CTVotersCount.org

CT: 2009 Regular Session Legislative Roundup/Wrapup

This year, CTVotesCount supported several bills, opposed several bills, and took no positions on other bills related to elections and voting. The regular session ended at midnight June 3rd with a special session scheduled for later in June to address the budget and possibly some other issues. In this post we will provide updates on the status of bills of interest as we are made aware of their final status.

This year, CTVotesCount supported several bills, opposed several bills, and took no positions on other bills related to elections and voting. The regular session ended at midnight June 3rd with a special session likely to be scheduled for later in June to address the budget and possibly some other issues. In this post we will provide our understanding of the status of bills of interest. There may be updates as we learn more.

Finding the actual status of bills can be a challenge. Bills are often rewritten and introduced with a new bill number. Some bills are extensively changed or completely rewritten by amendments. In a few cases an amendment completely changes the intent and the subject of a bill, while the bill’s title cannot be changed!

Perhaps more challenging is determining the major reasons/cause of a bill’s demise without action by one or both houses of the legislature: Did the legislature just run out of time, with the Committee Chair and Leadership prioritizing other bills? Was there mild support or substantial opposition? Would one house pass the bill and the other trash it? Would a veto by the Governor be likely? How would a veto be viewed by the public? Or did the bill simply need more work to make in politically acceptable or workable in practice? We will take some educated guesses.

General Comments on the 2009 Session:

In our limited experience, this year is typical of the last few years. Many bills are introduced. A substantial number receive committee hearings, followed by a smaller, yet still substantial number passing committees. But, a small subset are ever introduced and debated in either the House or the Senate. The structure of the system provides many opportunities for members to express support or opposition to bills along with many “reasons” for hard work and support to end with no results. Many blame partisanship, leveling charges at one side or the other: Democrats are blamed for a “do noting” session and Republicans are seen as “obstructionist”. However, the system providing extended debate, in a relatively small window, at the end of the legislative session, with an absolute deadline, makes this all (or so little) possible.

Naturally, we are relieved when bills with concepts we generally oppose or bills that have unintended consequences are not enacted one way or another. But we are equally disappointed when important issues and bills do not receive the attention we believe is appropriate.

Bills:

H.B. 5226 AN ACT CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF POLLING PLACES FOR A PRIMARY.
Would have allowed towns to determine polling places for a primary, greatly reducing costs. Passed the GAE Committee but never introduced in either house.

H.B. 5903 -AN ACT CONCERNING ABSENTEE VOTING FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS.
This bill would provide additional time and support for military voters to receive and return absentee ballots. CTVotersCount and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz opposed the provisions in this bill that would have allowed risky voting via internet, fax, or email. It was passed without discussion by the GAE Commitee, but later amended by Chairman Spallone to remove that objectionable provision. According to the legislative web site it was not introduced for a vote in either house.

H.B. 6435 – AN ACT CONCERNING ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION AND PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT PROCEDURES.
CTVotersCount, the League of Women Voters, and Common Cause suported this bill. It was later amended to contain risky provisions for associated ballot security. The final version had an acceptable compromise treating associated ballots in a very similar manner to absentee ballots. It passed the House but was never taken up in the Senate. It was more likely than not to be vetoed by the Governor. However, it faced perhaps an even chance for a veto to be overriden.

H.B. 6437 – AN ACT CONCERNING AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE.
This bill would support the National Popular Vote Compact providing a back-door way for the popular election of the President. While sounding attractive it has serious unintended consequences. The bill was generally supported by Democrats and opposed by Republicans. CTVotersCount and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz opposed the Agreement. In early May, it squeaked by the House. Our reading is that it has luke warm support in the Senate and might not have passed there – it then would have faced an all but guaranteed veto, with no chance of override.

H.B. 6440 – AN ACT CONCERNING CERTAIN REVISIONS TO ELECTIONS RELATED STATUTES.
This was a so called “technical bill” requested by the Secretary of the State that would have made several minor changes in the election statutes, primarily changing details of wording and substance from lever “machines” to optical scan “tabulators”. Several groups opposed changes to loosen absentee ballot application distribution requirements – these provisions were removed. CTVotersCount opposed changes in the audit law that would have weakened the audit coverage of races; opposed provisons that would weaken the randomness of the audit while disproportionately adding audit costs to small and medium sized towns. We supported a provison to mandate completion of the audits within 10 business days of the election, replacing current provisions which mandate audits do not begin until 15 days after the election. A beneficial provision was added which would have provided for enforcement of audit procedures issued by the Secretary of the State. This bill passed the House on 5/21, but according to the legislative web site it was not introduced for a vote in the Senate. Overall we have mixed feelings on the bill given the plusses and minuses. We are surprised it was not passed by both houses by consent.

H.B. 6441 – AN ACT CONCERNING CONFIDENCE IN THE CONNECTICUT ELECTION SYSTEM.
Proposed and supported by CTVotersCount, this bill would have gone a long way to improve the integrity and efficiency of post-election audits, election results accounting, and the chain-of-custody in Connecticut. It would have closed many of the gaps identified by the Coaltion at negligible cost. We appreciate the support of our Senator and Representative (Handley and Kehoe) in initiating action. We appreciate the introduction and hearings on the bill initiated by GAE Chair Spallone. Unfortunately, the committee did not place a priority on the bill in this session. Our intentions are to continue to draw attention to the inadequacy of the current law, to propose an even more attractive bill next year, and to gather wider support.

H.J 113 – RESOLUTION AMENDING THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW EARLY VOTING. (And No Excuse Absentee Voting)
CTVotersCount is conditionally opposed to the expansion of absentee voting and early voting. There are integrity, security, and franchise concerns which need to be addressed. We do not have or see solutions to these concerns for scientific and practical reasons. This bill passed the GAE Committee but was not taken up by either house.

S.B. 909 – AN ACT CONCERNING TECHNICAL CHANGES TO ELECTION LAWS.
Supported by CTVotersCount. Technical changes proposed by the Secretary of the State’s Office. Passed by the GAE Commitee. Provisions largely rolled into an amendment to H.B. 6440 (see the discussion above on that bill)

S.B. 913 – AN ACT CONCERNING UNITED STATES SENATE VACANCIES
This bill would replace appointment of U.S. Senate vacancies by the Governor with an election. Was passed by the Senate and House. The Governor is expected to veto the bill. A veto override is likely. <Courant> < CT News Junkie>

S.J. 43 – RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION CONCERNING VOTING BY ABSENTEE BALLOT.
Passed the GAE Commitee, never taken up by either house. Provisons seem to have been rolled into H.J. 113 (see discussion under that bill above)

Barbara Simons: The Internet and Voting: Worth Doing Right

Recently we were dissapointed when the Huffington Post ran a PR piece from Everyone Counts touting their risky election technology used in a Honolulu election. Now, Huffington Post has provided a platform for an expert technologist’s view.

Recently we were dissapointed when the Huffington Post ran a PR piece from Everyone Counts touting their risky election technology used in a Honolulu election: Did Hawaii and Honolulu Defy Own Laws, Science, and Common Sense?. Now, Huffington Post has provided a platform for an expert technologist’s view.

Barbara Simons is the only technologist on the Board of Advisors of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. She is a recognized expert on voting integrity and security. She was also President of the Association for Computing Machinery.

She refutes the contention that technologists are intimidated by technology:

In response to multiple efforts to allow voting over the Internet in major elections, many of our nation’s prominent technology experts have signed a statement cautioning against adopting Internet-based voting systems without first understanding and guarding against the numerous and well-documented dangers. This is not because, as Mr. Contorer suggests, those opposing Internet voting find “[t]he introduction of technology to any process … scary”. The signatories to this statement are not at all intimidated by technology; in fact many are established experts in voting systems who are most certainly aware of the major risks associated with Internet voting.

Simons then explains that ATM Banking and voting are different:

The article asserts that since we are able to conduct banking and commerce over the Internet, we should also be able to vote over the Internet. This is a common misconception (or misrepresentation) that is often made when attempting to support Internet-based voting. Banks spend considerable time and money to ensure the security of our assets, yet there are still risks. Identity theft and fraud affect millions of Americans and cost billions of dollars each year. When we can detect such fraud it is because we are able to track our money through each transaction from start to finish, including the people associated with those transactions.

However, elections by their very definition disallow this type of explicit end-to-end auditing. Voters must cast their ballot in secret and not be able to prove to others how they voted. Election officials must not be able to tie votes to citizens except in very narrow circumstances as carved out by law. The lack of these basic protections make Internet-based voting a dangerous idea and place it so far from the realm of Internet banking or commerce as to make the author’s point moot.

There are significant security issues that any vendor must address before declaring such a system fit for public elections. Yet the author glosses over these security issues raised by Internet voting, referring several times to “military-grade encryption.” It is a well-known marketing technique of voting system vendors to tout the strength of their encryption because it sounds impressive. But the fact is that encryption is only a secondary part of any electronic security.

Technology can help in elections:

Americans deserve the best electoral system available. There are many options for making elections more accessible, secure, and efficient, and the Internet will have a role to play. Current possibilities that show promise include the easier maintenance of voter registration records and the distribution of blank absentee ballots. But we should not subject our democracy to the costs or risks of current Internet-based voting schemes.

We recommend reading the entire post <read>

Internet Voting: One of the Most Serious Threats to Democracy in the 21st Century

Now, President Obama has formally recognized the risks and insecurity of the internet. Given that recognition, the incidents we see reported almost daily, and those viruses that occasionally hit our computers, on what basis can anyone support internet voting?

Our headline parapharases and logically extends the concerns expressed yesterday by President Obama as quoted in a Hartford Courant article:

Calling the protection of government and private information and communications networks “one of the most serious … security challenges of the 21st century,” President Barack Obama plans to appoint a new adviser to oversee an effort at improving “cybersecurity” throughout the United States.

Private companies with revenue to gain, state legislators, and Federal committees have been touting the benefits of internet, fax, email, and even voting by phone. We along with other voting integrity advocates, security experts, CIA experts, and computer scientists have been warning of the risks to democracy.

Now, President Obama has formally recognized the risks and insecurity of the internet. Given that recognition, the incidents we see reported almost daily, and those viruses that occasionally hit our computers, on what basis can anyone support internet voting?

A second piece of postitive news is that the military internet voting bill in Connecticut, if it passes, will likely be in a version that precludes votes being returned electronically. In that form we support it along with other cost effective and secure methods which have been proposed in the U.S. Senate and House to help our soldiers vote.

Update 10/27/2009: Northrop Grumman report on the Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation <read>

This strategy, which relies on a simultaneous application of electronic warfare and computer network operations against an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks and other essential information systems, appears to be the foundation for Chinese offensive IW. Analysis of this strategy suggests that CNO tools will be widely employed in the earliest phases of a conflict, and possibly preemptively against an enemy’s information systems and C4ISR systems.

The PLA is training and equipping its force to use a variety of IW tools for intelligence gathering and to establish information dominance over its adversaries during a conflict. PLA campaign doctrine identifies the early establishment of information dominance over an enemy as one of the highest operational priorities in a conflict; INEW appears designed to support this objective.

Its not just China that could do this, and its not just warfare. Similar attacks could change election results and disclose votes. This is why internet, email, and fax voting should be a concern.

Same Day Voter Registration Passes Connecticut House

The bill, via an amendment which we understand was passed, provides essentially an absentee ballot for newly registered voters. This is a resonable compromise. We support the bill. However, we point out that absentee ballots centrally counted or hand counted remain exempt from Connecticut’s post-election audits.

CTNewsJunkie and the Courant have the story and the debate. We expect the Senate to pass the bill, but the Governor seems to be leaning toward a veto: From CTNewsJunkie:

While she’s reluctant to comment on any bill before it reaches her desk, Gov. M. Jodi Rell said Tuesday that it raises a lot of questions.

On her way up the stairs to her office Tuesday Rell said same-day voter registration may open up the process to “the possibility of fraud.” However, Rell said she hasn’t really considered the bill and doesn’t really have a firm opinion yet.

She said she can’t understand people who forget to register to vote. “You can’t help but know there’s an election coming these days,” Rell said.

We supported the initial version of the bill which provided a ticket to newly registered voters to go to their regular polling place – it could cause difficulties for voters with transportation issues. It was later replaced with a version that called for ballots to be filled out at the registration site with ambiguous direction for the handling of such votes – it provided very questionable security.

MN: Citizens for Election Integity: Audit and Recount Report

The voting machines used in the audited precincts were shown to be accurate. All recount observers felt the counting procedures were accurate and none questioned the integrity of the count. No systematic concerns were raised by observers in the post-election audit or recount. Some procedures are in need of improvement, such as the absentee ballot process.

We look forward to a day when the Connecticut audit results are equally reassuring

Citizens for Election Integrity, Minnesota, released a report on the 2008 post-election audit and recounts: CEIMN Non-Partisan Observation Report <read>

The voting machines used in the audited precincts were shown to be accurate. All recount observers felt the counting procedures were accurate and none questioned the integrity of the count. No systematic concerns were raised by observers in the post-election audit or recount. Some procedures are in need of improvement, such as the absentee ballot process.

The Citizens for Election Integrity should be proud of their observation and every citizen of Minnesota proud of the quality of the audit, recounts, and the election itself.

We look forward to a day when the Connecticut audit results are equally reassuring. From the Connecticut Coaltion November report:

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

Several audit supervisors attributed discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts to human limitations; other supervisors attributed these to inaccurate scanners. We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.

Minnesota Raw Numbers Reported To State: Differences in initial reported totals by counties between hand counts and the optical scanners: About 1 difference in 4800 votes

Connecticut Raw Numbers Reported To State: Differences in initial reported totals by municipalities between hand counts and the optical scanners: About 1 difference in 133 votes(*).

(*) These figures do not include cross-endorsed candidates and only recognize differences beyond those which could be attributed to votes classifed as questionable by election officials.

Update: Minnesota has a new Senator. It is about time, slow but very very sure democracy flurishes in Minnesota. Politico coverage <read>

Republican Norm Coleman has conceded to Democrat Al Franken in the Minnesota Senate race, ending one of the longest Senate races in American history and clearing the way for Democrats to hold a 60-seat supermajority in the Senate…

“The Supreme Court of Minnesota has spoken and I respect its decision and will abide by the result,” Coleman said. “It’s time for Minnesota to come together under the leaders it has chosen and move forward. I join all Minnesotans in congratulating our newest United States Senator – Al Franken

Did Hawaii and Honolulu Defy Own Laws, Science, and Common Sense?

Honolulu: Everyone Counts, a vendor, generates publicity for election conducted via internet and telephone.

But wait, there are more problems: Hawaii used Hart Interactive voting machines in 2008, yet they also violate Hawaii law in several ways, including apparently a prohibition on transmitting votes over the internet or phone lines. Now a judge has agreed with a citizen suit and has issued an injunction against their use in 2010.

Update: Voting Drops 83 Percent In All-Digital Election
Update: Look who is behind Everyone Counts

Update 09/15: Maui judge formalizes ruling that bans electronic voting <read>

Update 05/28: [Former] U.S. EAC Chair Cashes In to Head Company Running ‘All-Digital’ Elections <read>

Update 05/26: Voting Drops 83 Percent In All-Digital Election <read>

Perhaps there is more to it than the PR Releases disguised as news stories:

About 7,300 people voted this year, compared to 44,000 people who voted in the last neighborhood board race in 2007.

*****************

Honolulu: Everyone Counts, a vendor, generates publicity for election conducted via internet and telephone: <press release> Somehow this same organization convinced the Huffington Post to publish a similar puff piece written by an Everyone Counts executive: <read post>

For too long we have tolerated the idea that elections should be difficult. If you think voting is inconvenient, too bad for you, say pundits. And if elections are expensive and a logistical nightmare to run, oh well, at least there aren’t too many of them.

America’s newest state, our southernmost state, has a different idea. Right now, as you read this article on the Internet, citizens of Honolulu are voting in America’s first all-digital online and telephone election. Residents of neighborhoods with contested board seats received pass-codes in the mail, along with a Web address and a phone number allowing them to vote at any time, day or night, from anywhere in the world.

Recall that the telephone and internet are less than secure. We have convered the risks of internet voting several times <read>. We are amazed that anyone would trust the phone system, realizing that any phone can be tapped, the phone companies and the NSA have demonstrated their ability to ignore law and listen in to any and all phone calls.

1. The use of electronic voting machines was not adopted through lawful rulemaking in accordance with the Hawai’i Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA).

2. The use of the Internet and/or telephone lines to transmit vote counts was not adopted through lawful rulemaking (HAPA).

3. The use of the Internet and/or telephone lines to transmit vote counts is not allowed under current state law.

Last year Ellen Theisen of VotersUnite.org wrote an extensive report on the perils of outsourcing elections. Hawaii was one of the highlighted jurisdictions in the study. The index entry summarizes the situation:

Hawaii. State officials have handed elections to voting system vendors. Now the state cannot run elections without a vendor.

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 2 – Counting Not Extremely Accurate

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified. Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>. Yesterday, in Part 1, we covered the Memory Card Report. Today, in Part 2 we highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s commitment to solve the problems identified. Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Summary Three Reports On The November Post-Election Audits

From the Secretary of the State’s Press Release, December 12th, 2008, headlined: BYSIEWICZ: RESULTS OF POST ELECTION AUDIT SHOW ACCURATE ELECTION DAY MACHINE COUNTS:

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz announced today that post election audits conducted in 10% of all voting precincts in Connecticut have shown extremely accurate machine counts on Election Day November 4, 2008. An initial review of the audit results has been completed by the Office of the Secretary of State, and the results will now undergo a complete, independent analysis by the University of Connecticut’s Voting Technology Research Center under the direction of Dr. Alexander Shvartsman.

“We set a record in Connecticut on November 4th with 1.64 million people casting ballots and Election Day went remarkably smoothly,” said Secretary Bysiewicz. “The results of this audit indicate, once again, that the optical scan voting system is secure and extremely accurate. Connecticut voters can be confident in the integrity of our elections and that their votes were counted correctly. Still, I’m not asking anyone to simply take my word for it: that’s why these post-election procedures are so important. We want to shine the light on the electoral process, before and after all votes are cast…

While the audits did uncover accurate machine counts on Election Day, there were discrepancies in isolated cases involving the hand-count audits for some ballots marked with votes for major party candidates who were cross endorsed by minor parties.

From the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition Report, January 28, 2009 (I was the lead author of this report):

In this report, we conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of

* standards,
* detailed guidance for counting procedures, and
* consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

We also note continuing failures to follow audit and chain-of-custody procedures.

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

The Coaltion report highlighted many discrepancies in votes and ballot counts that exceded questionable ballot counts and that did not involve cross-endorsed candidates <read>

From the UConn Post-Election Audit Report, May 12 2009:

The VoTeR Center]s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unacceptably high unexplained differences between hand and machine counts…As a result the [Secretary of the State’s] Office performed additional information-gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand counting of ballots…

The main conclusion in this report is that for all cases where non-trivial discrepancies were originally reported, it was determined that hand counting errors or vote misallocation were the causes. No discrepancies in these cases were reported to be attributable to machine tabulation. For the original data where no follow up investigation was performed, the discrepancies were small, in particular the average reported discrepancy is lower than the number of votes that were determined to be questionable…

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the hand counting remains an error prone activity. In order to enable a more precise analysis it is recommended that the hand counting precision is substantially improved in future audits. The completeness of the audit reports also need to be addressed…

This analysis does not include 42 records (3.2% of 1311 [candidate race counts]) that were found to be incomplete, unusable or obviously incorrect. This an improvement relative to the November 2007 elections.

The Secretary of the State and her Office, are rightfully proud of proposing the audit to the Legislature in 2007. Based on the municipal reports from November, we asked for public follow-up investigations of the initial audit results, at least starting with the largest and most blatant discrepancies and incomplete forms. We appreciate that follow-up of the largest discrepancies was initiated. Yet, we are disappointed that the investigations were not open to public observation and that all incomplete forms were not investigated.

Our comments and concerns:

The investigations prove that Election Officials in many Connecticut municipalities are not yet able to count votes accurately. As we have noted, we appreciate that the largest discrepancies were investigated. We asked for that as a minimum. Yet without reliable counting, initially, or via follow-up we find no reason to agree that the audits prove the machines in Connecticut were “extremely accurate”. Reports in several other states show that officials and machines can count quite accurately. Some audits and recounts by hand show occasionally that initial reported election results created on election night by people and machines are inaccurate because of human and machine errors — that is what is supposed to happen, exactly what audits are designed to do. (We plan on developing a detailed post discussing counting accuracy and reasonable expectations in the near term)
The audit and the audit report are incomplete. The report “does not include 43 records (3.2% of 1311) that were found to be incomplete, unusable, or obviously incorrect”. When we overlook obvious errors, then in future elections creating obvious errors is another route to avoiding detection of errors or fraud — If the counts don’t match, just don’t report the result.
Even with all the investigations and adjustments we have many unexplained discrepancies. The largest discrepancies were investigated, leaving 98 cases of discrepancies greater than 4 and 34 cases greater than 9. Or 68 with discrepancies over 2% including 31 with discrepancies over 5% of the vote. (Table 1 and Table 2 of the UConn report) We are reminded of Ohio in the same November 2008 election, where a discrepancy of 5 ballots was a matter of serious national concern. With effective initial counting, there should be a small number of counts requiring investigation.
The Chain-of-Custody is critical to credibility. Even the some of the originally reported data which closely matched machine totals lacks credibility — based on lapses in the chain-of-custody of ballots prior to the initial municipal counting. In several cases the ballots were not resealed after the initial audit counts, and are thus less than fully credible. Once again, we do not have any reason to suspect errors or fraud, we just point out the lack of following procedures, the holes in credibility, and the openings for covering errors and fraud in elections.
The entire audit process should be open to observation. We do not doubt the hard work and integrity of the Secretary of the State’s election staff of seven, several of whom recounted ballots and performed research in a number of towns. If the recounting and field research had been open to the public, we might be in a position to vouch for the integrity of the process. We, not the public, were informed of the initial “site visits” but our request that they be open to the public, or at least open to us, was to no avail. If any critical part of the audit is performed out of public view, it leaves questions for the public and opens up another avenue for fraud or for errors to be covered up.
Either “questionable ballot” classification is inaccurate in many towns or we have a “system problem”. Based on our analysis of the audit results and our observations during 18 post election audits, we find that election officials classified way more votes as questionable than necessary. In most cases only a very small number, 1 or 2 votes per candidate, are filled out poorly enough not to counted by the machine, but several towns classify large numbers as questionable. This is a problem as it opens a hole for real problems to go undetected. When 10% of ballots are incorrectly classified as questionable it opens up the possibility of not recognizing a problem of a 10% undercount for a candidate.
Conversely, if the officials are reasonably classifying questionable ballets, then we have a system that 5%, 10%, or 25% of voters in several towns are actually unable to use properly. That would really be a serious “system problem” that needs to be addressed – by better systems not by smarter voters. (If we actually have such a “system problem” then we have a very poor ballot layout, much worse than other states, much worse than the legendary “butterfly ballot” in Florida 2000.)
Accuracy and the appearance of objectivity are important. We disagree with the Secretary of the State’s initial assessment on December 12 when all the data from the municipalities was available, but no UConn report was available. Secretary Bysiewicz said the audits “have shown extremely accurate machine counts”. While it may actually be the case, the accuracy of all scanners in the audit cannot be proven based on the data available now, and less so based on the data available in December.
Timeliness is important. We have reports and follow-up, long after the election: The election was November 4th, the audit was complete in early December, the Presidential electors were certified on December 14th, the initial “site visits” began on January 19th and were complete by January 23rd, the data from the initial “site visits” were sent to UConn on February 18th, and further follow up data on April 3, 2009. The report is dated on May 12, 2009 — over six months after the election. The longer the delay the colder the trail of evidence, the more opportunity for cover-up, and the less value the data.
When the Presidential electors were certified on December 14th, there were huge obvious discrepancies. What if a race for President, a U.S. Representative, or State Legislator was close? Would there have been a swifter response even though the machines were declared “extremely accurate” at that point?

Our bottom line:

The problem is not that there were machine problems. We have no evidence there were any. The problem is that when there are or ever were, dismissing all errors as human counting errors, we are unlikely to find a problem. In this audit, the worst discrepancies were investigated, which proved that many discrepancies in these audits were human errors — not surprisingly based on observation of inadequate counting. However, a sample does not prove all discrepancies are human errors.
We stand by our recommendations and the recommendations of other groups for what is required to have effective, credible audits. CTVotersCount Petition 2009, Coalition Recommendations, Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits, and The League Of Women Voters Report on Election Audits.
The current Audit Process in Connecticut demonstrates the need for audits to be Independent and focused on election integrity, not just machine certification reliability. Even with hard work and high integrity the appearance of integrity is questionable when the Election Officials and the State’s Chief Election Official are responsible for both the audit the election. We know of no other area of business or Government where something labeled an “audit” is this far from independent. If the purpose of the audit were to just check if the machines can work as certified and not to uncover and rectify instances of error and fraud, then improved audit execution and tweaks of the current law might suffice. Yet, for the audits to provide election integrity we need a credible audit that is completed in time to adjust election results, that includes an audit of the entire process, and one that subjects all ballots and machines to selection for audit. The current law has too many exemptions which all represent opportunities for error or fraud to go undetected.

Secretary Bysiewicz supported independent audits in 2008 when they failed to pass the Connecticut Legislature. She reiterated her commitment to independent audits and having a completely open process in a letter to CTVotersCount petition signers earlier this year, sent on January 23rd:

We supported the creation of an Independent Audit Board last legislative session as the next step in improving the administration of audits in our state. We also supported a bill that would require one hundred percent (100%) testing of memory cards prior to thier use. Of course, we will continue to support that type of refinement to our current process.

Our audit law requires that audits be conducted in public. I have long been a strong advocate of openness and transparency in government. We will advocate for the types of improvments suggested in the petition (e.g. that all audit activiteis should occur in public)...

We will work very hard to maintain the gains we have made against any effort to pull away from these basic security measures, like audits, on the ground that we face financial challenges in the state and local level. Like you, I strongly believe that such measures are critical to maintaining public confidence in our electoral process and constitute a small price to pay for ensuring that our elections function properly.

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 1 – Bad Cards, Procedural Lapses Continue

This week the University of Connecticut VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report. In Part 2 we will highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Summary

From the press release:

My office entered into this historic partnership with the University of
Connecticut VoTeR Center so that we could receive an independent, unbiased accounting of Connecticut’s optical scan voting machines,” said Bysiewicz. “The results of these two studies confirm that numbers tallied by the optical scanners were remarkably accurate on Election Day November 4, 2008. Voters should feel confident that their votes were secure and accurately counted.

From the Post-Election Memory Card Audit Report:

In summary. (1) all cards used in the election were properly programmed, (2) cards with junk data continues to be a problem, and additional analysis is in progress to determine the cause, (3) a number of cards show that the pre-election procedures are not followed uniformly and that cards continue to be duplicated; we recommend a stronger policy statement is needed on handling the cards before and during the election an disallowing memory card duplication.

The Secretary of the State, her Office, and UConn are rightfully proud of initiating the audit in 2008 and instituting the unique memory card testing program. We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified:

From the Press Release:

“Overall, I’m pleased that our first pre- and post-testing procedures with UConn demonstrate the security of our office’s chain of custody practices with election officials,” said Bysiewicz. “However, the percentage of unreadable cards is still too high and we await UConn’s forthcoming investigation into possible causes and recommended solutions for guidance on this issue. In the interim we will provide additional training to local election officials to make sure regulations concerning the handling and security of memory cards used by the optical scanners are uniformly followed throughout the State of Connecticut.”

From the Secretary of the State’s May 14th Newsletter:

Moving forward, my office will continue to improve the training we give to Registrars of Voters and local election officials to reduce any further errors in counting. We will also start new training within weeks to improve the security of memory cards used by the optical scanners to record votes on Election Day.

Our comments and concerns:

This is not a random audit of memory cards. We continue to applaud this unique memory card testing program, yet it is a registrar selected set of memory cards, not exhaustive, not a random sample. 297 cards used in the election were tested out of 833 districts. This opens a huge hole for covering up errors and fraud – just don’t send in your card. It also biases any statistics one way or another based on which cards tend to be sent to UConn.
9% error memory card failure rate is bad enough, but is it the actual rate? 9% of all cards sent to UConn had memory problems. These are all classified as cards not used in the election, if so, the rate would be 41/142 or 29%. We wonder if many bad cards are found in the process of testing and not used in the election thus not counted in the audit. Or could some of these cards have worked in the election and failed subsequently? Bottom line we don’t know the actual failure rate % since we don’t have a random sample. The 9% is within the range of previous UConn pre and post election tests <all UConn Reports> <Our Past Commentary>
There is a serious failure of officials to follow procedures. A rate of 34% or 144 failures to follow procedures on 421 non-junk-data cards is a serious pervasive problem. (52-Not Set for Election, 20 Results Print Aborted, 2-Set for Election, Zero Counters, 41-Duplication Events, 29-Zero Totals Printed Before Date of Election) In some cases multiple problems may have occurred on the same card so the number of districts detected as failing to follow procedures is likely a bit less that the 34%. (This paragraph has corrected numbers, in an earlier version we had double counted some of the errors)Once again, this is not a random sample yet it’s a totally unacceptable level of not following procedures. The report correctly suggests these should be changed through better training and instruction to municipalities. If procedures are necessary, then when they are not followed it means there is an opportunity for problems to occur. This should cause everyone to wonder to what extent other unaudited election procedures are regularly not followed. Most procedures are in place because they are intended to prevent election day problems, errors, and fraud. In fact, this memory card finding is very consistent with the Audit Coaltion Reports which have consistently shown a significant level of failures to follow procedures, for instance the chain-of-custody failures described in the most recent Coalition report <read>

Our bottom line:

A non-random partial post-election audit of memory cards is useful, but it is insufficient. A more rigorous sampling process would yield more accurate information and, just as importantly, it would eliminate the existing opportunity for errors or fraud to be covered up by not sending the cards for testing. Last year we proposed and the GAE Committee passed 100% pre-election independent testing of memory cards. We stand by that recommendation to protect the cards from front-end insider fraud and to make it less likely that election officials have to deal with junk data cards. Post-election random testing or 100% testing of memory cards is also advisable.
How many more tests, reports, and elections will it take before the junk data problem is significantly reduced? Ridiculous, Unacceptable, Unconscionable come to mind to describe the junk data problem. 5%, 9%, 20% or even 1% is way out of line for electronic equipment. Why do we stand for it? What about all the other states that use this exact same technology, why are they putting up with it?
Almost every failure to follow procedures is an opportunity to cause problems, cover up errors, or cover up fraud. Perhaps it is easier to understand human failure to follow procedures exactly, every time. Once again no mater if failure to follow procedures is 5%, 10%, 20% or 40% in handling memory cards it points to a likely much higher rate of failure to follow all procedures. How can we have confidence in elections with such a lack of ability or attention to following procedures, many of which are performed outside of public view, outside of audits purview to discover. We can only hope that the Registrars of Voters will join in the commitment to meet a much higher standard.

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Related story 5/28: Diebold memory card problems in Florida — a different model, this time it is high speed wireless cards <read>

Safe Ways To Protect And Speed Military Votes

Protecting the Military Vote. High security, high privacy, low cost. Bills by Republicans in the U.S. Senate and a Democrat in the U.S. House.

Senator Schumer(D) is holding hearings on military voting delays and lost votes. Senators Inhof(R) and Chrnyn(R) are offering legislation to get the job done, without risking security and privacy <American Chronicle Story>

The legislation attempts to reduce delays in the current absentee voting process for our overseas troops by allowing the U.S. Postal Service to express-ship their completed absentee ballots to local election offices. The bill amends the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) and ensures that the ballots are delivered to the appropriate state election officials by the jurisdiction´s statutory deadline, while safeguarding voter privacy and ballot secrecy.

And from Representative Rush Holt(D): <H.R.2082>

To amend the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act to require States to accept absentee ballots of overseas military and civilian voters which are submitted by the voter to a provider of express mail services not later than the day before the date of the election involved for transmission to the appropriate State election official, to require the Secretary of Defense to reimburse overseas military voters for the costs of using a provider of express mail services to transmit the ballot to the official, and for other purposes.

These are the right ways to do it. No need to compromise security. No need for Connecticut’s Secretary of the State to develop methods that Computer Scientists and the Department of Defense are unable to develop. No need to spend upwards of $500 per vote. Earlier coverage <here>

National Popular Vote Squeaks Through Connecticut House

Initially defeated by 1 vote, legislators change their votes.

Most votes on this bill are along party lines with Democrats generally for the bill and Republicans generally against the bill. However, there are prominent Democrates who oppose the Agreement including Connecticut Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz and Minnesota Secretary of State, Mark Ritchie.

The National Popular Vote Agreement passed the Connecticut House after initially being defeated by one vote. See how your representative voted <here> As reported by the Hartford Courant <read>

The vote was a nail-biter to the end, and it passed only after four veteran Democrats switched their votes from negative to affirmative: Deputy House Speakers Robert Godfrey of Danbury and Emil “Buddy” Altobello of Meriden, and Reps. Peggy Sayers of Windsor Locks and Peter Tercyak of New Britain.

As frequent CTVotersCount readers are aware we strongly oppose the National Popular Vote Agreement. For more information read our Case Against The National Popular Vote or a recent talk by Conn College Professor Dorothy B. James.

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Update: Similar articles at CTNewsJunkie.com, TheDay, and ConnPolitics.tv . Here is a conglomerate of my comments on those sites:

There are other reasons to be against the National Popular Vote agreement: 1)The national vote number is not accurate, it is the result of error prone counts in various states which usually would not matter except in close swing states. 2)There is no national recount law to correct those results. 3)Close elections can be expected to all end at the Supreme Court as voters could sue their Secretary of the State for using unreliable results.

Mr. Ritchie’s opposition is based, in part, on the fact that there is no national recount law that would provide a number that would have any hope of being credible.

Since state electors would be awarded by Secretaries of the State based on questionable results in other states, I can see close elections all ending up in the Supreme Court based on voters suing their Secretary and others states’ Secretaries based on providing or relying on questionable results.

Also, in passing, I mention that the following argument is questionable:

“In 2008, candidates concentrated over two-thirds of their money and campaign visits in just six states and 98 percent of their money in just 15 states, a press release touting the bills passage said.”

This is a media centric concern. In recent elections almost all of the media money goes to out of state media moguls. Does the average voter in Connecticut need more phone calls and candidate ads to be better informed? No. Do candidates have to visit Connecticut for the election to be covered responsibly by the Connecticut media? I doubt it.

Several comments on those sites are from “mvymvy” who shows up on many blogs, with comments as useful and redundant as his or her name, but does not actually address the issues that we bring up. I suspect because the facts and logic are with our arguments.