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Fixing the Transcript for DemocracyNow: “Fixing” the Electoral College

In a segment last week DemocracyNow editorialized on, interviewed New Yorkers, and representatives of FairVote, on the occasion of New York joining the National Popular Vote Compact/Agreement: Fixing the Electoral College: New York Joins Pact to Elect President by Popular Vote

Unfortunately, their transcript needs at least as much fixing as our current election system. As CTVotersCount readers know, we oppose the Compact because it would make a risky system, much riskier, without providing the claimed benefits. We understand the attraction to many, like nuclear power, fracking, GMOs, and Touch Screen Voting, the national popular vote would seem to be beneficial, yet like those other ideas it has largely unrecognized and unappreciated consequences. For details and background, refer to our recent testimony to the Connecticut Legislature or review our index of past NPV posts..

As a service to our readers, we here provide some annotations to the DemocracyNow transcript, showing where we disagree with the interviewees, and some of the biased comments of the reporters.

I am a fan of DemocracyNow. Yet, like all media they are not exempt from their own biases and blinders. In a segment last week they editorialized on, interviewed New Yorkers, and representatives of FairVote, on the occasion of New York joining the National Popular Vote Compact/Agreement: Fixing the Electoral College: New York Joins Pact to Elect President by Popular Vote <read>

As a service to our readers, we here provide some annotations to the DemocracyNow transcript, showing where we disagree with the interviewees, and some of the biased comments of the reporters. Our comments are in {maroon, with curly brackets and italics} .

Transcript

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: New York has become the latest state to join an agreement that would transform the way we elect the president of the United States. Under the compact for a national popular vote, states across the country have pledged to award their electoral votes to the presidential candidate who wins the nationwide popular vote. If enough states sign on, it would guarantee the presidency goes to the candidate who wins the most votes across the country.{Not so. Gamesmanship like FL 2000 could easily cause the system to fail. Also there is no official popular vote number to use to determine the winner under the Compact} It would prevent scenarios like what happened in 2000, when Al Gore won the popular vote but still lost the election to George W. Bush. {Al Gore also apparently won FL by the newspaper recount of all votes in the state, demonstrating under a fair count, Gore would have won FL under the Electoral College in 2000}

AMY GOODMAN: The compact will kick in only when enough states have signed on to reach a threshold of 270 electoral votes. This week, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo brought the campaign a step closer, adding New York’s 29 electoral votes to those already pledged by nine other states, including California, Illinois, Massachusetts and by Washington, D.C. In a statement, Governor Cuomo said, quote, “By aligning the Electoral College with the voice of the nation’s voters, we are ensuring the equality of votes {Yes, votes, if counted accurately would be equal, but that is misleading since citizens would not be equal, since there is not an equal national franchise and different levels of ease of voting and suppression across states} and encouraging candidates to appeal to voters in all states, instead of disproportionately focusing on early contests {sorry Gov, the Compact has nothing to do with primaries} and swing [states].” New York State Senator Joseph Griffo, a Republican, sponsored the bill.

STATE SEN. JOSEPH Gur RIFFO: Potential presidential candidates concentrate more than two-thirds of their advertising budget and two-thirds of their campaign stops in just five states. Almost 100 percent of their message is seen in approximately 16 battleground states. New York has 19.5 million people, but we’re routinely ignored by campaigns. I want to empower people. I want to make New York state relevant in a national campaign again. I want democracy that creates excitement in people, not apathy. Joining the National Popular Vote compact creates that opportunity. It leverages the combined power of the states in a compact to say, “No longer can you take us for granted. No longer can you effectively disenfranchise million of Americans by ignoring us {Do your really feel disenfranchised Gov? Did you vote for President last time? Did you tell New Yorkers not to waste their time?}. No longer can you assume that you have our vote.”
{Readers, think for yourselves:

How many votes would have changed if Obama and Romney had visited Connecticut and spoke to a few thousand voters each, giving the same talking points as they did in other states, and you watched them on Local news, in addition to National news?

Do voters want more 30sec ads to help them decide who to vote for?

Have you ever visited a swing state or early primary state? The voters there would tell you they do not want more ads and phone calls to help them choose a candidate.

Ask yourself who benefits by this? Most of the money would go to media moguls, not in your state.}

AMY GOODMAN: To talk more about the campaign for a national popular vote, we’re joined now by Hendrik Hertzberg, staff writer for The New Yorker magazine. He has been writing in support of the national popular vote since 2006, serves on the board of the electoral reform organization FairVote. {Another ”journalist” who shows his bias serving on a board advocating for the NPV.}

Rick, welcome to Democracy Now!Talk about the significance of New York joining on, but also what the national popular vote is.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Well, it’s an important step psychologically, because now the threshold, instead of being 50 percent of the way to the threshold, we’re 61 percent of the way. So every little bit—every little bit helps. And, of course, New York is the media capital. Things don’t really happen in the brain of the media until they happen in New York. {Wow quite a statement, for someone advocating for a group that contends that New Yorkers are left out. Maybe that is why so many New York Republicans voted for the bill, considering it is the center of the media businesses which would be the chief beneficiaries, if the Compact’s advocates are correct in their assumptions of how campaigns would change.} So even though California, New Jersey, state of Washington—even though all these other states have already signed on, it’s only now starting to raise to the level of some sort of public attention. And most people don’t even know this is going on, and that includes people who are extremely well informed—don’t even—have never even heard of this, don’t realize that we’re halfway—more than halfway to solving one of the central problems of our Constitution, which is the—this Electoral College setup. {And unfortunately, the public does not understand the unanticipated consequences, with one-sided media coverage in favor of the Compact.} And the problem with the setup is not the Electoral College itself. The problem is the winner-take-all by state. That’s what creates all the anomalies. {Does anyone here see problems with voting rights inequality? Voter suppression? Campaign spending? Citizen’s United? The Media complex? Apparently not today.}

And what the National Popular Vote plan does is, by a whole bunch of states getting together to award their electors to whoever wins in all 50 states, as soon as that happens, well, then it doesn’t matter what state you live in: {Once again there is no equal franchise, state to state}. Your vote is just as much equal to go after, to campaign for. It means that, for instance, in New York, where it’s pointless to do—to do doorbell ringing, to have a coffee collection, invite your neighbors in—what difference does it make? Everybody knows which way New York is going. {Usually so in most states, but their votes count and contribute their fair share in determining the winner} But if every vote, if a vote in New York is worth the same as a vote in Ohio or Pennsylvania, you get a—that really is transformational. Even more than preventing a wrong winner is that you get grassroots politics happening in every corner of the country. {And you then get incentive for suppression and manipulation everywhere too.} And if you’re worried about political corruption, if you’re worried about campaign finance, for example, what this would do is, all those billions raised for campaigns, instead of being funneled into a handful of states, they would have to be spread out across the whole country, so their relative impact would be much less. This is an extraordinary reform. {That is an extraordinary claim, that by providing more opportunity for more money to make more of a difference, you are reducing the influence of that money? How many of the advocates for the Compact agree that Citizens United is bad for Democracy? I suspect the vast majority, yet increased influence of money is twisted to be a benefit when it comes to the Compact.}

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, what allows a group of states to be able to come together and reach a compact like this? Wouldn’t a constitutional amendment be needed for this? Explain the legality of it.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Well, this is based on two things in the Constitution. One is what you just mentioned, interstate compacts. There are hundreds of them. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, maybe not the best example lately, but that is an example of an interstate compact. It’s in the Constitution. The other part is that the only thing in the Constitution about electing the president is basically a one-liner that says each state shall appoint a number of electors in such manner as the Legislature thereof may determine. That’s all it says. Everything else is left to—is left to the states to figure out. And the winner-take-all notion, that’s a—that’s something that came in 20, 30 years after the Constitution was written. And it’s because a party that controls the state Legislature isn’t going to say, if given the choice between keeping all those electors for themselves or giving, you know, some portion of them to the opposition, of course they’re going to do it this way. {I am not a Constitutional lawyer. I am not a lawyer. Yet, I would agree the Compact is likely Constitutional, yet it may well be challenged to the Supreme Court. And based on the precedents of past elections, and the rules of the Electoral College, it is quite likely that the Supreme Court would be “forced” to choose the President under those challenges. See our testimony for a discussion of the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act and the Compact’s likely effects.}

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democratic New York State Senator Michael Gianaris, who is among those who oppose joining the compact for a national popular vote.

STATE SEN. MICHAEL GIANARIS: The current system allots Electoral College votes based on a state’s population, whereas a system such as the National Popular Vote will do so based on voter turnout in a presidential election, which means states that have a high number of unregistered residents would not be counted as much, or states that have low voter turnout would not be counted as much as they are under the current system. There’s also a myriad of other issues related to those that have wealth being able to saturate a big city media market to affect the outcome more than they currently do, which is already too much, as well as the possibility for some states that are unhappy with the results, potentially between Election Day and the Electoral College vote, changing their state laws to pull back out of a compact like this, which would throw the whole system into chaos. {We generally oppose the Compact for other reasons, the increased risks to the system. We do not reject these arguments out of hand. Unfortunately, the strongest arguments against the Compact are not getting a fair hearing}

AMY GOODMAN: That’s Democratic New York State Senator Michael Gianaris. Now, interesting, he’s Democrat, and the person we played for the national popular vote was a Republican. But can you answer his points? {Interesting because, in our opinion in general, Democrats are for it for the wrong reasons, and Republicans are against it for the wrong reasons. Both think their party would benefit from their positions.}

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: He’s wrong on every single one of them. You cannot withdraw from the state—interstate compact for 90 days before an election. That’s part of the deal. That’s part of the contract that you make.

The notion that—as far as turnout is concerned, right now there’s a sort of a five-to-10-point difference in the turnout between battleground states and spectator states. So when you have a nationwide vote, you’re going to see—yes, you’re going to see turnout increase, but don’t say it like it’s a bad thing.

He mentions that the Electoral College is based on—is not based on how many people vote; it’s based on population. And that’s one of—that’s sort of the original sin of the Electoral College, because the reason it’s based on population is so that the three-fifths of the slaves could be counted to give the slave owners more representation. It imports—the Electoral College mechanism imports that right—which is in the Senate and the House, right into this choice of the presidency. Now, that part of it’s gone now, but that is the original sin. {There are a lot of things in our history which are regrettable, but tying the Electoral College to slavery, is close to playing the Hitler card on other issues. Should opponents bring up disappointing or criminal Senators, Governors, and Mayors that were elected by popular vote?}

And of course it makes more sense for the president to be chosen by voters, one-by-one voters, rather than by states with a fixed number of votes. Even if only three people vote in a state and it’s got 10 electoral votes, they’ll still go to that candidate. All the National Popular Vote plan does, really, is elect the president the way we elect a dog catcher or a governor or a senator or representative. It’s not that complicated. {Unfortunately, it is much more complicated. Study our testimony on the 12^th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act, along with the effect of the Compact.}

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: But my question is, given the fact that you would only need the states who equal a number of 270 votes to join the compact, and they would therefore then be decisive in terms of who would get elected if the—who wins the popular vote, but isn’t it possible just as well for the compact to be broken years down the line? In other words, for new legislatures to come in and decide to leave?

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Sure, that would be possible, yeah. And actually, that’s one of the advantages to this maybe over a constitutional amendment. We can try it. We can try it, see if—try electing a president democratically, see if we like it. If we like it, we can keep it. If we don’t like it, we don’t have to keep it. That’s actually a plus, not a minus.

AMY GOODMAN: So, so far, now—

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: And I might add, Juan, that it’s not as if the states that are compacting are then going to decide who’s president. No, the only thing that will decide who’s president is the voters in all the states that are compacting and that are not compacting. It won’t make any difference whether you live in one of them or not. {Unless, they are not counted accurately, there was no national post-election audit, no national recount, and no national popular vote number available in time for states to choose their electors. Oooops we have none of those, so we are stuck with the “trust us” non-verification system.}

AMY GOODMAN: So, now signed on: New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Vermont, California, Rhode Island and Washington.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Mm-hmm.

AMY GOODMAN: What happens next?

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Well, right now there’s a focus on Connecticut, where the bill is being considered. It’s kind of a one-by-one thing, state to state. {Yes, we are the next target.} Now, people may have noticed that the states that you mentioned are all blue states. And, of course, because of what happened in 2000, Republicans tend to have a—you know, they kind of—they kind of have a—react to this and think—or, suspiciously, they think maybe this is Al Gore’s revenge. {And Democrats are apparently, in general, blind to the risks, since they have been led to believe that this would have changed the outcome in FL in 2000. Yet with different voters, more voters, with a different counts, and different campaign strategies, who knows if Gore would actually have won under the NPV in 2000. Can we at least all agree that more and different voters would go to the polls under the Compact and that we have no idea what an accurate count would have been in 2000?}, in fact, there are plenty of Republicans who back this. If you believe in democracy, if you believe that the way to have an election is count the votes, see who wins, then it really doesn’t matter if you’re a Republican or a Democrat. Yes, there are these inbred prejudices. Republicans are—maybe they’re more resistant to change. Maybe they think this is somehow an end run around the Constitution, which it is not, which it definitely is not. They have a—they have more skepticism to overcome. But this isn’t like, you know, taxing the rich, where that’s a matter of principle. It’s a matter of principle the other way: If you’re for democracy, you really ought to be for this. {Yup, anyone against this is charged with being undemocratic. And the other side says proponents are against the Founding Fathers. And then back to the opposition favoring slavery…}

AMY GOODMAN: Well, I want to thank you very much for being with us. Hendrik Hertzberg is a staff writer at The New Yorker. He’s been writing in support of the national popular vote since 2006. I think you said in your last piece you had written 51 pieces on this.

HENDRIK HERTZBERG: Fifty-two as of this morning.

AMY GOODMAN: He serves on the board of the electoral reform organization FairVote. When we come back, we’re going to England and to Norway to talk about drones and who’s running the U.S. drone operation. Stay with us.

As we have said many times, we are not in theory opposed to electing the President by national popular vote. But we need a uniform voting system, a uniform national franchise, enforceable, and enforced to avoid increasing the risks inherent in the current system.

CyberDissonence? State concern of Biblical Proportions

In Connecticut, apparently: Electricity is Critical! .., when it comes to elections, the message is “What Us Worry?”

You could say the State’s concern with Electoral attack is of Biblical proportions, i.e. criticizing utilities while not noticing the XP in our own systems.

New report from the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority highlights the risks of the power grid to cyber attack: Cyber Security and Connecticut’s Public Utilities <read>

There is a profound distance in perspective between the consume r of electricity, natural gas and water , who sees consumption as a normal, secure part of life, and the U.S. Intelligence Community , which sees threats to such consumption. The latter witnesses sophisticated, daily probes and penetrations of U.S. institutions , including not only corporate information technology networks but also regional electric distribution networks and private utilities. In the August 16, 2013 New York Times , reporter Matthew L. Wald noted that both government and private experts describe the U.S. electric grid as “the glass jaw of American industry.” Such experts fear that a successful strike by an adversary “could black out vast areas of the continent for weeks; interrupt supplies of water, gasoline, diesel fuel and fresh food; shut down communications; and create disruptions of a scale that was only hinted at by Hurricane Sandy and the attacks of September 11.”…

Efforts to hack into public utilities are significant , and by many reports , growing both in volume and sophistication. Public utility regulators and state authorities ould be dereli t to ignore what national security personnel call ongoing “battlefield preparation”…

The stark fact is that the United States is vulnerable; probes are active, dangerous and widespread. T his national pregnability pertains directly to Connecticut. There is no option but to acknowledge this reality and resolve to resist, defend and take countermeasures to ensure operational security in our public utilities

The report mentions the NIST (National Institute of Standards) Cybersecurity Framework and concerns within Homeland security.

As the Legislature considers for the third year in a row, passing legislation that would enable Internet voting, ignoring the concerns of our Secretary of the State, Department of Defense, experts from NIST and Homeland Security. In 2012 Governor Malloy was concerned and vetoed the bill based on security concerns, yet in 2013 he signed a similar bill. Now the Legislature is considering a bill to eliminate our constitutional right to a secret vote. You could say the State’s concern with Electoral attack is of Biblical proportions, i.e. criticizing utilities while not noticing the XP in our own systems.

*****Update 04/28*******

As we were saying, CT State Computers and Municipal Computers running XP could be vulnerable. In fact, all computers running Microsoft Internet Explorer are vulnerable. For the latest bug XP computers may never be “safe(*)” again. Washington Post: Hackers targeting newly discovered flaw in Internet Explorer <read>

This is the first major security disaster for users who still run Microsoft XP, the 12-year-old operating system that Microsoft discontinued support for earlier this month. The short-term solutions do not work with the old operating system, and no patches will be released to fix it.

Many federal agencies still use XP despite repeated advance warnings from Microsoft that impending discontinuance of support would leave their computers vulnerable.

About 10 percent of government computers still run XP, including thousands of computers on classified military and diplomatic networks

* Remember all computers and browsers are vulnerable to as bugs and traps, as yet undiscovered by good guys.

If Internet voting is so safe, why is the power grid so vulnerable?

Of course the answer is that Internet voting is not safe, much more vulnerable than the power grid. But why don’t we know that?

How are grid vulnerabilities different from the vulnerabilities of electronic voting and Internet voting in particular? Lets look at a story from the LA Times highlighting vulnerabilities in the power grid

Of course the answer is that Internet voting is not safe, much more vulnerable than the power grid. But why don’t we know that? Could it be that voting is largely a Government managed function and therefor Government articulation of vulnerabilities, and public expenditures on security would be less welcome?

Today we have a story from the LA Times highlighting vulnerabilities in the power grid: Security holes in power grid have federal officials scrambling <read>

Adam Crain assumed that tapping into the computer networks used by power companies to keep electricity zipping through transmission lines would be nearly impossible in these days of heightened vigilance over cybersecurity.

When he discovered how wrong he was, his work sent Homeland Security Department officials into a scramble.

Crain, the owner of a small tech firm in Raleigh, N.C., along with a research partner, found penetrating transmission systems used by dozens of utilities to be startlingly easy.

How are grid vulnerabilities different from the vulnerabilities of electronic voting and Internet voting in particular? We can start with the article subtitle:

In Congress, the vulnerability of the power grid has emerged as among the most pressing domestic security concerns

Internet voting is hardly a concern in the Connecticut Legislature which unanimously passed Internet voting two years in a row mandating the Secretary of the State and Military Department do what the DoD, experts from Homeland Security, and the National Institute of standards say is impossible. And even here grid security is a big concern of state government.

Then again maybe they are also the same in some ways:

“There are a lot of people going through various stages of denial” about how easily terrorists could disrupt the power grid, he said. “If I could write a tool that does this, you can be sure a nation state or someone with more resources could.”…

Some members of Congress want to empower regulators to force specific security upgrades at utilities. Others are attacking whistle-blowers and the media, demanding an investigation into disclosures of how easily the country’s power grid could be shut down.

Here is a difference. Who would even attempt insuring the safety of our election system? Let alone Internet voting?

Lloyds’ appraisers have been making a lot of visits lately to power companies seeking protection against the risk of cyberattack. Their takeaway: Security at about half the companies they visit is too weak for Lloyds to offer a policy.

Power companies are actual monopolies, but so are local election departments. Some of the same issues apply:

The problem, said Scott White, a security technology scholar at Drexel University in Philadelphia, is that “you are basically dealing with these monopolies that are determining for themselves which expenditures are a priority. Security has not generally been one.”

Utilities deny they’ve ignored the problem, pointing to the billions of dollars they say they’ve spent to upgrade outdated computer systems and close security holes.

Here is a difference, something seldom seen when Internet voting is adopted and declared successful:

They are signing contracts with security firms like Booz Allen Hamilton to investigate such things as to how to keep potentially mischievous devices out of the equipment they buy, often from foreign suppliers. The security firms help clients sift through reams of confidential intelligence provided by federal agencies. They simulate cyberattacks.

“It is the equivalent of war gaming, like the military does,” said Steve Senterfit, vice president of commercial energy at Booz Allen Hamilton.

Here in Connecticut we pride ourselves in the safety of 169 autonomous elected election departments. But that also has its downsides. Like the power grid, electronic voting involves users’ computers or distributed military computers:

But critics, including many in Congress, say more needs to be done to shore up a grid increasingly exposed to attacks. They note that so-called smart grid technology, which allows operators to calibrate the flow of energy from an increasingly diverse pool of sources, has opened new security risks.

The technology relies on devices in remote locations that constantly send signals to substations to help control when juice needs to be brought on and offline. The smarter the grid becomes, though, the more entry points an attacker can exploit.

“The whole idea of a smart grid is to push equipment further and further away from the substations,” Crain said. “Some of it is even in people’s homes. It’s physically impossible to secure it all.”

Here is a difference: The grid is apparently not on the Internet, so it is actually just a little harder to compromise:

The vulnerabilities Crain exposed, for example, had been overlooked because taking advantage of them requires an attacker to have access to closed, local networks. Now, a cyberterrorist with a little knowledge and the right laptop can gain that access and cause chaos in a regional power system merely by linking up with the control panel at a secluded electric vehicle charging station.

Mid-Term Report: One more bill best left off the agenda

We conclude our summaries of the election bills we are watching that passed the Government Elections and Administration Committee this year.

As is too often the case, this bill is aimed at a concept we strongly support, yet the bill is so flawed that is misleading and dangerous. Without going into the details I can claim, in all modesty, that I have been a strong, supporter of the concept nationally, and a catalyst in Connecticut. I would be happy to sit back and let others take deserved bows for a great result, well implemented. However, the worst outcome would be the loss of the value of post-election audits, knowing that I was a likely cause.

We conclude our summaries of the election bills we are watching that passed the Government Elections and Administration Committee this year.

Machine Audit Prototypes

As is too often the case, this bill is aimed at a concept we strongly support – machine assisted audits – yet the bill is so flawed that is misleading and dangerous. Without going into the details I can claim, in all modesty, that I have been a strong, supporter of the concept nationally, and a catalyst in Connecticut. I would be happy to sit back and let others take deserved bows for a great result, well implemented. However, the worst outcome would be the loss of the value of post-election audits, knowing that I was a likely cause.

To be credible, post-election audits must have public verifiability. Connecticut’s current audits have public verifiability: The public can observe each ballot votes are counted manually, observe the totals being produced and accumulated. There are flaws in the current audit law and the audit law as it is currently conducted, yet public verifiability provides the opportunity for independent assessment and reporting of those concerns.a

The good/sad news is that trusted machine assisted audits are possible and they could provide a much more effective and efficient audit for Connecticut.

For a detailed list of our concerns and a paper suggesting how trusted machine assisted audits can be conducted, see our testimony <read>

Mid-Term Report: Two bills that should go forward

Today we highlight two bills important to election administration that we hope will be passed. As is often the case, nothing is perfect, yet sometimes testimony improves an inadequate bill, based on a good concept. Sometimes we support a bill that falls short, that none the less would be an improvement.

Authority of the Secretary of the State

This bill is basically a good idea that we can support – providing enforceability of “any declaratory ruling, instruction or opinion issued by the Secretary of the State. It also requires that towns provide email for every Registrar. While we like the intent of the bill it should be improved before passage. <written testimony> As I said in my prepared testimony:

I support H.B. 5480, yet would like to see two improvements to better serve the public. First, that the Secretary of the State’s instructions etc. be required to be posted to the Secretary’s web site in a timely manner. Second, that registrars provide an email address on their web site and/or the Secretary of the State’s web for communication with voters. This would be especially useful to military and overseas voters.

Electronic Check-In

This bill allows for electronic check-in of voters. Once again this is a concept that we support, yet testified against the original which had many problems that went well beyond electronic check-in <testimony>

We are pleased to report that our objections have been addressed in a substitute bill approved by the Committee. So, we can fully support it going forward.

Mid-Term Report: Two really dangerous bills and a duck

Yesterday, the Government Elections and Administration (GAE) held its last meeting of the year to approve bills originating in the Committee. Today we will recap three of be seven election bills we are tracking.

It is hard to compare and prioritize the importance and impact of bills for good or ill. Today’s three bills provide an instructive contrast. All three are well intended, yet ill conceived. One is extremely threatening to democracy, yet the threat may be way off or ultimately avoided. Another sets a bad precedent for Connecticut and the Nation, flaunts reason, with a message almost the opposite of that intended. The third aimed at fairness is unfair to most of those seeking redress for an imagined unfairness. UPDATED.

UPDATED.

The National Popular Vote Agreement

For about the fifth time in eight years, the National Popular Vote Agreement came up and passed the GAE. We can only hope it does get vote on in the House and Senate. The one time it passed the House, it lost originally by one vote, but several members changed their votes to provide a pass.

Perhaps Connecticut’s seven Electoral College votes will not tip the balance to put the Compact in effect. That would take states passing the Compact totaling half the Nation’s total Electoral College. The Compact is half-way there, so far, after seven years. But the danger is in that passing here, Connecticut’s yea or nay could make the difference or influence other states.

Maybe the danger is far off. Maybe there will not be another really close election like 1876, 1960, 2000, or 2004 for a long time. Maybe things will change and we will have more voting integrity, less suppression across the country. Maybe faced with an actual impending implementation, enough states will bow out of the Compact in time.

Maybe Not. The stakes are high. An essentially “stolen” presidency can be bad in itself, and also disheartening for democracy.

In my estimation, the most dangerous bill going forward this year.

Constitutional Amendment to Void the Secret Vote

For the last three or four years we have been fighting Internet voting, a bad idea, justified in the name of supporting our troops. Statistics show great results in supporting our troops based on the implementation of the MOVE Act. Connecticut paralleled other states in going from 61% absentee ballot return rates in 2010, to 94% in 2012, on the same order as the return rate for all absentee ballots.

Yet critics are not satisfied. They push for risky, expensive, and likely ineffective Internet voting. Yesterday, Representative Hwang called anyone who would vote against the bill “unpatriotic”. We applaud the three Representatives that voted against the bill, articulating the risks of coercion and the value of the Secret Vote. They are the true courageous patriots.

As we said in our testimony, “Like vaccination, it only works if everyone has the secret vote.”

Also I applaud Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill’s steadfast opposition to Internet voting and defense of the secret vote, in the face of such support for Internet voting.

Here we are torn with regard to the dangers. This bill is bad because it is a foot in the door of eliminating the secret vote. Yet, is it worse that it is a foot in the door of Internet voting? Or is the worst aspect that it is using flag waiving to accuse others of being unpatriotic, while actually assaulting the democracy our soldiers and ancestors fought and died for? And, like the Popular Vote Compact it sets influence and precedent for other states as well.

In my estimation, the second most dangerous bill going forward this year.

Limit Post-Election Audits to Three Per Town Per Election

This bill started off really, really, bad. It would have cut post-election audits in half, from 10% down to 5%, and worse by “auditing” by feeding the ballots through a different scanner and comparing the tapes.

As such it would have been a contender for the most dangerous bill of the year – it would impact only Connecticut, but seriously and immediately and had Connecticut be known as the 1st state ever to “effectively eliminate post-election audits”. Hopefully, like last year, it would never have been brought before the Senate or House. As we testified, audits should be strengthened, not weakened.

What remains is severely abbreviated version with only a clause limiting audits to a maximum of three districts per election or primary. There are several impacts of this well-intended, yet flawed remnant:

Audits work best when truly random across all districts. Limiting some towns causes the audit to be less protective, with certain votes and districts to have less opportunity for being selected. (Fortunately, a limit of three on 10% has only a moderate such a effect in Connecticut).
The intention is to save towns from “being audited almost every time” while others “hardly or never get selected”. This effort to spread the burden fairly will actually help towns with many polling places audit less, and place additional burdens on towns with fewer polling places, especially those with a single polling place.
It is worse than it might seem. When towns like New Haven and Hartford, get regularly selected for three to six polling places, they have about two hundred votes per polling place (and over the long run, audit a fair 10% of their votes). But when towns like Suffield, Lebanon, Clinton, Oxford, or Andover get audited, they have to count 2000, 3000, 4000, or approaching 9000 votes at once! Under the current law they get their fair share over time.
The towns with many polling places are right that ~~they~~ their scanners get audited almost every time, yet this bill will not change that. Yet, they will get a bit less than their 10% share. Yet large towns will continue to, fairly, get routinely selected even more often. (We marvel at how some with 20 to 30 districts in a 10% audit random drawing are surprised they are almost always selected.)

In the grand scheme of things this bill, unfair as it is, will have little effect on audit integrity. Yet, we are sympathetic to the towns with few polling places, who ironically are disproportionately represented within the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC) which is the bill’s proponent. Can we call this a ‘duck’, since maybe we ducked the a really bad bill, leaving one with a few quacks in the logic.

Testimony: Defending the Secret Vote and Check-in Integrity

Yesterday, I testified against two bills. I do not particularly like testifying against bills that promote concepts that I support, like electronic check-in, yet like all technology, it can be done in a way that helps, without adding risks.

On the other hand, it is a privilege to defend the Secret Vote, one of many, often under-appreciated, keystones of democracy. Also appreciated is the many thoughtful questions presented by the Committee which gave me an opportunity to stand for the Secret Vote.

Yesterday, I testified against two bills. I do not particularly like testifying against bills that promote concepts that I support, like electronic check-in, yet like most technology, it can be done in a way that helps, without adding risks.

My prepared remarks <read>

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount , a software technologist and a veteran.I oppose S.B. 441. I support the concept of electronic check-in. Unfortunately, this bill does not impose any requirements or standards with regard to the capabilities, reliability, and integrity of electronic check-in systems nor for associated manual processes. It has other serious flaws, that would reduce check-in integrity, reduce transparency, and extend waiting lines. The State of Indiana has initiated a robust certification process, perhaps Connecticut could base any certification on Indiana’s work, without duplicating it.

I oppose S.J. 24 for four reasons.

The secret vote protects us all. The true value of the secret vote is everyone’s right that every voters’ vote be secret, so that it cannot be sold or intimidated. The secret vote is not simply a right for an individual to keep their vote secret. No person can waive that right for every other voter. Like vaccination, it only works if everyone has the secret vote.

Military members are especially subject to intimidation and perceived intimidation, based on the authority of command and confirmed by continuing disappointing revelations. As my Basic Training Captain expressed it, “I am your mother, your father, your sister, and your brother”.

This bill is motivated by Internet voting, a risky, unsafe method of voting. In addition to overwhelming opposition by Computer Scientists and Security Experts, Internet voting has been discredited by a Department of Defense study, security experts from the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Institute of Standards and Testing.

This bill is motivated by a desire to help soldiers vote, yet, conventional means have proven successful and economical, when the MOVE (Military and Overseas Voting) Act has been followed by Election Officials and the Military.

This veteran says:

“Support our soldiers by waiving the Flag, but do not waive the secret vote. Do not thank me for my service — protect the secret vote that all of our soldiers and ancestors have fought and died for. Weakening the secret vote is ‘Democracy Theater’ at its worst, providing the illusion of helping our troops, providing an illusion of democracy.”

I also supplied extensive written testimony on both bills: <eCheck-In> <Secret Vote>

I spoke for the allotted three minutes. Then I was questioned extensively on the value of the Secret Vote. Unfortunately, the hearing was not recorded by CT-N. Sometime there will be transcripts, yet they cannot not replace a video or being there.

NPV – A graphic scenario

We are opposed to the National Popular Vote Compact, primarily because it would tend to make the current risky system for determining the President by the Electoral College, much more risky and subject us to open-season for vote suppression, insider fraud, outsider fraud, and legal challenges likely to end with the Supreme Court choosing the President. Paul Choiniere of The Day provides a graphic depiction of a related scenario.

Article published Mar 16, 2014
Connecticut should reject popular vote scheme
Paul Choiniere

The National Popular Vote folks are at it again in Connecticut. They want to end the practice of using the Electoral College system to determine the election of the president. Instead, the candidate who gets the most votes nationally would become president.

They don’t, however, want to amend the Constitution to make this change – the way it should be done – because the movement apparently sees that goal as too difficult.

Instead, its backers seek a clumsy and byzantine approach, one wrought with potential problems. What might happen if the Connecticut General Assembly endorses the plan, enters into the compact and the governor signs the legislation?

Picture this.

Connecticut voters make a clear choice who they want to be president. The state’s support is enough to give that candidate the electoral votes necessary to become president. However, because Connecticut’s choice to lead the country did not win the popular vote, Connecticut has to give its electoral votes to the other guy, electing him (or her).

I expect that would not sit well with many of those who voted in the majority, only to see their choice ignored.

How could such a thing happen? The National Popular Vote legislation requires states that sign on to this movement to agree to cast their electoral votes for the top voter getter nationally, regardless of who that state’s voters want to be president.

So far, nine states and the District of Columbia have passed National Popular Vote laws. They control 136 electoral votes, which means the movement is about halfway to its goal of locking up 270 electoral votes in this manner, the majority necessary to elect someone president.

So, the Electoral College system would remain in place, but all these states would basically be committed to ignoring it and making sure the popular vote, not the Electoral College system, determined the winner.

I can see that plan unraveling quickly. One can easily imagine the anger of voters in, for argument’s sake, a traditional Republican state seeing the state’s electoral votes handed to the Democrat – against the will of the people in that state – giving the Democrat enough electoral votes to win. Can anyone doubt the legislature would be pressed to return in special session, abandon the National Popular Vote compact, and back the voters’ choice?

A rush for the exits would soon follow among other states.

The National Popular Vote organization calls this impossible because the compact prohibits it. They also say such a reversal would face insurmountable constitutional hurdles. That’s debatable. At the very least, it invites potential chaos.

Motivating the popular vote movement are arguments of fairness and making more states relevant. The fairness issue is basic – the candidate with the most votes should win. A strong argument can be made for that position, but is this version of “fair” what is best for the country and Connecticut? The current system has arguably served the nation well for 207 years.

Less credible is the contention that election by popular vote will force the candidates to pay attention to more states. Currently, candidates focus their resources and their visits largely on contested states, particularly those with big electoral numbers. Yet, I suspect, even with a popular vote determining the winner, candidates would continue to give their attention to big population centers, which does not describe Connecticut or its cities.

In any event, if the people of the United States want to abandon the Electoral College system in favor of the direct election of the president, they should do so by formally amending the U.S. Constitution. It may be difficult, but it is preferable to the controversy the National Popular Vote arrangement invites.

Paul Choiniere is editorial page editor.

We agree that “Less credible is the contention that election by popular vote will force the candidates to pay attention to more states”. We would go further and suggest this may well be a reason most of the media supports the Compact. Most voters want more information on candidates, yet more attack ads, more robo calls, and the same soundbites delivered here will do little to quench that thrust.

Testimony on three bills – FOI is an issue in elections too

Today I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

Yesterday I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

My prepared remarks <read>

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount and a software technologist. Most of my career focused on developing software, evaluating software products, and recommending technology strategy for the Travelers, in its Computer Science Division. I also spent nine years developing and marketing software products in small companies, for use in large organizations.

Today I have submitted testimony on three bills.

I support H.B. 5480, yet would like to see two improvements to better serve the public. First, that the Secretary of the State’s instructions etc. be required to be posted to the Secretary’s web site in a timely manner. Second, that registrars provide an email address on their web site and/or the Secretary of the State’s web for communication with voters. This would be especially useful to military and overseas voters.

I oppose S.B. 348. It would make Connecticut the 1^st state to effectively eliminate post-election audits. It is the same bill approved in committee last year. Please do not make that mistake again. I am working with the ROVAC to propose a bill that would strengthen the audits and provide almost the same savings. I believe we are close to agreement, yet, we have not reached agreement on of all the details.

I oppose H.B. 5492 as proposed, a demonstration of electronic audits. I have long been a strong proponent of machine assisted audits, in Connecticut and nationally. Unfortunately, as written, I am concerned that it might be an unsatisfactory and redundant project – theater, not integrity – possibly delaying or precluding effective use of such technology in Connecticut. Possibly leading to what some would call a “pretend audit”. My written testimony details my concerns and proposes alternatives.

Post-election audits are different than other audits for several reasons:

Unlike other audits they are not independent. They are conducted by the same officials who are responsible for conducting the elections, specify the election equipment, and select vendors to program them.

Unlike financial audits, such as bank audits or campaign finance audits, because of the secret vote, there are no independent records similar to bank statements which can be compared with other financial records of the entity being audited. Election audits must be compared against the paper ballots held by election officials.

Thus, audits and recounts must be conducted publicly and transparently, providing for public verification. Without that they cannot be trusted. Without that they cannot provide credibility for our elections, that is, credibility for our democracy.

Thank you

S.B. 5480 AN ACT CONCERNING REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE AND THE STATE ELECTIONS ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, AND THE POSTING OF REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER IDENTIFICATION. <bill> <testimony>

For this bill concerns were for the central publication of enforceable directives, rulings, and instructions. And that registrars email address be made available to the public as they are for members of the General Assembly.

H.B.5492 AN ACT CONCERNING A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FOR CONDUCTING AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

Public transparency is important for two reasons with this bill. First, it is a project that deserves public observation and comment, yet there is no requirement for public notice of the demonstration and a requirement for public input. Second, it involves an alternative to post-election audits, that themselves require transparency and public verification. This should be a criteria to be demonstrated and proven as part of the project.

S.B. 348 AN ACT CONCERNING POST-ELECTION AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

In addition to other problems which would effectively eliminate post-election audits, this bills electronic audit provision would replace black-box voting with black-box auditing transparency and public verifiability.

As we said in our testimony, it is possible to strengthen the audits and save registrars almost as much effort.

What is lacking in Connecticut’s Post-Election Audits (Part 2)

Some contend that Connecticut has the Nation’s toughest post-election audit law. We contend it has several holes, is not well executed by officials, and if a voting machine were ever to count inaccurately the audit would be unlikely to recognize that. Almost certainly, there will be bills and proposals to weaken and strengthen the audit debated this year. Today, we will focus on:

WWWSD (What would Willie Sutton do?)

From the law:

…the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded in not less than ten per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable..

This has always been interpreted as including only the votes cast in polling places for a district, rather than votes for a district.

This means that all votes counted in central locations are not audited. Now we ask, if Willie Sutton robbed banks because “that is where the money is”. If you were a criminal insider prepared to rig an election, wouldn’t you rig the central count absentee machine(s) because “that is where the audit is not”?

Also the central count machines have ballot programming for the whole town, a bit more complicated than district machines, a bit more work to test. Now we ask, where is a bug or error more likely, in a machine with only one ballot, only one district, or one with more programming, where an error in any single district could cause a problem?

Now, we have EDR (Election Day Registration) in Connecticut, also counted centrally, also as complicated as central count absentee, also exempt from the audit!

With EDR and possibly no-excuse absentee voting on the horizon, we may have 30%-40% of our votes exempt from the audit before we know it – unless the audit law is strengthened to close this ~~loophole~~ gap.