Caltech/MIT: Election Integrity – Past, Present & Future

On Saturday October 1st, I was pleased to be a part of the The Future panel at the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project event, Election Integrity – Past, Present & Future. The event was to celebrate the 25th anniversary of a conference on voting integrity held in 1986.

On Saturday October 1st, I was pleased to be a part of the The Future panel at the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project event, Election Integrity – Past, Present & Future. The event was to celebrate the 25th anniversary of a conference on voting integrity held in 1986. Perhaps I was invited to join the Future panel because I have only been involved for a bit over seven of those twenty-five years.  Like most panelists on all three panels , I addressed a bit of the Past, Present and Future.

My presentation was titled: A Watchdog Activist Lobbyist Plods and Plots the Future of Election Integrity <PowerPoint.pdf>

Once a video of the event and other presentations are available, I will provide links.

Update 10/30/2011 Videos available <watch>

Online Voting: Hartford Courant hacked?

Was the “online tampering” done by outside hackers? Or was it an insider? Does the Courant have the expertise to determine the cause in this instance and actually create effective controls to prevent future online voting attacks? If so, the editors should be advising the likes of the Department of Defense, banks, and Google.

We note a small correction box in today’s Hartford Courant:

CORRECTION

  The results of a Buzz question on Senate Candidate Linda McMahon that ran on courant.com last week and in print Sunday were exaggerated due to apparent online tampering. Controls have been put into place to prevent improper manipulation of Buzz results.

Checking the Sunday edition we see that in answer to the question, “Can Linda McMahon win a Senate seat in 2012?” The poll said Yes 6%, No 94%.  And in the four polls the total votes for the other three were 456, 1,759, and 2,588, while in the McMahon poll there were 14,348 votes.

Was the “online tampering” done by outside hackers? Or was it an insider? Does the Courant have the expertise to determine the cause in this instance and actually create effective controls to prevent future online voting attacks? If so, the editors should be advising the likes of the Department of Defense, banks, and Google.

Hopefully Connecticut’s registrars will not be forced by the legislature to provide online voting. According to Secretary of the State Merrill, one-third of registrars do not even have web access. On October 27th the state will have the opportunity to hear from experts on the risks of online voting and the other options for serving military and overseas voters.

Post-Election Audit Drawing: 12 Districts in 5 Municipalities

UPDATED: Yesterday, members of the Coalition assisted in the drawing of districts for the Post-Election Audit of the September 13th Primary. New Haven, on average, expect to have 3-4 districts selected each time and Hartford 2-3 districts. However, since the law exempts districts from the selection that have recanvasses or contested races, the expected average is higher than 10% in each particular post-election audit. As random selection from a single collection of districts goes, the average seldom occurs.

UPDATED: Yesterday, members of the Coalition assisted in the drawing of districts for the Post-Election Audit of the September 13th Primary. New Haven, on average, expect to have 3-4 districts selected each time and Hartford 2-3 districts. However, since the law exempts districts from the selection that have recanvasses or contested races, the expected average is higher than 10% in each particular post-election audit. As random selection from a single collection of districts goes, the average seldom occurs. This time New Haven will audit 6 and Hartford 1. Over a long period selections should average out with all towns approaching a average number of audited districts equal to 10% of the districts time the number of elections and primaries in which they participate – with slight expected variations because some towns are more likely to have recanvasses more frequently (*)

The Bridgeport Primary held Tuesday is a different Primary and will be subject to a separate drawing. Bridgeport normally would expect to average 2-3 districts selected each time. Ironically, after last November’s chaotic election 0 for 24(**) were selected. This time the number should be exactly three.

* This is for several reasons. Some towns have close to equal numbers of voters for both major parties in elections or highly competitive candidates from factions of the same party in primaries. Other towns have large numbers of positions or candidates in vote for multiple races which increases the chances of two candidates votes being close. Other towns are have fewer offices or are far from competitive.

** There were 25 districts in the Nov 2010 election in Bridgeport, but due to ongoing failures of election officials in Hartford and Bridgeport to produce accurate lists of districts for the drawings.

Here is the press release with the list of districts:

Denise Merrill
Secretary of the State
Connecticut
For Immediate Release: For more information:
September 28, 2011 Av Harris: (860) 509-6255
Cell: (860) 463-5939
– Press Release –
Precincts From September Municipal Primaries Selected For Post-Election Audit
Deputy Secretary of the State, Election Advocates Select 10% of Voting precincts in 21 Connecticut Communities to Hold Municipal Primaries September 13th; Ballots to be Hand-Counted and Matched Against Machine Totals to Ensure Integrity of Voting

Hartford: Deputy Secretary of the State James Spallone today joined Connecticut voting rights advocates from CT Voters Count and Common Cause for a public drawing to randomly select 12 precincts that will have election results audited following the September 13, 2011 municipal primaries that took place in 21 Connecticut communities. A complete list of the precincts selected is below. Precincts from Bridgeport, where municipal primaries were held on September 27th, will be drawn at random for a post election audit at a later date.

“On September 13th voters went to the polls across Connecticut to choose nominees to run in November’s general election to fill very important roles in local government,” said Deputy Secretary of the State James Spallone. “Our audit law exists to hold our election process accountable and reassure the public to have continued confidence that all votes were recorded accurately. We will repeat this process again in the near future for the city of Bridgeport, whose primary was held two weeks after other cities and towns.”

Voters went to the polls for municipal primaries in the following 21 Connecticut cities and towns on Tuesday September 13, 2011: Brookfield, Cromwell, East Hartford, Farmington, Guilford, Hartford, Lebanon, Lisbon, Killingworth, Middlebury, Middletown, New Haven, New Britain, New London, North Stonington, Norwalk, Oxford, Stratford, Scotland, Trumbull, and West Haven. The General Election for municipal candidates will be held on Tuesday November 8, 2011.

As required by Public Act 07-194, An Act Concerning the Integrity and Security of the Voting Process, 10% percent of the polling precincts used in the election are subject to an audit. Secretary Merrill directed that a pool of 114 precincts from the communities that held municipal primaries September 13th, not counting precincts that required a recount. To comply with the law, 12 precincts were chosen to have their election results audited. In addition, five alternate precincts were chosen, they will only face an audit if one of the selected precincts cannot perform an audit. The audits must be complete by October 21, 2011.

The law requires a hand audit 10% of all polling places in all elections and primaries. (Polling precincts which are already part of a recount are exempt from audits by statute). The provisions in the law, developed in close cooperation with the computer science department at the University of Connecticut, give Connecticut one of the strictest audit statutes in the country. Connecticut is the first state in New England to require a comprehensive audit of election results.
Public Act 07-194 states that local Registrars of Voters, “… shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded in not less than ten per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable. Such manual audit shall be noticed in advance and be open to public observation.” The results of audits will be analyzed by the University of Connecticut and then presented to the Secretary of the State’s Office and the State Elections Enforcement Commission, and ultimately made available to the public.

The law contains a detailed description of the audit process:

“The manual audit… shall consist of the manual tabulation of the paper ballots cast and counted by each voting machine subject to such audit. Once complete, the vote totals established pursuant to the manual tabulation shall be compared to the results reported by the voting machine on the day of the election or primary. The results of the manual tabulation shall be reported on a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State which shall include the total number of ballots counted, the total votes received by each candidate in question, the total votes received by each candidate in question on ballots that were properly completed by each voter and the total votes received by each candidate in question on ballots that were not properly completed by each voter. Such report shall be filed with the Secretary of the State who shall immediately forward such report to The University of Connecticut for analysis. The University of Connecticut shall file a written report with the Secretary of the State regarding such analysis that describes any discrepancies identified. After receipt of such report, the Secretary of the State shall file such report with the State Elections Enforcement Commission.”

List of Precincts chosen for the post-election audit:

Municipality

Precinct

East Hartford

Goodwin School

Hartford

Annie Fisher School

Middletown

Macdonough School-District 1

New Britain

Roosevelt Middle School District 3

New Britain

Welte Hall District 9

New Britain

Stanley Holmes School District 14

New Haven

Troup School Ward 2

New Haven

Truman School Ward 4

New Haven

Cross Formerly East Rock Ward 9

New Haven

Wilbur Cross High School Ward 10

New Haven

Firehouse Lombard Ward 15

New Haven

West Hills/Micro Society School Ward 30-02

Alternate Precincts

Hartford

The Community Room

Middletown

Moody School Gym District 4

New Britain

Vance School District 1

New Haven

Hall Of Records Ward 7

New Haven

Clarence Rogers School Ward 30-1

-30-

Av Harris
Director of Communications
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill
(860) 509-6255 ofc
(860) 463-5939 cell
av.harris@ct.gov

Bad News, Good News, Bad News, Good News, Bad News from Bridgeport

Oooops the law passed just this year to fix the problems in Bridgeport said nothing about the SOTS being able to walk into central absentee ballot counting operations, only polling places. In the words of Cindi Rice, “Who could have imagined…”

Update: More problems, documented this time. Was it fraud, mismanagement, or incompetence? Who knows for sure?

An editorial in the CT Post highlighting the excitement surrounding the election, the attention, and the hijinks: A chance for Bridgeport Democrats to weigh in <read>

 That there will be a Democratic mayoral primary Tuesday is a good thing for the city of Bridgeport.

Pick your favorite, but the exchange of ideas, suggestions, accusations, recriminations and so on between Mayor Bill Finch and challenger Mary-Jane Foster has put some energy in the air in a city that needs every bit of energy it can muster.

There are indeed ways to measure that energy.

Consider this: In 2007, when Christopher Caruso, a popular legislator from the North End of the city, challenged Finch, 493 absentee ballots were cast in the mayoral primary. Finch won that contest, incidentally, by fewer than 300 votes.

As of Friday, the Bridgeport Town Clerk’s office had received 1,200 applications for absentee ballots, and 756 executed ballots had been returned.

 The good news? There’s plenty of interest.

The potential bad news? All those absentee ballots should make fans of fair elections just a little nervous.

[good news] So it’s a pleasing development that Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill has said she’ll have a presence in Bridgeport on Tuesday for the 2011 version of the Democratic mayoral primary.

The Post covered and we commented on some absentee ballot allegations earlier this week: Absentee Fraud in Bridgeport? Who could have imagined? <read>  Now the Post covers more, the same day as the editorial: Bridgeport absentee ballots becoming focus of election complaints  <read>

[more bad news] Jason Bartlett, Foster’s campaign manager, said that Councilwoman Lydia N. Martinez, D-137, illegally assisted several elderly residents of Harborview Towers in filling out their absentee ballots. Martinez could not be reached for comment.

According to Bartlett, Martinez was at Harborview Towers collecting filled-in absentee ballots, which would be illegal under state law. The law requires that an absentee ballot can only be touched by a voter, a letter carrier, a police officer, a caretaker or an immediate family member. Bartlett said that this is “clearly illegal” activity, particularly because Martinez is a city council candidate.

Harborview Towers, on the city’s East Side, is a high-rise public housing complex that caters mostly to elderly and disabled residents.

Bartlett said that Martinez was also seen by Foster campaign workers engaged in similar activities in an apartment building on Grant Street, in the East End.

The Foster camp additionally charged that some Finch campaign workers were using the fact that the primary had to be rescheduled from Sept. 13 to Sept. 27 to confuse voters who support Foster.

“They’re taking advantage of the rescheduled primary by sending known Foster supporters second and third absentee ballot application forms. They’re trying to confuse them into voting twice, which would invalidate their vote,” he said. “We’ve asked that people from the secretary of the state’s office come down and safeguard the absentee ballot process.”

We have no way of substantiating or refuting the allegations.  There is one more piece of bad news, as we commented on the Editorial, including a quote from the article:

More bad news, the SOTS presence will not provide confidence with regard to Absentee Ballots. Oooops the law [passed just this year to fix the problems in Bridgeport] said nothing about the SOTS being able to walk into central absentee ballot counting operations, only polling places. (Of course like any citizen they can watch the AB operation from a distance). In the words of Cindi Rice “Who could have imagined…”

According to a CTPost article yesterday:

“But Av Harris, a spokesman for Secretary of the State Denise Merrill, said that her office’s authority over absentee ballots is very limited, adding that complaints on absentee irregularities must be heard by the state Elections Enforcement Commission and also the courts.”

Update: More problems, documented this time. Was it fraud, mismanagement, or incompetence? Who knows for sure? Finch campaign mails incorrect voting locations to some voters <read>

“The Finch campaign sent a mailing out last week to a couple hundred newly registered voters in an attempt to boost voter participation and educate these voters about the upcoming primary election and the mayor’s record of progress,” Breslin said in an email. “The campaign was also trying to educate voters about where to vote on Election Day, as many of these voters are first-time voters in Bridgeport. Unfortunately, this limited list of new voters included some inaccurate polling locations.”

The Connecticut Post discovered one instance in which a resident of developer Phil Kuchma’s Fairfield Avenue complex, just blocks away from City Hall, received a mailing informing the resident that Blackham School was her polling place.

A day or two later, an identical mailing arrived. The only difference in the mailing was the switching of the words Blackham School for City Hall.

Elections Performance Task Force, Third Meeting: Prof. Heather Gerken

Monday’s meeting featured presentations by Yale Law School Prof. Heather Gerken, Ted Bromley of the Secretary of the State’s Office, and an outline of the next meeting, along with deadlines for the Task Force.

Last week the Secretary of the State’s (SOTS) Election Performance Task force held its third meeting. The meeting featured presentations by Yale Law School Prof. Heather Gerken, Peggy Reeves and Ted Bromley of the SOTS Office, along with an an outline of the next meeting and deadlines for the Task Force.  The video is now up at CT-N <view>

Agenda for the day:

1.Introductions and welcoming remarks by Secretary Merrill
2.Guest speaker Heather Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to discuss election performance measurement
3.Presentation re: Online voter registration (Peggy Reeves & Ted Bromley)
4.Organization of subcommittees:

  • Improving post-election processes
  • Improving voters’ experience (registration through election day)
  • Improving voter participation among underperforming groups (utilizing focus groups)

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Secretary stated that in order to influence the Legislature in 2012 a report would need to be finalized in mid November, with a draft by mid October.

Professor Gerken

Professor Gerken addressed the value of data collection along with the state of data collection nationally and in Connecticut:

Doug Chapin said that we measure what matters. And if that is the case then elections don’t matter very much in this country…

We know more about the companies in which we invest,…we know know about the performance of our local baseball team, we even know more about our dishwashers than we know how [the] election system runs in this country. The data we have are undependable, unverifiable, and to inconsistent to allow us to compare across jurisdictions.

  • We don’t know how many voters cast votes in national elections
  • We don’t know how many registered voters
  • We don’t know how many voters were turned away on election day
  • We don’t know about lines on election day
  • We don’t know how many pollworkers
  • We don’t know what percentage of voting machines broke down
  • We can’t demonstrate significant improvements over 2000
  • States report inconsistently
  • Gerken ranked the 50 states on official EAC data reporting. Connecticut was 45th best. (better than PEW ranked our election web site), even so “Most states did a terrible job”
  • Connecticut collected only 25%-30% of the data requested by the EAC
  • She gave examples of the many areas in which business, consumers, and government use extensive data to make decisions, find problems, and improve. It is not exceptional to collect such data.

Imagine if you had a corporation who could not tell you how many people it employs; It couldn’t tell you how many customers it has; It couldn’t tell you what percentage of its business came from Internet sales;…one that failed to conduct regular audits of its accounting books;…never compared its performance to other places in the country;…you would not invest a dime in this company; And yet we are willing to trust our most precious commodity, the vote, to an election system that does not keep good data;…election administration is the mysterious outlier [when it comes to business and government data collection]

  • Election officials never survey voters
  • Election officials never benchmark between jurisdictions
  • What we need are simple, easy to collect, and non-controversial data
  • She gave an example of how LA County used data to understand and correct a problem with absentee ballots, at essentially no cost
  • Provided another example of using electronic pollbook data to determine polling place staffing
  • Atlanta found counting early votes was much cheaper than counting absentee votes

Prof. Gerken covered the potential value of The Democracy Index which she has defined.

Several additional areas were addressed in the Q&A:

  • In Connecticut, much data is collected and faxed to the SOTS, that apparently, has not been accumulated and reported to the EAC
  • Connecticut is planning a new system that will have the data entered rather than faxed. (Sounds good but will it be input by 169 towns, without concerns of “unfunded mandate”?)
  • India is leading in accumulating data for The Democracy Index
  • North Dakota and Delaware led in complying with the EAC survey
  • Public accountability needs really simple data like The Democracy Index – an attention grabber.  For internal accountability and improvement require more detailed data.
  • Data helps distinguish a unique problem/crisis from a pervasive problem or general incompetence

Ted Bromley, SOTS Office, and Peggy Reeves, Assistant SOTS

They spoke and used a PowerPoint presentation to provide and overview of online voter registration. The heart of the presentation was covered the systems in Washington State and Arizona, based on two reports from PEW and Caltech/MIT.  I found the presentation very informative. We will reference it here if it is posted to the SOTS website. Some of the highlights:

  • Arizona uses a system added on to  and integrated with an existing motor vehicle system
  • The Washington system communicates with the motor vehicle system to verify existing address information
  • Using motor vehicle information allows the system to capture existing digital signatures to use for later verification of pollbooks or absentee ballots
  • A big advantage of the Arizona system is avoiding redundant, potentially inconsistent data – both addresses can be changed in sync if the voter/driver changes either one
  • Both systems allow individuals to do a conventional paper form registration
  • The Arizona system cost $100,000 [2002] to implement and about $125,000 to operate annually
  • Microsoft helped Washington implement their system at a cost of $6,000,000 [2002] for a new centralized voter registration system + $280,000 for online registration
  • Savings are realized as most data entry of paper forms is eliminated and the digital signatures are captured and used
  • People who registered online [vs paper] voted at a higher percentage, and even more so for younger voters. [We speculate that those who take the initiative to register online are more likely to vote than those who get a paper registration application from an activists or campaign]

Based on the presentation, we must applaud the Arizona system and its costs. Avoiding redundant data and data entry must benefit both agencies. A $100,000 implementation sounds very efficient, built on what must have been an already well coded and documented motor vehicle system.

Q&A

  • The captured electron signatures might also be used to make petition verification more efficient
  • The Secretary speculated that more younger voters would register and vote if online registration were available
  • Alternatives for those without computers or drivers licenses could be offering registration at other agencies, or to provide a signature on election day a their polling place

 

Absentee Fraud in Bridgeport? Who could have imagined?

Who says there is little a single legislator can do to affect election integrity and confidence? Human error can change an election result or serve as a ready excuse to cover-up fraud.

A couple hours ago we quoted Denise Merrill when she said “Most of this stuff doesn’t get attention until something goes wrong“. Right on cue, an opportunity presents itself to address the current risks of absentee voting and avoid the expanded potential for fraud and disenfranchisement with no-excuse absentee voting:

Article in the Connecticut Post:  MariAn Gail Brown: Absentee ballot issues cast doubt on primary <read>

Hendricks is the voter who filed an affidavit claiming state Rep. Ezequiel Santiago showed up on her doorstep last Thursday asking if she was voting by absentee ballot. When Hendricks informed him that her vote in next Tuesday’s primary would be cast by absentee ballot, Santiago made her an offer.

“He told me that he would take the ballot from me,” Hendricks says in a sworn statement, “to turn in if I hadn’t sent it already.”

Hendricks might be old but if her mind is still sharp, assuming her assessment of the situation is correct, this is an election law violation. The only people who can turn in absentee ballots are electors themselves, their legal guardian, or a caretaker such as a doctor or nurse who has an affidavit signed by the absentee voter…

“I was there that day to check to see whether the residents received their ballots or not,” Santiago says. “I also stressed to them that they shouldn’t allow anyone from any campaign (to) help them fill out their ballots for them.”

Don’t you just wonder why a state representative who is also a city employee who makes it a point to tell Hendricks, according to her affidavit, that he does “a lot of work up in Hartford for senior citizens” would then tell Connecticut Post reporter John Burgeson that he merely “stressed to them that they shouldn’t allow anyone from any campaign” to help them? If that really was Santiago’s mission, why show up there? He could have just as easily issued a letter to his constituents. It’s just hard to buy that Santiago wasn’t there to troll for absentee ballots.

Maybe only because they checked, and maybe only because of this attention it was discovered that the voter was sent two absentee ballots:

 The only way Hendricks would have received two absentee ballots, Bridgeport’s town clerk says, is that she filed two absentee ballot applications. To Maya, this points out another shortcoming in the election process in Connecticut’s biggest city.

“What we need is an automated absentee ballot system. I’ve researched that. And I even found one that met our needs,” Maya says. “But there were glitches in the program that I found and we can’t use that. But we have so many absentee ballots that this system we have of doing all this by hand doesn’t work anymore.”

We are not buying that excuse.

“What we need is an automated absentee ballot system. I’ve researched that. And I even found one that met our needs,” Maya says. “But there were glitches in the program that I found and we can’t use that. But we have so many absentee ballots that this system we have of doing all this by hand doesn’t work anymore.”

A decade ago Bridgeport’s town clerk had 17 employees. In 2007, the department had nine employees. And now with retirements and layoffs, this campaign season the town clerk’s is down to six staffers, who not only process absentee ballots, but handle land records, register business trade names and issue dog licenses, among other things.

As the article says the number of absentee ballots sent for this election is 1,100. We wonder how many of those are duplicates? So far, it seems that for the one voter checked, it was a duplicate. Just last November, the  citizen Bridgeport Recount showed 1,221 absentee votes for Governor, but the city’s official count was 1,181, so there is certainly plenty of precedent for inaccurate counts in Bridgeport, yet the 1,100 represents a decrease in absentee ballots sent last November. (Unless some magically appeared back then.)

 Who says there is little a single legislator can do to affect election integrity and confidence? Human error can change an election result or serve as a ready excuse to cover-up fraud.

Related: Today, Secretary Merrill responds to critical editorial, articulates her position on early voting, mail-in, and no-excuse absentee voting. <read>

Update: We have looked up the existing Google election application used by many to find their polling places. Politico: Google polling app misleads voters <read> Last spring we attended a presentation by Google on the system. In reply to our question, the Google representative confirmed that the application is only as good as the data supplied by the state. Which in Connecticut’s case would need to come from our inaccurate state system as reported by the Audit Coalition. Sadly, the Legislature and the Secretary of the State’s Office chose not to require Registrars to keep the system up to date, but choose to have Registrars file yet another paper report with the Secretary of the State <see our testimony page 16>

Sec 4. (NEW) Also requires registrars to certify to the Secretary of the State a list of polling
places prior to each election. The Secretary of the State needs to have an accurate list of polling
places to be in compliance with the law and to restore the integrity of the post-election audit
random drawing.

We support this goal, but propose a more efficient 21st century solution.

We recommend instead that registrars be required to certify that the Statewide Centralized Voter
Registration System is up to date with the correct list of polling places, rather than submit a list
of polling places. In 2010 the Secretary of the State’s Office used the registration system
information to provide voters with online access to verify their registration and determine the
location of their polling place – it would seem to be more efficient to have

  • registrars be required to keep the online list accurate,
  • provide voters with certified accurate information.

Our recommendation would

  • avoid redundant transcription by the registrars,
  • reduce the paperwork and redundant data entry required for the random drawing, while increasing automation at the Secretary of the State’s Office,
  • and provide voters with accurate polling place information, available online.

Norwich Bulletin: Merrill pitches for more tech, less costs in elections

Saving money, getting people voting are laudable goals, yet we caution that in the process we should not sacrifice voting integrity and confidence in pursuing increased participation. In fact, we should be increasing integrity and confidence while we also pursue convenience and participation. And we should be cautious that our efforts actual result in the intended results.

Article: Merrill pitches for more tech, less costs in elections <read>

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill on Wednesday detailed her ideas for election changes that would include greater use of technology and support for a constitutional amendment allowing early voting…

Merrill was careful to say she isn’t supporting the idea of early voting but a constitutional amendment that would give Connecticut that option. Other states have begun using things like mail-in ballots more, boosting voter participation, she said…

“My primary consideration is costs,” the secretary said. “I’m looking for efficiencies.”

Merrill didn’t give exact estimates about how much she’s looking to save. A dialogue with municipal leaders is important, she said…

“The election process is a partnership with elected officials,” Merrill said.
Preston First Selectman Robert Congdon, who served with Merrill on the Appropriations Committee when both were in the General Assembly, said the ideas point in the right direction.

“She realizes that we’ve got to come into the 21st century,” said Congdon, who is also chairman of the council of governments. “She’s cognizant of the fact that we have to be able to afford these things.”

Costs was also on the mind of Salem First Selectman Kevin Lyden.

“I applaud your initiative,” he told Merrill after the secretary finished her speech. “We have to look at what’s going on nationwide. But I’m concerned about mandates. The state gives us (towns) mandates but not the money for them.”

Saving money, getting people voting are laudable goals, yet we caution that in the process we should not sacrifice voting integrity and confidence in pursuing increased participation. In fact, we should be increasing integrity and confidence while we also pursue convenience and participation. And we should be cautious that our efforts actual result in the intended results.

In the words of Gerald Weinberg “Quality is Free, IF you are willing to pay for it.”

And in the words of Doug Chapin, at the Secretary’s Election Performance Task Force, just last month “You can have little to no impact on your turn-out bottom line with election laws. Turnout tends to be driven by what’s on the ballot rather than when, where, or how it is available.”

The article continues:

Merrill’s office is developing a “model plan” to deal with election day emergencies such as happened last November when some Bridgeport polling places ran out of ballots. She is asking every town to develop its own emergency plan that could include printing more ballots at the polls. Only one-third of voting registrars have Internet access, Merrill said. Increasing Internet use will reduce election problems, she said.

“Most of this stuff doesn’t get attention until something goes wrong,” the secretary said.

We could not agree more. It would be preferable, however, to prevent the next several election disasters in Connecticut, rather than reacting after the fact, saying “Who could have ever anticipated that…[check-off lists do not match ballot counts] or [we have such a weak chain-of-custody for ballots] or [a single individual could change the vote counts on the scanner and access the ballots undetected]?”

NJ: Questionable practices – Questioning courts and watchdogs

Rigged election or three human errors – we may never know for sure.

Update: All four parts of the series are now complete in one <.pdf>

Significant that the Judge ordered a redo of the election. For the reasons stated, that may not be the best solution when the voters’ intentions are clear.

*************

Rigged election or three human errors – we may never know for sure.  Freedom To Tinker: NJ election cover-up <read>

The Court: The 2011 New Jersey Primary Election was held on June 7, 2011. In District 3 of Fairfield Township, Cumberland County, four individuals ran for two open seats on the Democratic Executive Committee. Following the election, the County Clerk certified the results as Vivian Henry, 34 votes; Mark Henry, 33 votes; Ernest Zirkle, 9 votes; and Cynthia Zirkle, 10 votes…

[Administrator of the Cumberland County Board of Elections] Ms. Hernandez claimed that she has programmed the voting machines in Cumberland County since June of 2008, to avoid the cost of the County of hiring a programmer. She further claimed that she mistakenly placed the position for Vivian and Mark Henry onto the position of Cynthia and Ernest Zirkle, and vice versa. This information was then put into the voting machine cartridge and sent to the warehouse for testing. The voting machine technicians inserted the cartridge into the voting machine and began the necessary testing. Ms. Hernandez then claims that the voting machine technicians did not catch her error in the programming…

On August 17, 2011, an expert retained by the Plaintiffs, Dr. Andrew W. Appel, made an inspection of the voting machine and the laptop, pursuant to the Order following the July 11 hearing. In conducting this inspection, Mr. Appel found certain concerns with the security procedures which the Administrator had put in place.

He also discovered that his ability to examine the Administrator’s WinEDS laptop was seriously compromised by what appeared to be an action that someone performed on the computer on August 16, 2011, which erased a number of files which Dr. Appel wanted to examine…

In response to the August 22, 2011 Order to Show Cause, the Attorney General filed a Certification of Jason W. Cossaboon, Sr., a Computer System Analyst employed by Cumberland County. Mr. Cossaboon, in his Certification, states that on August 16, 2011, he was asked by the Administrator to determine the date the hardening process was applied to the laptop used to program the voting machines. [editor’s note: I’ll explain “hardening” in the sequel article]

 

He apparently was not able to find a log file for the laptop to indicate the date the hardening was done. However, he states that while working on the laptop, he noticed the computer was running very slowly. As a result, he deleted certain “temporary files.” He also, for some reason, deleted the event view logs…

I do not know and may never know exactly why this election was defective. I have suspicions that something happened here that was improper and I even question whether something happened here that may have been criminal. And I strongly encourage the Attorney General to turn this over to the Attorney General Division of Criminal Justice, so that appropriate criminal investigators can conduct a full and complete investigation of this matter, to assure that criminality did not take place.

Although the Board of Elections and the Administrator maintain that human error was all that was involved here, for me to believe that I have to believe that three independent errors, human errors, occurred here, and that somewhat stretches my belief of common sense and reality, but it’s possible.

Accordingly, I am ordering a new election to be conducted on September 27, 2011.

To be continued. This is part one of four blog posts promised.

Absentee votes in Florida, voters not required to participate

A three part series highlights ongoing, organized, absentee vote fraud in Florida. The [low] highlight is the video and story in the first part, of a disabled former county worker who tried her darnedest to vote but in the end was denied.

A three part series highlights ongoing, organized, absentee vote fraud in Florida.  The [low] highlight is the video and story in the first part, of a disabled former county worker who tried her darnedest to vote but in the end was denied. <part1> <part2> <part3>

Could Mrs. Thompson have forgotten that she received and returned the ballot? She said no numerous times. As a former County worker, she was sharp as a tack mentally. We compared the ballot envelope signature to a fresh signature sample done by Judith at Elections as well as to the signature on her State identification card. The signature on the absentee ballot envelope when compared with Mrs. Thompson’s valid signature wasn’t even close. There were three of us looking at the signatures. The envelope signature was very tight compared to her looser hand and the capital letters were written differently. I asked Elections how they verify absentee ballot signature, they said:

The signatures are verified electronically. If the signature on the certificate requires further review, then the certificate is reviewed manually. – Michelle G. McClain, Assistant Deputy Supervisor, Voter Services

It is interesting to note that when Miami Dade County Clerk Harvey Ruvin reviewed petition signatures he did them ALL manually and had a handwriting expert on hand. Maybe the Elections Department’s program is not working as it allowed Mrs. Thompson to be disenfranchised by a forged signature. I got a few different stories about how signatures are verified at the Election’s Department. I even called the software company that supplies Elections and they were very defensive. I asked them about statistics on accuracy, They never called  back. Joe Centorino at the State’s Attorney’s office (now head of County’s Ethics), at my urging, instituted an investigation into Mrs. Thompson’s lost vote.  He said it was difficult proving these cases. His biggest complaint was that there is no penalty for people from campaigns picking up absentee ballots from voters even though it is illegal. He needs to have a penalty to impose on the illegal activity in order to make arrests….

We had spent some time at the Miami–Dade County Department of Elections looking at returned absentee ballot envelopes and ballots from the preceding election. What we reviewed were the now empty ballot-filled envelopes which have the voter’s address information and signature. The actual ballots do not have any identifying numbers, names or marks on them. We viewed those separately. We were not allowed to touch or copy the envelopes or ballots. They were held up in front of our faces.

What we saw during our time at Elections amazed us. It actually prepared us for Ms. Thompson’s experience. What we learned through interviews before Ms. Thompson’s trek to Elections was not surprising.

During our time at Elections, we saw ballots that were filled in strangely.

Among the oddities were numerous ballots that had only 2 candidates (the same two) filled in out of the scads of candidates in the November election. There were ballots with pencil circles around the “correct” bubble with dark ink colored in them. It may not sound like much, but when you are sitting there looking at page after page, you soon realize that some things you see are not quite right.

When it came to the ballot certification envelopes, our review offered up many questions and we oftentimes received answers from the department about the absentee process that didn’t make sense.

On the envelopes we noted some strange things like unusual numbers of voters in a certain area missing required printed signatures at the envelope top while other areas had all of the required printing on them. There were envelopes with signatures in the wrong place allowing the envelopes to be opened or closed; there were different hand writing styles on the top, bottom and front of the envelope; there were envelopes with NO signature (they were counted, now I want you to try that at a poll) and other things that just seemed weird.

In some cases we asked to compare the envelope signatures with the one on file and we were denied the opportunity. We asked questions about the envelope review process. The response really didn’t calm our discomfort with what we saw. After this visit, I am still not convinced that the envelopes are truly looked at in a comprehensive matter – having found one vote counted with NO signature…

Miami Herald’s Columnist Fred Grimm said:

“In 1993, after the Hialeah city election was tainted by illicit commerce in absentee votes, a Miami Herald editorial warned, “Florida’s absentee ballot guidelines are among the nation’s most lenient. Indeed, the laws encourage ‘ballot brokers’ who exchange blocs of absentee ballots for money. The Legislature needs to adopt tighter regulations for obtaining absentee ballots. The Florida Senate wisely voted down a bill this year that would have made the code even looser.”

 That bit of wisdom did not hold. In 2004, the Legislature relaxed absentee ballot rules. And ballot brokers are still deciding elections. (The Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections mailed out 126,372 absentee ballots for Tuesday’s county mayoral election.) If the rules were any looser, my dog Jasper could vote absentee.”…

A View from an Insider:

There are cases where they would be “using” the absentee ballots mailed to the typical Cuban seniors — those who are handicapped by their physical problems, and many who are not. These people don’t speak English; most live either in nursing homes or in private nursing homes [family homes that take up to 8 seniors], so the people who are the managers at these places are in control of the votes/people.

These seniors don’t know how to vote, so they trust their “handlers” to do this for them. Let’s say that there’s a private home that houses 8 seniors; the person who manages the place will sell their ballots to the people who are gathering votes for the candidates. This manager can collect anywhere from $50 to $100 per ballot. It all depends on how badly the campaigns need the vote and, most all, how much money is available for negotiating.

Why on earth do you think that the costs of running a political campaign in Miami-Dade get higher with every new election? Do you really believe that they need the money for radio and TV?

In the case of the dining rooms [“comedores”], I understand that it is more of a communal process. As the ballots arrive, the “handlers” sit with the seniors and they tell them that they are going to help complete the voting process, so it is easier for them. These seniors have no idea how to vote, and even the presence of a ballot scares them to death.

In the cases of the hundreds of Cuban clinics in Miami-Dade – that are no more than Medicare mills – the owners, or managers, ask the seniors if they want to “negotiate” their ballots, and they offer them money. Naturally, a Medicare mill is there to help the senior make money, one way or the other. And then the seniors request their ballots by phone, and even if they would need a medical excuse, stating that they “can’t go to the polls,” remember who’s helping them to do the transaction, THEIR CLINIC…

Here is a last word from the Miami Herald:

“Still, interviews with at least a half-dozen people involved in Greater Miami elections paint a picture of a flourishing cottage industry in which ballot brokers promise to deliver blocks of absentee votes for a price. To be sure, many strategies for targeting absentee voters are legal, but the practice becomes dubious when voters are pressured with insistent phone calls and home visits. And the efforts can cross the line into fraud, when ballots that are collected under the guise of helping a voter are altered or destroyed.”

How much safer/riskier is Connecticut? We are not so sure. People here have been prosecuted. We are certain, that our President and the make-up of our Congress is dependent on errors and fraud in Florida and in every other state.

Common Sense: Integrity and Confidence

We often speak of the need for ‘Integrity and Confidence’ in elections, yet the words ‘Integrity’ and ‘Confidence’ are often misunderstood, with their meanings collapsed. We need both confidence and integrity in our elections, neither alone is sufficient.

Note: This is the forth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous><next>

Posting on a recent presentation we realized that we often speak of the need for ‘Integrity and Confidence’ in elections, yet the words ‘Integrity’ and ‘Confidence’ are often misunderstood, with their meanings collapsed. We need both confidence and integrity in our elections, neither alone is sufficient.

Integrity

We find the Wikipedia definition of Integrity close to what we mean when we call for election integrity.

Integrity is a concept of consistency of actions, values, methods, measures, principles, expectations, and outcomes. In ethics, integrity is regarded as the honesty and truthfulness or accuracy of one’s actions. Integrity can be regarded as the opposite of hypocrisy,[1] in that it regards internal consistency as a virtue, and suggests that parties holding apparently conflicting values should account for the discrepancy or alter their beliefs.

In elections, to us, integrity means that the voters’ intentions are realized in the results of each race or contest. That within reason every vote is counted accurately. It means that the entire system of voter registration, ballot access, and election administration functions according to law and common sense expectations of the public. A system where what we expect is what we get, and what we expect is democracy. A system sufficient for the people to control, define, and elect their government.

Confidence

For Confidence we prefer Dictionary.com’s definition:

Confidence. 1.full trust; belief in the powers, trustworthiness, or reliability of a person or thing: We have every confidence in their ability to succeed. 3.certitude; assurance: He described the situation with such confidence that the audience believed him completely.

In elections, to us, confidence means that the vast majority of voters and candidates trust that voters’ intentions are realized in the results of each race or contest. They trust that within reason every vote is counted accurately. It means that they trust the entire system of voter registration, ballot access, and election administration functions according to law and common sense expectations of the public. They believe we have a system that provides that what we expect is what we get, and what we expect is democracy. They trust we have a system sufficient for the people to control, define, and elect their government.

Confidence without Integrity

The Madison Avenue, vigilance free system. A system which the public and candidates trust, which in reality is not one of integrity. Such a system would not be sufficient for democracy because the will of the people would be thwarted through election errors, election skulduggery, voter suppression, or insufficient ballot access. Largely a myth created by weak, fearful, gullible, or duplicitous officials, believed by some of the people some of the time. Symptoms include lack of transparency, defensiveness, and errors attributed to rare, unique and explainable mistakes.

Without Confidence and without Integrity

A system without integrity with weaknesses more transparent to the public, than apparent to officials. This system is more prevalent than systems with confidence and without integrity. We have been admonished by some officials to  “Stop doing what you are doing because it will scare the voters away from the polls“. We have news for  such officials and politicians: The public has a general lack of confidence in the system already. When we asked voters to sign a petition calling for increased integrity and confidence in elections, most immediately agreed to sign – they recognized the need. The second most prevalent reaction was to laugh and walk away indicating that it was a hopeless quest.

Integrity without Confidence

Yet, a lack of confidence does not necessarily imply a lack of integrity; perhaps power does not always corrupt a weak link; perhaps transparency is not necessary for election integrity; perhaps elections are an exception to what we see when we lift the veil of government secrecy in every other area. Confidence requires a transparent system. In addition confidence requires laws and procedures that are sufficient, enforceable, and enforced. Unless the laws of human nature are suspended for elections, integrity also would require those same things: laws and procedures that are sufficient, enforceable, and enforced. Sufficient laws must go beyond punishing the guilty and correcting the innocent; sufficient procedures must go beyond correcting errors and mistakes so that they will not happen again; the system must assure redress of incorrect results.