Category: Chain of Custody

Two Reminders: Transparency and the Limits of All Paper Elections

This week we have had two demonstrations of themes we have discussed in theory at CTVotersCount.
From Connecticut, the importance of transparency.
From abroad the limits of paper only elections.

This week we have had two demonstrations of themes we have discussed in theory at CTVotersCount.

First from Connecticut, amid the sad tale of our past Governor, heading once again for food and shelter at the expense of the public: Jury Finds Rowland Guilty On All 7 Counts; Attorney Vows Appeal <read>

A reminder from the prosecutor:

Prosecutors called the verdict a victory for transparency and the electoral process. The jury agreed that Rowland conspired to do work on two Republican congressional campaigns and had pitched a scheme to keep his pay hidden from federal election regulators.

“It ought to be — no it has to be — that voters know that what they see is what they get. In this case, the defendant and others didn’t want that to happen,” Michael J. Gustafson, Criminal Division Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, told reporters.

We would add that transparency is insufficient. Somebody, like the public, has to use the transparency. And occasionally the system needs to assist in assuring transparency.  As we have pointed out in theory: <Vote Audit Observe> <Public Transparency and Observability>

Second a reminder from Scotland, pointing to some of the same risks and the insufficiency of paper only counting. As we have discussed in theory:
Common Sense: Paper Ballots are Insufficient for Voting Integrity <read>

Take a look at this video alleging irregularities in the Scottish Independence vote:

We cannot vouch for the accuracy and know the actual implications of the allegations in the video. Perhaps some of the footage is rigged. Perhaps the incorrectly classified ballots and stacks were double checked and corrected. Yet the video reminds us of several theoretical questions and issues with paper only counting and elections:

  • It would be much more credible and provide higher confidence to have a machine publicly count and print results then followed by solid ballot custody and an audit or recount. To accomplish fraud or cover error then would be much harder, since the numbers have to at least come close to matching when machines are rigged ahead of time, and ballots must be changed in a corresponding way.
  • Paper counting demands double checking by multiple individuals, observed by opposing interests.
  • In addition, central counting of paper ballots requires strong ballot security from the polling place ballot box to the counting place.

In Connecticut we are fortunate to have paper ballots, recanvasses, and post-election audits. Unfortunately, we also have very weak, vulnerable ballot security, and a post-election audit that is weal in many regards, and far from adequately executed.

Education “Reform” provides lessons for voting integrity

? What is more important to you? Democracy or the Education of our children?

Answer: <click>

? What is more important to you? Democracy or the Education of our children?

Answer: This is a trick question. Without an educated populace, we cannot have Democracy. Without Democracy we won’t have true, objective education.

Connecticut is engaged in “High Stakes Education Reform” at risk is a bit of our treasury and the entire future of our children and our Democracy. At the heart of choosing and succeeding is “High Stakes Testing”. At a minimum, if we cannot trust the tests, cannot trust the new or traditional educators, then all is lost.

A significant analogy for Elections and Education 

  • If we cannot trust election results or cannot trust election officials then all is lost.
  • In Connecticut election integrity is based on Paper Ballots
  • And Education Integrity is based on Paper Tests
  • Change the paper and you have changed the result
  • Both are dependent on the chain-of-custody

Yet,

  • Elections are a safer in Connecticut because of optical scanners – because the voted ballots are scanned in the view of officials from at least two parties, before they are stored.
  • Trust in Elections and Education will not be improved by computer voting or testing

A lesson for Elections from Education

Connecticut is in the midst of an eduction and education testing scandal, as summarized by the Hartford Courant <read>

Things appeared to be looking up at Betances. In 2011, only 19 percent of third-graders at the pre-K-to-3 school achieved the state’s reading goal, but in 2012, the number shot up to 74 percent, by far the most dramatic improvement by any Hartford school. Bonuses of up to $2,500 were awarded to teachers; school Principal Immacula Didier received a $10,000 bonus from the district, The Courant reported.

It wasn’t the jump in the scores that attracted the attention of state officials to this year’s reading test, it was a safeguard put into place because of a test-tampering incident at a Waterbury school in 2011. After that, the State Department of Education began checking the frequency and type of erasures on tests. This year’s survey flagged Betances with an abnormally high number of rubbed out and changed answers on the third-grade reading mastery test. Twenty-seven of 42 test booklets were over the norm for erasures, or about 64 percent. The next highest number in Hartford was 15 percent.

Further analysis found a disproportionately high number of erased answers changed from wrong to right. Investigators from the law firm of Siegel, O’Connor, O’Donnell & Beck, who also investigated the Waterbury case, followed up with interviews with teacher and students. Teachers were “very surprised” to see that certain struggling students were able to change two dozen or more answers, all or nearly all from wrong to right. One test had 31 erasures, nearly half the 64 bubble-answer questions. Some students interviewed said they didn’t believe they had made the changes they were shown in their test booklets.

A sad story for our children. Yet, the somewhat mitigating good news is that there is an effective Audit which detected the problem! We can only hope that the PBS NewsHour will run a prominent retraction of their story touting the miracle of Betances reading program.

Yet, in the additional bad news, are lessos for voting integrity:

The report says that Ms. Didier, Linda Liss-Bronstein, the school’s literacy coach and dean of professional development, and a custodian were the only school employees with keys to the secure storage closet where CMT materials were kept. The janitor said he never went into the closet. Ms. Didier and Ms. Liss-Bronstein had custody of the completed booklets and reviewed them for such things as stray lines or double answers before forwarding them to the central office, the report says. The report does not accuse them of changing answers.

What can we learn? (What will we learn?)

  • The chain-of-custody matters for all critical paper records
  • Perhaps we should guard our childrens’ tests and ballots like we guard our records in a safe deposit box or like a bank guards money
  • At least two people should be required to access critical paper records
  • All accesses should be logged and verified by a third party
  • Let us not rely on trust, let us verify and secure in order to trust
  • Keep valuable records under dual lock and key, in the custody of independent authorities
  • Consider vaults, guards, and 24×7 video surveillance

When it comes to elections we have a long way to go in protecting our ballots as demonstrated by this costly lesson.

What the Courant has not learned (or has forgotten)

On the plus side, schools around the state will be moving to computer-based testing over the next two years as the new Common Core curriculum is adopted. That will eliminate at least this kind of malfeasance.

Is this the same newspaper and Editorial Board that:

For more information and tales from Connecticut and around the country on the chain-of-custody, see: <Chain-of-custody index>

? How are ballots secured in your town, after the election? How are tests protected, before and after grading?

Testimony against six bills and for one

All of these bills are well intended. In fact, I would support most of the concepts, yet in only a single case could I support one of these bills , based on huge gaps between the good intent and the actual details present and missing in those bills.

Let me echo again, Paul Krugmann:

Three decades ago, when I went off for my year in the United States government, an old hand explained to me the nature of the job: it was mostly about fighting bad ideas. And these bad ideas, he went on to explain, were like cockroaches: no matter how many times you flush them down the toilet, they keep coming back.
– Paul Krugman

All of these bills are well intended. In fact, I would support most of the concepts, yet in only a single case could I support one of these bills , based on huge gaps between the good intent and the actual details present and missing in those bills.

Oppose:

  • S.B. 901 – all but eliminate our post-election audits
  • H.B. 6428 – Town by town electronic check-in
  • S.B. 775 and S.B. 777 – Town by town, pollworker by pollworker check-in and polling-place lookup
  • S.B. 779 and H.B. 6429 – Make cross-endorsed voting easier on officials, more work for  voters

Favor:

  • S.B. 1058 – Minor change to destruction of blank absentee ballots – lots more we should address beyond this minor change

Each of the .PDFs has a link to the associated bill(s)

A Tale in two Courant Editorials

Where we disagree with the Courant, is that we believe ballots deserve the same level of protection as money and supplies, that the need for verification applies equally to private employees, public employees, and public officials. We are not so sure of trust part of ‘trust but verify’, we would ‘verify sufficiently to deter and trust’.

Two editorials dated Friday, one published on Sunday and one on Monday show the different appreciation some have for money and democracy, the different level of trust some hold for private employees vs. public officials.

Sunday, the Courant provides advice to the Hartford Charter Revision Commission on their trust in public officials, saving public money, and the value of elections: What’s Good, Bad In Hartford Charter Proposals <read>

•Registrars of Voters. Making this office more professional cannot happen soon enough, although it is not clear if it can be done by charter or if a change in state law is necessary.

The city’s first problem is that it has too many registrars, due to a quirk in state law. The law says the candidates for registrar of voters who garner the highest and second-highest number of votes win the posts. But if a major-party candidate — Democrat or Republican — is not among the top two finishers, that candidate must also be named a registrar.

That happened in Hartford in 2008, when the Working Families Party candidate outpolled the Republican. So both of them and the Democrat all became registrars. Registrars make $80,000; with staff and benefits each costs the city about $200,000 a year.

Now guess what. The registrars say they don’t have enough money to run the fall election and need another $115,000.

This is why people get frustrated with government. In the computer age, towns get by with one nonpartisan registrar; Hartford certainly doesn’t need three.

One way around it might be to make the job appointive, or make it a civil service job in the town clerk’s office, perhaps with part-time registrars from the political parties. The charter commission needs to pick a solution and put it forward.

We are surprised that the Courant does not clearly understand that changing a state law mandating the number of, and election of registrars would require a change in state law. At least they are recognizing that more and more as a possibility as they continue a long string of editorials recommending reform. We are even more surprised that given the many scandals in Connecticut by elected and appointed officials that they would prefer to have elections run by a single politically appointed official. As we have said before, the better solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate”, regionalize, professionalize, economize. Others have made the case as well.

The editorial run today is about embezzlement in private agency, the Waterbury YMCA. We generally agree with this editorial, especially its final paragraphs: Boys & Girls Club Theft A New Height Of Lowness <read>

The case should stand as a warning to anyone involved with a nonprofit organization. Here, as is often the case when a theft is discovered, the culprit is a trusted longtime employee. Mr. Generali had been associated with the club for more than 30 years. Last year, Donna Gregor, the bookkeeper at the Mark Twain House and Museum in Hartford, was sent to prison for 42 months for embezzling more than $1 million from the museum over eight years, a theft that could have put one of the state’s leading cultural institutions out of business.

The lesson is, in the words of Ronald Reagan in another context, trust but verify. Most embezzlements involve a perpetrator with incentive and without conscience, plus a lack of adequate internal controls, which creates the opportunity to steal.

To avoid it, say accountants who work in this area, have at least two people watching the money in every accounting cycle.

Where we disagree with the Courant, is that we believe ballots deserve the same level of protection as money and supplies, that the need for verification applies equally to private employees, public employees, and public officials. We are not so sure of trust part of ‘trust but verify’, we would ‘verify sufficiently to deter and trust’.

CO Legislature, Election Officials want to create “a favored class of citizens”

The ballot access issue has been debated in Colorado for too long. It is time for ballots to be confirmed as public records

Colorado is considering a law to restrict their Freedom of Information Law to limit ballot access to ballots to most citizens. They say it would create “a favored class of citizens” we say it would make most Coloradans second class citizens. Denver Post editorial: Hickenlooper should veto ballot access measure <read>

A rapidly growing coalition of groups from across the political spectrum — from Common Cause to the Colorado Union of Taxpayers — is urging the governor to veto a bill governing public access to voted ballots. We hope he listens carefully to their arguments, because an important principle is at stake.

Does access to public records apply equally to all citizens in this state, or should the law open some records only to special classes?

The Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) states that “all public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times.”

By contrast, the ballot bill — which began as Senate Bill 155 but was grafted onto House Bill 1036 at the eleventh hour — says an “interested party” won’t have to wait like the rest of us until an election is certified to enjoy transparent government. And it defines interested parties as not only the candidates themselves but also political parties and even representatives of issue committees that gave money to ballot measures.

Why should the principle of open government be accorded to them and not to other groups just as interested in an election’s outcome?

Why should their ability to inspect records be greater than that of the humblest citizen with no clout or money to spend on politicking?

As members of the Colorado Lawyers Committee Election Task Force wrote in an analysis, the bill’s “restriction of CORA rights during an election to political parties and candidates creates — for the first time — a favored class of citizens … .”

When we first wrote about this bill in March, we described it as a flawed measure that left too much discretion to county clerks and failed to improve procedures that fueled worries about voted ballots being linked to specific voters. But we were also relieved that the clerks had retreated from their earlier opposition to any public access to voted ballots.

The more we consider this complex bill, however, the worse it looks — and our unease is heightened by its crude handling. Not only was it appended to an unrelated measure having nothing to do with elections, it also was rushed through the House with little notice and limited debate.

The ballot access issue has been debated in Colorado for too long. It is time for ballots to be confirmed as public records <read> <read>

Enthusiastic support for the Secretary’s Performance Task Force Recommendations

Given the many members, the brief meetings, and the lack of representation of all interests, we were skeptical when the Task Force was convened. To our delight, we find that we can offer endorsement of each of the twenty-one recommendations in the report.

There is a lot to do in all the recommendations. It will take time, money, and deliberate work with everyone at the table. Our hope is that each of the recommendations will be thoroughly explored, evaluated, and acted upon, that none get overlooked.

Last summer and fall, the Secretary of the State convened an Elections Performance Task Force to look at elections and what might be done to improve them in the State of Connecticut. Details, presentations, and videos of the Task Force meetings are available at the Secretary’s web site <here> The Secretary issued a final report and recommendations <here>

Given the many members, the brief meetings, and the lack of representation of all interests, we were skeptical when the Task Force was convened. To our delight, we find that we can  offer endorsement of each of the twenty-one recommendations in the report, starting on page 34.

We strongly endorse those recommendations in bold below [our comments in brackets]

Identify measures that will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the voting process.

1. The Secretary recommends an amendment to Article 6, Section 7 of the Connecticut State Constitution similar to House Joint Resolution Number 88 of the 2011 legislative session. The amendment would allow the General Assembly to adopt more flexible laws for voting.

2. The Secretary recommends partnering with Professor Heather Gerken to develop a Connecticut Democracy Index. This would allow for benchmarking across municipalities and with other states to track trends in the election process, to measure performance and to gain valuable data that can inform decisions going forward.

3. The Secretary recommends streamlining the absentee ballot process. A working group should be formed to examine and make recommendations around ideas like creating a single absentee ballot application and linking the absentee ballot tracking system with the Centralized Voter Registration System. [Assuming such streamlining does not increase integrity risks or confidence in the process]

4. The Secretary recommends further study of how regionalism could make Connecticut’s electoral  system more cost-effective and consistent. For instance, the use of a statewide online voter registration system, regional on-demand ballot printing, and regional voting centers should all be further explored. [Here we would go further to explore complete regionalizaton, “doing for elections what we have done for probate in Connecticut]

5. The Secretary recommends that the polling place for district elections be the same as for state elections. This will help eliminate voter confusion caused by having to go to different polling locations for different elections. [This would be convenient, yet if mandated, would be challenging for many towns due to different boundaries and contests]

6. The Secretary recommends exploring better ways of coordinating the printing of ballots with programming of memory cards in order to create a more efficient, reliable and cost-effective process.

7. The Secretary recommends the development of a certification process for Registrars of Voters. Additionally, standards and best practices should be developed for that office around issues such as election administration, voter registration and voter outreach. These standards and best practices may need to account for differences in small, medium and large municipalities. Finally, a mechanism for enforcement and, if necessary, the removal of a Registrar of Voters should be created. [We would especially recommend standardization and better practices for post-election audits and recanvasses, along with better manuals, including creating manuals for each pollworker position]

8. The Secretary recommends that a formal study of the cost of elections be undertaken, and that a standardized set of measures for such costs be established.[We would combine this into the Democracy Index, providing ongoing measures and comparison over time]

Maintain the security and integrity of the voting process.

9. The Secretary recommends the development of a secure online voter registration system in Connecticut. The system should be tied to other statewide databases, such as the Department of Social Services, the Department of Developmental Services, and the Department of Motor Vehicles, to allow for verification of data.

10. The Secretary recommends that the state acquire at least one high speed, high volume scanner to be utilized in the post-election auditing process. This centralization of the process will reduce the fiscal and logistical burdens on towns, as well as provide for a more accurate and secure auditing process.[We are a strong supporter of electronic auditing, done effectively and transparently. The number of scanners and their capacities should be a byproduct of an effective electronic auditing pilot, plan, cost benefit analysis, and appropriate law establishing and governing electronic audits]

11. The Secretary recommends that the post-election auditing process be amended to include all ballots that are machine-counted, including those counted centrally.[We would go farther and subject all ballots cast to selection for audit.]

12. The Secretary recommends that a greater emphasis be placed on ballot security. Ballots should be stored in a secure, locked facility. Additionally, two individuals should always be present whenever these facilities are accessed. This policy should be uniformly followed and enforced.

13. The Secretary recommends that the state join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), an interstate data consortium that the Pew Center on the States is currently building. This data center would allow participating states to streamline the processes for registering eligible voters; update records of existing voters; and remove duplicate and invalid records from state voter files. The Secretary stresses the need to include multiple agencies in the database, including those that offer public assistance, interact with people with disabilities, and otherwise come into contact with eligible voters who may not normally visit the Department of Motor Vehicles. Evaluate ways to integrate technology into our election system.

14. The Secretary recommends further exploring the use of new technologies in the election process through pilot programs and examination of other states’ usage. However, the cost and security of any new technologies should be carefully examined. Examples of new technologies for consideration include:

a. Electronic poll books

   b. More advanced voting systems for the voters with disabilities

    c. Online voter registration

15. The Secretary recommends immediate implementation of a statewide web-based electronic reporting system for election results.

16. The Secretary recommends the use of web-based training to standardize election staff training across the state.[We would like to see video training and manuals having a pollworker focus, designed by professional technical writers]

Find ways to increase voter participation, particularly among minorities, young people, people with disabilities, and military and overseas voters.

17. The Secretary recommends Election Day registration in Connecticut and any necessary adjustments to the voter file system to ensure accuracy. Election Day registration has increased voter participation in states where it has been enacted.

18. The Secretary recommends an effort to increase voter participation in Connecticut, with a particular focus on youth, minorities, people with disabilities, and military and overseas voters.

a. Early voting bears further study as a possible mechanism for reaching minority voters. [We are skeptical that early voting has a particular focus on any group of voters]

   b. Since the electorate is becoming more mobile, voter registrations should be mobile as well.
   c. Connecticut’s curbside voting program should be better advertised to voters with disabilities, all polling  places should be easily handicapped accessible, and poll workers at all locations should be properly trained on utilizing the IVS vote by phone system. A viable, better alternative to the IVS system should also be sought.

   d. The military and overseas voting process should be amended to allow for the facsimile transmittal of completed absentee ballot applications. The original application would then be returned in the envelope along with the completed absentee ballot via mail, in order for the ballot to be counted.[Fax transmission should only be required to obtain a blank ballot in situations where the voter cannot print a blank ballot]

e. The military and overseas voting process should be streamlined by the electronic transmission of printable, mailable ballots. This, along with the above recommendation, would eliminate the mailing time of transmitting completed applications and blank ballots through manual post, and would allow for more time for participation by military and overseas voters.

f. The electronic transmission of ballots to military and overseas voters should be further streamlined through the use of the Centralized Voter Registration System.[Having the system aid the overseas voter in downloading their correct blank ballot]

19. The Secretary recommends that existing voter registration provisions included in legislation such as the National Voter Registration Act be fully enforced. The Secretary further recommends that Connecticut’s Department of Corrections be designated as an official voter registration agency.

20. The Secretary recommends a concerted effort to educate the public and the incarcerated population about the voting rights of those detained pre-sentencing and the restoration of voting rights to felons. The Secretary further recommends that the restoration of voting rights be extended to include parolees, as is the case in over a dozen states.

21. The Secretary recommends that Election Day be declared a holiday, as it is in many countries, and/or that elections include in-person voting on a weekend day. This would grant citizens more time to vote and would allow for the use of students and persons with the day off as poll workers.

We note several caveats:

Our endorsement of proposals is conditional. Conditional on the details of any proposed implementation or law. For instance, although we support Election Day Registration, we do not support the current bill before the Legislature which would call for Election Day Registration, because the bill is inadequate to protect the rights of EDR voters, other voters, and could result in chaos and uncertainty.

The report is the Secretary of the State’s, not approved by or endorsed by the Task Force as a whole.

Contained in this report are the findings of the Election Performance Task Force, organized by subcommittee subject matter, with the additional category of voting technology. The Secretary utilized these findings along with feedback from members of the task force, other interested parties, and the public to shape the recommendations that are detailed at the end of this report.

While we endorse the recommendations, we do not endorse the details in the report itself:

  • The statistical information and conclusions do not come close to meeting rigorous standards in justifying the conclusions reached.
  • As noted in the report, the cost of elections information provided is questionable. We find it wildly inaccurate to include data that elections might have been conducted at costs per voter less than the cost of printing a single ballot.
  • We strongly disagree that there is any basis to predict that online voting will be a safe and accepted practice within ten years.

There is a lot to do in all the recommendations. It will take time, money, and deliberate work with everyone at the table. Our hope is that each of the recommendations will be thoroughly explored, evaluated, and acted upon, that none get overlooked.

Secrecy vs. Anonymity of ballots

From Aspen we have a discussion of the value of anonymous ballots and the meaning of the secret ballot. What voting free from coercion requires is the secret casting of ballots and the ongoing safeguarding of those ballots along with the anonymity of the voter associated with each ballot.

Recently we discussed the distinction between integrity and confidence. From Aspen we have a discussion of the value of anonymous ballots and the meaning of the secret ballot. What voting free from coercion requires is the secret casting of ballots and the ongoing safeguarding of those ballots along with the anonymity of the voter associated with each ballot <read>

Before 1947, Col­orado bal­lots were marked with unique num­bers and were not anony­mous. Vot­ers might mark their bal­lots in secrecy, but their votes were trace­able through delib­er­ate num­ber­ing. A 1947 con­sti­tu­tional amend­ment out­lawed any marks on bal­lots that make them trace­able. This rev­o­lu­tion­ary change facil­i­tated effec­tive pri­vacy of Col­oradans’ vot­ing process and is the foun­da­tion of our civil right to expect our votes to remain secret. This vot­ing method — some­times referred to as the “secret bal­lot” — iron­i­cally does not allow for secrets on ballots.

How­ever, oppo­nents of elec­tion trans­parency talk end­lessly about “secret bal­lots.” Hate to tell you, there’s no such thing. “Secret bal­lots” have no place, indeed no mean­ing, in our elec­tion law. Vot­ers are enti­tled to pri­vacy while vot­ing and a sys­tem designed to pre­vent trac­ing a bal­lot to a voter. These safe­guards ensure NO ONE learns how any­one else voted. They ensure what every­one wants: Nobody knows how I voted.

We agree with the writers. When lawmakers use the word secret ballot we believe the actual intent is that the identity of the voter should always remain secret, which is equivalent to anonymous ballot, not that ballots remain secret. In fact, in order to perform publicly observable audits, recounts, racanvasses, or to make ballots public requires that they not be secret. In fact, if non-transparent audits, recounts, or recanvasses or any official review of ballots is allowed then ballots would not be secret – they would be available for officials to inspect but kept from the voters.

In the Connecticut Constitution we have, in Article 6 Section 5:

The right of secret voting shall be preserved.

Obviously consistent with anonymous ballots, rather than preserving ballots in secret.

Update: 04/17/2012: On to the Colorado Supreme Court <read>

Where Common Sense fails: Do insider attacks require a sophisticated conspiracy?

In this post, we address where Common Sense fails. Where what seems obvious to individuals and election officials is often counter to the facts or science. Those that are unfamiliar with technology and a specific area of science often overestimate how difficult or easy specific things are to accomplish.

Note: This is the fifth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous> <next>

We frequently hear versions of the following comments, often from election officials:

“It would take a very sophisticated operation to steal an election. Computer experts with access to the election system.”

“Our staff is trusted and they don’t have that level of expertise.”

“You are a conspiracy theorist, you just don’t trust election officials, and the security of our voting machines”

To some of these charges I plead guilty and with others items beg to disagree:

  • I do believe in the existence and possibilities of fraud by conspiracy, yet in the case of election integrity argue that compromising an election does not require the existence of a conspiracy of the sort implied by the current definition of conspiracy theory. In fact, individuals have been convicted or exposed for small to moderate size conspiracies.
  • I do trust most election officials. The problem is that many election officials express and request blind trust of all election officials. This despite regular instances of errors by officials, and occasional successful prosecution of various election officials for criminal violations. Unless election officials are cut from a different class than other citizens and public officials, some of the time, some of them will make errors, and others will comitt fraud, sometimes without prosecution, and sometimes undetected.
  • It does not require a sophisticated operation to steal an election. Fraud would not necessarily require computer experts with access to the election system.

In this post, we address where Common Sense fails. Where what seems obvious to individuals and election officials is often counter to the facts or science. Here we have to be careful trusting our own initial views and those of honest officials, we need to be open to the idea that we may not individually have all the answers -willing to listen to, if not completely trust, scientists and the facts. (We are not just talking about elections here, but many other areas which are critical to democracy and life.)

Those that are unfamiliar with technology and a specific area of science often overestimate how difficult or easy specific things are to accomplish. As we often confuse conspiracy and conspiracy theory, we often confuse the meanings of theory, between the common meaning of theory and a scientific theory. They are as different as a Pat Robertson theory of earthquakes and the germ theory of disease.

For instance, people often think technologists can do anything such as solve the nuclear waste problem, cure all cancer, make smoking safe, produce clean coal, or provide safe internet voting. These are all hard problems that have, so far, eluded teams of the best scientists. I frequently recall a friend in middle school, in the late 1950’s, who had no concerns with smoking, saying “By the time I get lung cancer in 30 or 40 years, science will have a cure”.

Once even “scientists” believed with the right recipe sea water could be turned into gold. In the dark ages of the 1950’s it was believed it would be possible to predict the weather and the economy, if only we had enough data and the right programs. Since then, with the advent of Chaos Theory, we have learned both are impossible, yet that fact has provided us the opportunity to deal with the economy and weather more rationally and realistically. Since the 30’s or 40’s we have also known that it is impossible to prove that any computer software/hardware system is accurate and safe – there is no recipe possible. (And thus it is also impossible to build a computer or communications system that is provably safe. In practice, we can see from failed attempts of government and industry that the best systems are, in fact, regularly compromised, providing practical as well as theoretical reasons to avoid trusting any computer/communications system.)

On the other side, many things are much easier than the public and many elections officials believe. Smart individuals and small groups continue to create computer viruses and hack into the best systems of the most sophisticated government agencies and industries. On the easy side, the U.S. Government believes, apparently with good reason, that a single Army Private could access and steal a huge number of confidential documents from many Federal agencies. (That he was a low level insider with lots of access, just emphasizes how vulnerable systems are to a single insider and that it would take steps in addition to a safe computer system, even if that were possible, to protect us from an insider.)

How often have we each gone to an expert with what we viewed as a tough problem, only to have it solved quickly and inexpensively? For example: Recently, my condominium unit needed a new main shut-0ff valve. The maintenance staff and I believed it would be a big job requiring service interruption to dozens in my neighborhood requiring a shut-off of a valve in the street. Enlisting the help of a general plumbing contractor, the contractor simply froze my pipe while installing a new valve.

When it comes to election machine hacking, online voting, and conventional stealing of votes it is relatively easy in many jurisdictions to compromise the vote, especially when it only requires a single insider. Some attacks take extensive technical knowledge which many hackers possess and could help or intimidate a single insider to execute or could simply get a job in election administration. Other attacks take very little technical expertise. When officials misjudge how easy it is for attacks to be accomplished, when officials don’t understand technology, it makes it all the easier for a single trusted insider.

One company, LHS, programs all the election memory cards for Connecticut and other states. LHS’s President said that we are safe from hacked cards because he has no employees with software expertise (including himself). There are several fallacies in this:
— How would he know if a particular employee has technical expertise?
— It is not all that hard to miss-program memory cards.
— A single employee could gain outside technical help or be intimidated to do what an outsider demands.

Similarly, many election officials would claim we are safe because they do not have computer experts on their staff. Once again, how would they know how much it would take and what a person does not know?

As for outsider attacks, one example: To our knowledge, in only one instance, a Internet voting system was subjected to a open, public security test. It was compromised extensively and quickly. Even if it had not been compromised so easily or was subjected to a more extensive test it would hardly be proven safe, hardly be safe from attack by insiders.

In our view, the best we can do realistically is voter created paper ballots, counted in public by machine, a printout of results in public, followed by a secure ballot chain of custody, followed by effective independent post-election audits, and where necessary complete recounts.  All transparent.

Finally, we need to emphasize the requirement for a “secure ballot chain-of-custody” or at least a reasonably secure system making it difficult for single insiders to compromise ballots. For those with blind trust in security seals we provide presentations by an expert <view> and examples of quick  seal compromise by that same expert and an amateur <read>

CO: Chain-Of-Custody and Confidence broken

Confidence depends on counting everything, the chain-of-custody, and what is discovered. It looks like faults in all three do not inspire confidence and integrity in Saguache County

Update 1/26/2012: Recall election brings new Saguache clerk  <read>

County Clerk and Recorder Melinda Myers lost her recall election by more than a 2-1 margin Tuesday night and will be replaced by the candidate she beat in a controversial 2010 election. Voters recalled Myers, 941-453, pushing her from office 14 months after an election that prompted two reviews by the secretary of state and another by a statewide grand jury. Republican Carla Gomez, who lost to Myers in the last election, topped independent Patricia Jenkins, 762-319, according to Tuesday’s final unofficial results.

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CO: Citizens challenge SOS plan, discover ballot irregularities <read>

Confidence depends on counting everything, the chain-of-custody, and what is discovered. It looks like faults in all three do not inspire confidence and integrity in Saguache County:

The group peppered Secretary of State’s Office (SOS) staff with questions about how the review should be conducted and what should be reviewed. They protested that the votes cast in Prec. 5 (Crestone) have been in question since the election and since they were largely mail-in, should be counted as a precinct in order to decide if the Nov. 5 “retabulation” of these votes following the discovery of the error was accurate…

The SOS assigned teams to citizen volunteers Monday and began sorting out the ballots. Citizens asked the counting activities be delayed until their questions could be answered but Munster and communications officer Andrew Cole simply stated that the directives issued for the review by the SOS last week must be followed…

In opening the ballot boxes, volunteers discovered that only two of the three boxes had the necessary seals attached. None of the seal logs were where they were supposed to be, watchers observed. Counting judge Duboe and another individual, while possibly trying to trying to locate unvoted ballot stock, opened the ballot boxes March 30.

One of the four teams counting ballots discovered more signatures than ballots. Another team found several ballots with white out covering votes, different inks used on the same ballot and marks that appeared to be made by felt tip markers which had bled through to the other side of the ballot.

Another team found what seemed to be an entire batch of provisional ballots that had not been opened or reviewed. Some 10 ballots were discovered that had votes made only for Joseph and Myers and no other candidates. The SOS said that these votes were valid, although they did disqualify one vote cast for Linda Joseph found by another team that was unverifiable.

Some ballots apparently were missing and there was confusion concerning a set of odd provisional ballots, all blank, cast in Precincts 7, 8 and 9. One voter signature had been cut from a provisional ballot out of another pollbook and taped over a signature of the same person into a different pollbook. “We have no idea what happened there,” Marks said.

See earlier coverage <here>

EVT/WOTE: Keynote – How salty is the soup? And why risk limiting audits are insufficeint.

Professor Stark’s talk is centered on three big ideas which would produce audits sufficient to convince most of us that the losers lost. The talk is serious and lite covering election integrity from 10,000 feet.

Editor’s Note: August 8th and 9th, we attended the EVT/WOTE (Electronic Voting Technology / Workshop On Trustworthy Elections) in San Francisco.  Over time, we are highlighting several papers and talks from the conference.

The keynote speaker was Professor Philip Stark, Department of Statistics, U.C. Berkeley. He is the leading researcher and advocate for single ballot auditing, which would make post election audits much more efficient, while also provides the basis for efficient auditing by machine. The talk is serious and lite covering election integrity from 10,000 feet.  I recommend reviewing the slides from the talk, with one caveat: The slides are a large download, but well worth the wait. <slides – large download> <video> <listen>

His talk is titled: Risk Limiting Audits: Soup to Nuts, and Beyond.

Soup refers to the analogy he frequently uses to describe the statistical basis of risk limiting audits. Pollsters know that the accuracy of polling depends on the number of voters polled, not the size of the population eligible to vote in a particular contest. Thus the accuracy of an audit depends on the number of ballots checked, not the number of ballots in the election. It is just like tasting soup (or an ocean):

  • To know whether the soup is too salty, don’t need to eat all of it.
  • Enough to taste a teaspoon, if soup is stirred well.
  • Doesn’t matter how big the pot is: a teaspoon is enough.

Nuts refers to the limits on the purpose of an audit, according to Professor Stark:

The purpose of elections is to convince the losers that they lost.
(D. Wallach)
The purpose of election audits is to convince everybody who isn’t
nuts that the losers lost. (Y. T.)…

What’s a nut?

  • Somebody whose biggest fear is different enough from yours.
  • Somebody who shares your biggest fear is sane (and smart!).
  • Somebody whose biggest fear is close to yours has an interesting perspective.
  • Eccentric ! preoccupied ! irrationally fixated ! nuts.
  • The “Wayne’s World” test.

Unfortunately, who is a nut is in the eye of the beholder. Some have blind trust in election machines and blind trust in security procedures, Officials with high levels of trust question the need for post-election audits of any type. They would classify anyone questioning the possibility of election errors or fraud as nuts. Others would never be convinced of election integrity, distrusting whatever evidence is presented by officials and judged sufficient by independent observers.

Professor Stark’s talk is centered on three big ideas which would produce audits sufficient to convince most of us that the losers lost:

Strongly Software-Independent Voting System
A voting system is strongly software-independent if an undetectable error or change to its software cannot produce an undetected change in the outcome, and we can find the correct outcome without rerunning the election.

Risk-limiting Audit
Large, known chance of a full hand count if the outcome is wrong, thereby correcting the outcome.

Risk is maximum chance of failing to correct an apparent outcome that is wrong, no matter what caused the outcome to be wrong.

Resilient Canvass Framework
Known minimum chance that the overall system (human, hardware, software, procedures) gives the correct election outcome—when it gives an outcome.

Combine a strongly software-independent voting system with a compliance audit and a risk-limiting audit.

Ingredients for resilient canvass framework

  • Voters create complete, durable, accurate audit trail.
    Strongly software independent voting system.
  • LEO curates the audit trail properly.
    Proper use of seals, surveillance, secure chain of custody, . . .
  • Compliance audit to ensure that the audit trail is adequately
    intact before the risk-limiting audit starts. If not, need a re-vote.
    “No smoking gun” is not affirmative evidence.
  • Timely reporting of all-but-final results for auditable batches.
    Smaller batches are better.
  • Count votes by hand until there’s strong evidence that counting
  • the rest won’t change the outcome–risk-limiting audit
    “Explaining” or “resolving” errors isn’t enough.
    Might need to count all votes by hand if margin is small or audit finds enough error.

A compliance audit is what we mean when we say that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link and that the chain of custody in Connecticut is insufficient to proved confidence in our post-election audits.

Take the time to download the slides for a non-technical introduction to post-election audits, single ballot audits, their purpose, and what is needed to provide justified confidence in elections.