CT | CTVotersCount.org

Conflict of interest generates knee-jerk call for election reform

As we have said before in several ways, modernization and solving election problems in Connecticut will be almost impossible to achieve within the existing system of 338+ local registrars, many of whom are very very part time. The comprehensive solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate”. Consolidation, Professionalization, and Regionalization. Not a panacea, but in our opinion a prerequisite.

Press release: Mayor Segarra & Hartford Legislators Call For Election Reform – Registrar of Voters Primary Raises Concerns <read>

This year in Hartford, there is a primary for one of the offices of Registrar of Voters. By the law the current party registrar is responsible for conducting primary elections for their own party. But that naturally creates a conflict of interest when the sitting registrar is also a candidate. This happens quite frequently in Connecticut and is not the only conflict. There can be a conflict when the registrar as a party member and usually a Town Committee member has taken a vote or a position for a particular candidate. Or as happened in Hartford in 2010, the registrar is on a slate for a Town Committee election. A registrar could also be a candidate for higher office and is often the spouse or close relative of a candidate. The list of potential conflicts is almost endless.

Shortsighted, stop gap solutions:

The two failed bills referenced in the press release are stop gaps. One would only apply to large city Town Committee elections. The other would only apply to elections for Registrar of Voters. We also do not like the idea of the Secretary of the State appointing the replacement registrar, that could create an appearance of a conflict of interest and the Secretary may not be that familiar with local individuals qualified and conflict-free to assume the duties. And in Hartford and occasionally other towns we have a third-party registrar candidate running with the sitting registrars administering the election. From the 1st bill:

That title 9 of the general statutes be amended to require (1) a registrar of voters who is a candidate in a primary or at an election, for the office of registrar of voters, to recuse himself or herself from official duties relating to such primary or election, and (2) the Secretary of the State to appoint a person to assume such duties during such period.

Every even year election, the registrars are candidates so they both would be replaced, for half of the elections! Where would 338+ qualified candidates be found? Especially if the state mandated certification of Registrars of Voters is ever materialized? Remember in most primaries and all elections there are multiple contests, it might be difficult to define fairly segregate the duties associated with one contest from the others.

A Comprehensive Solution

As we have said before in several ways, modernization and solving election problems in Connecticut will be almost impossible to achieve within the existing system of 338+ local registrars, many of whom are very very part time. The comprehensive solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate“. Consolidation, Professionalization, and Regionalization. Not a panacea, but in our opinion a prerequisite.

Courant: Keep Primary in Aug. We agree.

We agree with the Courant and add some details to the case against September and June.

Courant Editorial: Leave Connecticut Primary Date Alone – Primary Elections Changing months has its drawbacks <read>

Heat and vacations help make August “a terrible time to have a primary” election, Gov.Dannel P. Malloysaid this week. So he’s going to ask the legislature to change the dates once again — to June for congressional primaries and to September for legislative primaries.

Don’t set those months in concrete just yet, governor. Changing the dates might cause more trouble than it’s worth…

A Courant editorial two years ago quoted a blogger whose research showed that August primaries were historically no worse and often better at attracting voters than September ones. Consider the August 2006 Democratic U.S. Senate primary contest between Ned Lamont andJoseph I. Lieberman. It drew 53 percent of the party’s registered voters…

Give voters a good show, make it easy to get in, and they will come.

The last time the legislature switched primary dates — from September to August — lawmakers on the winning side argued that holding it in September chopped too much time out of the general election campaign. When a June primary was proposed, incumbents complained, understandably, that they wouldn’t have as much time as their challengers to campaign.

We agree with the Courant and add some details to the arguments:

September primaries leave precious little time for determining the winners with potential recanvasses and court challenges. Especially considering Federal requirements to print and distribute absentee ballots to military and overseas voters forty five days before the November election.
Incumbents and unopposed candidates without primary challengers would be advantaged in the September primary with the limited time available for candidates to raise funds and campaign for the November election.
In any case, most campaigning for September primaries would occur in August and include Labor Day weekend.
June would be difficult for all candidates. When would party conventions be held? Late May would be far too late for challengers to create a real campaign. State Legislators and sitting state officials would be running campaigns in the middle of the busiest part of the legislative session.
June would not only interfere with legislative business, it would add to the campaign season. Many of those calling for a June primary would be added to those complaining that campaigns are too long!

Update:

The Courant Editorial seems to imply that Election Day Registration (EDR) applies to primaries:

Connecticut took a step in the right direction this year when the General Assembly passed legislation authorizing Election Day registration — a proven turnout booster. Same-day registration goes into effect in Connecticut next year.

Give voters a good show, make it easy to get in, and they will come.

The bill that passed in Connecticut this year only provides EDR for elections not primaries. We checked with the Secretary of the State’s Office – they concurred with our interpretation. Although we are in favor of EDR, we opposed this year’s bill because it may cause problems without the benefits of EDR successful in other states.

Which party deserves top spot on archaic Connecticut ballot?

UPDATED – Court Challenge

The state legislature’s top Republicans charged Thursday that GOP candidates should have been placed at the top of the ballot during last fall’s municipal elections, and challenged Connecticut’s chief elections official to correct the matter before the state elections this November.

Republicans say they should have the top spot. Most votes for Governor last time were on the GOP line. CtMirror story: GOP says its candidates earned top spot on the next state ballot <read>

The state legislature’s top Republicans charged Thursday that GOP candidates should have been placed at the top of the ballot during last fall’s municipal elections, and challenged Connecticut’s chief elections official to correct the matter before the state elections this November.

State law rewards the party with the best showing in the gubernatorial contest by placing its candidates first on the ballot for the next four years.

In the 2010 gubernatorial election, Democrat Dannel Malloy finished 6,404 votes ahead of Republican Tom Foley. But Foley earned all 560,874 of his votes on the GOP line. Malloy, who was endorsed by both the Democratic Party as well as the Working Families Party, collected 540,970 votes on the Democratic Party line, and 26,308 votes on the Working Families ticket.

So which party truly finished first in terms of ballot order rights? Republicans now assert it was theirs…

Merrill’s spokesman, Av Harris, said the secretary’s office expected to complete its review of the legal questions raised by the Republican legislators by Friday.

Democratic State Chairwoman Nancy DiNardo and Jonathan Harris, the state party’s executive director, said Thursday that they believe Democrats are entitled to the top spot on the ballot.

“In my mind, the plain meaning of the statute … talks of the highest number of votes collectively” received by a party’s gubernatorial candidate, and not necessarily votes tied just to one line, Jonathan Harris said. “If you look at the plain language of this statute, it indicates the Democrats should be on line A.”

The GOP legislative leaders also wrote to Merrill that New York faced “the identical issue” in 1995 and determined that while Republican George Pataki had defeated Democrat Mario Cuomo in the 1994 gubernatorial contest, Cuomo received more votes on the Democratic line that Pataki had on the GOP line. Pataki also had been endorsed by New York’s Conservative Party and received enough votes on that line to gain the victory.

A consequence of a bit of ambiguous law, combined with unanticipated consequences of fusion voting, and an archaic party line ballot, designed to resemble the face of lever voting machines.

Here is the text of the Connecticut law, New York’s law might not be identical:

Sec. 9-249a. Order of parties on the ballot label. (a) The names of the parties shall be arranged on the machines in the following order:

(1) The party whose candidate for Governor polled the highest number of votes in the last-preceding election; …

Not being a lawyer, I agree with Jonathan Harris, the law seems to read that the 1^st line should be the party of the “candidate that polled the most votes”. Rather than the party “with the most votes for governor”.

This is another reason to change to a non-partisan ballot, yet I am sure there can be equally sticky issues no matter how the ballot layout is supposed to be determined. At least we have statewide primaries coming up, so ballots have yet to be printed.

Update #1

Upon reflection we note that Governor Malloy was also the candidate for the Working Families Party, so perhaps the Democratic Party and Working Family have equal claim to rows A and B on the ballot.

Update #2

Thanks to a reader, for looking up and sending along text from the New York law. It is different, clearly specifying “the party which polled for its candidate”:

In printing the names of candidates on the ballot, the candidate or candidates of the party which polled for its candidate for the office of governor at the last preceding election for such office the highest number of votes, shall be row or column A or one and the candidates of the other parties shall be placed on such ballot in descending order of such votes.

Update #3 Merrill Rules

Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, has interpreted that the Democratic Party deserves row A, while the Working Families Party did not qualify as a party. Letter to Republican leader: <read>

We note that the Secretary’s letter “interprets” the law. The Secretary’s web site says “*Disclaimer: We do not advise on laws*” but from the law quoted in the letter, she does have the power to “rule”.

Update #4 08/09/2012

Republican Party files suit for top spot, Courant story: State Republican Party Files Lawsuit To Gain Top Ballot Line In November Election <read>

We stick with our interpretation of the law, which says Secretary Merrill is correct. And that what would be right in the long run, would be a change in the law to a non-partisan ballot.

Update #4 08/14/2012 Now it is in court

CTNewsJunkie: Going To Court On Primary Day <read>

Everything you wanted to know about voter ID, including Connecticut

REMINDER: Most voters do not need a voter ID in Connecticut.(but it is easier if you bring one) Some 1st time registrants do under the Help America Vote Act.

ProPublica article on voter id: Everything You’ve Ever Wanted to Know About Voter ID Laws <read>

Starting with the heart of the matter:

Why are these voter ID laws so strongly opposed?

Voting law advocates contend these laws disproportionately affect elderly, minority and low-income groups that tend to vote Democratic. Obtaining photo ID can be costly and burdensome, with even free state ID requiring documents like a birth certificate that can cost up to $25 in some places. According to a study from NYU’s Brennan Center, 11 percent of voting-age citizens lack necessary photo ID while many people in rural areas have trouble accessing ID offices. During closing arguments in a recent case over Texas’s voter ID law, a lawyer for the state brushed aside these obstacles as the “reality to life of choosing to live in that part of Texas.”

Attorney General Eric Holder and others have compared the laws to a poll tax, in which Southern states during the Jim Crow era imposed voting fees, which discouraged the working class and poor, many of whom were minorities, from voting.

Given the sometimes costly steps required to obtain needed documents today, legal scholars argue that photo ID laws create a new “financial barrier to the ballot box.”

Just how well-founded are fears of voter fraud?

There have been only a small number of fraud cases resulting in a conviction. A New York Times analysis from 2007 identified 120 cases filed by the Justice Department over five years. These cases, many of which stemmed from mistakenly filled registration forms or misunderstanding over voter eligibility, resulted in 86 convictions.

There are “very few documented cases,” said UC-Irvine professor and election law specialist Rick Hasen. “When you do see election fraud, it invariably involves election officials taking steps to change election results or it involves absentee ballots which voter ID laws can’t prevent,” he said.

One of the most vocal supporters of strict voter ID laws, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, told the Houston Chronicle earlier this month that his office has prosecuted about 50 cases of voter fraud in recent years. “I know for a fact that voter fraud is real, that it must be stopped, and that voter id is one way to prevent cheating at the ballot box and ensure integrity in the electoral system,” he told the paper. Abbott’s office did not immediately respond to ProPublica’s request for comment.

There are several other details covered in the ProPublica article. Pennsylvania’s law is perhaps coming under the most fire as the strictest and most burdensome. As this article points out, absentee voting essentially requires no id, so a voter intent on voting for someone else or registering fraudulently has a much easier method available: New Pa. voter ID law criticized as inconsistent <read>

Pennsylvanians who vote by absentee ballot in November will need only to provide proof on their applications that they have Social Security cards, state Rep. Dan Frankel said Monday night.

All voters who show up in person on Election Day, however, must have state-approved photo identification, the Squirrel Hill Democrat said.

“If the last four digits [of a Social Security number] are good enough for absentee ballots, they should be good enough for voting at the polls,” he said during a discussion of the state’s new voter ID law.

In Connecticut we have a moderate voter Id requirement that does not have the barriers that are so controversial in other states, still stricter that those for voting by absentee ballot. From the Moderators Handbook:

b. VOTER I.D. AND VOTING

The elector announces their street number, address and name in a loud voice to the checkers. Each elector must present one of the following forms of identification to the checkers:

Their social security card, or

any pre-printed form of identification which shows their name and address, or

any pre-printed form of identification which shows their name and signature, or

any pre-printed form of identification which shows their name and photograph, or

sign a statement under penalty of false statement on Form ED-681 entitled, “Signatures of Electors Who Did Not Present ID”, provided by the Secretary of the State (see Form 3 in this Handbook) that the elector whose name appears on the official check list is the elector signing the form. (§9-261)

As in all states there are also special HAVA requirements for some 1st time voters:

d. HAVA IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: INDIVIDUAL VOTERS SUBJECT TO THE ADDITIONAL HAVA IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS WILL HAVE AN ASTERISK (*) NEXT TO THEIR NAME ON THE OFFICIAL VOTER LIST.

Please note, that in addition to the above procedures, those first time voters who register by mail after January 1, 2003, and vote for the first time in a federal election after January 1, 2004 are subject to the following additional requirements under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA):

The voter must present identification with their mail-in registration or at the polls;

If the voter is required to present identification at the polls pursuant to HAVA, the acceptable forms of identification under HAVA are:

a. A copy of a current and valid photo identification;

A copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck or government document that shows the name and address of the voter;

EXCEPTION: If the voter provides:

A valid Connecticut motor vehicle operator’s license number; or

The last four digits of the individual’s Social Security number.

AND

The Registrars of Voters are able to verify that information prior to the election, the remaining HAVA identification provisions will not apply to the voter. However, normal Connecticut identification procedures will still apply.

NOTE: Members of the armed forces and persons entitled to use the federal post card application under section 9-153a of the general statutes, as amended by this act, are not required to provide identification when registering by mail.

If the voter is required to present identification at the poll pursuant to HAVA, the applicant is NOT allowed to sign a statement under penalty of false statement on Form ED-681 entitled “Signatures of Electors Who Did Not Present ID”, prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector whose name appears on the official check list is the elector signing. (§9-261) (See Form 3)

If the voter is required to provide identification at the poll pursuant to HAVA and does NOT provide identification as outlined in section d(2), the applicant will be entitled to a provisional ballot. See section entitled “Provisional Ballot” for information.

Our opinion

In Connecticut we are lucky to avoid the controversy this year. Lucky because we have moderate requirements that should satisfy those with reasonable concerns, yet not keep voters from voting because of costly and time consuming requirements. With no evidence of anything beyond the possibility of very very isolated cases of voter fraud in polling place voting there is no reason to add to our Id requirements. The ball is in the court of those with concerns to demonstrate the need.

We maintain our position that unlimited absentee voting or mail-in voting represent a real and much greater risk and concern. With absentee voting, individual voter fraud represents a minor part of our concern; where untended disenfranchising voter error represent a greater concern; and where documented and potential organized voting fraud by insiders and outsiders represents the greatest risk.

Registrar error. Will candidate and public get same redress as similar fraud case?

We believe that the law should be followed, but in cases like this courts should normally rule in favor of candidates that do their part in complying with the law and clearly have the support required. Last year in similar circumstances, with allegations of fraud and a clear conflict of interest a court ruled in favor of the candidate

Update 07/03/2012: Candidate files to get on ballot <read>

***********

A primary candidate got all the necessary petition signatures, but the registrar issued incorrect forms. New Haven Register: Goof sinks primary in 116th District serving West Haven, New Haven <read>

A mistake could cost a state representative hopeful his chance to get on the ballot, as the Democratic registrar of voters reportedly gave him the wrong paperwork to petition for a primary. The registrar, Michelle Hufcut, meanwhile, has withdrawn her candidacy in a primary for the Democratic registrar job, citing health reasons. David C. Forsyth, who is hoping to be the Democratic candidate for state representative in the 116th District, officially learned Thursday that he should have used petition forms from the secretary of the state’s office. Forsyth needed to collect signatures to bring an August primary against state Rep. Lou Esposito of West Haven, the party-endorsed candidate…

Prior to this year, 116th District candidates could use petition forms from the city registrar because the district was limited to part of West Haven. However, following the state’s redistricting earlier this year, the district now includes parts of New Haven, and candidates running for multitown districts must use petition papers from the secretary of the state office, according to Av Harris, spokesman for the office…

“The petitions … are not going to be able to get him on the ballot because they were invalidly issued by the registrar. … This is a pretty black-and-white issue because it’s a matter of state statute,” said Harris Forsyth said his lawyer has been in contact with the state and will help him in court.

Governor vetoes bill with email/fax voting “rat”

Such rats risk bills being occasionally vetoed, yet more often fuel criticism of the the Legislature and serve to make citizens disgusted with Government in general.

I do not support any mechanism of voting that would require an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in order to cast a timely, secret ballot, even if such waiver is voluntary…allowing an individual to email or fax an absentee ballot has not been proven to be secure.
– Dannel P. Malloy, Governor

UPDATED

CTVotersCount readers know that we have a long history of opposing Internet voting of any type, and a recent history of opposing H.B. 5556 in Connecticut, because it contains a provision for email/fax voting, added in late to an “emergency certified bill”. In Connecticut such provisions are know as “rats”.

Today Governor Malloy vetoed that bill with an extensive message. One paragraph, echoing our recent letter published in the Hartford Courant, articulately summarized the good reasons to avoid such voting <read veto message>

Upon close examination, however, I find that some portions of this bill likely violate the United States Constitution…I cannot support the bill before me given its many legal and practical problems…

HB 5556 also contains a provision allowing deployed service members to return an absentee ballot by email or fax if the service member waives his or her constitutional right to a secret ballot. I agree with Secretary of the State Denise Merrill that this provision raises a number of serious concerns. First, as a matter of policy, I do not support any mechanism of voting that would require an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in order to cast a timely, secret ballot, even if such waiver is voluntary. Second, as the Secretary of the State has pointed out, allowing an individual to email or fax an absentee ballot has not been proven to be secure. In 2011, the United States Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, issued a report on remote electronic voting. The report concluded that remote electronic voting is fraught with problems associated with software bugs and potential attacks through malicious software, difficulties with voter authentication, and lack of protocol for ballot accountability. None of these issues are addressed in this bill. To be clear, I am not opposed to the use of technology to make the voting process easier and more accessible to our citizens. However, I believe that these legitimate problems have to be carefully studied and considered before enacting such a provision.

Contrary to the Governor’s message, my reading of the bill indicates it would have provided for email/fax voting for the military AND overseas voters, including voters on vacation abroad. See sections 23, 24, and 25.
http://cga.ct.gov/2012/ACT/PA/2012PA-00117-R00HB-05556-PA.htm

Others have differing opinions on the rest of the bill, and claim that the Governer would not negotiate. However, we do know that the email voting provision likely was never offered for negotiation with the governor, never had a public hearing, and was opposed by the Secretary of the State prior to placement in the bill. Still it was put in the bill shortly before the final votes by the full House and Senate, deserving of the title of “rat”.
http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16655/malloy-vetoes-campaign-finance-bill

Such rats risk bills being vetoed on occasion, yet more often rats and emergency certifications fuel criticism of the the Legislature and serve to make citizens disgusted with the Legislature, legislators, and Government in general.

Secretary of the State Merrill issued the following statement:

HB 5556 was a good faith effort to respond strongly to court decisions like Citizens United that have allowed an avalanche of private special interest money into our election system. Connecticut is a national leader in enacting clean election laws, and there can be no turning back. This bill would have strengthened our existing law in a number of ways, and I strongly support the concept. However, it is unfortunate that such important legislation included a section enacting voting by fax or email. As election technology, email or fax voting is not secure and could expose the electronically submitted ballots to hacking or other interference, calling into question the integrity of votes from our brave military serving overseas. These are citizens who put their lives on the line every day to protect our right to vote, and we should do everything we can to make sure their votes are actually counted with some assurance of accuracy and integrity. The technology that would make electronically submitted ballots secure has not yet been developed, and I am grateful that Governor Malloy concurs with this view. Therefore, I urge our Governor and General Assembly to work out a compromise on improvements to our Citizens Election Program and our response to Citizens United, and to do it soon. Our voters need to know if money or the public good drives our political system.

************** Update 06/23/2012

We have not taken a position on the campaign finance provisions of H.B. 5556. We are in favor of public funding of elections and the limitation of corporate money in elections. Today the Courant published an op-ed by the Executive Director of the CT ACLU articulating their position against the details within the bill: Veto Thwarts Bad Campaign Finance Bill <read>. We have referenced the arguments of those in favor of the bill in several of our posts. To the ACLU we would add that the threat is real in Connecticut: Two years ago protests by the Catholic Church against a bill before the Legislature resulted in threats to the lives of two legislators – we can easily see threats and intimidation directed at funders of the groups listed in the op-ed.

************** Update 06/25/2012

Governor and Legislature would have different goals in crafting a compromise bill: Malloy, legislature make last stab at campaign reform <read>

Official Audit Report – provides no confidence in officials and machines

Once again, the report is “Flawed by a lack of transparency, incomplete data, and assumed accuracy”

Last week the University of Connecticut (UConn) released its official post-election audit report on the November 2011 election, seven months after the election and one month after the shredding of all ballots. Once again, as we said last time, the report is “Flawed by a lack of transparency, incomplete data, and assumed accuracy”. In our opinion, the report falls short of the rigor of the fine peer reviewed papers <e.g.> and valuable memory card reports: <e.g.> that UConn provides.

The report is available at the UConn site: Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2011 November Election <read>

Our strongest concern with report is the two underlying assumptions which defy common sense and logic:

That officials are always correct when they claim or agree that they counted inaccurately, when hand counts and optical scanner tapes do no match.
That when officials count inaccurately, it implies that the optical scanners did in fact count accurately.

These assumptions leave us wondering:

How do officials know that they counted inaccurately?
Should we put blind trust in the judgment of officials that claim they cannot count accurately?
How accurate are the unaudited official hand counts used to provide a portion of the totals in each election which are compiled late on election night? We have only one, perhaps extreme, example to go on, coupled with some significant errors in the comparatively ideal counting conditions of the audits.
If every difference between scanners and officials is attributed to human error, then in what circumstances would we actually recognize an actual error or fraud should it ever have occurred?

According to the report:

Audit returns included 45 records with discrepancies higher than 5, with the highest reported discrepancy of 40. It is worth noting that 75% (30 out of 45) of the records that were subject to the follow up investigation already contained information indicating that the discrepancies were due to the human error. Following this initial review the SOTS Office [Secretary of the States Office] performed additional information gathering and investigation of those 45 records. The final information was conveyed to the Center on May 18th of 2012[after expiration of the six month ballot retention period]…

For the revised records SOTS Office confirmed with the districts that the discrepancies were due to human counting errors.

So, apparently if any official included text in the local audit report indicating human error, the report was accepted as indicating inaccurate hand counting and implying accurate scanner counting. For example <a 26% difference in counting 50 votes. Or was it actually 64 votes?>

Last time, for the Nov 2010 audit report, we misunderstood and assumed incorrectly that the Secretary of the State’s Office conducted non-public ballot counting to investigate some of the differences. To avoid making that mistake again we asked for a description of the investigations. Peggy Reeves, Assistant to the Secretary of the State for Election, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, provided a prompt description to us:

In response to your inquiry, our office performed the additional investigations referenced in the UCONN report by phone call only and we did not visit any municipalities and did not count any additional ballots. Our office did not create a list of subject towns and as such, have no such list to provide you pursuant to your request. Our office identified subject municipalities by simply reviewing the audit returns submitted to our office and calling the municipalities in question to inquire as to the reason for the discrepancy. In our experience, we do concur with the statement that hand counting errors do create the reported discrepancies.

So, the investigations apparently consisted of calling some or perhaps all local officials and having them agree that they did not count accurately. No list of such towns was created, thus we are left to speculate, if some or all of the towns identified by UConn were contacted.

Unlike the official report, the Coalition actually observes the conduct of the majority of counting sessions of post-election audits and provides comprehensive observation reports on how the local audits are conducted. Also providing ever more extensive detailed data, copies of official local reports, and statistics derived from those local reports, providing the public and officials the opportunity to verify the details in our analysis of discrepancies.

We do agree with the UConn report and the SOTS Office that most differences can be attributed to human counting errors. Coalition reports show that the counting sessions are frequently not well organized, that proven counting methods are frequently not used, the official procedures are frequently not followed, in many cases, officials do not double check ballots and counts, and often that recounting is not performed when differences are found. Yet as we have said over and over:

We have no reason to question the integrity of any official. We have no evidence that our optical scanners have failed to count accurately. However, if every difference between a hand count and a scanner count is dismissed as a human counting error then if a machine has or were ever, by error or fraud, to count inaccurately, it would be unlikely to be recognized by the current system.

Given the above we see no reason to comment on the official statistical analysis of inaccurate data, adjusted without counting or credible investigation.

We will comment that Coalition observations indicate that officials do not understand the intended meaning of “questionable votes” and frequently tend to classify far too many votes as questionable. Votes, which should be expected to be, and normally are, read correctly by the optical scanners.

We do disagree with the Secretary of the State when she and her press release state:

“Connecticut has the toughest elections audit law in the country and I
am confident at the end of this year’s audit the numbers will once again match”…

The provisions in the law, developed in close cooperation with the computer science department at the University of Connecticut, give Connecticut one of the strictest audit statutes in the country…

The 10% audit does entail counting a relatively large percentage of ballots as, is necessary, in a fixed percentage audit in a relatively small state, yet the law is full of loopholes, and we would not characterize the statute nor its operation in practice as “strict”.

***************
Update 07/07/2012: Audit not Independent

We are reminded by a Courant correction today that this audit does not meet any reasonable definition of independent because:

The local counting is supervised by the individuals responsible for the local conduct of the election.
The University of Connecticut is contracted and dependent financially on the Secretary of the State, the Chief Elections Official.
The Secretary of the State also revises and dictates the date used in the report.

UConn paper warns of limitations of cryptography

Use of good tools must go hand-in-hand with good use of tools

We have just become aware of an excellent paper from the University of Connecticut (UConn): Integrity of Electronic Voting Systems: Fallacious Use of Cryptogrphy <read>

The report describes the limits of cryptography to protect the integrity of election equipment, our votes, and ultimately our democracy. They also provide a memorable phrase widely applicable beyond cryptography and elections:

Use of good tools must go hand-in-hand with good use of tools. In particular, severe security deficiencies have been reported in electronic voting terminals despite the use of cryptography. In this way, superficial uses of cryptography can lead to a false sense of security. Worse, cryptography can prevent meaningful independent technological audits of voting equipment when encryption obfuscates the auditable data. A vendor may provide its own test and audit tools, but relying on the self-test and self-audit features is problematic as one should never trust self-auditing software (cf. relying on a corporate entity to perform self-audit).

They the describe the challenges and limitations of using cryptography in general, the general vulnerabilities in the Diebold-Premier-Dominion AccuVote-TSx, and demonstrating two specific attacks:

we designed and tested two attacks against the AV-TSx terminal. In the first, the attacker wishes to swap votes received by two candidates. The attacker can be successful provided that the sizes of the two files that define the candidate representation in the digital slate are identical. We found that is not a rare occurrence and in fact our test election contained such pairs of candidates. The swapping was applied to the name definitions of the two candidates and included the integrity check. In the second attack, the attacker simply wishes to make one of the candidates disappear from the slate. This can be achieved though a modification of the file that defines the layout of the candidate’s name.

All our findings are based on straightforward experimentation with the voting terminal; we had no access to internal or proprietary information about the terminal or access to source code.

They point that systems are vulnerable because of their complexity:

Two observations are critical in this respect: (i) The safety and correctness of a large system is only as good as its weakest link. Additionally, a single failure — whether benign or malicious — can ripple through and affect the entire system. (ii) Procedural counter-measures can be used to mitigate the weaknesses of the system, however, in a large system relying on many distributed procedural elements, the probability of a procedure failure can be extremely high, even if each individual procedure fails with small probability.

They also provide examples of other measures which provide vulnerability

Cryptographic techniques can mitigate the risks of attacks against removable media cards. The level of protection depends upon the strength of the cryptographic techniques, upon the safekeeping of the digital keys used to protect the cards, but also upon the safe-keeping of the voting terminal themselves. Indeed, the firmware of the voting terminal necessarily holds a copy of the digital keys used to protect the removable media. A successful attack against the terminal compromises those keys that an attacker can use to produce forged, compromised removable media cards. This situation is analogous to one where a person always hides a physical key under the doormat – knowing where the key is hidden defeats the purpose of having a lock. The trust in the whole system depends on the vendor diligence in…

Once a card is programmed on EMS, it is shipped to the election officials to be inserted into the voting terminal where it stays for the duration of the election before being shipped back for aggregating the results (where central tabulation is used). The integrity of the card during the entire process is critical to the integrity of the election.

If the card can be tampered with while in transit to the precinct election officials, the entire system can be compromised. The election description can be made inconsistent with the paper ballot leading to an incorrect interpretation of the votes and therefore incorrect tallying.

Implications for Connecticut

Although we use the AccuVote-OS and this report is on the AccuVote-TSx many similar risks apply, even if the AccuVote-OS makes less use of cryptography. As the UConn report points out:

in 2005 H. Hursti released his findings on the Diebold OpticalScan system (the so-called “Hursti Hack”). This was an early design that used only a superficial password protection to secure the system. Newer designs normally incorporate some cryptographic tools; however, the application of the tools remains haphazard.

That is the same system in use today, everywhere in Connecticut.

Letter: Email, Fax Voting Provisions Mar Campaign Bill

Many citizens and legislators do not understand that email voting is a risky form of Internet voting and that fax voting presents equivalent risks. If the system worked as it should, there would have been public hearings and a chance to educate our senators and representatives.

Our letter opposing H.B. 5556 was published in the print edition of the Hartford Courant today, available online by searching letters <read>

Email, Fax Voting Provisions Mar Campaign Bill

Luther Weeks, Glastonbury
The writer is executive director of CTVotersCount.
on 2012-06-03

There are additional reasons Gov. Dannel P. Malloy should veto the campaign finance bill [June 3, editorial, “Veto This Bill”].

Without public hearings, provisions were added mandating email and fax voting for military and overseas voters. Each of our 169 town clerks must implement email voting in time for the August primary, with no standards for security, no provisions for informing intended voters, and no funding.

There have never been public hearings on email or fax voting in Connecticut. Last year, the legislature held hearings on online voting resulting in a symposium at CCSU broadcast by CT-N. Three leading computer scientists confirmed for legislators that Internet voting is unsafe. Email and fax voting are less secure than online voting. We all have the experience of lost emails and fake emails from our bank. Large corporations and the U.S. military have been unable to protect networks from outsider and insider attacks.

The bill asks military and overseas voters to sign away their right to a secret vote, recognizing that the system will at minimum expose their votes to officials in town hall. Yet, the purpose of a secret vote, guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution, is each voter’s right that no other voter’s vote can be bought or coerced. One voter cannot sign away the rights of every other voter.

That is about all that could be fit into the 200 word limit. Many citizens and legislators do not understand that email voting is a risky form of Internet voting and that fax voting presents equivalent risks. They do not understand the technical and administrative challenges of implementing the law in 169 small, medium, and large towns, some of which have asked for exemptions from maintaining web sites.

If the system worked as it should, there would have been public hearings and a chance to educate our senators and representatives.

Newspapers join CTVotersCount, ACLU, and CBIA in objections to H.B. 5556

CTVotersCount opposes H.B. 5556 and has urged Governor Malloy to veto the bill because it contains a provision for risky, unconstitutional email and fax voting.

CTVotersCount also opposes H.B. 5556 and has urged Governor Malloy to veto the bill because it contains a provision for risky, unconstitutional email and fax voting.

The underdefined provisions for military and overseas voters were added to an otherwise unrelated bill at the last minute by Senator Gayle Slossberg. Email and fax voting were never the subject of public hearings this year or ever by the General Assembly.

Not only are those voting mechanisms risky, we believe they are unconstitutional. They require individual voters to sign away their right to a secret vote, since email and fax votes cannot be made secret. However, we believe the secret vote guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution is every voter’s right that no individual voter’s vote can be associated with the individual, such that their vote could be coerced or intimidated. So an individual voter cannot sign away that right for all other voters.

The newspaper, ACLU, and CBIA have other concerns and constitutional objections. Here is an article from the Hartford Courant discussing those concerns: Newspapers Ask Malloy To Veto Bill <read>

Under the interpretation of the bill by the Connecticut Daily Newspapers Association, newspapers that sponsor a political debate would be required to calculate “the value of the debate — i.e., set-up, airtime, advertising, etc. — coupled with the broadcasting of such debate” as an “independent expenditure” that would need to be reported publicly under the recently approved campaign finance bill.

In addition, the newspaper association board would need to approve those expenses, and the board “would then be required to disclose the votes of individual board members and ‘pertinent information’ that took place during the discussion of the expenditure,” according to a letter to Malloy by Chris Van DeHoef, the association’s executive director.

“If CDNA should partner with a local television station to host and televise a debate and CDNA placed ads in its members’ papers, would those ads constitute an independent expenditure?” Van DeHoef asked in his letter. “Would the airtime be an independent expenditure?”