Election News Roundup

Several instructive articles and events this week.

  • Last week, Secretary of the State and President of NASS (National Association of Secretaries of  State) held a press conference discussing Donald Trump’s allegations of 3 Million “Illegals” Voting.  Secretary Merrill Challenges President’s Reported Claims of Illegal Voting
  • Meanwhile, at least, Connecticut is no Kansas: The Kansas Model for Voter-Fraud Bluffing
  • Here an article I generally agree with from Forbes: What The Election Can Teach Us About Cybersecurity
  • Speaking of attacks on voter databases here is a story from this fall: Hackers hit Henry County voter database

Several instructive articles and events this week.

Last week, Secretary of the State and President of NASS (National Association of Secretaries of  State) held a press conference discussing Donald Trump’s allegations of 3 Million “Illegals” Voting.  Secretary Merrill Challenges President’s Reported Claims of Illegal Voting <press release> <video>

After the press conference, I discussed the issue  with Secretary Merrill:

  • I agree that it is unlikely there there were more than a few illegal in-person votes in the election (I doubt as more than a few undocumented are registered.  There may be some, especially felons, registered by their and official’s mistakes)
  • Any credible investigation should confirm that.
  • We would not be in this bind, if there were routine audits of all aspects of the election process, including voter lists and estimates of the number of illegal in-person voting.
  • We know the lists are a mess.
  • An audit of check-in lists could for a very low cost and effort show that there was nowhere near millions of illegal in-person votes.
  • Speaking of audits, Connecticut’s voting machine audits are better than average in a poor field, considering that half the states don’t do audits at all and perhaps one or two states do vote count audits that are quite good.

Meanwhile, at least, Connecticut is no Kansas: The Kansas Model for Voter-Fraud Bluffing <read>

Here an article I generally agree with from Forbes: What The Election Can Teach Us About Cybersecurity <read>

Lowering The Bar For Information Warfare: Three Methods Of Interference

In the past, regimes wishing to upend elections had to do things like engineer strikes or military uprisings. Today the game has changed: Anyone can use the internet to destabilize elections in ways that are easily deniable — and perhaps more effective.

Around the world, no two elections are conducted the same way. However, as more campaigns come under fire, we can now see common hallmarks of offensive interference.

Doxxing: Gathering sensitive, confidential data and maliciously disclosing information in a calculated fashion to inflict setbacks in political momentum and unity.

The best examples of this are the email leaks that plagued the offices of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and its allies in the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) in 2016…

Forget Watergate-style break-ins; today, doxxing is easy to accomplish with simple phishing e-mails introducing malicious software to email recipients…

Digital Propaganda: Inundating voters with misleading or inflammatory information masquerading as news and other trusted sources.

Today it’s easy to fabricate websites with seemingly innocuous domain names hosting digital propaganda and then use orchestrated, automated social bots and other methods to seed it across social media and other channels…

Hacking Election Machinery: The most volatile attack scenario is compromising voting machines, agencies and other polling infrastructure.

This is the hardest category to pull off, because remotely compromising a voting machine, for example, is more difficult than tricking election staffers into clicking on malicious email attachments (as stage one of a doxxing expedition). Yet, every newly-disclosed vulnerability rightfully worries election regulators. Even quick technical fixes applied after such disclosures may not reassure voters’ perceptions.

Training their sights on election machinery is a high-stakes game for nation-state attackers, because a country could consider such intrusions attacks on their critical infrastructure systems, an act meeting the threshold for military retaliation and other dire responses in the physical world. The risk and sheer complexity of these attacks is likely why productivity-minded election adversaries spend most of their time on propaganda and email hacking.

That last part, I disagree with.  Hacking is difficult, yet quite possible from the outside.  Its much simpler from the inside.  Its not just a cyber risk.

Speaking of attacks on voter databases here is a story from this fall: Hackers hit Henry County voter database <read>

Attempts by computer hackers to hold Henry County’s voter database for ransom had county and state officials scrambling just days before the Nov. 8 general election.

Voters were advised about the data breach in a letter sent by the Henry County commissioners earlier this month.

Commissioner Glenn Miller said the voter database was restored from backups at the county and state level, and no ransom was paid.

He said officials have no reason to believe the security breach compromised election results, or that voter registration information was extracted from the system.

The ransomware attack occurred on Oct. 31. Ransomware is a malicious software used to deny access to the owner’s data in an effort to extort money. Miller said hackers that use ransomware are typically after money, not stealing data.

 

Video: The Story of the Attempted Presidential Election Audit

Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election

Also, I’m not sure that we at the University of Michigan could hack into all the paper ballots across multiple states sufficient to change the Presidential election. But I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security course could have changed the outcome of the Presidential election this year. It really is that bad, – Alex Halderman

Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election <video>

Alex Halderman and Matt Bernhard discuss the recount efforts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In answer to the first question, about 50min in to the presentation:

Also, I’m not sure that we at the University of Michigan could hack into all the paper ballots across multiple states sufficient to change the Presidential election. But I’m pretty sure my undergraduate security course could have changed the outcome of the Presidential election this year. It really is that bad, – Alex Halderman

The sound varies through the hour long video, yet you will get an interesting and unique inside view of the efforts of citizens and scientists. Including fascinating insights into their discussions with the Clinton, and later the Stein campaigns.

Connecticut pre-election voting machine testing now less reliable

Over the the last few weeks, we have learned that in the November Election, registrars have substituted a less effective form of pre-election testing that is less likely to catch errors in ballots or election equipment. There are at least two problems

Over the the last few weeks, we have learned that in the November Election, registrars have substituted a less effective form of pre-election testing that is less likely to catch errors in ballots or election equipment.

Pre-election testing in Connecticut used to involve feeding about twenty-five hand-voted test ballots of every type to be used by a scanner and checking the results.  In general, pre-election testing is not a panacea – it cannot test every case, cannot detect every possible error, and cannot prevent clever hacks for recognizing the difference between a test and a real election.  Yet, pre-election testing can detect many errors in ballot printing, memory card programming, or hardware problems.

For the November 2017 election, a new voting machine for those with disabilities was introduced statewide.  One of its features is printing a vote on a standard ballot that can be scanned along with other ballots. It would have been advisable to have several test ballots of every type voted using the two voting methods designed for those with disabilities, a touch screen and an interface for sight impaired.  That would be quite an undertaking.

Instead of a test of the user interface, officials used a special IVS test function which directly printed out test-ballots, bypassing the user interface.  Then they used those test ballots to test their acceptance and results on the AccuVote-OS scanners.  Sounds useful and helpful.  It is.  Yet, apparently, from our discussions that was the extent of testing or the majority of testing of the IVS and the AccuVote-OS in many towns.  There are at least two problems:

First, such a test does not completely test the IVS.  It certainly tests that the IVS understands the ballots, yet there is no guarantee that either of the interfaces would correctly display and record the votes for each candidate and contest on the ballot.  Perhaps, for instance it displays or says the wrong names for State or local offices, such as State Representative, Registrar, or Probate Judge.  It would still record the vote in a correct position on the ballot.

Second, such a test does not completely test the AccuVote-OS. The problem is that the IVS does not fill in the bubbles on the ballot in the way a voter is supposed to fill them in.  For each vote, the IVS makes a black square about twice as wide as the wide dimension of the oval. Those votes should certainly be counted by the AccuVote-OS. However, their being counted is no guarantee that a voters proper vote would be counted.  What if the location of the bubble was incorrectly programmed?  A transposition, an incorrect number etc. could cause some bubbles, especially partially filled in bubbles to not be counted by the AccuVote-OS, while all the IVS voted “bubbles” would be counted.

We did not do a formal survey.  We talked to several registrars and it seems they did little, if any, testing beyond the canned IVS test.

 

 

Lessons from the “recount”. What would have happened here?

The Nation, hopefully, learned some lessons about our existing “recounts” after the November Election.  We learned some disappointing lessons in three states.  We likely would have learned similar lessons in the other states that have recounts.  Remember that only about half the states have recounts at all.  What might we have learned about Connecticut’s recanvasses?

We recommend three articles and comment on Connecticut’s recanvasses.

Our best guess is that Connecticut would rank close to Pennsylvania.  Observed variations and poor recanvass procedures, with courts sooner or later. stopping or blocking the recanvass.

The Nation, hopefully, learned some lessons about our existing “recounts” after the November Election.  We learned some disappointing lessons in three states.  We likely would have learned similar lessons in the other states that have recounts.  Remember that only about half the states have recounts at all.  What might we have learned about Connecticut’s recanvasses?

We recommend three articles and comment on Connecticut’s recanvasses.

From the Washington Post: Jill Stein has done the nation a tremendous public service <read>

To start, we must recognize that what we saw in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania were recounts in name only. Though more than 161,000 people across the nation donated to the effort — and millions more demanded it with their voices — every imaginable financial, legal and political obstacle was thrown in the way of the recounts…

n an election tarnished by unreliable, insecure and unverifiable voting machines, ordinary Americans should at least be able to make sure their votes are counted, especially in states with razor-thin margins.

Beyond the obstacles to the recounts themselves were the irregularities and anomalies we uncovered while counting. The recounts did not confirm the integrity or security of our voting system; they revealed its vulnerability…

During the course of our representation, we consulted some of the world’s leading experts in computer science and cybersecurity. They all agreed on two fundamental points: First, much of our voting machinery is antiquated, faulty and highly vulnerable to breach; second, it would be irresponsible not to verify the accuracy of the vote to the greatest extent possible…

The campaign to verify the vote should be nonpartisan. Stein has done the nation a real service in demanding these recounts. By refusing to surrender in the face of significant resistance and criticism, she has exposed problems in our voting system and shown a way forward for reforms that will protect our democracy in a new age of vulnerability.

From the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Candice Hoke compares Pennsylvania to Ohio: Pennsylvania’s voting system is one of the worst <read>

State officials don’t know if our elections have been hacked, and they don’t seem to care

…Experts in election technology have pointed out that most Pennsylvania counties — including Allegheny — use e-voting systems that have been outlawed by most states. The chief reason? The omission of voter-approved paper printouts that can be recounted and that allow for audits to check on the accuracy of the electronic machines. Even when voting systems are aged and vulnerable to hacking or tampering, durable paper ballots combined with quality-assurance audits can ensure trustworthy results.

Cuyahoga County [Ohio]election officials, like many around the nation, have learned that, even though their voting machines are certified and function perfectly one day, on another day they may fail to count accurately. Software bugs — especially from updates, malware and errors in programming — can lead to unpredictable inaccuracies. Cuyahoga County now conducts an audit after every election, using paper ballots, which most Pennsylvania counties are unable to do.

Paper ballots plus audits assure voters their choices have been accurately registered and that no partisan tampering, hacking or software glitches have affected the results of an election. Election officials can evaluate the accuracy of electronic voting systems and correct any tabulation problems. And no adversary — not even a foreign nation with sophisticated espionage capabilities — can manipulate elections results with e-invasions…

Unfortunately, Pennsylvania does not provide any of these assurances to voters, candidates, political parties or the nation. Instead, Pennsylvania law mandates little transparency or accountability when it comes to its computer-generated election tallies — something no business organization would tolerate in its information systems…

And yet, in Pennsylvania those officials close off all avenues by which forensic checks for evidence of tampering or miscounts could occur, then claim that no such evidence exists and that therefore Pennsylvania election systems are secure and accurate. This is utter nonsense. And it defies core principles of cyber risk management.

From a losing State Senate candidate in Colorado: Despite Jill Stein, Election Integrity Should Not Be A Partisan Issue  <read>

The recount in Wisconsin financed by two losing candidates, Jill Stein and Hillary Clinton, was a total farce, but hopefully it will not also become a tragedy. That could happen if the partisan motivation behind that episode gives election integrity concerns and complaints a bad name…

I have seen some of those weaknesses and vulnerabilities up close and personal. In Colorado on November 8, I lost my own race for re-election to the Colorado State Senate by 1,478 votes out of 81,774 ballots cast, or less than 2%. Our Republican judges and poll watchers observed numerous irregularities, and we can prove some fraudulent votes were cast. I did not demand a recount because the errors and fraud do not appear to be on a large enough scale to affect the outcome. Nonetheless, those weaknesses leave me with less than 100% confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the final count.

If there were 270 Republican ballots with questionable signatures, and Republicans are only 34% of registered voters, that means there were probably over 800 ballots with questionable signatures in that one legislative district alone. The Colorado Voter Group, a watchdog organization promoting election security, believes our signature verification system is inadequate and wide open to abuse.

What if Connecticut was one of the close states?

In summary, we don’t know exactly what would happen.

  • Unlike other states, Connecticut has no law for citizens to call for a recount.  They could always go to court and attempt with evidence to get a judge to order a recount.  That would likely end up in appeals court and likely the Supreme Court.
  • Unlike other states, we do not have a recount – the word does not appear in our statutes.  We have a recanvass which is something like a machine recount.
  • Our close-vote recanvass is at the 0.5% margin typical in other states. Yet is limited to margins of under 2000 votes.  So in this past November election by our calculatinsthat would be a margin of about 0.12%.
  • Unlike recounts in other states, our recanvasses are not closely observable by the general public. The law is a bit ambiguous, yet there are only a very limited number of observers allowed to each candidate and party, at most two each.  So, a town could easily have a recanvass with twenty-five teams of counters, with a Jill Stein, Hillary Clintion, and Donald Trump limited to two close observers each. Hardly enough to closely observe ballots marks counted at 25 tables.
  • Unlike recounts in other states, parties and candidates have no standing to object to the proceedings or to participate and dispute the counting of particular ballots.  In practice party lawyers observe the process to find procedural errors to take to court and call for a “recount”.  The last time that happened, the result was a repeat recanvass, with a party lawyer put in charge (it was a primary).  The only difference was that he sat and watched while essentially the same process was repeated.
  • In practice, the recanvasses vary in their interpretation and adherence to the law from town to town.  Recall that was one of the Supreme Court’s objection to the Florida recount in Gore v. Bush – that it was unfair, because it was not uniform across Florida Counties.

Our best guess is that Connecticut would rank close to Pennsylvania.  Observed variations and poor recanvass procedures, with courts sooner or later. stopping or blocking the recanvass.

An Electoral House of Cards – When votes are not publicly verifiable

An Alternet interview of Jonathan Simon: Something Stinks When Exit Polls and Official Counts Don’t Match – A discussion with an exit poll expert reveals an electoral house of cards. 

When their were claims that exit polls did not match in the Democratic Primary, I said that neither side made the case  saying, “I stand with Carl Sagan who said, “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”

Now a very thoughtful interview with Jonathan Simon who outlines the case that we should be concerned about the exit polls and concerned just as much that we cannot verify our elections

An Alternet interview of Jonathan Simon: Something Stinks When Exit Polls and Official Counts Don’t Match – A discussion with an exit poll expert reveals an electoral house of cards.  <read>

When their were claims that exit polls did not match in the Democratic Primary, I said that neither side made the case  saying, “I stand with Carl Sagan who said, “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”

Now a very thoughtful interview with Jonathan Simon who outlines the case that we should be concerned about the exit polls and concerned just as much that we cannot verify our elections:

We try as carefully as we can. I’ve been doing this pretty steadily now for the last 15 years along with some of my colleagues, and I would be the first to acknowledge that there is a lot of smoke there and there’s a lot of probative value to this work, but that bringing it forth as ironclad proof is very problematic. So we’re stuck at a place where I pivoted to is looking at the risk involved in having a computerized, privatized, unobservable vote counting system and just taking on faith that that system is not being manipulated when there is such a obvious vulnerability (on which the experts strongly agree) of the system to malfeasance and manipulation. That is where I’ve tended to go, is to look at that risk rather than screaming fraud from the rooftops and claiming proof…

Simon goes on to refute many of the reasons raised to be skeptical of exit poll data, yet also acknowledging that without evidence, the polls could be consistently wrong. Yet, errors strongly trend in the same direction.

In this past Tuesday, again we saw a very consistent pattern of exit polls that were more in favor of Hillary Clinton, more in favor of Democratic senatorial candidates and then vote counts were shifted from the exit polls to the right towards Donald Trump, towards the Republican senate candidates. Those are the figures that I pulled down and did a very basic analysis of. You have a column of numbers of state by state showing the degree of that shift and we’ll eventually do that for the national vote for the House of Representatives as well…

What it means to me is that neither system is self validating. Neither system can be trusted. If you look at accounting, you do double entry accounting. I’m not an accountant so my terminology may be off, but you basically audit by checking one column of numbers against another column of numbers. If they disagree, you know something is wrong somewhere. There is some arithmetical mistake, some failure of entry, possibly fraud … you don’t know. You just know that if two things that are pretty much supposed to agree had disagreed, there’s a problem somewhere. I can rule out mathematically and scientifically, by this time, errors due to random chance. Errors due to random chance, sampling errors, what we call margin of error issues, would not be expressing themselves so consistently in one direction. They’d be going in both directions and they’d be much smaller…

If you want to sleep well at night, which I also prefer to denial, and you want to say to yourself, Yeah, it must have been people just lying to the exit pollsters and I’m not going to worry about it, that’s fine. What you’re missing at that point is the fact that if you challenge me to say, How do you know these exit polls are valid? I would turn right around and challenge you and say, How do you know the vote counts are valid?

The fact is, and this is cold hard fact, neither of us can prove our case. That is the problem. We have an unobservable system that cannot answer the challenge that it might be subject to manipulation. It can’t demonstrate that it is not rigged. Exit polls are just a tool that we use to look at it and say, Well folks, there might be something to dig deeper into here. The problem is virtually never is anyone allowed to dig deeper. We have optical scanner equipment all over this country right now that have the voter marked ballots that drop through the optical-scan reader device and sit in their cabinet below. Those voter marked ballots need to be saved 22 months in theory, although they’ve been destroyed early, in fact, in many cases, especially if when there was an investigation going on in Ohio…They are corporate property. They are off limits to public inspection. It might as well, in the 99.9% of cases, be a paperless touchscreen that has no record whatsoever.

The bottom line is that Democracy requires citizen engagement and action:

[Around election time concern] passes briefly in front of the public eye. There’s a lot of stirring about it and then it dies out and it’s basically left to us hardcore election integrity advocates. This is catastrophic. This is tragic. What we’re left with is a system that was accepted more or less without real proof.

If that’s what democracy is worth to us, then we deserve what we get. Democracy requires support. It requires citizen support. It requires an investment of care and an investment of vigilance and an investment of participation more than deciding, Yeah, I’m going to vote or I’m not going to vote. It requires the fulfillment of a duty to be part of the public that counts and observe the counting of the votes so we don’t have the ludicrous situation where we hand our ballots to a magician who takes them behind a curtain, you hear them shred the ballots, comes out and tells you so-and-so won. This is what we’ve got now and it’s what we’ve accepted. We spend more money in two weeks in Iraq then would cost us for 30 years to hand-count our elections. This is surrealistic, this is absurd, but it’s the very strong inertial reality. Getting the energy up to change that reality, especially when that reality has worked well by definition for everybody who is sitting in office. They’re the people with the least incentive to look under the hood and say, Hey, we need to change this. It’s what put them in office.

It is an outstanding interview.  I highly recommend reading in its entirety.

Could the election be hacked? Checking a “Fact Checker”

USAToday article: Could the U.S. election be hacked?  <read>

We add some annotations:  [Bottom-line there is a conspiracy in plan view.  A thinly disguised attempt to assure us that elections are not vulnerable and that any attempt to say otherwise is an attack on every pollworker.]

USAToday article: Could the U.S. election be hacked?  <read>

We add some annotations:  [Bottom-line there is a conspiracy in plan view.  A thinly disguised attempt to assure us that elections are not vulnerable and that any attempt to say otherwise is an attack on every pollworker.]

Fact-checking the presidential debate: Fibs and fiction [Actually the have left that to us.]

Factcheck.org’s Lori Robertson takes a look at the claims made during the second presidential debate between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Find out where fact-checkers found that candidates stretched the truth.

SAN FRANCISCO — The impact of Russian hacking on the upcoming presidential election was a topic in Sunday night’s debate, raising the question: Is the U.S. election hackable? Experts say at the national level, no. But there could be individual incidents that undermine faith in the system. [We disagree.  Election systems are very vulnerable based on the California Top To Bottom Review and the Ohio EVEREST report. Nobody should be considered an expert who ignores those reports. Actually so called “experts” denying the risks are thinly disguised attempts to create blind faith in the system.]

There’s almost no danger the U.S. presidential election could be affected by hackers. It’s simply too decentralized and for the most part too offline to be threatened, according to the head of the FBI and several security experts. [Decentralization means it would indeed be a challenge to hack every polling place and central count location in the country, yet that is a strawman argument, it is not necessary.  Only hacking a few jurisdictions in a small number of swing states is all it would take. See Ohio 2004 and Florida 2000. Offline is a good practice, yet that is insufficient for two reasons:  First, insiders can do all manner of hacks with our without connectivity. Motivated governments can and do find ways to hack systems without connectivity, see STUXNET.]

“National elections are conducted at the local level by local officials on equipment that they obtained locally,” so there’s no single point of vulnerability to tampering here, said Pamela Smith, president of Verified Voting, a non-partisan, non-profit organization that advocates for elections accuracy. [Most voting equipment is obtained from two our three vendors nationwide. Most officials have blind trust in their entire staffs, that is a formula allowing one or several individuals to hack a jurisdiction. Security of election equipment and voted ballots varies.  In many jurisdictions and whole states, such as Connecticut and New Jersey, machine and ballot security is very weak.]

In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee last month, FBI Director James Comey said that while concern has been rightly focused on the integrity of state voter registration systems, the actual voting process remains “very, very hard to hack into because it is so clunky and dispersed.’’ [We should be concerned with voter registration systems.  We should equally be concerned with voting systems and the systems which are used to total results for polling places, central count, jurisdiction accounting, and statewide accounting.]

“It is Mary and Fred putting a machine under the basketball hoop at the gym,’’ Comey said. “These things are not connected to the Internet.’’ [This is an attempt to say we are challenging the integrity of each  of the Mary and Fred’s who work in elections.  [Actually it is quite a leap to believe that each every pollworker and elected official is of high integrity.  Some have gone to jail for their activities. As a class we see no reason to agree that election officials that legislators, mayors, governors, and other public officials.  In Connecticut we have seen many punished for violating the public trust.]

Nevertheless, Comey said federal authorities have been counseling state officials to secure their systems, especially voter registration databases, as hackers have continued to “scan’’ the systems for vulnerabilities.

High stakes rhetoric

In Sunday’s debate, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton noted U.S. intelligence officials have blamed Russia for hacking Democratic officials accounts.

“We have never in the history of our country been in a situation where an adversary, a foreign power, is working so hard to influence the outcome of the election,” she said, and alluded to her Republican opponent Donald Trump’s praise of Russian president Vladimir Putin. [Many claim that the U.S. hacked a recent Ukraine and several over the years in South America.  Russia has been charged with hacking an election in Georgia. Some of these claims have stronger verification than U.S. claims without transparent evidence that any of these hacks were acts of the Russian Government. Not so long ago the U.S. was blaming hacks on China.  It seems we have a new enemy of choice.  Brought out also to charge that Trump, Clinton, Stein, and Sanders are somehow linked to Russia and Communism.] 

Trump replied that he knew “nothing about the inner workings of Russia,” and didn’t address electoral issues.

However on the campaign trail he has said multiple times that he fears the election will be stolen. In August in Columbus, Ohio he said “I’m afraid the election’s going to be rigged. I have to be honest.”

His website features a page where supporters can sign up to be election observers, to “Help Me Stop Crooked Hillary From Rigging This Election!”

Hacking dangers [We are not the only ones concerned:]

Experts say some local systems may be vulnerable to hacking. In some jurisdictions, local rules allow the transfer of election results using WiFi rather than putting the information on a thumb drive that’s physically taken to the central tally site. Others simply use outdated machines, said Kim Alexander of the California Voter Foundation, a non-profit, non-partisan organization that promotes the responsible use of technology in elections.

“They’re in a position where they need to buy something new, but governments don’t want to spend the money on it,” she said.

Depending on the voting machine, all it might take would be one disgruntled election official plugging in a thumb drive containing malware to falsify vote tallies, said Mike Baker, founder of Mosaic451, a computer security company that focuses on infrastructure protection, including for some state and federal election networks.

So far, 33 states and 11 county or local election agencies have approached the Department of Homeland Security for cybersecurity risk and vulnerability assessments, Secretary Jeh Johnson said in a statement Monday.

But time is a factor and he encouraged election agencies to ask for help now.

“There are only 29 days until election day, and it can take up to two weeks from the time we receive authorization to run the scans and identify vulnerabilities. It can then take at least an additional week for state and local election officials to mitigate any vulnerabilities on systems that we may find,” he said.

DHS may increase protections for voting systems to thwart hackers

The good news is that in the upcoming election, close to 80% of voters nationwide are in areas that will either use either paper ballots or voting machines with paper backups, both of which are considered much more secure than online only systems, said Smith.

Y2K or Pearl Harbor

The biggest question in the mind of voting security expert Joseph Kiniry is whether the 2016 election will be Y2K or Pearl Harbor.

The Y2K or millennium bug arose because programs represented the four-digit year with only the final two digits, which made 2000 indistinguishable from 1900. There were predictions of widespread computer failures and possibly catastrophic meltdowns of the world’s digital infrastructure.

Hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of hours of work dealt with the problem and on January 1, 2000 the world woke to nothing more than a hangover, to the relief of many.

“I hope this is Y2K all over again,” said Kiniry, chief scientist at Free & Fair, a public-benefit corporation that works on creating technologies to keep elections free and fair.

But he and others worry that there’s a chance, though a small one, that it could be Pearl Harbor instead.

[Unlike Y2K, we are being warned, yet there is little action to significantly improve voting equipment, procedures, and security.  Maybe Y2K was a one-off where a very technical problem was described to the public, government, and business and after fifteen or so years of warnings, finally there was action in time to largely avoid the actual risks. As a Y2K programmer, I still hear complaints that we all ripped-off the system because nothing significant happened on Jan 1, 2000.  Many took the wrong lesson from that successful project/challenge.]

“Imagine lines wrapping around the block at every polling place in American on election day because the databases were compromised. Or results far different from previous elections and then two weeks after everyone thinks they know the outcome of the election, we find evidence of hacking in the machines,” he said.

66.5 million people watched Sunday’s Trump-Clinton debate
Voter confidence key

While election officials worry about such possibilities, they’re loath to discuss them publicly. If voters lose confidence in the system and don’t turn out to vote in the first place, it would be a greater threat to the integrity of the election system than hackers, they believe. [Don’t let the voters know what the risks really are, but privately worry, ignore, and cover-up.]

“It’s a tough position for us to be in. We don’t want to scare voters away,” said Alexander.

The fear is that proof of even one example of vote manipulation could be amplified through social media to threaten the electorate’s trust in the entire system.

That trust is a bedrock of American democracy and if it’s lost, “that puts us in a whole different category of countries that don’t have free and fair elections,” said Melinda Jackson, chair of the political science department at San Jose State University. [I would love to see a survey of what percentage of voters and non-votes have that blind trust given the thinly disguised attempt to deny risks.]

It might not even take that, she said.

“Already we see candidates sowing the seeds of distrust by saying the election might be rigged,” she said, citing Trump’s multiple statements to that effect.

In an absolute worst case scenario, were either Trump or some other group to question the legitimacy of the elections “we might see violence, we might see protests, we might see rioting, things that we see in other countries but not here,” said Jackson. [We have plenty of protests here. Just not so much over elections and no so much covered by the media.  See Standing Rock Dakota Pipeline and see where the violence comes from.]

While that’s an unlikely Doomsday scenario, she said, “it’s not impossible.”

Contributing: Kevin Johnson in Washington D.C.

Elizabeth Weise covers technology and cybersecurity for USA TODAY. Follow her at @eweise.

Ballots Still Broken: Doug Jones on Today’s Voting Machines

Broken Ballots co-author, Doug Jones interview on the vulnerabilities of today’s voting machines, the newer models available, risks of Election Management Systems, and Internet voting: Douglas Jones on Today’s Voting Machines  <read>

Fortunately, Connecticut has avoided the problem of corruption of the EMS by using a separate system from programming elections and using a manual reporting system to accumulate the results at the end of the night.  That does not mean our systems are safe from errors, hacking, and fraud.

Broken Ballots co-author, Doug Jones interview on the vulnerabilities of today’s voting machines, the newer models available, risks of Election Management Systems, and Internet voting: Douglas Jones on Today’s Voting Machines <read>

Fortunately, Connecticut has avoided the problem of corruption of the EMS by using a separate system from programming elections and using a manual reporting system to accumulate the results at the end of the night.  That does not mean our systems are safe from errors, hacking, and fraud.  We need audits that subject every ballot to the potential for audit selection, along with audits of the entire system including the accuracy of the results reporting and totaling.

In my opinion, the benefits of the currently available systems are not enough to justify replacing our current optical scanners.  In the next few years we will need to replace them.  Odds are a that in five to ten years there will be much better systems available at much lower cost.  Worth the wait.

We have also wisely avoided the risks of Internet voting.

Of Prisons, Water, and Elections

A story about prisons claimed that officials look at a prison as a jug of water.  Even with a small pinhole leak, the water will get out.  They look for the slightest weakness in the prison, assuming prisoners (with lots of time on their hands, collective wisdom, and little to lose in trying) will find any weakness, no matter how small, difficult, and time consuming.

That is how we should look at voting systems

For justified trust and credibility it is critical that our elections be publicly verifiable.

I don’t have the original quite.  A story about prisons claimed that officials look at a prison as a jug of water.  Even with a small pinhole leak, the water will get out.  They look for the slightest weakness in the prison, assuming prisoners (with lots of time on their hands, collective wisdom, and little to lose in trying) will find any weakness, no matter how small, difficult, and time consuming.

That is how we should look at voting systems: electronic, Internet, mechanical or manual.  If there is a weakness in the system, someone motivated will find it and exploit it.  When it comes to attaining publicly verifiable results, recounts, and audits, any opening for breaking ballot security or transparency, someone motivated will find it and likely exploit it

For more details, review our Common Sense Series post on Public Transparency and Verifiability <read>

A Meeting, A Hearing, and Lots of Nonsense

In the last two weeks there was a meeting of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and a hearing of the House Science and Technology Committee on “Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks”.  In total there were seven “experts” giving their opinions along with many of the committee members giving theirs. For the most part, solid facts and reason were missing.  The general plan seemed to be officials going overboard in reassuring the public.

In the last two weeks there was a meeting of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and a hearing of the House Science and Technology Committee on “Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks”.  In total there were seven “experts” giving their opinions along with many of the committee members giving theirs. For the most part, solid facts and reason were missing.  The general plan seemed to be officials going overboard in reassuring the public.

One speaker was featured in both meetings, the Louisiana Secretary of State.  He claimed, perhaps half joking, that it would take so many conspirators to rig an election that they would be better off just voting for their candidate — that got a lot of laughs, apparently at the expense of those who think our elections are vulnerable.  He also claimed that hacking was hard to do since it takes programming skills.  Actually programming skills are quite widely known and there are several ways to hack elections that do not require programming skills.

Another was the Secretary of State of West Virginia.  She is widely known as a strong proponent of Internet voting. Readers may recall that she came to Connecticut to tout a pilot of Internet voting that was wisely not continued by the West Virginia Legislature. She also declined to describe new voting security measures she has taken, lest they become known.  The EAC Committee seemed to agree with that failed theory, known as Security Through Obscurity.

Ironically, that same Secretary of State from West Virginia was given an award at the meeting by the EAC, partially for her strides in security.

Overall there was too much focus on cyber risks, from foreign powers, and from Russia.  In the Committee meeting it was accepted that Russia hacked the DNC, although to our knowledge has not been proven.

There were two highlights.

  • The statement and comments by Dan Wallach from Rice University, the only true expert on election security present in either meeting.
  • The opening remarks  by the Science and Technology Chair. He made a very clear statement of the importance of fair elections to democracy.

<Dan Wallach’s prepared remarks>

<Video of the EAC Meeting>

<Video of the Science and Technology Committee Meeting>
Lest some accuse me of being alarmist, let me reiterate and add to my position recently expressed in a letter to the Hartford Courant:

The truth is that there is no more or less risk to elections this year than in the recent past. The bad news is that the risks of election skullduggery are significant and do not come only from one adversary.

The risks come from foreign adversaries, domestic interests, partisans, independent hackers, and election insiders including vendors.  Elections can be compromised without access to the Internet, without coding, and without altering computers. Political insiders, especially, have the motives and opportunities.

In any one election race the risks are low to moderate, yet the stakes are high.  The closer the vote, the less certain the peoples’ votes were reflected in the declared winner.  It is too late to do much before November, yet we should not rest once the election is over and decided.  The time for deliberate action is in the months and year or two after a presidential election.

Security Against Election Hacking

From Freedom to Tinker, Andrew Appel: Security against Election Hacking – Part 1: Software Independence <read>

We have heard a lot lately about the vulnerabilities of our elections to hacking.  Both cyberhacking and unsophisticated insider attacks. Andrew Appel describes some common sense approaches to detect and deter error and fraud in our elections, covering three major vulnerabilities:

  • Incorrect or unavailable poolbooks.
  • Voting machines
  • Accumulation of results across polling places and jurisdictions

From Freedom to Tinker, Andrew Appel: Security against Election Hacking – Part 1: Software Independence <read>

We have heard a lot lately about the vulnerabilities of our elections to hacking.  Both cyberhacking and unsophisticated insider attacks. Andrew Appel describes some common sense approaches to detect and deter error and fraud in our elections, covering three major vulnerabilities:

  • Incorrect or unavailable poolbooks.
  • Voting machines
  • Accumulation of results across polling places and jurisdictions

Any of these computers could be hacked.  What defenses do we have?  Could we seal off the internet so the Russians can’t hack us?  Clearly not; and anyway, maybe the hacker isn’t the Russians—what if it’s someone in your opponent’s political party?  What if it’s a rogue election administrator?

The best defenses are ways to audit the election and count the votes outside of, independent of the hackable computers…

So the good news is: our election system has many checks and balances so we don’t have to trust the hackable computers to tell us who won.  The biggest weaknesses are DRE paperless touchscreen voting machines used in a few states, which are completely unacceptable; and possible problems with electronic pollbooks.

In this article I’ve discussed paper trails: pollbooks, paper ballots, and per-precinct result printouts.  Election officials must work hard to assure the security of the paper trail: chain of custody of ballot boxes once the polls close, for example.  And they must use the paper trails to audit the election, to protect against hacked computers (and other kinds of fraud, bugs, and accidental mistakes).  Many states have laws requiring (for example) random audits of paper ballots; more states need such laws, and in all states the spirit of the laws must be followed as well as the letter.

Read the full, brief article to understand the details of Appel’s recommendations.

In addition to paying attention to all these recommendations, Connecticut needs to attend to improving our existing post-election audit transparency, the security of ballots, and consider adding formal measures along these lines for check off lists and results reporting.