Editorial: Understand all the Symptoms, Explore the Options, Then Act

Editorials and legislators are already reacting and taking sides to solve the “ballot printing” problem.
It is critical to understand the entire scope of issues and inadequacies in all aspects of the election process; then review all the options, look for local best practices in Connecticut and explore what other states do well; then and only then develop a comprehensive cure. This is the common sense way to proceed, unfortunately it is hard work from start to implementation. Otherwise we are destined to react to one problem at a time, with one expensive, disruptive band-aid after another.

Background: Reacting to one symptom at a time

The problems in Bridgeport stem directly from a series of errors and faults. The specific details will likely come out in calmer times. They include a combination of:

Ordering an unjustifiably low number of ballots based on past history
No review of that order in the light of Obama’s visit and the predicted closeness of the election
Lack of awareness in polls and/or city hall of the pending lack of ballots
Lack of timely reaction to the pending and actual lack of ballots
Lack of detailed standards for handling pending and actual lack of ballots

Solutions also revolve around ballot printing. The obvious solutions to the “ballot printing” problem:

Legislating enough ballots for all voters plus some spares
Not leaving ballot printing to the judgment of local officials
Legislating a minimum based on a formula based on past similar elections
Formal procedures to initiate, obtain, and protect emergency ballots
State funding of ballot printing

Editorials and legislators are already reacting and taking sides e.g. <Editorial NH Register> <AP: Lawmakers will try to fix ballot problems>. We point out that printing 100% of ballots would average on the order of $500,000 a year over printing enough for expected voters plus a generous margin, while post-election audits average on the order of $120,000 per year.

We are seeing several even more wide ranging reactions triggered by the problem with ballots. They include changing from optical scan to more risky, unproven, and expensive solutions: Touch Screens (DREs) are expensive, lead to long lines, unauditable, risky, and expensive. Internet voting is unproven, expensive, unauditable, risky and expensive. Others include making the Secretary of the State an appointed official.

Editorial: Understand All The Symptoms, Explore Options, Then Act

Ballot printing is only one weakness in the current system. Other major weaknesses include, but are no means limited to:

Inadequate ballot security and chain of custody
Lack of standards and uniformity in all aspects of election management, especially ballot security, post-election audits, and recanvasses.
Inaccurate, unreliable, non-transparent accumulation of vote totals for certification which also are critical to determine recanvass levels, and ballot access for third parties
Inadequate training of and for election officials at all levels
Lack of oversight and inspection of compliance in all areas including, election management, ballot security, post-election audits, and vote accounting
Ambiguous, incomplete, hard to comprehend manuals, procedures and directives
Our laws have not been fully updated to reflect optical scanning and paper ballots. Overall there is ambiguity between the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of the State, Elections Enforcement, and the 339 registrars of voters

After the 2007 election, in early 2008 the General Administration and Elections Committee of the Legislature held five public hearings, one in each of our Congressional districts to understand issues with the first optical scan election. Yet little has changed. Perhaps it is time for more hearings covering a range of issues surrounding voting in Connecticut – not just in every district but also multiple hearings focused on various areas of election management.

It is critical to understand the entire scope of issues and inadequacies in all aspects of the election process; then review all the options, look for local best practices in Connecticut and explore what other states do well; then and only then develop a comprehensive cure. This is the common sense way to proceed, unfortunately it is hard work from start through implementation.

Otherwise we are destined to react to one problem at a time, with one expensive, disruptive band-aid after another – following a series of unnecessary election controversies.

Bridgeport Newspaper up too late? Listening to voting vendor, suggests unsafe sophisticated voting system to Connecticut

What happened in D.C. in an Internet voting test was largely a result of very very poor security on the voting system and the D.C. Internet itself. An electronic version of the incompetence exposed in Bridgeport…what makes anyone think they can do better with a system that is scientifically proven risky and requires high technical expertise and flawless oversight just to make it moderately safe, when they cannot even work the current system?

CTPost article posted last night at 11:35 pm: Toward an end to long lines at the polls, miscounts and other election fouls <read>

Update: Stamford Advocate: UConn Professor suggests ATMs would be different but voters still need paper records. Legislator says he fought eliminating lever machines and now favors appointing the Secretary of the State. Election snafus may tarnish Bysiewicz’s stature <read> See after CTPost.

Connecticut Post

Here is their case:

We need a better method of casting our votes. Our system is antiquated. All of these optical scanners, which resemble clunky first-generation fax machines, are only slight improvement over the old lever voting machines. In Connecticut, you can pay your property tax bills on line, purchase beach stickers for your vehicle, and trawl through your kids’ test scores and attendance records at school. You can even pay your federal taxes this way, too. Why can’t you register to vote and cast your ballot online? The time is now for Internet voting. Seventy-seven percent of us have Internet access, and the figure is constantly climbing. Those who don’t have it at home can either access it at work or a library.

Thirty-three states permitted some form of Internet voting this electoral season. The Land of Steady Habits, as we are all aware, is not one of those states.

We point out that NONE of those states as far as we know are doing much other than a pilot for military and overseas voters under an unfortunate provision of an otherwise laudable Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act (MOVE) well implemented by Connecticut. As we have characterized this before, Damn the science, Damn the integrity, If it feels good do it.

And where does the paper go for unbiased information?

Degregorio is director of elections for Every Vote Counts, a California-based Internet voting firm. “Internet voting is being used every single day as it has been for the past 10 years, in the private sector,” Degregorio says. “Many boards of directors, unions use it for official purposes to elect their leaders, trustees and pension plan administrators. It’s been this way for the past 10 years,” says Paul for the past Security was on the minds of those overseeing Washington, D.C.’s election as it launched a pilot project to test the integrity of its new voting system for collecting overseas and military absentee ballots. The result? Within hours, computer students at the University of Michigan and their professors hacked into the system. The firm that developed Washington, D.C.’s Internet voting for overseas and military absentee balloting, is an “inexperienced outfit,” Degregorio says, adding that it used a flawed and “sloppy source code.”

As CTVotersCount readers are aware, computer scientists, security experts, and voting integrity advocates have long opposed Internet voting based on the theoretical impossibility of making it safe. As was demonstrated dramatically in the rapid, successful attack on the Washington D.C. test system by professors and students from the University of Michigan, followed by expert testimony regarding the general barriers to developing a successful system: Internet Voting Faces The Music: Hats off to D.C. and Michigan.

And the CTPost’s detailed rebuttal of the testimony in D.C.:

Should the District of Columbia’s experience discourage us from pursuing Internet voting as a replacement for the system we have? Absolutely not.

I have posted a short comment on the article to help edify the Post and the public:

The Help America Vote act was also designed to increase voting integrity. The safest most reliable means under HAVA is paper ballots and optical scanning. But that breaks down with poor chain of custody with a lack of security and not following election procedures.

Electronic voting over the Internet does not have the paper backup. No reputable computer scientist or security expert supports it, nobody has developed a safe system of Internet voting…and scientists have so far proven it would be impossible to do that.

What happened in D.C. in an Internet voting test was largely a result of very very poor security on the voting system and the D.C. Internet itself. An electronic version of the incompetence exposed in Bridgeport…what makes anyone think they can do better with a system that is scientifically proven risky and requires high technical expertise and flawless oversight just to make it moderately save[safe*], when they cannot even work the current system?

Also you have extensively quoted a voting system vendor without balancing information from mainstream experts who oppose Internet voting. Would you go to Blackwater to get advice on choosing between the alternatives of going to war vs. negotiation?

For more on the D.C. test and related testimony by scientists etc. see: https://www.ctvoterscount.org/internet-voting-faces-the-music-hats-off-to-d-c-and-michigan/

Luther Weeks
CTVotersCount.org

PS: I am certainly not defending the current state of voting laws and process in Connecticut.

(*) Maybe I have been up too late the last two days observing recanvasses! As I have said before, I am human, far from perfect, and warn that I have served as an election official.

Stamford Advicate

Professor said ATMs would have eliminated these problems but voters need paper:

If Bysiewicz had purchased ATM-style machines after the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002, instead of the scanning technology, the Bridgeport controversy might have been avoided, he said.

“But even those ATM-like machines have problems,” Moscardelli said. “Voters prefer to have some way of verifying the vote on paper.”

Legislator suggests appointing SOTS and that he was against optical scan.

McKinney remembered arguing with Bysiewicz over the HAVA voting systems. During the process of obtaining the equipment, Bysiewicz had to rebid the contract.

“I spent a year or two fighting the optical scanners,” he recalled. “We publicly cautioned her, warning that just because they weren’t manufacturing the old lever voting machines anymore, maybe we could bring some manufacturing back to our state, maybe to Bridgeport. She was more anxious to get the scanners.”

…McKinney said the Election Day debacle in Bridgeport may rekindle the issue of voting technology. He wonders if the secretary of the state, which was established in 1639, is an outdated job.

“The reality is she’s an extraordinarily ambitious politician who used her office as secretary of the state for higher office when she simply should have been doing her job,” McKinney said.

“I think her abject failure to do her job properly leads me to wonder whether or not we should elect the secretary of the state or have it as a position appointed by the governor,” he said. “If it’s appointed, we’re much less likely to have someone there looking for higher office.”

Connecticut Governor Race: Integrity Issues

From the details we have so far, we can start our list of issues with the situation in Bridgeport. We continue our issues with election integrity in Connecticut, especially in close elections.

Initial assessment…to be updated and subject to further editing. 4:00pm – extensive editing.

Yesterday as the ballot issues developed in Bridgeport, I was at work as a central count absentee ballot moderator in Vernon, CT. Sometime during the evening we heard some sketchy details about what happened. Our focus was on getting our count complete. After we were done I listened to more sketchy details along with some election results, as I waited in the registrars office for my turn to have our results checked and be submitted to contribute to Vernon’s totals – a few more Bridgeport details emerged. The complexity of the election required extra time and care to calculate the results in each district, especially even the relatively small number of hand counted ballots. There were may races and most had cross-endorsed, “fusion” voting candidates. That also required extra time and extra care reviewing and accumulating results for all the districts.

At this point 10:00am , reading several news reports, some of the details are still sketchy and the initial election results are yet to be fully reported. According to the Hartford Courant at this point, with 90% of the districts reporting, Tom Foley-R leads Dan Malloy-D by a bit over 11,000 votes, yet the Courant reports Bridgeport unofficially as adding enough to give Malloy about a 1,500 vote lead. Yet, that still leaves a large number of other districts unaccounted for, perhaps most notably, Danbury where Foley’s running mate, Mark Boughton is Mayor.

Yet, from the details we have so far, we can start our list of issues with the situation in Bridgeport:

An annoying lack of ballots. Like many municipalities in this election, Bridgeport, most notably the February 2008 Presidential Primary. We don’t know why Bridgeport did not print enough ballots: inaccurate calculations, inaccurate projections/guesstimates, false economy, or local politics? The logistics is complicated by having ten different ballot formats covering the 25 polling districts.
Usually just an annoyance to the public. Faced with a shortage of ballots, registrars make paper copies of ballots which can be counted by hand, but not our scanners. This annoys voters who would rather vote on an official, scanned ballot. This annoys the public because they suspect skulduggery and want the results quickly.
And a concern to voting integrity advocates. This concerns voting integrity advocates like CTVotersCount because we prefer the dual safety of optical scanners and paper ballots. In addition, Connecticut officials have a poor track record in counting complicated ballots, especially those with cross-endorsed candidates <here> and <here> in audits, when they are well rested and under observation, with optical scanner results to compare with their counts! Unfortunately, we have no faith, coupled with no evidence to provide assurance that hand counts late at night by tired officials are close to accurate – hand counted ballots are never audited in Connecticut. We do have evidence that officials do not always count accurately in the audits, and many claims by officials that they are unable to accurately count paper ballots.
Becomes an issue of voter disenfranchisement. Unlike other municipalities that have faced the same problem, Bridgeport did not react quickly enough. Apparently from the reports (sketchy) the ballots were not copied to be available in time to prevent some districts from running out. Apparently voters were turned away or quit waiting. Why copies were not available in time is worth understanding. It lead to these real issues of disenfranchisement.
Judge steps in to solve disenfranchisement, resulting in additional serious fairness issues. The polls were mandated to be open an extra two hours, but the voting was not limited to those in line by 8:00pm. Voters were robo-called by the town to explain that the polls would be open to 10:00pm. This would certainly mitigate the disenfranchisement problem, but likely cause more voters to vote than originally would have. Tentative results were available before that time showing that Malloy and Congressional candidate Jim Himes, both Democrates were behind. With Bridgeport highly Democratic an opportunity was open for voters to know that their votes might well change the result. Clearly if Malloy wins the election, it will be up to the courts to sort out how to determine how Connecticut’s next governor is chosen.

We continue our issues with election integrity in Connecticut, especially in close elections:

Connecticut calls for a close vote recanvass in very close elections. It is not a recount: We have pointed out recanvasses inadequacies for sufficient accuracy and transparency for very close elections.
Even a recanvass calls for a very close vote: The law calls for a recanvass when the difference is 0.5%, but a maximum of 2000 votes, which amounts to a bit less than 0.2% (correction, earlier version said .02% — no consolation to admit that I am human and an election official) in this race. If Malloy gains just 500 more votes or Foley gains 3,500 more there will be not be a recanvass.
Connecticut has an error prone, difficult to verify way of accumulating votes. We use a three step process of manual counting and transcription to report summary results. In 2008, in just one municipality, a large error was included in statewide results, several times greater than the 2000 vote limit for recanvasses. So, just one error in initial reporting could easily avoid a critical recanvass, and the opportunity for a subsequent court ordered recount — and result in the incorrect winner declared.
Another “opportunity” for skulduggery hidden as incompetence: Knowing all the other reports, just one “innocent” transposition in one result not yet reported could prevent a recanvass for an apparent winner or cause one for an apparent looser. Or holding back on correcting a discovered error could also provide the same opportunity.

Update 11:31 Malloy now leads by 631 votes with 692 of 751 districts reporting, Danbury still not reported. (These are AP results, not the official results from the Secretary of the State’s Office.

Update: 2:00: Bysiewicz announces Malloy is the winner and no “recount”, without complete results. Margin sits at about 3000 votes about 1000 from recanvass. <read>

Dannel Malloy has won the election for governor, and there will be no statewide recount, Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz announced this afternoon.

Even though votes in the governor’s race were still being counted, both Democrat Dan Malloy and Republican Tom Foley were inching closer to declaring victory Wednesday morning.

Meanwhile, Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz said if there is a recount, it could be weeks before the winner is known.

We point out:

We don’t have a recount but a recanvass, by law, even our Secretary of the State is usually imprecise on that
When all the votes are officially reported the winner might well change and we could easily be in recanvass territory
By law the recanvass must be completed within five business days from the election. This is the first we have heard from the Secretary that she predicts such cannot be accomplished. Several recanvasses in the 2nd congressional district, such as 2006, were completed within the law

Also listening and calling in to the Colin McEnroe show with guest, Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz and other callers including candidate Tom Foley:

The Secretary points out the advantage of having both a Democratic and Republican registrar watching out for voters interests in Bridgeport. Later the Secretary talked about discussions in the Legislature toward making registrars single non-elected officials, and then requiring their certification.
Tom Foley was not comfortable with the announcement of the winner without official results, he is anxious to reconcile results with the Secretary’s office.
[In a similar vein, we are also working to reconcile the Audit Coalition Post-Election Audit Results of the August Primary with the Official UConn report which has been forwarded to us by the Secretary of the State’s Office. The UConn report shows much less differences than the Coalition report. It has yet to be published on the UConn site.]
I did get to ask the Secretary to reconcile her statements in the Courant that the recanvass would take several weeks, with the law and past experience. She did agree that it would and must be completed by next Tuesday. We both agree if subsequent to the recanvass, a court ordered recount might take weeks.
Weeks or months, there will likely be quite a difference in Connecticut based on which candidate wins. A Democratic Legislature will continue. With two candidates from two different parties there will be a dramatic difference in plans and gridlock.

Update 10:50pm: AP has Folley up by 8,424, withdraws call for Malloy, Bysiewicz yet to release results supporting her statement of Malloy lead of 3,103. According to Channel 8 <read>

Update 11/4 11:00pm: Out of state most of the day. Susan Bysiewicz scheduled a press conference to announce results, delayed it, and then said would not announce official results today. Now I am back we find that Bridgeport suddenly realized that they did not count one bag of 335 ballots. Foley calls a foul. I suspect incompetence. From CTNewsJunkie: “Found” Bag Of 335 Ballots Opened, Counted <read>

Bridgeport missed a legal deadline to finish counting its votes at 6 p.m. Wednesday. It’s still counting votes late into Thursday night. When they finish, Connecticut may finally find out whether Republican Foley or Democrat Dan Malloy is the state’s next chief elected official.

A tired worker responsible for counting ballots at the JFK School polling place she apparently went home after Tuesday night’s elections before the work was done. Only on Thursday night—when, because of a whole bunch of mistakes and problems in Bridgeport’s vote, officials were still busy working on an official tally—did the existence of the bag of uncounted ballots left behind become known.

Chris Covucci, Foley’s state field director, was present as Amy Espinosa opened the bag Thursday night. He objected to the decision to count these ballots. He said they should be taken to a neutral place and counted by a third party.

“We don’t know where they’ve been,” he said…

Bridgeport Republican Registrar of Voters Joe Borges confirmed in an interview that moderator Espinosa went home without finishing counting after the election Tuesday night. She left behind the bag of photocopied ballots—facsimiles of official ballots that Bridgeport gave to voters after real ballots ran out.

The bag contained 335 ballots. Officials had kept it sealed and say they knew of its existence.

Borges quoted Espinosa as saying she was going home Tuesday night “because of the late hour.”

“I can’t do it. I’m tired. I’ve got to go to work” the next day, he quoted her as saying.

Laske himself later issued a statement calling it “ completely irresponsible for counsel for the Foley campaign to mischaracterize this part of the process to the media, and to assert that any impropriety exists with regard to these ballots, which have been secured since they were cast, and their existence has been fully disclosed to the parties and to the public.”

If we can bank by ATM, why not vote by the Internet?

The usual explanation of why its not a good idea to vote by Internet, even thought we bank by ATM is that they are different applications. However, banking is not all that safe. Today in Connecticut we have a report of the vulnerabilities of credit cards and ATM transactions in the Hartford Courant.

The usual explanation of why its not a good idea to vote by Internet, even thought we bank by ATM is that they are different applications. It we got money from ATMs like we vote then:

We would not get a receipt
The bank would send us a monthly statement saying we had transactions, but no record of amounts or distinction between deposits and withdrawals (updated)
And the bank would only do single entry bookkeeping – showing only transactions to their accounts, without the customer name or account identified

We would probably call that faith based banking and quickly revert to cash and mattresses.

However, banking is not all that safe. Today in Connecticut we have a report of the vulnerabilities of credit cards and ATM transactions in the Hartford Courant <read>

Thieves installed “‘fake'” card readers at the cash registers, Det. Dane Semper of the West Hartford Police Department wrote in an e-mail. The devices allowed thieves to capture bank card data, authorization codes and PIN numbers…

Last week, a Romanian citizen, Ion Preda, 22, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud in U.S. District Court in Bridgeport. Preda admitted that he and others installed skimming devices and pinhole cameras at ATMs in several states, including a People’s United Bank ATM in Madison. With the account information and PIN numbers they obtained, those involved used the information to create counterfeit bank cards. The combined loss to all the banks victimized was more than $200,000, authorities said.

In a similar vein criminals could place phony voting kiosks or attack individual personal computers. Worse still is the danger of insider fraud attacking Internet routers or servers. In fact, the fraud in the Courant article could most easily be accomplished by credit card equipment or ATM service technicians or retail employees and managers.

Then again we could vote the way we gambol with slot machines.

Warning: NO Internet Voting In CT – A Scam or just misleading calls to voters?

“People have been stopping into the office to express concern over telephone calls that they’ve received in which they are directd [sic] to a web site where they believe they’re being told they can vote online,”

From the New Canaan Patch: Residents Report Concerns About Possible Voter “Scam” <read

Town Clerk says it’s not quite a scam, but not it’s not quite right, either.

Responding to reports that prospective voters have been approached by an organization inviting them to “vote online,” Town Clerk Claudia Weber said the outreach campaign is not quite a “scam,” but some of the information being offered is not completely accurate.

“People have been stopping into the office to express concern over telephone calls that they’ve received in which they are directd [sic] to a web site where they believe they’re being told they can vote online,” Weber told Patch.

She said Rep. John Hetherington, the registrar of voters and Republican Campaign Headquarters have received similar calls from concerned residents.

Weber said the callers identify themselves as part of The Legacy Foundation. They direct prospective voters to a password protected website for an organization called Democracy Depends on You!

“Once they get onto the site, they’re actually invited to request an application for an absentee ballot,” Weber said. Applying for an absentee ballot is legal. Weber says the problem is the language on the site.

With a password provided by the caller, prospective voters see the following message:

As you know, our Democracy depends on Americans from every part of our great country exercising their right to vote. Few elections have generated the enthusiasm of the election to be held this November 2nd.

For a multitude of reasons, you can avoid the long lines at the polls and vote early from the comfort of your own home.

Download and complete your application for absentee voting now. “There are only certain reasons to vote by absentee,” Weber said. “Wanting to avoid lines is not one of them. You can vote by absentee ballot if you are going to be absent during voting hours, bcause of illness or physical disability, if you are in service in the armed forces, if your religion forbids secular activity on that day, or if your required performance as an election official precludes you from getting to your polling place to vote.”

Patch was shown the Democracy Depends on You! website homepage, which provides no address or phone number. The site says it is “Paid for by the Alliance for America’s Future – not affiliated with LongDistanceVoter.com”.

The Alliance for America’s Future homepage says its mission is “dedicated to educating and advocating sound economic and security policies that will foster growth, prosperity, and peace for America’s future.”

We looked up the Alliance for America’s Future on Google, it seems to be a 527 linked to Mary Cheney.

Update: New Hampshire too <read>

Register Citizen: Denise Merrill favors regionalization of some election functions

getting Connecticut’s towns more up to speed with modern technology will be one of her goals. “I will work very hard to enforce a statewide voter registration Web site … I’m looking at regional solutions (for voter registration),” she said. “We just don’t have the money for every town to do what they do,” she added, referring to the traditional voting process that requires staffing, machines and the costs that go with them.

getting Connecticut’s towns more up to speed with modern technology will be one of her goals. “I will work very hard to enforce a statewide voter registration Web site … I’m looking at regional solutions (for voter registration),” she said.

“We just don’t have the money for every town to do what they do,” she added, referring to the traditional voting process that requires staffing, machines and the costs that go with them. “Voting in person is less common now in some towns, because people don’t live where they work, so they opt for an absentee ballot.”

We note one small, yet perhaps critical error in the article. Jerry Farrell is Commissioner of Consumer Protection, rather than the Office of Public Safety.

Editor’s Note: CTVotersCount attempts to provide fair coverage of the Secretary of the State race. We reference any information that we find that may help citizens determine their vote, particularly with regard to issues associated with voting integrity and voting in general. We certainly do not find every article published and also ignore many which primarily provide redundant information to previous posts with well known candidate positions and information. At times it seems we have several posts in a row focused on one candidate and at other times several focused on another candidate. The posts we cover are selected for informational value and based on when we discover the information. (Also, see our Editor’s Note on the 2010 race for Secretary of the State)

Denise Merrill outlines Secretary of the State campaign

Video: Hartford Courant interviews of the Secretary of the State candidates

We appreciate the Courant and CT-N for making these interviews available to the public, providing an additional unique opportunity for voters to learn about the candidates positions and personalities. However, we note several criticisms of the interviews.

We appreciate the Courant and CT-N for making these interviews available to the public, providing an additional unique opportunity for voters to learn about the candidates positions and personalities. We recommend listening to both interviews to gain a perspective beyond the few quotes we include below.

However, we note several criticisms of the interviews:

The questions are limited to those areas of interest to the Editorial Board and are shaped by their ideas for change. We note the absence of any questions about voting integrity, voting systems for those with disabilities, supporting military and overseas voters, ballot initiatives, or our relationship to vendors responsible for servicing our election equipment and programming our elections. Although the candidates did touch just a little bit on election integrity and the security of mail and internet voting.
The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, how he differed from his opponent.
The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, if he would have chosen the same equipment as Secretary Bysiewicz.
The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, if he was going to keep any lists of people he would be doing business with.
The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, if he would keep a list of people who called the office to ask for help.
The Board asked Merrill but not Farrell, about the law providing for three registrars if a third-party registrar is elected.
The Courant Editorial Board seems, at this time, to find it amusing that there are “Voting Integrity Activists In Connecticut” and that they have met some such activists (see the Farrell interview). For the record, to my knowledge, I have never met a member of the Courant Editorial Board. However, not so long ago, the Courant thanked voting integrity activists, including me, in one of their editorials for “willingness to shoulder civic responsibility and to apply their expertise and vigilance to the cause has helped to protect and strengthen voting in Connecticut”.

Denise Merrill <view>

A few quotes of interest to CTVotersCount readers:

“[More participation] is the core mission of this job”
“We should do everything we can to make voting easy”
“I want want really very much to have the no-excuse absentee ballot”
“[election day registration] not until we have a really good statewide voter file…not an efficient system yet”
“I’d like to focus on more consistent procedures for everyone”
Should the hurdles for third-party candidates be lowered: “I don’t think so. The system as it is is pretty fair”
“People still by and large trust the system”
100% Mail-in voting, like Colorado, with permanent absentee status?
“They invested a lot in their voting systems…something we ought to consider…maybe something like same day registration would increase participation more with less risk”

Jerry Farrell: <view>

A few quotes of interest to CTVotersCount readers:

“Three roles as I would see it: First voting…secondly…business registrar…thirdly…custodian of state records which I would capitalize on”
“[More Participation] If we were to go different route on how we conduct elections, there could be financial repercussions to the towns and cities…I am for amending the law…to get rid of the provision that calls for an excuse to be given to get the absentee ballot”
“I would be very careful about same day registration…there is no way as it is presently configured for the polling official to find out if that person is registered elsewhere…you would need some type of electronic hook-up…that has a cost to it”
“At the end of the day…voting must have the greatest amount of integrity to it”
“Voting integrity activists…have absolutely impressed on me…the fact that absolute paper trail is such a necessity.”
“It would be very hard for me to be out there running [without public financing]…I am a very firm advocate of it…we cannot have a system [where the] third parties [have an] absolutely impossible impediment”

Denise Merrill: 2nd Campaign Commercial

Here is her 2nd commercial <view> Previously, Merrill had been ran the same commercial used before the primary. And Jerry Farrell has run two since the primary. Update 10/29.2010: Radio ad <listen>

Here is her 2nd commercial <view>

Previously, Merrill had been ran the same commercial used before the primary. And Jerry Farrell has run two since the primary.

Update 10/29.2010: Radio ad <listen>

Post-Election Audit Report: Incremental Improvement – New Integrity Concern

Citizen observation and analysis shows some improvements along with a newly uncovered problem with the random selection process…We conclude that August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of:

failure in the integrity of the random district selection process,
lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies,
weaknesses in the ballot chain of custody, and
lack of, consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

the list of polling districts for the random audit drawing was missing some districts and is otherwise inaccurate and ambiguous. The integrity of the audit requires an accurate list of districts that is verifiable by the public. We have extended our recommendations to the Legislature to include an efficient fix to this problem.

Full Report, Press Release etc.<Audit Coalition Post>

Summary, from the Press Release and Report:

Coalition Finds Small Improvements and New Problem in
Connecticut Post-Election Audits

Citizen observation and analysis shows some improvements along with a newly uncovered problem with the random selection process

This is the sixth major post-election audit observation report by the Coalition since the adoption of optical scanners and paper ballots statewide.

Coalition Executive Director, Luther Weeks noted, “Unfortunately, we discovered that the list of polling districts for the random audit drawing was missing some districts and is otherwise inaccurate and ambiguous. The integrity of the audit requires an accurate list of districts that is verifiable by the public. We have extended our recommendations to the Legislature to include an efficient fix to this problem.”

League of Women Voters of Connecticut President, Cheryl Dunson said: “Compared to previous audits, the Coalition noted continuing incremental improvements in the attention to detail, following procedures, and in the chain-of-custody by election officials. We caution that the primary audit is simpler and shorter than those for November elections which may account much more accurate counting this time.”

We conclude that August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of:

failure in the integrity of the random district selection process,
lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies,
weaknesses in the ballot chain of custody, and
lack of, consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

Each of these items individually could impact the integrity of the statewide post-election audit and calls into question the credibility of the entire post-election audit.

Although most of our general observations and concerns remain, we observed improvements in following audit procedures, in the accuracy of the counting, and in the completion of forms.

Connecticut Citizen Action Group Executive Director, Tom Swan said, “The integrity of the entire audit is dependent the ballot chain-of-custody and on every step of the audit being accurately accomplished in a consistent, transparent, and professional manner. We continue to support our past recommendations to the Secretary of the State and the Legislature for improvement in the post-election audit laws, counting procedures, and chain-of-custody.”

Weeks added, “We look forward to the post-election audit of the November election. We hope to see significant improvement in following procedures along with more accurate counting, demonstrated in the November post-election audit which will involve more extensive, complex counting. ”

Observers came from the membership ranks of the coalition partners — The League of Women Voters of Connecticut, The Connecticut Citizen Action Group, Common Cause Connecticut, and Connecticut Voters Count. Without volunteer observers, nobody but a small number of local election officials would know what happens in post-election audits.

New Overall Audit Integrity Concern

A new concern surfacing this year is the inaccurate list of districts used in the random selection process which is required by law to be based on all of the districts used in the election. This directly impacts the integrity and credibility of the entire post-election audit.

Issues In Three Towns

Several districts in one town were selected, but in one case in the municipality, the ballot bag contained only blank ballots. In subsequent discussions with the registrar, she reported that a novice moderator in a multiple district polling place had sealed all voted ballots in one bag and all unused ballots in another bag. [As far as we know, this district was never counted as was not included in Audit Reports from the Secretary of the State.]

In the one district: The official Audit Report indicates 1703 machine counted ballots but only 688 manually counted ballots counted in the audit. In that same audit report 188 ballots are listed for one party with a total of 254 votes in the race audited for that party. The huge difference may represent poor counting procedures and lack of understanding of the audit procedures, however, we have no way of determining the accuracy of the audit nor of the official reporting of results. Our observer’s comments:

They never counted the ballots first…One team referenced the Tally Sheet from Election night. They recounted their votes until the figures agreed… Checking was done to the Tally Sheet off the Moderator’s report not the machine tape… I did not observe a machine tape, only the Moderator’s return with the Tally Sheet. When I asked if they had a machine tape, I was told no by one of the Registrars. When I asked if there was a tape in the ballot bag, I was told no… I have concern about the number entered on the “LT Gov”

These results may represent incompetence. However, incompetence uninvestigated transparently leaves an opening to cover-up fraud and error. The Secretary of the State’s Office had reviewed district results, yet apparently did not notice these large differences until it was pointed out by the coalition.

In one of the last district reports provided to the Secretary of the State’s Office: In one district in one municipality which audited three districts there was a significant difference between the machine counts in one race and the hand count reported. For two candidates the machine counted 262 and 154 votes while the hand counts were 132 and 78 votes for those same candidates.

Full Report, Press Release etc.<Audit Coalition Post>

Update from CTNewsJunkie: Questions Raised As State Finishes Post-Primary Audit <read>

NewCanaan: Patch Voter Guide to Secretary of the State candidates

How would you use technology to increase access to public information and make it easier to vote? Would you implement online voting? Why or why not?

Covering candidate statements, qualifications and several questions, including one question on voting: <read>

How would you use technology to increase access to public information and make it easier to vote? Would you implement online voting? Why or why not?

Farrell: As the Commissioner of Consumer Protection, I have used technology — electronic forms, online licensing — to make state government more efficient and less costly. I have saved the taxpayers millions of dollars, in that way, and would implement all of those plans again at the Secretary of the State’s office. Note that, while my opponent may talk of doing similar things, I am the only one who actually has experience doing so and can immediately start implementing technology, to increase access to public information, lower costs, and make interacting with government more convenient. Unfortunately, there are a variety of roadblocks that prevent voting online. Because elections must be free of the possibility of fraud, every method of voting must have a “paper trail”, where, even if initially tabulated by a computer, there is still an actual paper ballot to examine if there is a question of fraud. I believe that the next Secretary should work to ensure that the current voting machines continue to function and that we find ways to 1) assist the disabled in voting (an issue where we are not in full compliance with the law) and 2) ensure that the ballots cast by our military overseas are counted.

Merrill: One of my top priorities will be making it easier to vote. I believe that our voting system must keep pace with the mobility of the society and the technological advances in information systems. Although we have made strides over the past 10 years in creating a statewide voter database, it could be greatly enhanced and made more accessible to the public. We must increase the use of electronic voter registration by making it easier to register online, using fillable forms that could readily be placed into the statewide file. Online voting might be possible in time, however, there are significant issues with privacy and security that would have to be overcome. Paramount is the integrity of the ballot. I would alternatively support streamlining the absentee ballot process, as other states such as Oregon have, with “no excuse” absentee balloting and possibly a system of “early voting” as in Florida, both of which have been shown to increase voter participation. Both would probably require a constitutional amendment. I would also consider same-day registration to vote provided we have an effective statewide voter file.

We are pleased that both candidates recognize the risks of associated with online voting. Like most fast food, expanded mail-in voting and internet voting are appealing, yet not so good for us.