Broken System: Bridgeport Primary Does Not Add Up

Summary: This article and the Bridgeport Primary expose the problems with a “system” that ignores and excuses discrepancies that are discovered. As we have often pointed out in post-election audit reports, ignoring and excusing away discrepancies means that if there is ever an error or a fraud it will not be recognized. In this case we will never know who actually won the Bridgeport Primary. We may have some penalties assessed by Elections Enforcement. All we know for sure is that this was not a reliable election, that voting integrity in Connecticut is far from assured and does not exist in Bridgeport.

ConnPost article by Bill Cummings: Voting Numbers Do Not Add Up <read>

In the midst of a heated court battle over last fall’s Democratic mayoral primary, state Rep. Christopher Caruso’s legal team asserted there were more votes than voters.

City officials and their lawyers scoffed at Caruso’s contention, calling it untrue and irresponsible.

However, a Connecticut Post examination of election records from the Sept. 11, 2007, primary shows there were more votes than voters — 105 more.

Continue reading “Broken System: Bridgeport Primary Does Not Add Up”

What Does It Take To Get A Voting Machine Federally Certified?

Not Much <read the whole story>

Last February, SysTest labs wrote its certification test report for a new voting system manufactured by Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold). The report listed the 79 problems the lab found during testing. Even so, SysTest recommended the system be certified by the EAC.

As we have pointed out, apparently we don’t take voting machines seriously. We take gambling machines and electric meters seriously. And hold gas companies to higher standards than Diebold.

CT Irony #1: The Hand-Count Irony

In our most recent Presidential Primary there were many towns in Connecticut that ran out of optical scan ballots and a huge percentage (30-40% ?) of the vote in those towns was then un-scannable hand counted copied ballots. These were counted late at night by unprepared election officials after a fifteen hour day.

Ironically the only votes audited (because that is the law) were those counted by machine.

(This is particularly ironic because many discrepancies in past audits were attributed by election officials to hand counting errors during the audits – resulting in claims by election officials that it is impossible to count accurately by hand.)

Of course reality is that it is possible to count accurately by hand, but it takes checks and balances. One check is to count more than once. Another check and balance is to count by machine as well. Or by machine followed by sufficient random hand count audits.

The post-election audit should audit by random selection all types of ballots no matter where or how they were cast, no matter where or how they were originally counted. Currently we only audit ballots cast in polling places that were originally counted by machine. We exempt all hand counted ballots, all absentee ballots counted centrally by machine, and provisional ballots.

Risks Continue For 2008 – Myths Have Not Been Repealed Nor Refuted

Note: A post by Jon Kantrowitz on MLM prompted this response.

There is no reason to be comfortable. The “Ten Myths In The Nutmeg State” have not been repealed.

I have the greatest respect for the computer scientists mentioned in the article, their research, and their contributions. We also need many more election officials as conscientious Ion Sancho. He is one of the stars of “Hacking Democracy” and a tireless advocate <video>

To their ranks I would add Dr. Alexander Shvartsman of the UConn VoTeR Center. He and his team have had papers selected for the ACCURATE conference this year and last <read> <read>.

Where I diverge from the article is in its conclusion:

thanks to this team of computer scientists and their partners in the public sector, communities across the country will be better prepared to prevent malicious attacks and mishaps at the ballot box.

This is true but to a very limited extent because so few states have used the well known and not so well known available information about voting risks to take action to protect our votes.

In Connecticut:
Continue reading “Risks Continue For 2008 – Myths Have Not Been Repealed Nor Refuted”

Voting Machine Does Not Compute – Story Does Not Compute

The Danbury NewsTimes has the story of problems with a referendum in New Milford <read>. We are always pleased to see election integrity coverage, and we agree with the sentiments of this article, however there is something more to investigate. Apparently New Milford is not following procedures or there is more to the story.

Problems with New Milford’s budget referendum last week are a cause for concern on a much bigger voting process — the presidential election in November.

The new optical scanning machine at the town’s Lanesville district malfunctioned, which necessitated the hand counting of all 426 votes there.

Continue reading “Voting Machine Does Not Compute – Story Does Not Compute”

CTVotersCount Visits the UConn VoTeR Center

On June 4th we visited Dr. Alex Shvartsman and his team at the UConn VoTeR Center, toured the lab, and observed the testing of memory cards and the Diebold AccuVote-OS. Dr. Shvartsman and some of the staff

We have applauded the VoTeR Center’s academic work on evaluating the security of the AccuVote-OS and other voting machines <read> <read> along with their programs to independently inspect memory cards. <read> <read>. We have have also highlighted the Center’s post-election audit reports with some criticism based not on UConn’s work but on the lack of our confidence in the integrity of the data provided <read>

UConn’s reports on Diebold vulnerabilities complemented those of other researchers around the country, confirming the same vulnerabilities and adding additional vulnerabilities. The computer program to independently test memory cards represents excellent work. We are aware of no other researchers and no others state with a similar capability. This makes possible the unique program in Connecticut to test memory cards. We would like to see the program expanded to pre-test 100% of our memory cards before each election prior to delivery to election officials. The testing continues to highlight quality control problems in the programming of the cards by LHS Associates, and the failure of election officials to rigorously follow pre-election testing procedures.

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“Paperless electronic voting is in retreat” – Because It Cannot Be Verified

Electronic Verification for E-voting: A Dead End for Voter Confidence, by By Sean Flaherty, Verified Voting Foundation <read>

There is a small possibility that sometime in the future some smart people will come up with a way that we can vote and verify our votes all electronically, without paper. Yet, it may be impossible. For now at least, voter verified paper and manual counting or manual audits are required.

Paperless electronic voting is in retreat, its popularity done in by disturbing security reviews of current e-voting systems and significant voter concern about the integrity of elections. Optically scanned paper ballots, which also use software to count votes but allow software-independent hand audits and recounts, are the most common voting system in the United States. A number of states that have purchased paperless electronic voting machines are moving to adopt optical scan systems, with accessible ballot-marking devices for voters with disabilities. Approximately 60% of America’s voters live in jurisdictions in which voter-marked paper ballots will be the primary voting system in the November elections.

But we live in a technological age, and to some it seems logical that in crafting laws governing voting systems we not “stifle innovation” by closing the door on paperless voting. The present generation of systems was a bust – but could a new generation of paperless voting systems contain enough redundancies that paper ballots or voter-verifiable paper records could become unnecessary?

…First, it is necessary to compare electronic voting to electronic commerce. There is a fundamental problem in comparing e-voting to e-commerce: the secret ballot. Secure electronic commerce depends in part on connecting the individual investor with the online stock trade, the taxpayer with the 1040 form, the traveler with the flight itinerary. The secret ballot, an essential element of our democratic tradition, requires that the voter not be connected with the votes she has cast. If taxpayers had no way of confirming to their satisfaction that their tax returns were received by the IRS as they submitted them, most would never consider filing their taxes electronically…

In Connecticut we are more than half way there. We have voter initiated verifiable paper ballots, yet lack sufficient post-election audits and lack a sufficient chain of custody.

Florida Risks OUR Democracy With Internet Voting

What’s wrong with Florida using Internet Voting? Why should Connecticut Voters care?

  • It is not private – open to intimidation abuse, vote selling – especially in environments such as military, business, religeous, and union.
  • There is no auditable record
  • Anything that risks who is declared President, or could change the balance in Congress and the Senate threatens the future and value of votes for Connecticut voters.

Update: Additional Article <here>

Voters Group Objects To Internet Voting Pilot Program
Posted May 29, 2008 by Catherine Dolinski, Tribune Tallahassee Bureau
Updated May 29, 2008 at 01:58 PM
A group of skeptical voters are objecting to Okaloosa County’s plans to experiment with Internet voting for overseas service members, raising the possibility of a lawsuit if Secretary of State Kurt Browning doesn’t squelch the idea.

Under plans by Okaloosa Elections Supervisor Pat Hollarn for Operation Bravo, service members in Germany, England and Okinawa would vote at computer stations on encrypted electronic ballots. A secure computer line would transmit the data to Spain and then Florida. Only Florida election officials would be able to decode the ballots, according to Hollarn.

The voters would also see a paper printout of the ballots prior to transmittal. Hollarn noted that’s more than Florida’s 2007 paper-trail legislation requires for disabled voters.

But Dan McCrea of a group called Florida Voters Coalition isn’t buying it.

“Taxpayers are still reeling from the costly mistake of allowing DRE touchscreen voting before that technology was secure,” he said in a letter to Browning today. “We mustn’t repeat that mistake.”

He called Operation Bravo “illegal” and “dangerous.”

McCrea cites the 2007 paper-trail statute, while Hollarn cites a 2005 statute permitting safe electronic transmission of election materials. McCrea said Browning should rule that the 2007 law is the controlling law.

McCrea also contends that Hollarn has a conflict of interest because she heads the Operation Bravo Foundation, which is “essentially … a voting system vendor.”

But Hollarn replies the foundation is only a fundraiser for the project, and said McCrea’s accusation is “grasping at straws.”

Browning spokeswoman Jennifer Davis said he hasn’t yet received Okaloosa’s final plans and had little comment. But she differed with McCrea’s characterization of the project as “internet voting,” comparing the the ballot transmission to a fax.

“The voters would also see a paper printout of the ballots prior to transmittal.” – this is a false sense of security – a receipt given to a voter which cannot be compared to or used to audit the tally produced by the computer counting the votes is absolutely useless for increasing or providing integrity.

What could be a worse than a receipt useless for verifying the tally, but perfect for delivering to a friend, intimidator, purchaser, manager, minister, union steward, or commanding officer?

“comparing the the ballot transmission to a fax.” – well no, presumably there is a paper record of a real fax available on the other side. Not that a faxed ballot would that much better in any regard.

Hats off to Dan McCrea and the Florida Voters Coalition.

People And Paper Save The Election In Arkansas!!!

The ballots were incorrect, the machines were not programmed correctly. But election officials noticed the ballot problem in time and after the election discovered the machine problem. Because they had a paper record the election was able to be correctly decided. <read>

Haggard says the night before the election, officials noticed that the electronic ballot on two machines slated to be used at East Cadron B was missing the State House District 45 race. So officials printed up paper ballots to be used just for that race in that precinct.

Voters cast electronic ballots on the voting machines for other races, then cast paper ballots for the District 45 race. At the end of the day, Dr. Terry Fiddler (D) had beat Linda Tyler (D) for the House seat with 794 votes to Tyler’s 770. But a post-election examination revealed that despite the fact that the electronic ballots on the two machines at the East Cadron B precinct didn’t display the District 45 race, the machines recorded votes for that race anyway…

“Somehow the recording software had tabulated it into the wrong race,” Haggard says. “Thank goodness for the paper trail. We went to the paper trail and could show how people actually voted.”...

ES&S machines were also at the center of the controversy over the 13th Congressional District race in Florida in 2006 when more than 18,000 ballots cast in Sarasota County

But in Sarasota they had no paper trail <read> and a huge loss for democracy in the polling place, in Congress, and in the courts.

Some say that Pennsylvania is Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with Arkansas in between. I guess not! In Pennsylvania they don’t have the paper to protect the vote <read>.

Update: As other advocates have pointed out, all is not rosy in Arkansas:

  • A DRE should always exactly equal the paper record, the same machine prints and tallies both – it should not mix up candidates and print a record for a candidate not on the ballot
  • The paper record is subject to the problems of voters not really checking – an optical scan paper record completed by the voter would provide much more confidence
  • What if any pre-election testing was performed – this is about the easiest error to spot, other than the machine failing to start or catching fire