CT | CTVotersCount.org

Bridgeport: Judge rules for primary challenge, delays primary two weeks

We agree that the Judge made the correct decision in this case. However we caution, this ruling should not be taken as a general precedent that candidates and election officials can make unlimited errors, without consequences. This is a case where the will of the petition signers is clear; the campaign complied with the law to the extent humanly possible; the campaign was not responsible for any failure to comply with the letter of the law; no harm to the public occurs from this decision and significant harm if the primary were denied. There will always a be need for common sense.

CTPost Article: Judge orders Mary-Jane Foster on Bridgeport mayoral primary ballot <read>

Some of the highlights from the article:

[Judge] Bellis found that the interplay of state and city statutes that Democratic Registrar of Voters Santa Ayala had relied on to deny Foster a ballot spot was confusing and ambiguous and that the Foster campaign had made every reasonable effort to follow the law…

“Given the facts of the present case it appears that the interests and the constitutional rights of the voters, candidates and political parties outweigh any interest the Legislature has in enacting laws which are meant to make the election process fair and orderly,” the judge wrote. “Denying candidates a place on the ballot for a primary after they have demonstrated that the required amount of electors were willing to sign a petition to endorse their candidacy does not further the expressed intent of the legislature and it risks violating the rights of political parties and candidates and disenfranchising voters in this case.”…

Bellis noted in her ruling that the confusion engendered by the state takeover had made the laws governing the nominating petition process even more confusing. And she said the record showed the Foster campaign had, on numerous occasions, sought clarity from Ayala’s office and from the state, only to be rebuffed or ignored.

The case pitted Foster’s campaign, represented by Alan Neigher, who urged the judge to ignore technicalities and listen to the will of the people. The registrar’s office was represented by Deputy City Attorney Arthur Laske III, who stuck by his interpretation of the law and the City Charter…

In a statement issued after the decision, Secretary of the State Denise Merrill said she was pleased with the judge’s decision. Merrill’s office had suggested to Ayala that her reading of the applicable statutes was correct.

“Democracy works best when voters have choices,” she said. “Those of us who administer elections at the local and state level must always remember that while each of us has statutory obligations, our most important goal is to make sure that voters can express themselves freely through the ballot. I am therefore pleased that Judge Bellis’ decision will provide Democratic voters in Bridgeport with a legitimate choice — even if it is two weeks later than other municipalities in Connecticut cast primary ballots.”

Opinion:

Yet to be decided, perhaps months or years in the future, the State Elections Enforcement Commission complaint against Democratic Registrar of Voters Santa Ayala.

See our earlier coverage <here> and <here>

Addendum: The court ruling

Elections Performance Task Force: Technology Fair and Doug Chapin

You can have little to no impact on your turn-out bottom line with election laws. Turnout tends to be driven by what’s on the ballot rather than when, where, or how it is available. – Doug Chapin

Elections Performance Task Force Coverage <prev>

Yesterday was the 2nd meeting of the Elections Performance Task Force. It was a technology fair along with a talk plus Q&A with Doug Chapin. <ct-n video>

The technology fair was well attended with perhaps two to three times as many people as the Task Force members. Several vendors demonstrated electronic poll books, with single vendors demonstrating on-demand printing, high speed scanners, the AutoMark for persons with disabilities, and the PCC Technology Group, Connecticut’s voter registration database vendor. I was pleased to hear about a new version of our voter registration system in use in four towns that should provide a solution to past performance problems. It also has a capability for updating election results from polling places on election night via iPad or SmartPhone – hopefully that capability will be implemented by the State to provide more detailed election results, downloadable by the public, as we have been calling for. Also we noted that a pilot test of one vendor’s electronic poll book system will be conducted in the city of Torrington.

Doug Chapin, Director of the Program for Excellence in Election Administration, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, provided insights to the Task Force covering issues related to technology and election administration, followed by a Q&A. His talk centered on the value and price of changing election administration, technology, and election laws. Some of his main points to the Task Force:

Extensive data is needed to determine the value of, and direction of election administration changes.
In this era of tight budgets, assume you will not get increases for election administration.
Measuring Return On Investment (ROI) is important. Understand both the value and cost of changes.
A trend in the near term is attention on voter registration, including accuracy and online registration. Most states that do online registration accomplish it in cooperation with another state agency, such as motor vehicles.
Early voting, no-excuse absentee voting, and voting centers are strong trends. They can provide voter convenience. They can save money or add to costs. Data does not support significant changes in participation.
Once you start early voting, taking it away can have an impact, once people are accustomed to it. (As taking away local polling place voting may also have a similar impact)
Survey voters to determine their levels of satisfaction and confidence in the process.
Do not expect increases in participation based on changes or reforms in election administration. Satisfaction and convenience can be increased but not participation.

Chapin did not cover integrity, security, and the potential for errors and fraud. I found his remarks on the limits of election administration to effect participation particularly valuable. Certainly election administration can impact participation, yet likely only marginally. More data is needed to assess the value of early voting, voting centers, and election day registration to support his contention in each case. Surveying voters is useful to improve convenience and service, yet has its limitations when it comes to confidence in our elections. In the near term we will have more to say on the relationship between integrity and confidence, along with why we need both for democracy to flourish <see here>.

You can have little to no impact on your turn-out bottom line with election laws. Turnout tends to be driven by what’s on the ballot rather than when, where, or how it is available. – Doug Chapin

I was particularly interested in the demonstrations of electronic poll books and their potential in Connecticut. To me, they represent a huge step forward in accuracy, providing value to voters, poll workers, election officials, and campaigns. However, I do not see significant savings to match the investment, maintenance, and operational costs. There are some savings, especially in the phone intensive coordination of registration transfers between polling places, involving multiple phone calls between headquarters and polling places. It will be interesting if the Torrington pilot demonstrates savings such that towns will be willing to foot the bill for the local hardware and software, while offering to pay their share to the state for interfacing our voter registration system to electronic poll books – I doubt it. Overall, I would favor a solid plan for electronic poll books, yet justified as a moderate cost investment based on the value of accuracy and convenience.

We do need better equipment, accommodations, and access for persons with disabilities – much better than our current costly, problematic, inconvenient IVS system. That deserves its own Task Force with election officials and representatives of persons with disabilities, along with extensive testing and cost benefit analysis.

The issue of ballots, ordering, costs, and on demand printing is complex. The Secretary mentioned that we do not have a good handle on ballot printing costs today. Costs vary from town to town and are based on the size and pages of ballots required. It is also based on the number of ballot styles and voters per ballot style. On-demand printing provides another option, yet the devil is in the details. How would on-demand be deployed? How many printers? Costs for programming ballot styles? Transportation costs, presuming printers are not in each polling place? Contingency plans for power failures, traffic accidents etc. The only valid analysis would be to compare complete proposed systems comparing all costs and benefits. Our estimate is that there is a potential to save a little, provide additional value, yet also a potential to spend a lot with little benefit. We should proceed with caution and skepticism.

The next meeting is scheduled for September 19th, 1:00pm – 3:00pm. The Task Force will hear from one of its members, Heather Gerken, Yale University School of Law.

Update: For another take, read this CTNewsJunkie.org article. Best of all watch the video yourself: <ct-n video>

Letter: Feedback after first meeting of the Election Performance Task Force

Having reviewed the video, minutes, and the proposed items to be addressed by the task force, we offer the attached general and specific comments and suggestions in a constructive spirit, to forward your efforts to achieve the democratic goals that we all hold dear.

Elections Performance Task Force Coverage <next> <prev>

Today we provide our initial feedback to Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill’s Election Process Task Force with a cover letter and several pages of suggestions. <read>

As we said in the cover letter:

Having reviewed the video, minutes, and the proposed items to be addressed by the task force, we offer the attached general and specific comments and suggestions in a constructive spirit, to forward your efforts to achieve the democratic goals that we all hold dear.

We especially applaud the open and transparent publication of announcements and information on the Secretary of the State’s web site…

CTVotersCount intends to comment further as the Task Force and our research progress. We invite the Task Force and individual members to request further details, clarifications, or to provide criticism of our suggestions at any time.

Information, video replays, transcripts, agenda’s, and the schedule of meetings can be found at the Secretary of the State’s web site <here>

Election Performance Task Force

The Election Performance Task Force has been convened by the Secretary of the State to review and evaluate our election system in order to ensure that elections in Connecticut are fair, accountable, efficient, cost-effective, and work to encourage broad-based voter participation.

We will:

– Examine Connecticut’s current electoral system. What is working well? What are its weak points?

– Identify measures that will increase efficiency and effectiveness of the voting process while maintaining its security and integrity.

– Provide future direction for our electoral process: given demographic and other trends, what should our system look like in five years? In ten years?

– Evaluate ways to integrate technology into our election systems. What is in use elsewhere? What offers the greatest value-added to election administrators? To voters’ experience?

– Find ways to increase voter participation among ethnic minority groups and young people. Are there policies in place elsewhere that are working to achieve this goal?

The public is encouraged to submit feedback and ideas to the task force via email to electionperformancetaskforce@ct.gov.

Update: In an interview with the Examiner, after the 1st Task Force meeting, the Secretary described her goals for the Task Force, her concerns with the operation of the current system, and the difficulty of changing it when the weaknesses are not apparent: <read>

Examiner: What will you be doing between now and the next General Assembly session?

Between now and January

Denise: I’ve already launched two task forces. One is on election performance. I want to follow up on some of the problems we identified. We’ve taken some steps to standardize things but I think there’s a lot more we could do. We met this morning and we’re going to look at new technologies in voting, early voting, online voting, online voter registration, and all these kinds of things that would be improvements to our system. That will probably continue for about six months and we’ll probably have some legislative initiatives next session on that. And the other group I’ve convened is called the “Civics Health Index.” I’m very interested in what I’m calling a crisis in civic engagement. I think a lot of people are very concerned about the state of our civic institutions of all kinds. Where are the next generation of voters going to come from? So how do we get young people involved? How do we keep our democracy healthy? A very interesting group has convened around this issue. They will issue a report and have some recommendations on some action to take. We’ve got about 40 people on this group. We’ve gotten some terrific feedback. We’ve really tapped in to something people are very concerned about. The power of politics, the lack of voter participation and civic engagement of all kinds is really bothering people so I hope we can start a really positive conversation on that.

…

Examiner: Do you think that your predecessor [former Connecticut Secretary of the State and now U.S. Senate candidate Sue Bysiewicz]—some of these changes might have been made in times past—do you think you took over an office that was in good shape as far as the elections process?

Denise: I think that elections are a funny area of the law. When everything is going right nobody notices it at all. Its only when things go wrong that it gets attention and I’m not sure anybody could have anticipated this. I’m not sure, given how much trouble I’ve had even, getting some of this through the legislature, imagine trying that if there hasn’t been a problem. I’m not sure if anyone would have listened. It’s difficult. Local registrars and local officials jealously guard their powers and this was not easy to make them understand. I would like to see us reform our entire election system, frankly. I don’t think there’s enough accountability in the system. And I think some of those weaknesses showed.

Update: 09/14/2011: Today our report was sent from the Secretary of the State’s Office to the Taskforce members.

CLARIFICATION: Official Post-Election Audit Report

We were surprised and pleased to open the following letter from Deputy Secretary of the State, James Spallone, clarifying/correcting some of the impressions left by the report. We appreciate the clarification.

We remain concerned when the differences between machine counts and hand counts reported by several registrars of voters. We also continue to be concerned, that such differences are attributed to hand counting errors, without investigation.
ADDENDUM ADDED.

Editor’s Note: CTVotersCount welcomes responsible contrary opinions. Even more so, we appreciate factual corrections to information published here.

Last month we posted and criticized the Official Post-Election Audit Report for the November 2010 election, created by the University of Connecticut. We said the audit was “Flawed by lack of transparency, incomplete data, and assumed accuracy”. Upon returning from California we were surprised and pleased to open the following letter from Deputy Secretary of the State, James Spallone, clarifying/correcting some of the impressions left by the report.

Based on the clarifications we now understand that we were under the misimpression that the Secretary of the State’s Office had conduced unannounced, non-transparent recounts of some of the data originally reported by registrars of voters. According to Mr. Spallone such counts did not occur. Secret counts would not be illegal, yet would tend to reduce public confidence in the integrity of the audits and in our democracy. On the other hand, not conducting investigations of significant differences does not inspire confidence or lead to integrity.

We remain concerned with the differences between machine counts and hand counts reported by several registrars of voters. We also continue to be concerned, that such differences are attributed to hand counting errors, without investigation. As we have said in the past “if all differences are attributed to hand counting errors, then if there ever were a machine error or fraud it would not be recognized by the audit”.

We appreciate the clarification and will continue to encourage the investigation of significant differences, announced, and subject to public observation, along with improved auditing procedures, training of officials, and improvements in the audit law without increasing costs.

The audit remains, in our opinion, “Flawed by lack of investigation, incomplete data, and assumed accuracy”.

Addendum:

Perhaps a small yet critical point, we interpret the situation differently. The Deputy Secretary says: “Information gathering and follow-up, however, is not part of the official audit process.” It may not be part of the unenforceable ‘process’ developed by the Secretary of the State’s Office, but we interpret it legally as part of the Audit. The audit law requires the report from UConn, so anything that contributes to the report would, in our opinion, be part of the audit. For instance, past investigations included in the report, and in this case discussions between the SOTS Office and registrars or UConn leading to the dropping of some data from the report etc.

Susan Bysiewicz, former Secretary of the State, claimed that the audit was ‘Independent’ because UConn completed the audit report, rather than her office. We agree with her that the report (and obviously therefore anything included in it) is part of the audit. We disagree that UConn is ‘independent’ legally since their budget for elections depends on the Secretary of the State, and is not ‘independent’ in practice since the Secretary’s Office reviews and contributes interpretations to the report.

Once again, the law does not require investigations to be public – the issue is that transparency would be one of the requirements for credibility of the report and trust in democracy.

EVT/WOTE: When is the CT Recanvass law totally inadequate?

To be reasonably sure that the correct candidate is officially designated as the winner in a race with a write-in candidate, it would be prudent to assume the possibility of a 25% undercount of write-in votes. Then require a recount of all write-in votes in a race where the write-in candidate received at least 42% of the votes in a two candidate race (or 42% of the votes necessary to win in a more than two candidate race.)

Editor’s Note: August 8th and 9th, we attended the EVT/WOTE (Electronic Voting Technology / Workshop On Trustworthy Elections) in San Francisco. Over the next few days we will be highlighting several papers and talks from the conference.

We have criticized Connecticut’s recanvass law as inadequate in very close elections, where the result may depend on accurate adjudication of a handful or less of votes where voters’ intent may be critical and subject to interpretation.

In a paper delivered yesterday, An Analysis of Write-in Marks on Optical Scan Ballots, researchers analyzed 100,000 ballots for write-in votes that might not have been counted correctly. They concluded in that one sample, from one election, in one jurisdiction that 16% of write-in votes were not counted by the Diebold/ES&S/Dominion-AccuVoteOS scanners. This means, according to my math, that if a write-in candidate in a two candidate race received 46% of the vote as counted by the scanner, it is quite likely that a rigorous hand count would show that candidate as the actual winner – reversing the election night apparent result.

This is not a problem with the scanners as designed. It is a problem with voters misunderstanding the write-in process. None the less, in most states, like Connecticut, the voters’ intent should and does legally rule.

More research would be needed in more elections and on more ballot formats to determine the range of possible error in scanner counting of write-in ballots. The range might be 10% to 25% undercounted write-in votes depending on conditions. Connecticut uses those same AccuVote-OS scanners, yet a different ballot format. Our rate of undercounting could be higher or lower. In a race that was expected to be close with many write-in ballots a candidate might provide better voter education or bring out many inexperienced voters – once again, the undercount rate could vary either way.

Pending further research: To be reasonably sure that the correct candidate is officially designated as the winner in a race with a write-in candidate, it would be prudent to assume the possibility of a 25% undercount of write-in votes. Then require a recount of all write-in votes in a race where an apparently losing write-in candidate received at least 42% of the votes in a two candidate race (or 42% of the votes necessary to win in a more than two candidate race.)

Secretary of the State convenes “Elections Performance Task Force”

We note an emphasis on voter convenience and making “life easier for our local officials”. These are laudable goals, however, these should be balanced with an equal emphasis on voting integrity, transparency, and “counting every vote”, providing voters with justified confidence in the system. We wish the task force well and hope that all relevant goals will be considered. While the task force plans to “look at new, innovative technologies” it includes no experts on technology or security.

Elections Performance Task Force Coverage <next>

Press Release:

For Immediate Release: For more information:
July 20, 2011 James Spallone: (860) 509-6212
Press Release-

Merrill Convenes Election Performance Task Force
Group to Recommend Improvements to State’s Election System

Hartford: Secretary of the State Denise Merrill today convened an Election Performance Task Force to review Connecticut’s election system and recommend improvements.

“The mission of this task force is to review our current election system, evaluate its effectiveness and recommend changes to improve and modernize the system,” says Merrill, Connecticut’s top elections official. “We need to look at our system from the perspective of the average voter. For example, is there a way to improve their experience at the polls? Do voters want more convenience? We also plan to look at new, innovative technologies that could make life easier for our local officials.”

“We need to imagine what the voting experience can be like five or ten years from now if we make the right decisions today,” Merrill said.

The task force began its work with a discussion of baseline data on voter registration and turnout rates, as well as a review of Connecticut’s current elections system. The review covered the roles of registrars of voters, town clerks, the Office of the Secretary of the State and the State Elections Enforcement Commission in Connecticut’s decentralized elections system. Merrill asked the group to consider a number of questions including: Why do certain individuals choose not to vote? Why are there turnout disparities among various populations? Are there barriers to registration and voting that discourage people? What is working in other states to improve participation and why?

Merrill said the group will study potential reforms including online voter registration, Election Day or “same day” registration, absentee ballot reform, mail-in voting, regional voting centers and changes designed to bring more consistency to the system across town and city lines.

At its next meeting, the task force will view demonstrations of new voting and elections administration technology.

All task force meetings will be open to the public and may be viewed on CT-N. The Office of the Secretary of the State will be posting information about the task force on its web site at www.ct.gov/sots<http://www.ct.gov/sots>.

MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE’S ELECTION PERFORMANCE TASK FORCE

* Denise Merrill, Secretary of the State

* James F. Spallone, Deputy Secretary of the State

* Tony Esposito, President of the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut and Registrar of Voters, Hamden

* Judi Beaudreau, Registrar of Voters, Vernon

* Urania Petit, Registrar of Voters, Hartford

* Therese Pac, Town Clerk, Bristol

* Lisa Valenti, Town Clerk, North Branford

* Kachina Walsh-Weaver, Connecticut Conference of Municipalities

* Brian Sear, First Selectman, town of Canterbury

* Cheri Quickmire, Common Cause

* Carol Young-Kleinfeld, Connecticut League of Women Voters

* Shannon Clark Kief, State Elections Enforcement Commission

* Kevin Ahern, State Elections Enforcement Commission (alternate)

* Steve Carbo, Demos

* Professor Heather Gerken, Yale Law School

* Professor Bilal Sekou, University of Hartford

* John Murphy, Coventry

* Attorney Richard Bieder

We appreciate that that these issues deserve full exploration and discussion. Especially considering the implications of Connecticut’s “decentralized elections system”. We note an emphasis on voter convenience and making “life easier for our local officials”. These are laudable goals, however, these should be balanced with an equal emphasis on voting integrity, transparency, and “counting every vote”, providing voters with justified confidence in the system. We wish the task force well and hope that all relevant goals will be considered.

While the task force plans to “look at new, innovative technologies” it includes no experts on technology or security.

Audit Report: Flawed by lack of transparency, incomplete data, and assumed accuracy

Lack of transparency in the process, provides no basis for public confidence in the process, in the audit, and ultimately in our election system. The purpose of the audit is to determine the accuracy of the optical scanners, that purpose is negated when the accuracy is assumed. A statistical calculation based on randomly selected data, omitting some of that data not randomly chosen for omission, is invalid.

Update 8/12: We have received a clarification of the official report from the Deputy Secretary of the State, which modifies our opinion <read>

******************

Last week, the University of Connecticut released its official post-election audit report on the November 2010 election, just short of seven months after the election: Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data, 2010 November Election <read>

Like previous reports, this official report fails to provide confidence in the post-election audit process and in the accuracy of the election itself.

The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 867 records. Among the 867 records received by the Center, 20 records (2.3%) were incomplete. This report deals with 847 records (97.7%) among which 799 records (94.3%) are from the original data and 48 records (5.7%) were revised based on the follow up conducted by the SOTS [Secretary of the State’s] office.

As demonstrated by the Coalition audit reports there are major shortcomings in the post-election audit process where official hand counts do not match optical scanner counts and incomplete reports are submitted. Based on the UConn report, these differences are addressed in three inadequate ways:

1) Some results are recounted by state officials outside of public view:

The VoTeR Center’s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unexplained differences between hand and machine counts. The vast majority of records with high discrepancies were concentrated in the following three districts: East Haven (Deer Run School) with the highest reported discrepancy of 180, Hartford (Burns School) with the highest reported discrepancy of 170, and Preston (Town Hall) with the highest reported discrepancy of 55. Additionally, one or more discrepancies were reported in all but one district for the town of Orange; here the highest reported discrepancy was 14, however this could not be explained as no questionable ballots were reported. Following this initial review the SOTS Office performed additional information gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand-counting of ballots in the four districts mentioned above. The final information was conveyed to the VoTeR Center on June 17th of 2011 for the 48 records pertaining to those districts. The rest of the records (799 out of 847) discussed in this audit report are the original records reported by the towns. [Emphasis ours in all quotes]

We interpret this to mean that some of the counts with differences were recounted by state officials behind closed doors. And based on those counts the Secretary of the State’s Office assumed that all the counts in those districts with differences were hand counting errors. Further, assuming that when election officials make an error in counting in one case in a district and that the machine was accurate in that case, then in all cases where there were differences in those districts that the machine did not make errors.

For the last couple of years we have repeatedly, to no avail, requested that recounts of ballots for the audit be announced and open to public observation or at least the Coalition be notified and given the opportunity to observe. Lack of transparency in the process, provides no basis for public confidence in the process, in the audit, and ultimately in our election system.

As a service to the public, the Coalition provides transparent access to the official audit count reports. You can see scanned copies of the original reports from the towns mentioned <here>

2) Other differences were not recounted but “affirmed” to be hand count errors:

187 records (22.1%) showing discrepancy of 2 to 5 votes, 42 records (4.9%) showing discrepancy of 6 to 13 votes (for this group, although no manual review of the discrepancies was conducted, the SOTS Office affirmed that the discrepancies were due to hand counting errors),

We interpret this to mean that the Secretary of the State’s Office has such faith in the accuracy of our optical scanners and the election process that they assume that any differences must be caused by hand counting errors. The purpose of the audit is to determine the accuracy of the optical scanners, that purpose is negated when the accuracy is assumed.

3) Some audit reports contained incomplete data and such data was not included in the report:

The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 867 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots. This report contains several statistical analyses of the audit returns and recommendations. The statistical analysis in this report deals with the 847 records that are sufficiently complete to perform the analysis.

We interpret this to mean an assumption that the legally mandated audit of three races in a randomly selected 10% of districts is valid even if some of the results are not reported. A statistical calculation based on randomly selected data, omitting some of that data not randomly chosen for omission, is invalid.

Spelling out our concerns, as we said last year, after the November 2009 official UConn report:

All counting and review of ballots should be transparent and open to public observation. Both this year and last year we have asked that such counting be open and publicly announced in advance. [And again in 2011 to the new administration]
Simply accepting the word of election officials that they counted inaccurately is hardly reliable, scientific, or likely to instill trust in the integrity of elections. How do we know how accurate the machines are without a complete audit, any error or fraud would likely result in a count difference, and would be [or could have been] very likely dismissed.
Even if, in every cases officials are correct that they did not count accurately, it cannot be assumed that the associated machines counted accurately.
Simply ignoring the initial results in the analysis of the data provides a simple formula to cover-up, or not recognize error and fraud in the future.

As we have said before we do not question the integrity of any individual, yet closed counting of ballots leaves an opening for fraud and error to go undetected and defeats the purpose and integrity of the audit.

We also note that in several cases officials continued to fail perform the audit as required by law or to provide incomplete reports.

There are other flaws in the audit law.

For instance, there is no legally mandated deadline for the towns to submit audit reports to the Secretary of the State’s Office or for UConn to provide the analysis. We believe seven months after an election is a long time for the public and candidates to wait.
As the Coalition covered in our August 2010 Post-Election Audit Report and the November 2010 Post-Election Audit Report, the list of districts used in the random district drawing is inaccurate and challenging to verify. This also negates reliability, accuracy, and confidence in the random audit.
The November 2010 election, most glaringly pointed out the need for the audit to select from all ballots in the election, not just those counted by optical scanners in the polling place. Among the omitted are centrally counted optically scanned ballots and all originally hand counted ballots. The Coalition Bridgeport Recount Report demonstrated to the public that hand counted ballots can be counted inaccurately on election night. The official election system was not able to audit or recanvass those ballots and has never officially, as far as we know, recognized even the possibility the original hand counted, hand transcribed, and hand totaled numbers may be inaccurate.

As we have pointed out, over and over:

We have no reason to question the integrity of any official. We have no evidence that our optical scanners have failed to count accurately. However, if every difference between a hand count and a scanner count is dismissed as a human counting error then if a machine has or were ever, by error or fraud, to count inaccurately, it would be unlikely to be recognized by the current system.

People and scanners have and will make counting errors. The solution is transparent counting, multiple times to insure accuracy, along with credibly ballot security.

Let us consider doing for Elections what we have done for Probate

The legislature should be considering doing for our elections what we have done for probate. I am not the 1st to suggest this, let us hope that our legislature is not the last to consider it.

CTMirror: A turnaround for the fiscally troubled probate courts <read>

We particularly note from the article:

On the heels of a major consolidation, Connecticut’s probate court system will end a year in the black for the first time in six fiscal years later this month, reducing its reliance on the General Fund and returning more than $5 million to the state’s coffers…

One of the oldest probate courts systems in the nation with roots dating back over 300 years, the Connecticut courts underwent a dramatic restructuring in January to reverse growing financial woes…

“The first point of the whole reorganization was to stem the hemorrhaging once we abandoned the idea that the courts could pay entirely for themselves,” said Rep. Robert Godfrey, D-Danbury, who spearheaded the reform effort that took two years to move through the legislature. “The fact that it happened was a miracle.”

As we said in 2nd comment on the CTNewsJunkie article:

The legislature should be considering doing for our elections what we have done for probate. We have 169 towns, each with at least two elected registrars of voters. Consolidation, if done appropriately, could yield decreased costs, increased professionalism, increased convenience, increased integrity, and confidence.

I am not the 1st to suggest this, lets hope that our legislature is not the last to consider it.

There are several ways this could be accomplished. Regionalization of dual elected registrars is one. Another way, which I would favor, would be regional professional, civil service, directors responsible for voting, perhaps with local registrars elected and paid a small stipend to watch out for the integrity interests of municipalities, voters, and parties. No matter how it is strutured it can be done well or poorly. The current system is inefficient and has proven problematic both in small towns and in large cities.

Some Question Integrity Of Union Vote

There seems to be several issues. First, does the overall process and accounting for approval correspond to predetermined bylaws and rules? Second, will the election itself be free from manipulation? And Third, is it sufficiently transparent to generate confidence in the losing side that they actually lost?

CTNewsJunkie: Union Voting Begins, Integrity of Vote Called Into Question By Some <read>

Union leaders are optimistic the labor agreement reached with Gov. Dannel P. Malloy’s administration will be ratified despite vocal opponents questioning the integrity of the voting process…

But there is some distrust among members regarding the process and a strong opposition movement encouraging members to vote against the agreement. Several union members have also emailed CTNewsJunkie with questions regarding how the vote will be counted, how that 80 percent will be calculated and what sort of oversight the process will have…

One member said he could not locate language in the union’s bylaws requiring the 80 percent vote or specifying how it is calculated. However, section 10 of SEBAC’s bylaws state the agreement requires a “four-fifths majority of representatives in good standing and not more than one bargaining agent voting in opposition.”
[State Employee Bargaining Agent Coalition spokesman Matt] O’Connor likened the process to the presidential Electoral College. Unions vary in the size of their membership, and their votes are weighted depending on that size, he said…

But one member said that system lends itself to rigging and dropping a piece of paper into a cardboard box gives few members confidence.

“This is outrageous and is not logical, unless you’re attempting to fix the vote to pass the most difficult aspect. The correct way is to let all votes stand as they have been cast, report those for and against numbers to SEBAC and combine all the yays and nays and arrive at a true membership percentage,” he wrote…

Members have also expressed concern over how the voting process will be monitored and whether or not an impartial third party would have oversight of it. O’Connor said the process is as transparent as possible but pointed out that the specifics of how votes are cast are really up to each individual union. Much like how each state in the nation decides its own voting process, each element of the coalition sets its own rules…

Members looking for specifics about the process can find them spelled out in their union’s individual constitution, he said.

Will there be a third party overseeing the votes of each union and their subsequent bargaining units?

“We’re not inviting the Carter Center in if that’s what you’re asking,” O’Connor joked.

If the sketchy details are consistent with the voting system, then we suspect that the voting process may not be transparent enough to generate that confidence. Voting with slips of paper in a box is fine if the vote takes place all at once and the ballots are publicly counted immediately thereafter. There seem to be two problems with the system described – the ballots need to be counted immediately and publicly after the box is opened, and the box must be on public display and actually observed by opposing interests the whole time.

Connecticut’s alternative for our elections is ballots publicly inserted into optical scanners then a result tape immediately produced and displayed publicly – followed by a post-election audit. This could work for the unions except that if there are multi-day elections the issue arises of security of the ballots and scanners between voting times. (Unfortunately, in the case of Connecticut elections ballot security and chain of custody between election day and the audit is insufficient to provide confidence.)

Flip-Flopping has its place, but not in voting

Reading and listening to the media we are led to believe that flip-flopping is the worst possible political sin. Wrong. Much of the time we spend writing, voice-mailing, or speaking with legislators is working to convince them to understand a more complete picture; to change their positions on issues.

Brad Friedman covers the case of a voting machine flip-flopping in Los Vegas and the history of flip-flopping and completely missing votes: Las Vegas Mayoral Candidate Sees Own Vote Flipped to Opponent on Touch-screen Voting Machine <read>

It took two tries, but Carolyn Goodman, candidate for Mayor of Las Vegas, and wife of current Mayor Oscar Goodman, was finally able to vote for herself today on Nevada’s illegally-certified, 100% unverifiable Sequoia AVC Edge touch-screen voting machines. At least she thinks she did. Whether her vote will actually be counted for her is something that nobody can ever know…

The failure that Goodman had, and noticed, is just the latest in a string of celebs and candidates who have had similar problems with 100% unverifiable voting machines — as still used by some 20 to 30% of voters in the U.S. — either flipping their vote, or not allowing them to vote at all…
[Randy] Wooten was running for mayor in the rural Poinsett County town with a population of just 80 people that year, when he learned, after the close of polls on Election Night, that he had received a grand total of ZERO votes, as reported by the county’s ES&S iVotronic touch-screen voting systems.

As AP noted at the time Wooten said, “I had at least eight or nine people who said they voted for me, so something is wrong with this picture.” Among those people who Wooten believed had voted for him: himself and his wife.

In Praise Of Flip-Flopping

In 2005, Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, publicly tested and was about to choose unverifiable touch screen (DRE) voting machines similar to those in Los Vegas – then she looked at the evidence, considered additional information from vocal advocates, and flip-flopped. That is why we have voter verifiable paper ballots and optical scanners in Connecticut, with a side benefit of saving about half the cost of DREs.