Category: Common Sense

Note: This is the forth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous><next>

Posting on a recent presentation we realized that we often speak of the need for ‘Integrity and Confidence’ in elections, yet the words ‘Integrity’ and ‘Confidence’ are often misunderstood, with their meanings collapsed. We need both confidence and integrity in our elections, neither alone is sufficient.

Integrity

We find the Wikipedia definition of Integrity close to what we mean when we call for election integrity.

Integrity is a concept of consistency of actions, values, methods, measures, principles, expectations, and outcomes. In ethics, integrity is regarded as the honesty and truthfulness or accuracy of one’s actions. Integrity can be regarded as the opposite of hypocrisy,[1] in that it regards internal consistency as a virtue, and suggests that parties holding apparently conflicting values should account for the discrepancy or alter their beliefs.

In elections, to us, integrity means that the voters’ intentions are realized in the results of each race or contest. That within reason every vote is counted accurately. It means that the entire system of voter registration, ballot access, and election administration functions according to law and common sense expectations of the public. A system where what we expect is what we get, and what we expect is democracy. A system sufficient for the people to control, define, and elect their government.

Confidence

For Confidence we prefer Dictionary.com’s definition:

Confidence. 1.full trust; belief in the powers, trustworthiness, or reliability of a person or thing: We have every confidence in their ability to succeed. 3.certitude; assurance: He described the situation with such confidence that the audience believed him completely.

In elections, to us, confidence means that the vast majority of voters and candidates trust that voters’ intentions are realized in the results of each race or contest. They trust that within reason every vote is counted accurately. It means that they trust the entire system of voter registration, ballot access, and election administration functions according to law and common sense expectations of the public. They believe we have a system that provides that what we expect is what we get, and what we expect is democracy. They trust we have a system sufficient for the people to control, define, and elect their government.

Confidence without Integrity

The Madison Avenue, vigilance free system. A system which the public and candidates trust, which in reality is not one of integrity. Such a system would not be sufficient for democracy because the will of the people would be thwarted through election errors, election skulduggery, voter suppression, or insufficient ballot access. Largely a myth created by weak, fearful, gullible, or duplicitous officials, believed by some of the people some of the time. Symptoms include lack of transparency, defensiveness, and errors attributed to rare, unique and explainable mistakes.

Without Confidence and without Integrity

A system without integrity with weaknesses more transparent to the public, than apparent to officials. This system is more prevalent than systems with confidence and without integrity. We have been admonished by some officials to  “Stop doing what you are doing because it will scare the voters away from the polls“. We have news for  such officials and politicians: The public has a general lack of confidence in the system already. When we asked voters to sign a petition calling for increased integrity and confidence in elections, most immediately agreed to sign – they recognized the need. The second most prevalent reaction was to laugh and walk away indicating that it was a hopeless quest.

Integrity without Confidence

Yet, a lack of confidence does not necessarily imply a lack of integrity; perhaps power does not always corrupt a weak link; perhaps transparency is not necessary for election integrity; perhaps elections are an exception to what we see when we lift the veil of government secrecy in every other area. Confidence requires a transparent system. In addition confidence requires laws and procedures that are sufficient, enforceable, and enforced. Unless the laws of human nature are suspended for elections, integrity also would require those same things: laws and procedures that are sufficient, enforceable, and enforced. Sufficient laws must go beyond punishing the guilty and correcting the innocent; sufficient procedures must go beyond correcting errors and mistakes so that they will not happen again; the system must assure redress of incorrect results.

Note: This is the third post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <next> <previous>

Last time our post ended with, “Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy. ‘Opportunity’ is insufficient.”

Introduction

Voter Verified Paper Ballots (VVPBs) are a necessary condition for voting integrity, yet as they say “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”.  VVPBs are only one link in a long chain that provides voting integrity, we might construct different chains with different links, but in the end, the entire chain must be complete and strong enough to provide voting integrity.

Three major segments of the chain of voting integrity:

1. Democratic voting access and participation: This would include areas critical to an effective democratic process beyond counting votes accurately such as fair rights to vote, accurate voter registration, lack of voter suppression, ballot design, candidate access to the ballot, campaign financing mechanisms, along with voter access to candidate information, complete news, and sufficient education.
2. A reliable and credible ballot chain of custody: Just like evidence in court, if we cannot trust the chain of custody of ballots then they can only provide a false confidence.
3. Exploiting ballots to create voting integrity and credibility: Ballots never used, seldom used, or incorrectly used are as helpful as seat belts used improperly, or not at all. Ballots provide election integrity when used for timely and effective audits and recounts coupled with effective action.

In this post, we discuss item #3:

Exploiting ballots to create voting integrity and credibility

Ballots must actually be used for election integrity. This seems so simple it may seem unnecessary to point out, except that many voters and officials seem to believe merely employing optical scanners is sufficient – the cure for voting integrity concerns.  In our The Myths In the Nutmeg State, this is Myth #9:

Myth #9 – If there is ever a concern we can always count the paper.

Reality

The law limits when the paper can be counted.

• Audits can protect against error or fraud only if enough of the paper is counted and discrepancies in the vote are investigated and acted upon in time to impact the outcome of the election.  See myths #1 and #2.
• An automatic recount (called a recanvass in CT) occurs when the winning vote margin is within 0.5%. The polling place moderator or the Secretary of the State can call for a recanvass, but even candidates must convince a court that there is sufficient reason for a recount.
• Recanvass by hand is not required by law.  In early 2008 the Secretary of the State reversed her policy of hand recanvasses.  We now recanvass by optical scanner.

Unlike Connecticut, some jurisdictions with paper ballots do not perform post-election audits or automatic recounts in any form.

To fully exploit paper ballots would require they be used in several ways in addition to the original election count (by hand or by optical scanner):

• A thorough, complete, adversarial, manual hand recount on close elections. By thorough we mean checking each ballot to correctly classify it by voter’s intent and checking both sides the ballot for distinguishing marks which would disqualify the vote. By complete we mean reviewing absentee ballot and provisional ballot materials to make sure that appropriate ballots are counted and appropriate ballots are rejected. By manual hand count we mean that all counting is performed by human counters using counting and tallying methods that assure accuracy. By adversarial we mean one where all competing interests are represented in closely observing the classification and counting, have a right to object to the classification or procedures employed, and there are far means for resolving objections. By close election we mean one where there is more than a very small probability that errors in classifying votes, counting votes, qualifying ballots, or tallying errors could have caused a result different than the voters’ intentions in the original count.
• Comprehensive, statistically meaningful, effective post-election audits. Audits approaching the standards in the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits and The League of Women Voters Report on Election Auditing. By Comprehensive we mean auditing all ballots cast including those originally counted by hand or by machine, and with all contests at least subject to selection for audit. We advocate for optical scanning followed by audits, those who advocate for counting exclusively by hand, should not trust that original hand count and should also insist on post-election audits. (We also point out that beyond the paper ballots, comprehensive election auditing should include auditing the whole voting process). By statistically meaningful we mean auditing enough paper and analyzing results such that strong statistical confidence in the result can be determined. By effective we mean the results of audits are used consistently for improving the election process, determining what levels to set for automatic close election recounts, and lead to full recounts when the audit cannot guarantee a high confidence in the original reported result.
• Candidate and public directed audits. Candidates and the public (at least in the case of ballot questions) should be given the right to select ballots for audit or recount either as part of post-elections audits or by paying the cost of such audits. Given such rights, questioned results in specific districts could be selected for audit or recount to satisfy the concerns of candidates and the public.
• Public access to the ballots. Several states provide for public review of ballots under freedom of information laws and other means. Such access has been used to instill public confidence in the process and also to confirm suspicions based on statically irregular results. When possible ballots should be posted to the web, rather than requiring access that is expensive and time consuming for officials, candidates and the public.

This is our list, let us know if we have missed another valuable use for ballots. Paper ballots are necessary but insufficient for election integrity. Using the ballots as we have described is also necessary for voting integrity. Yet, we must insure that the ballots audited, recounted, or accessed by the public are actually the ones cast by voters. Sometime soon we will discuss the chain of custody!

Note: This is the second post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous> <next>

Among the heroes of our Democracy, George Washington has been called The Indispensable Man. When it comes to voting integrity, voter verified paper ballots play The Indispensable Role.

Perhaps there is an alternative. I’ll grant that paper might not be the only possible media. Voter verified stone tablets/ballots might work but are hardly realistic. Beyond a different permanent media, so far, no safe alternative has been proposed which has withstood scrutiny.

The alternatives that fail to pass scrutiny, so far:

• Basic Touch Screen Electronic Voting (DREs)
• DREs with “Voter Verified” Paper Trails
• Internet Voting (including: Websites, Email, or Kiosk based)

Any form of voting that relies solely on computers for integrity is subject to fraud and error:

A hardware error could occur changing a program, or causing a touch screen or scanner to function improperly and unexpected, undetectably, to dramatically change a result – either on an individual voting machine or in transmitting or accumulating results.

An unscrupulous insider could change a program or function of a computer in a variety of ways that could be difficult or impossible to detect.

A voting machine could be programmed incorrectly to begin with, running correctly for years and then suddenly produce the wrong result on a particular set of ballots or based on the placement or spelling of a particular candidate’s name.

(It is not common sense that the spelling of a candidate’s name could change the result. It is common sense for experienced computer programmers. Programmers all have stories of mysterious problems. Believe it or not! I cannot send emails with my cell number including imbeded dashes ‘-‘, I can use periods ‘.” and other marks, I can use other phone numbers but not my particular cell number with dashes – the sent emails just plain disappear. I was using the cell number on my email signature.  It took months of lost emails, lost communications, interpersonal misunderstandings, changing software and email providers to no avail. until I stumbled onto this hard to believe fact. I still find it hard to believe, but it was repeatedly, rigorously tested to my amazed/dismayed satisfaction. As far as I can tell it is either a Microsoft or Apache bug which I have not pursued.)

No amount of testing or security can be sufficient to prevent such errors and fraud:

Based on Alan Turing’s Halting Problem it is impossible to determine, in general, that a computer program will do what it is expected to do in all possible circumstances. We could test many sequences of ballots and prove they are counted correctly, but in different circumstances the computer might function differently: A different set of ballots, a different sequence of their submission, submission at a different time, or with different time delays between ballots etc. could yield different results. In reality, it would be almost impossible to test each voting machine with a reasonable number of typical sets of ballots to provide reasonable levels of confidence, let alone test each machine before each election.

Beyond these basic, insurmountable obstacles, voting has unique challenges:

• Resources are limited. Election officials, in general have limited computer and security expertise. Jurisdictions cannot afford the expertise to plan reasonably effective testing and security measures. They cannot perform extensive testing of single voting machines, let alone each machine before each election.
• Election computers are programmed anew for each election. Past results do not imply that current programming is reliable or that new errors or fraud have not been induced.
• Scanners or touch screens can go out of alignment or develop blind/weak spots and errors.
• Security measures to prevent insider tampering with programming and computer chips would be prohibitively extensive, costly, and sophisticated.

Each of the current alternatives have their own limitations:

Touch screen (DRE) voting machines without paper trails do not have transparent records which can be verified by the voter or election officials after elections. There is no way for anyone to determine if a vote cast by a voter increased the vote for the correct candidates; no way for the public or officials to determine if the counters or electronic records of votes accurately reflect the voters’ actual choices.

Internet voting methods are subject to all the risks of the public and “private secure” Internets.  Sophisticated Government agencies and corporations are regularly subject to hacking (e.g. Google and the U.S. Defense Department). It is wildly optimistic and delusional  to expect voting jurisdictions or voting vendors to do as well, let alone better. Kiosks mitigate a few, but hardly all of these risks. Banks lose billions in ATM electronic fraud each year – once again, they are more sophisticated and can afford more to avoid costly fraud. And bankers have an advantage with double entry bookkeeping and customer receipts which provide means to detect fraud – means by definition unavailable to electronic voting. The recent extensive Wikileaks disclosure of government documents is an example of what a lone or very limited number of insiders can do in compromising the security of a system.

Paper trail DREs provide an inadequate substitute for voter verified paper ballots. The current paper trails are difficult to read for voters and officials and are frequently lost to jams oeundetected “out of paper” conditions.  A small percentage of voters actually verify their vote – fraud or error can misclassify a significant percentage of votes, with the smaller percentage verified chalked up to “I/you must have pushed the wrong button”.  Beyond this DREs are much more costly to purchase, operate, and audit than optical scanners.

The Bottom Line

It is theoretically impossible to develop a computer only voting solution that is not subject error and fraud. Beyond theory, common sense shows that proposed electronic voting systems are subject to error and insider fraud, with all but impossible testing and security requirements, well beyond the capabilities and resources available to election officials.

Paper ballots filled out by voters are inherently “Voter Verified”. They provide the ultimate record of voters’ intent. They alone provide the opportunity for determining the exact result in close elections and the opportunity to verify the correct result in all elections. They alone provide the opportunity for public transparency necessary for real trust and confidence. Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy.

We will have much more to say.  “Opportunity” is insufficient.

Note: This is the first post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <next>

One of the benefits of using optical scanners for voting is the requirement for voter marked paper ballots. They are much more reliable and useful than the paper records produced by some DRE (touch screen) voting machines:

• Marked by voters, paper ballots, should accurately reflect the voters’ intent. Voter verifiable paper records (produced by DREs) are actually reviewed in detail by very few voters, providing an opportunity for fraud and for significant errors to go undetected.
• Compared with curly, poorly printed, closely spaced DRE records (usually similar to store receipts), paper ballots are relatively easily preserved, organized, and recounted. They can be carefully reviewed for voters’ intent in the case of very close elections.
• Properly tuned and programmed optical scanners can quickly and accurately count large numbers of ballots with many contests.

However, obtaining these benefits depends on the details surrounding the use of optical scanners and paper ballots. At a high level the requirements are:

• The integrity of the paper ballots must be guaranteed by a trusted, reliable chain-of-custody.
• There must be a trusted, reliable reporting process for accumulating results from multiple polling places and jurisdictions.
• There must be a trusted, reliable post-election audit process that will detect and correct errors or fraud in ballot accounting, optical scanning, manual counting, and reporting process
• In very close elections there must be a thorough, transparent, and adversarial recount.
• The entire process must be effective, followed uniformly, enforceable, and enforced, along with a maximum opportunity for public transparency and meaningful observation.
• The risks of error and opportunity for fraud should be minimized by: non-partisan and opposing party election management/oversight; security, testing, and controls over optical scanner programming and chain-of-custody; and extensive training and certification of election officials.

To provide true election integrity, Connecticut, like most states, needs to do much better in every one of these dimensions.