophisticated government agencies and industries. On the easy side, the U.S. Government believes, apparently with good reason, that a single Army Private could access and steal a huge number of confidential documents from many Federal agencies. (That he was a low level insider with lots of access, just emphasizes how vulnerable systems are to a single insider and that it would take steps in addition to a safe computer system, even if that were possible, to protect us from an insider.)

How often have we each gone to an expert with what we viewed as a tough problem, only to have it solved quickly and inexpensively? For example: Recently, my condominium unit needed a new main shut-0ff valve. The maintenance staff and I believed it would be a big job requiring service interruption to dozens in my neighborhood requiring a shut-off of a valve in the street. Enlisting the help of a general plumbing contractor, the contractor simply froze my pipe while installing a new valve.

When it comes to election machine hacking, online voting, and conventional stealing of votes it is relatively easy in many jurisdictions to compromise the vote, especially when it only requires a single insider. Some attacks take extensive technical knowledge which many hackers possess and could help or intimidate a single insider to execute or could simply get a job in election administration. Other attacks take very little technical expertise. When officials misjudge how easy it is for attacks to be accomplished, when officials don’t understand technology, it makes it all the easier for a single trusted insider.

One company, LHS, programs all the election memory cards for Connecticut and other states. LHS’s President said that we are safe from hacked cards because he has no employees with software expertise (including himself). There are several fallacies in this:
— How would he know if a particular employee has technical expertise?
— It is not all that hard to miss-program memory cards.
— A single employee could gain outside technical help or be intimidated to do what an outsider demands.

Similarly, many election officials would claim we are safe because they do not have computer experts on their staff. Once again, how would they know how much it would take and what a person does not know?

As for outsider attacks, one example: To our knowledge, in only one instance, a Internet voting system was subjected to a open, public security test. It was compromised extensively and quickly. Even if it had not been compromised so easily or was subjected to a more extensive test it would hardly be proven safe, hardly be safe from attack by insiders.

In our view, the best we can do realistically is voter created paper ballots, counted in public by machine, a printout of results in public, followed by a secure ballot chain of custody, followed by effective independent post-election audits, and where necessary complete recounts. All transparent.

Finally, we need to emphasize the requirement for a “secure ballot chain-of-custody” or at least a reasonably secure system making it difficult for single insiders to compromise ballots. For those with blind trust in security seals we provide presentations by an expert <view> and examples of quick seal compromise by that same expert and an amateur <read>

Brennan Center: Changes in state laws could make voting harder

“Over the past century, our nation expanded the franchise and knocked down myriad barriers to full electoral participation. In 2011, however, that momentum abruptly shifted.”

Report from the Brennan Center For Justice: Voting Law Changes in 2012 <read>

Executive Summary

Over the past century, our nation expanded the franchise and knocked down myriad barriers to full electoral participation. In 2011, however, that momentum abruptly shifted.

State governments across the country enacted an array of new laws making it harder to register or to vote. Some states require voters to show government-issued photo identification, often of a type that as many as one in ten voters do not have. Other states have cut back on early voting, a hugely popular innovation used by millions of Americans. Two states reversed earlier reforms and once again disenfranchised millions who have past criminal convictions but who are now taxpaying members of the community. Still others made it much more difficult for citizens to register to vote, a prerequisite for voting.

These new restrictions fall most heavily on young, minority, and low-income voters, as well as on voters with disabilities. This wave of changes may sharply tilt the political terrain for the 2012 election. Based on the Brennan Center’s analysis of the 19 laws and two executive actions that passed in 14 states, it is clear that:

These new laws could make it significantly harder for more than five million eligible voters to cast ballots in 2012.

The states that have already cut back on voting rights will provide 171 electoral votes in 2012 – 63 percent of the 270 needed to win the presidency.

Of the 12 likely battleground states, as assessed by an August Los Angeles Times analysis of Gallup polling, five have already cut back on voting rights (and may pass additional restrictive legislation), and two more are currently considering new restrictions.

States have changed their laws so rapidly that no single analysis has assessed the overall impact of such moves. Although it is too early to quantify how the changes will impact voter turnout, they will be a hindrance to many voters at a time when the United States continues to turn out less than two thirds of its eligible citizens in presidential elections and less than half in midterm elections.

This study is the first comprehensive roundup of all state legislative action thus far in 2011 on voting rights, focusing on new laws as well as state legislation that has not yet passed or that failed. This snapshot may soon be incomplete: the second halves of some state legislative sessions have begun.

We point out that “voter suppression” is different than “making it harder…to cast ballots”.

We see no significant fraud problems calling for the stiff voter ID requirements and for curtailing EDR. These, along with making it more difficult for felons to vote and stiffer registration requirements each would tend to suppress the vote to the detriment of older, poorer and disabled citizens.
While current initiatives may be politically motivated, we have frequently cited risks and fraud associated with expanded mail-in and no-excuse absentee voting.
Early voting may be expensive if done without increasing risk, it might also suppress or encourage voting by particular groups. For instance, early voting would benefit employed citizens if voting centers are located in areas where many people work.

We note that the Brennan Center agrees with the analysis that mail voting and early voting have little effect on turn-out <here> <here>. According to the Brennan Report:

The primary benefit of early voting is convenience. Voters are provided more options and days during which they can vote. While there is little evidence that early and absentee voting increase turnout, there is strong anecdotal evidence that it makes election administration easier, reducing the crush of voters at the polling place on a single day. In the past, that Election Day crush has led to hours-long lines, and resulted in the de facto disenfranchisement of tens of thousands of voters.