Senator not impressed by Science and Online Voting Symposium

[Senator] Kane was unable to attend the Oct. 27 panel discussion, but dismissed the warnings from computer scientists. We hope he at least took the time to review the videos of the symposium online.

On October 27th, the Secretary of the State held a Symposium on Online Voting with experts from around the country and the world. Not in attendance was the Senator who sponsored this year’s Online Voting bill, Senator Kane.  The Senator continues to dispute the arguments of the computer scientists. Today’s report from the Waterbury Republican-American: Online voting on minds of lawmakers – Secretary of the state scraps idea; cites security concerns<read>

We hope he at least took the time to review the videos of the symposium online.

Lawmakers came close to requiring that state election officials implement online voting this year, with an eye toward allowing military personnel overseas easier access to the ballot box.

A Watertown lawmaker plans to make a fresh attempt in the next regular session.

Computer scientists who took part in an Oct. 27 panel discussion organized by Secretary of the State Denise Merrill said, unanimously, such a system cannot possibly be secured…

Sen. Robert J. Kane, R-Watertown, said in a telephone interview Friday he remains a proponent to online voting, and plans to introduce new legislation that would require the state to open an electronic ballot box accessible over the Internet.

Kane was unable to attend the Oct. 27 panel discussion, but dismissed the warnings from computer scientists.

“We, as you know, transfer millions of dollars every day via the Internet, via the computer,” Kane said, referring to the use of online systems by banks and financial markets. “Just think about all the commerce that gets done. If we can do that, why can’t we allow our military personnel who are fighting for our country, serving oversees, the ability to vote online for the elections they are defending when they defend our country?”

Shvartsman said banks generally accept a 2 percent loss to online fraud, and there are other key differences between banking and voting systems.

Rivest said the most important difference is the fraud can be identified in a banking system, because there are statements and other records that can be used to verify transactions after the fact, and identify errors or malicious intrusions. That is not possible in a voting system designed to protect the secrecy of each individual’s vote.

As I said in the first comment on the article:

Sad that in the name of serving soldiers we risk the very democracy they serve to preserve.

Also overlooked in [Senator] Kane’s approach are many non-military overseas voters including: State Department staff, Volunteers serving in places such as Haiti or Darfur, Peace Corps volunteers, business people, oil rig employees, missionaries, and military contractors.

There is a much better, more cost effective solution with much lower risk. Provide military and overseas voters with ballots and absentee applications online that can be printed and mailed in a single envelope. The military even provides free express mail, and a special $25 rate is available in most countries for all overseas voters. This system has proven to be effective.

Hopefully, the legislators who attended the Symposium or view it online will understand science or trust the scientists.

Tuesday election is on. Your polling place may move.

The Secretary of the State and election officials have worked out some good ideas and strong cooperation to support the municipal elections on Tuesday.

The Secretary of the State and election officials have worked out some good ideas and strong cooperation to support the municipal elections on  Tuesday.  <press release>

Governor Extends Voter Registration Deadline via Executive Order

If the governor has such powers, perhaps in election emergencies, the governor could be called upon or even expected to do what the Secretary of the State cannot do – order polls to stay open late in an emergency, choose extra voting districts for audit, or order discrepancy recanvasses in districts with questionable results!

Example coverage from The Day <read>

Gov. Dannel P. Malloy has issued an executive order extending voter registration until noon on Monday, Nov. 7.

The original deadline was tonight at 8, but the change was made to accommodate voters who would have trouble getting to municipal offices because of the power outages and damage from the weekend storm, according to the Secretary of State’s office.

Residents can obtain voter registration forms at www.sots.ct.gov or by visiting town offices or the Division of Motor Vehicles.

Executive Order #12

If the governor has such powers, perhaps in election emergencies, the governor could be called upon or even expected to do what the Secretary of the State cannot do – order polls to stay open late in an emergency, choose extra voting districts for audit, or order discrepancy recanvasses in districts with questionable results! Se our earlier post: <Bysiewicz: Secretary of the State powerless to enforce election laws, count ballots>

Secretary of the State’s Online Voting Symposium

An excellent panel of experts on voting technology and the challenges of overseas voting. Credit is due to the panelists, the Secretary, and those who contributed behind the scenes in making this event possible. John Dankowski, of Connecticut Public Broadcasting did an exemplary job of moderating a very civil, thorough debate. If only typical panels and Legislative hearings could be more like this format, interactive, civil, and informative.

On October 27th, the Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill held an ‘Online Voting Symposium’ at Central Connecticut State University (CCSU) in New Britain. We were there with our amateur video. The Connecticut Television Network (CT-N) was also there. When CT-N videos become available we will also post them here.

Summary

This is was an exceptional panel of experts on voting technology and the challenges of overseas voting. Credit is due to the panelists, the Secretary, and those who contributed behind the scenes in making this event possible. John Dankowski, of Connecticut Public Broadcasting did an exemplary job of moderating a very civil, thorough debate. If only typical panels and Legislative hearings could be more like this format, interactive, civil, and informative.

On a rainy/snowy night with competing demands at the State Capitol, we were pleased that several Legislators attended. In total about eighty people attended with a good mixture of registrars of voters, town clerks, and advocates. We expect many more will watch our videos or the videos and replays on CT-N.

Secretary Tennant of West Virginia, a proponent of online voting, was outnumbered four to one by the other panelists. Dankowski provided her a fair opportunity to respond and challenge the other panelists.

The Panelists

Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat
President & Co-Founder of Overseas Vote Foundation
The Overseas Vote Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization established in 2005 that helps overseas and military voters participate in federal elections by providing public access to interactive web services. 4.75 million individuals visited OVF’s 17 voter services sites in 2008.

Natalie Tennant
West Virginia Secretary of State

In 2010, West Virginia launched a piloted an online voting initiative for military members and overseas citizens for the primary election. Tennant has testified before Congress on the success of the state’s pilot program and her office has recently issued a report detailing the ways in which voters benefitted.

Assistant Professor, University of Michigan
Halderman, a computer science professor, led a team from the University of Michigan to successfully penetrate and manipulate the internet voting system Washington D.C. planned to use for military and overseas voters for the general election in 2010
 
Ron Rivest
Professor, M.I.T.

Rivest is a cryptographer and a member of the Election Assistance Commission’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee.  In 2006 he published his invention of the ThreeBallot voting system, which incorporates the ability for the voter to discern that their vote was counted while still protecting their voter privacy.
 
Alex Shvartsman
Director of UConn Center for Voting Technology Research

The mission of the VoTeR center is to advise state agencies in the use of voting technologies and to investigate voting solutions and voting equipment to develop and recommend safe use procedures for their usage in elections.

Videos (may take a bit to load into post) (click video to go to page allowing larger views)

 

 

My Two Cents
The panel covered most issues surrounding online voting during close to one-hundred minutes. The time flew by, well focused, and engaging. There is always more that could be said, more details, and additional important points which could have been discussed. Here are some additional points that I would like to have seen raised or had more emphasis.
  • Voting challenges and solutions should not be limited to military voters. As a veteran I appreciate the service and the challenges to voting for soldiers. All overseas voters should have effective access to voting. Many face similar challenges, many deserve our thanks, while all should be able to have their votes counted. Consider some examples: Volunteers and NGO staff in Darfur and Hati; Business representatives in China, South America, and Africa; Oil rig workers; Merchant Marine; State Department employees; Military contractors; and Peace Corps volunteers.
  • Insider attacks are easier and more effective than external threats. Like most panels the focus was on outsider attack, yet the risk of a single insider is likely greater. An insider likely needs much less sophisticated means, has more opportunity, and ready means to attack, in less detectable ways.
    • The government believes, a singly Army Private could have accessed and stolen government documents from many agencies. Whether they have the correct suspect or not, they seem quite convinced that it is possible. Many election officials, government technologists, contractors, and vendor employees would have similar opportunities to compromise online voting systems.
    • Ironically, driving home I caught snippets of the rebroadcast of the day’s John Dankowski show, Where We Live. The subject was Art Theft. One of the main contentions was that almost all museum art theft is accomplished by unsophisticated insiders – typically low paid security guards with access, using unsophisticated means.
  • The possibility of error. Online voting systems could have errors which lose votes irretrievably or mis-classify them. Without the paper records votes can be lost or changed, with or without detection, yet without recourse.
  • The confusion of the possibility of  a ‘secure’ government network, with reality and what is on the table. Panelists discussed the possiblity of a non-public Intenet, a highly secure, government network for online voting, using highly secure computers and servers as well. Even though a perfect system is impossible, such a network would be much safer than systems using individual’s computers, the public Internet, or a regular government Internet – many of us might agree such a system was ‘good enough’.  Yet we should not confuse that possibility with what was actually the subject of the symposium, what is being actually proposed around the country, or what is reasonable:
    • Neither the Federal Government, Connecticut, or any state is actually seriously considering such a system. For starters it would be hugely expensive, require agreement to let the military handle all such voting for every jurisdiction, along with huge investments and operating expense on the part of the Federal Government and each election jurisdiction.
    • It would likely have to be a huge network with a huge number of locations and secure computers, separate from other Military networks, especially if it were used to serve all overseas voters.
    • Remember that anecdotal extreme cases of voting challenges include front line troops in Afghanistan, relief workers in the most challenging conditions, Peace Corps volunteers in remote villages etc. It is hard to imagine a secure, expensive, network reaching in all such environments. We cannot lose sight of realistic means to solve the real challenge we started out to address.
Other Coverage
The Hartford Courant <read>
New Britain Herald <read>
Connecticut Network (CT-N) <video>
Waterbury Republican and Senator Kane <read>

CLEARED: East Hampton: State Investigating Possible Misuse Of Absentee Ballots

Complaint Cited ‘Numerous Applications’ For Ballots By Engel Before Police Chief Referendum

Complaint dismissed, 3/27/2012, from the Hartford Courant:

The state Elections Enforcement Commission has dismissed a complaint against former Republican councilwoman Melissa H. Engel concerning the alleged misuse of absentee ballots for a referendum more than a year ago.

The March 21 decision by the commission concerned the fiercely fought November 2010 referendum in which Police Chief Matthew Reimondo won back his job.

Engel, a critic of Reimondo’s, had been accused of mishandling absentee ballots in the weeks preceding the referendum, according to a complaint filed with the commission last September by East Hampton Sgt. Garritt Kelly.

Kelly was investigating concerns raised by a citizen over Engel’s request for at least 11 absentee ballots for residents of a seasonal campground she owns known as Markham Meadows, according to the complaint.

At issue was whether Engel and Douglas Logan, a campground resident, could act as official designees of the residents for whom ballots had been sought. State election law requires that only family members or a health care provider can serve as an official voter designee.

The commission concluded that either Engel or Logan was related to the individuals for whom ballots had been requested and therefore met the larger definition of “family.”

The commission also looked at whether Engel had sent two residents, Richard and Donna Kelly, “unsolicited” absentee ballots, and concluded that the ballots had been requested.

“I’m not surprised by the decision,” Engel said Monday. “I knew that I had done nothing wrong and this confirms that.”

Engel decided not to seek re-election last November after serving six terms on the town council. The Chatham Party, which had backed Reimondo, won four out of seven seats on the council in November.

************

Hartford Courant: State Investigating Possible Misuse Of Absentee Ballots – Complaint Cited ‘Numerous Applications’ For Ballots By Engel Before Police Chief Referendum <read>

The state Elections Enforcement Commission confirmed Monday that it is investigating possible misuse of absentee ballots by Councilwoman Melissa H. Engel during last year’s referendum reinstating Police Chief Matthew Reimondo…

Engel on Monday denied any wrongdoing in the matter. “I’m not sure what the basis of the complaint is,” she said. “I think there is nothing here and, I think the SEEC will determine that.”

Kelly said that Reimondo asked him to look into the matter in April of this year after concerns were raised that Engel had sought “numerous applications” for absentee ballots, according to the affidavit. His complaint states that voting records in the town clerk’s office revealed that Engel made 11 separate applications for absentee ballots. The handwriting on many of these applications appeared to be Engel’s, Kelly stated.

The complaint further states that Town Clerk Sandra Wieleba “became suspicious” after learning that two of the applicants for absentee ballots, Donna Kelley and Richard Kelley, “apparently had not requested the applications” and had “received them unsolicited.”

If these allegations are proven true the voters of East Hampton should appreciate the integrity and vigilance of officials for noticing and pursuing the matter. How many times do things like this happen and go undiscovered or not pursued?

We believe that a good case can be made for Connecticut to require signatures of voters at the polls and compare signatures on submitted absentee ballot envelopes, as many states do. It may not provide detection before votes are counted,  but aid in post-election investigations and serve as a deterrent to skulduggery.

UConn Report: Batteries and officials failing faster than previously reported

  Most projects start out slowly, and then sort of taper off.
    – Augustine’s Law #XL

Most projects start out slowly, and then sort of taper off. – Augustine’s Law #XL

Last week, the University of Connecticut (UConn) released a report on memory card testing covering 2007 – 2010. The results from 2007 until pre-election testing for August 2010 had been previously published, we expected to see the 2010 results much sooner. <report>

From the Conclusion, our comments in brackets [ ]:

Correctness of Card Programming: The audits determined that 100% of the cards actually used in the election [and actually submitted to UConn for testing] showed correct programming in terms of both the election description data and the executable code on the cards. In the case of the pre-election cards, in all cases where small discrepancies in the election description data were discovered, these differences were due to the very late changes, such as candidate name changes, substitutions, and race changes.

Audit Coverage: The number of memory cards submitted for audits fell substantially in 2010. We understand that in some cases districts were advised to not submit cards for audit in an apparent effort to occlude the fact that memory cards were duplicated. It is recommended that the SOTS Office encourages the districts to always submit one out four cards for pre-election audit and all of their used cards for post-election audit. The number of cards examined by the audits needs to be substantially increased in future elections to provide a better statistical basis for the overall election landscape in Connecticut. Not only this will help ensure proper programming of the cards, but it will also help address the reliability problem of the memory cards…

This dramatic drop in card submission renders most of the other statistics in the report unreliable and questionable. As UConn states, officials may be avoiding sending in duplicated cards; they could be choosing to send in more “junk data” cards as they are useless in the election; or avoiding sending in “junk data” cards assuming. incorrectly, it would reflect badly on them . Without public drawings we have no indication that cards are selected randomly, or that officials actually understand that they should be. Without accurate data it is hardly worth reviewing and making decisions based on the statistical analysis of the partial data.

Memory cards submitted by officials to UConn (Out of about 800 districts and 3500 cards)

As we have noted in the past, because the cards are not actually and publicly randomly selected, in addition to making it impossible for the reported results to be statistically accurate, it also provids an easy loophole for errors and skulduggery to be covered-up.

An earlier UConn report indicated that the problem was old batteries and that replacing batteries regularly might solve the “junk data” problem. Apparently this is not always so, with some cards quickly draining the batteries:

Continuing with the Conclusions:

This data loss is most likely caused by the weak batteries on the cards (however, as of this writing it is not clear how long a fresh battery lasts in a memory card). We are continuing to examine this issue. Increasing audit coverage will enable us to obtain and evaluate more cards that failed in search for a solution. In particular, we know that some cards drain batteries much faster than most; when we identify such cards it is recommended that they are removed from circulation. Longer term solution may be to develop replacement cards that use non-volatile memory technology…

Memory Card Duplication: In recent elections more then 6% of the cards [selected and submitted by officials] were involved in duplication. We note that the only authorized entity to provide card programming for election in Connecticut is LHS Associates. There is no guarantee that cards duplication done by the districts correctly reproduces data and programming on the copy cards. Additionally, if duplicated cards are not submitted for audits it increases the risk of using incorrect cards in elections. It is recommended that the SOTS Office reinforces its policy that prohibits card duplication…

Adherence to Election Procedures: The technological audits established that the districts do not always adhere to the established pre-election procedures. Most notably, in recent elections over 6% of the memory cards are duplicated by the districts, a practice that is not permitted by the SOTS Office. Additionally, some districts do not prepare all of their cards for elections and/or prepare for elections by running elections instead of running test elections. It is recommended that the SOTS Office reiterates the importance of following the prescribed election procedures. Lastly, some districts send cards for pre-election audit before they test the cards, while other districts send cards after they test the cards. For the pre-election audit to be most effective, it is recommended that districts uniformly send cards after the cards are tested and prepared for elections.

Overall, we applaud the report and the work of the UConn Voter Center. We are disappointed in the data submitted by election officials and the lack of progress in effectively addressing memory card problems. We are sympathetic to officials for the problems bad memory cards cause, yet our sympathy ends when they do not play their part in providing cards needed for UConn to make detailed and accurate assessments. We note that the lack of cooperation happened in the Bysiewicz Administration. We hope that the Merrill Administration will elicit more cooperation and encourage production of more timely reports for both memory cards and post-election audits.

For memory card testing to be useful and reach the potential of the exemplary testing developed by UConn, the program needs to be well defined and mandatory, enforceable, and enforced. The program should be mandated by law and/or all memory cards required to be sent through UConn in both directions from and to registrars, never to and from LHS, the vendor responsible for programming the cards. Or as we have recommended, the cards should be programmed in Connecticut, co-located with an independent testing function using the UConn developed test.

Bridgeport: Early ballots bring victories, sometimes fraud

In Bridgeport, a hallmark of Democratic Party politics has been the aggressive use of absentee ballots — so aggressive, in fact, that more than a dozen consent decrees have been signed since 1988 with the State Elections Enforcement Commission stemming from allegations of wrongdoing by party operatives.

CTPost article: Absentees: Early ballots bring victories, sometimes fraud <read> The article discusses the pursuit of absentee votes in the recent primary, the history of absentee ballot fraud in Bridgeport, and the Secretary of the State’s comments for early voting in preference to absentee voting.

“Goal: 1,200 absentee applications,” read a sign hanging in Mayor Bill Finch’s campaign headquarters last month.

By the time polls opened at 6 a.m. on Sept. 27, that goal had been surpassed — more than 1,300 applications were turned in and nearly 900 ballots returned. Before the first paper ballot was marked, Finch already had a 420-vote lead over Democratic challenger Mary-Jane Foster on Primary Day, the fruits of a well-organized absentee ballot operation.

“We, the politicians, we will do whatever we can to get that vote,” said Lydia Martinez, an East Side city councilwoman who for years has led the most successful absentee ballot operations in the city. “You can give transportation to people. You can call people to ask if they got their absentee ballot. I do have a record of who votes by absentee every year. I’ve been doing this for 30 years. I know who the people are.”

In Bridgeport, a hallmark of Democratic Party politics has been the aggressive use of absentee ballots — so aggressive, in fact, that more than a dozen consent decrees have been signed since 1988 with the State Elections Enforcement Commission stemming from allegations of wrongdoing by party operatives.

Nearly all the cases involved a Democrat helping someone apply, vote or submit their absentee ballot.

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill said she’d like to make reforms that could prevent absentee voter fraud. She said the problems could be resolved if Connecticut took advantage of new technology. One area she is considering is keeping electronic copies of voter signatures on file so they could be compared to what appears on the ballot or application.

Additionally, she is proposing a constitutional amendment that would allow the state to explore methods of increasing voter turnout by such practices as early voting, thus eliminating reasons for voting by absentee ballot.

Connecticut is one of 15 states, including New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, that do not allow early voting and require valid reasons for voting by absentee ballot. Nearly 30 states allow voters to cast an absentee ballot without Connecticut’s required excuses of being out of town, working, disabled or sick on election day. In Oregon and Washington, voting is done entirely by mail.

“No system is going to be perfect,” Merrill said. “Think of how elaborate the process is now and you still get allegations of fraud.”

Too Many Registrars? Or Too Little Thought?

We agree that Connecticut would likely be better off with regional, civil-service, professional election administration. Such a change requires much thought and planning, just like the consolidation of Probate Court. That is not what the Courant is proposing. The Editorial Board also demonstrates a great lack of creativity suggesting that each registrar in Hartford must be paid $80,000 and have a deputy. As we have suggested before, three registrars could each be part time, paid less, and/or do the job with fewer deputies.

The history of voting in the United States is a series of knee-jerk reactions.  Punch cards and lever machines to prevent problems with paper ballot skulduggery; Costly, hackable touch screens replacing levers and punched cards after the 2000 debacle in Florida. Once again, the Hartford Courant is ready for immediate knee-jerk action.

Editorial, Three Hartford Registrars Is $200,000 Too Many – Odd law burdens Hartford with unnecessary costs <read>

Wouldn’t you know, Hartford’s three registrars of voters can’t get along and are squabbling among themselves. This is not new, but things have gotten so bad that Mayor Pedro Segarra has offered to serve as a mediator to resolve disagreements.

This problem could be permanently resolved if the legislature would get off its keister. The city shouldn’t have three registrars. It does because of a quirk in state election law.

The law says the candidates for registrar of voters who garner the highest and second-highest number of votes win the posts. But if a major-party candidate — Democrat or Republican — is not among the top two finishers, that candidate must also be named a registrar.

In 2008, Urania Petit petitioned her way onto the Hartford ballot as a registrar candidate for the Working Families Party, and then outpolled the Republican registrar, Salvatore Bramante. The result is that both of them, along with Democrat Olga Iris Vazquez, all became registrars. A registrar in Hartford makes $80,000 per year. Add costs for staff, benefits, computers, etc., and each registrar costs the city about $200,000.

This is too stupid for words. The city is in dire fiscal straits and it has to waste $200,000 on a completely unnecessary job. That spending could go toward parks or public works employees, police officers, reading consultants — or it could be eliminated to lower the budget. If Hartford is going to waste money, why not at least make it fun and drop it in small bills from a plane over the city?

The legislature needs to change the law in its next session. Hartford could do just fine with one professional, nonpartisan registrar. It certainly doesn’t need three

We agree that Connecticut would likely be better off with regional, civil-service, professional election administration.  Such a change requires much thought and planning, just like the consolidation of Probate Court. Actually changing election administration would require much more planning since it would involve not just consolidation, but a complete change in the system. Such a change would have to account for many changes  in the law, the Connecticut Constitution, new ways of oversight, integrity considerations, and a significant transition plan.

That is not what the Courant is proposing here. They want the Legislature to do something to change Hartford to a single appointed registrar. Who would do the appointing? Who would watch out for the interests of voters along with candidates and parties of opposing interests? Which cities would this apply to? Or would each small town need to somehow appoint a person to a very very part time job? How could qualified candidates be found and vetted?  What guarantee would there be of such candidates being available and actually being appointed?

The Editorial Board also demonstrates a great lack of creativity suggesting that each registrar in Hartford must be paid $80,000 and have a deputy. As we have suggested before, three registrars could each be part time, paid less, and/or do the job with fewer deputies.

Reference the recent issue in Hartford and our past editorials. <Hartford Registrars: Fighting Disrupts City Office> <Let us consider doing for Elections what we have done for Probate> <Downsizing Newspaper Recommends Downsizing Registrars>

Good, Timely News: Military Voting Jumped Last Year

Partially implemented MOVE Act resulting in more military voting and registering than the general populace!

As Connecticut considers risky, expensive online voting, we have urged fully exploiting and complying with the MOVE Act, posting applications and ballots online and allowing for single envelope express return of ballots. Now we have proof that conventional safe, economical solutions are working.

Washington Post Article <read>

Buoyed by a new law requiring states to make absentee ballots more accessible to military troops serving overseas, troops voted at a higher rate than the general population in last year’s midterm elections, according to a new report.

Overall, 46 percent of the military voted in the 2010 midterm elections, a 21 percentjump from the 2006 midterms and slightly higher than the 45.5 percent of the general population that cast ballots last year…populace

Voter registration last year among troops also was higher than the general public; 65 percent of Americans registered to vote in 2010, but 77 percent of troops registered.