By Luther Weeks on June 27, 2017
Many articles on the Congressional hearings on the “Russian” hacking or not hacking of our elections. Brad Friedman and Mark Karlin come closet to my opinions:
Recent article by Mark Karlin referencing Brad Friedman: Beyond the Russians, Electronic Voting Machines Are Vulnerable to Any Hackers
Journalists and activists have been sounding the alarm about electronic voting machines and their proprietary software for years. The vulnerability of these machines to hacking has not been front and center for some time — primarily due to the failure of the corporate media and legislative bodies to take it seriously. That changed, to some extent, with the charges about Russian hacking from US intelligence agencies. However, the current emphasis is on the Russians allegedly attempting to influence the 2016 election, not on the flawed electronic voting machines that make hacking possible…
Meanwhile, our Secretary of the State continues to spread myths about the safety of voting systems not connected to the internet and “tamper-proof” seals that are at best “tamper-evident”.
We add that paper ballots are insufficient. They need protection from tampering. We need sufficient audits and recounts. Audits and recounts that are comprehensive and convincing. Audits and recounts that are transparent and publicly verifiable.f
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National
By Luther Weeks on June 21, 2017
Article in the Atlantic summarizes some of the bad news from the last couple of weeks: There’s No Way to Know How Compromised U.S. Elections Are <read>
So let us not be complacent. Just because you do not understand something, does not mean that hundreds and thousands of others can’t easily hack it.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, National
By Luther Weeks on June 16, 2017
NPR story by Pam Fessler: If Voting Machines Were Hacked, Would Anyone Know? Fessler quotes several experts and election officials including Connecticut Assistant Secretary of the State Peggy Reeves:
Still, Connecticut Election Director Peggy Reeves told a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine panel on Monday that many local election officials are ill-equipped to handle cybersecurity threats.
“Many of our towns actually have no local IT support,” she said. “Seriously, they don’t have an IT director in their town. They might have a consultant that they call on if they have an issue. So they look to us, but we’re a pretty small division.”
Reeves said the best protection against hackers is probably the fact that the nation’s voting system isso decentralized, with different processes and equipment used in thousands of different locations.
We certainly agree with that and the cybersecurity experts quoted.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, Internet Security Issues, National
By Luther Weeks on May 2, 2017
Article at Think Progress: How easy would it be to rig the next election?
In the popular imagination, this is what election hacking looks like?—?dramatic, national-scale interference that manually rewrites tallies and hands the victory to the outlier. Certainly these attacks may occur. However, they’re only one of a variety of electoral hacks possible against the United States, at a time when hacking attacks are becoming more accessible to threat-actors and nation-state-sponsored attackers are growing more brazen. Yes, hackers may attempt to change the vote totals for American elections?—?but they can also de-register voters, delete critical data, trip up voting systems to cause long lines at polling stations, and otherwise cultivate deep distrust in the legitimacy of election results. If hackers wish to rig a national election, they can do it by changing only small numbers on a state level.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National
By Luther Weeks on April 18, 2017
The worlds largest democracy has offered the public a chance to hack its unverifiable voting machines. The details are skimpy, history does not provide confidence, and while it may be a step in the right direction it is ultimately insufficient. See the article by George Washington University Professor Poorvi Vora: Hacking EVMs: The EC has issued a challenge. It must first accept the challenge it faces
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, National
By Luther Weeks on April 12, 2017
Denise Merrill, Secretary of the State and President of the National Association of Secretaries of State and Neil Jenkins from Homeland Security spoke on NPR on election integrity. <listen>
We disagree with both their similar statements:
.”Because our system is highly decentralized there’s no way to disrupt the voting process in any large-scale meaningful way through cyber attacks because there’s no national system to attack,” [Merrill] said Tuesday at a hearing before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on the impact of the critical infrastructure designation.
Jenkins was quoted as saying “having thousands of elections offices each with their own systems making hacking elections nearly impossible”
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, National, NonScienceNonsense
By Luther Weeks on April 2, 2017
A short op-ed in the Courant from Bloomberg View, by Cathy O’Neil describes the risks of artificial intelligence algorithms used by the likes of Facebook and Google: Controlling A Pervasive Use Of Algorithms Critical
We should have concerns with algorithms beyond Artificial Intelligence. The same concerns apply to any algorithm (computer code/manual process), such as voting machines. We have no access to the code in our AccuVoteOS optical scanners. Yet we know from studies such as the California Top-To-Bottom-Review, Hacking Democracy’s Hursti Hack, and studies by UConn that the system is vulnerable to attack. We do not know and cannot know for sure if the software running on a particular AccuVoteOS and its memory card is correct and accurate.
Posted in CT, Electronic Vulnerability, HowDoWeKnow, Post-Election Audits
By Luther Weeks on March 19, 2017
Georgia and Cobb election officials are rejecting calls from advocacy groups for voters to use paper ballots while the FBI investigates a data breach at Kennesaw State University.
Voters will continue to use electronic voting machines during upcoming elections, said Candice Broce, spokesperson for Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp. The use of paper ballots is reserved as a backup system in case there is a problem with the voting machines, she said…
Earlier this month, KSU announced a federal investigation at the Center for Elections Systems located on the Kennesaw campus to determine if there was a data breach that might have affected the center’s records, according to Tammy DeMel, spokesperson for the university.
When will they ever learn? We firmly believe that the days of paperless elections are coming to an end. It may take a few more years, yet we believe it is unlikely that any jurisdiction in the U.S. well make a major purchases of paperless voting equipment in the future. The useful life of most paperless equipment will end within the next decade or so.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, National, Skulduggery and Errors
By Luther Weeks on March 7, 2017
Yesterday, we submitted testimony on a number of early voting bills and a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.
The primary reason to avoid expanded mail-in or no-excuse absentee voting is the opportunity for and documented record of absentee voting fraud. There are other reasons:
- Contrary to a touted benefit – early voting DECREASES turnout…
And a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.
As an election official, I am sympathetic to the wish of Registrars to make their jobs simpler. Yet, my sympathy ends when it results in barriers to participation in democracy for candidates and citizens.
Posted in Electronic Vulnerability, Legislature 2017, Mail/Absentee Voting
By Luther Weeks on March 5, 2017
Last Monday we testified for S.B. 540, a bill that would increase audit transparency and public verifiability.
Later we noticed that Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, submitted testimony opposing one provision of the bill and therefor recommending against the entire bill. Her testimony misinterpreted our bill, recommending against it based on something we did not ask for and was not part of the bill.
In response we wrote a follow-up letter to the GAE Committee.
Posted in Chain of Custody, CT Law, Electronic Vulnerability, Legislature 2017, Post-Election Audits
