Internet Voting | CTVotersCount.org

USA Today: Electronic voting – The Real Threat

A USAToday Editorial, and an opposing view: Editorial: Electronic voting is the real threat to elections <read>

Imagine how easy voting would be if Americans could cast ballots the same way they buy songs from iTunes or punch in a PIN code to check out at the grocery store: You could click on a candidate from a home computer or use a touch screen device at the local polling place.

It’s not entirely a fantasy. In many states, some voters can already do both. The process is seductively simple, but it’s also shockingly vulnerable to problems from software failure to malicious hacking. While state lawmakers burn enormous energy in a partisan fight over in-person vote fraud, which is virtually nonexistent, they’re largely ignoring far likelier ways votes can be lost, stolen or changed.

How? Sometimes, technology or the humans running it simply fail

The article goes on to list some of the failures of electronic voting, many of which have been covered at CTVotersCount.

Fortunately our Legislature has not wasted time on raising Connecticut’s adequate voter I.D. law to the level of voter suppression. Unfortunately, the Legislature has continued to ignore science, experience, and the Constitutional requirement for preserving the secret vote – this spring they voted for email voting, in a provision inserted in a unrelated bill, without public hearings, Governor vetoes bill with email/fax voting “rat”

The opposing view from Bob Carey, Opposing view: Paper voting system is broken <read>

Carey is not a scientist. For years he has been advocating for more effective military voting, he knows much progress has been made to make paper voting effective for military and overseas voters, and that the military has been negligent in following the law to provide an officer to assist military votes at each base. He should also know how vulnerable even the defense department networks remain. And local control of elections requires using the regular internet for voting, managed by officials, largely no more technical than Mr. Carey.

Electronic Voting Debate Continues – Defying Science and History

Computer Scientists say safe Internet voting is impossible, unless unanticipated theoretical discoveries are made.

The World is not round*, leeches are not medically useful, electronic only voting and Internet voting cannot be made safe for the foreseeable future.

Several articles continue the debate on electronic voting. On one side we have Science and the history of electronic voting problems, Internet voting failures, and the risk of computers and the internet. On the other side those that apparently know little of Science who maintain faith that Scientists can solve any problem the uninformed choose.

From the Wall Street Journal: Decade-Old E-Voting ‘Wars’ Continue into Presidential Election <read>

From the Maryland Reporter: Election voting on the Internet ‘inevitable,’ experts say <read>
We note no computer scientists in the list of ‘experts’. The closest we find are perhaps political “scientists”.

Computer Scientists say safe Internet voting is impossible, unless unanticipated theoretical discoveries are made.

The World is not round*, leeches are not medically useful, electronic only voting and Internet voting cannot be made safe for the foreseeable future.

* Trick answer. It is much closer to round than flat.

Canadian election disrupted in broad daylight

Canadian Broadcasting story: NDP gives up: convention cyber attacker remains a mystery <read>

The source of the cyber attack that disrupted voting at the NDP’s leadership convention in March remains a mystery, and further investigation to find out who was responsible has been dropped.

The NDP was the victim of what’s known as a distributed denial of service attack when thousands of members were trying to vote online throughout the day on March 24. These kinds of attacks result in websites crashing or slowing down because the server is flooded with bogus requests for access.

Legitimate voters couldn’t access the NDP’s website to vote and organizers ended up extending the time allotted for each voting round, delaying the final result until hours after it was expected. Thomas Mulcair was finally declared the winner at about 9 p.m.

Scytl Canada, the company contracted to run the voting, quickly detected what was going on soon after voting began that day and reacted accordingly. They were able to keep the voting going by increasing the system’s capacity and by blocking some of the bogus IP addresses.

Scytl, an international company based in Spain, conducted a forensic analysis after the convention but came up dry when trying to pinpoint exactly who was behind the co-ordinated campaign.

Several points worth noting and much to be learned from this story:

A denial of service attack is about as simple as it gets. No insider knowledge required, no understanding of the details of the target application, no new technology to invent.
Denial of service has its limitations. No votes are stolen, although many can be suppressed. The attack is obvious and will be detected.
This was a highly professional system by a leading vendor. That was not enough to prevent the attack, yet expertise and preparation may have been a factor in limiting the disruption.
In this case the disruption was moderately successful, in a relatively small election. A strong denial of service attacks have shut down highly regarded systems for longer periods, hours and days.

What value is an attack that everyone sees? That depends. Courts have been reluctant to grant re-votes, for good reasons. Results of a vote can depend strongly on the other races and issues on a ballot, get out the vote efforts, and even the weather. An apparently semi-successful attack like this one could be successful if it biased the results toward those who could be expected to have the time, opportunity, and inclination to keep trying, or those expected to vote at particular times of the day, or those expected to vote online if it is an alternative to in-person voting. Perhaps there is suppression in just one area with voters strongly favoring one party or ballot proposition, or there is a local contest that would be expected to have a different result it re-voted separately from a national or state-wide election. There is also the possibility of braking news just before or after the election that would change the result on a later vote.

What can the F.D.A. teach us about Officials, Internet voting, and Computer voting?

Vast, easy spying capabilities. No technical expertise required. The possibilities are endless. Votes, voters, spouses, lawyers, business opponents, employees, bosses, officials, candidates, campaigns, investigators, and auditors can be monitored by practically anyone. Will the perpetrators be brought to justice?

A sickening (no pun intended) piece in the New York Times about the Food and Drug Administration: In Vast Effort, F.D.A. Spied on E-Mails of Its Own Scientists <read>

Summary: F.D.A. put off the shelf spy software on work and home computers of employees suspected of whistle-blowing. The software captured emails, keystrokes, chats, and screens of the employees, sending alerts based on specific words. Also thus spying on journalists and congressional staff which may have been ‘conspiring’ to hold the F.D.A. to account.

A wide-ranging surveillance operation by the Food and Drug Administration against a group of its own scientists used an enemies list of sorts as it secretly captured thousands of e-mails that the disgruntled scientists sent privately to members of Congress, lawyers, labor officials, journalists and even President Obama, previously undisclosed records show.

What began as a narrow investigation into the possible leaking of confidential agency information by five scientists quickly grew in mid-2010 into a much broader campaign to counter outside critics of the agency?s medical review process, according to the cache of more than 80,000 pages of computer documents generated by the surveillance effort.

Moving to quell what one memorandum called the “collaboration” of the F.D.A.?s opponents, the surveillance operation identified 21 agency employees, Congressional officials, outside medical researchers and journalists thought to be working together to put out negative and “defamatory” information about the agency.

F.D.A. officials defended the surveillance operation, saying that the computer monitoring was limited to the five scientists suspected of leaking confidential information about the safety and design of medical devices.

While they acknowledged that the surveillance tracked the communications that the scientists had with Congressional officials, journalists and others, they said it was never intended to impede those communications, but only to determine whether information was being improperly shared.

The agency, using so-called spy software designed to help employers monitor workers, captured screen images from the government laptops of the five scientists as they were being used at work or at home. The software tracked their keystrokes, intercepted their personal e-mails, copied the documents on their personal thumb drives and even followed their messages line by line as they were being drafted, the documents show.

The extraordinary surveillance effort grew out of a bitter dispute lasting years between the scientists and their bosses at the F.D.A. over the scientists? claims that faulty review procedures at the agency had led to the approval of medical imaging devices for mammograms and colonoscopies that exposed patients to dangerous levels of radiation…

With the documents from the surveillance cataloged in 66 huge directories, many Congressional staff members regarded as sympathetic to the scientists each got their own files containing all their e-mails to or from the whistle-blowers. Drafts and final copies of letters the scientists sent to Mr. Obama about their safety concerns were also included.

Last year, the scientists found that a few dozen of their e-mails had been intercepted by the agency. They filed a lawsuit over the issue in September, after four of the scientists had been let go…

Mr. Van Hollen said on Friday after learning of his status on the list that “it is absolutely unacceptable for the F.D.A. to be spying on employees who reach out to members of Congress to expose abuses or wrongdoing in government agencies.”

Senator Charles E. Grassley, an Iowa Republican whose former staff member?s e-mails were cataloged in the surveillance database, said that “the F.D.A. is discouraging whistle-blowers.” He added that agency officials “have absolutely no business reading the private e-mails of their employees. They think they can be the Gestapo and do anything they want.”…

The software used to track the F.D.A. scientists, sold by SpectorSoft of Vero Beach, Fla., costs as little as $99.95 for individual use, or $2,875 to place the program on 25 computers. It is marketed mainly to employers to monitor their workers and to parents to keep tabs on their children?s computer activities.

“Monitor everything they do,” says SpectorSoft?s Web site. “Catch them red-handed by receiving instant alerts when keywords or phrases are typed or are contained in an mail, chat, instant message or Web site.”…

What can we learn:

Any form of Internet voting is completely vulnerable to the loss of the secret ballot, including email voting. Military commanders could monitor voting by soldiers, business owners monitor employee voting, union leaders monitor members voting, bishops monitor voting of the flock and employees of their enterprises etc.
Similarly, votes made on software used to complete ballots for mail-in voting could be monitored.
Technicians know that it is hardly a leap to go from monitoring screens and keystrokes to being able to change votes undetected by the user.
All it takes is access and commercial software sold to the general public, no technical expertise.
Officials and public agencies are not exempt for ethics lapses and the ability to do practically anything. It is “parents ‘play'”. (Voting officials included)
The possibilities are endless. Spouses, dates, officials, candidates, campaigns, votes, voters, and auditors can be monitored by practically anyone.

What remains to be seen:

Will the perpetrators be brought to justice? Could they have information that they could use as a bribe to stop investigations and prosecutions? Will prosecutions be stopped for “national security” reasons? More on this topic coming soon…

*********

Democracy Now covers this same story <video>

There are really three aspects of the story:

Ignoring science, the F.D.A. approved dangerous medical equipment in diametric opposition to its mission
The F.D.A. targeted and fired whistle-blowers trying to prevent this
They spied on employees, protected communication, and Congress, creating an enemies list

Governor vetoes bill with email/fax voting “rat”

Such rats risk bills being occasionally vetoed, yet more often fuel criticism of the the Legislature and serve to make citizens disgusted with Government in general.

I do not support any mechanism of voting that would require an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in order to cast a timely, secret ballot, even if such waiver is voluntary…allowing an individual to email or fax an absentee ballot has not been proven to be secure.
– Dannel P. Malloy, Governor

UPDATED

CTVotersCount readers know that we have a long history of opposing Internet voting of any type, and a recent history of opposing H.B. 5556 in Connecticut, because it contains a provision for email/fax voting, added in late to an “emergency certified bill”. In Connecticut such provisions are know as “rats”.

Today Governor Malloy vetoed that bill with an extensive message. One paragraph, echoing our recent letter published in the Hartford Courant, articulately summarized the good reasons to avoid such voting <read veto message>

Upon close examination, however, I find that some portions of this bill likely violate the United States Constitution…I cannot support the bill before me given its many legal and practical problems…

HB 5556 also contains a provision allowing deployed service members to return an absentee ballot by email or fax if the service member waives his or her constitutional right to a secret ballot. I agree with Secretary of the State Denise Merrill that this provision raises a number of serious concerns. First, as a matter of policy, I do not support any mechanism of voting that would require an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in order to cast a timely, secret ballot, even if such waiver is voluntary. Second, as the Secretary of the State has pointed out, allowing an individual to email or fax an absentee ballot has not been proven to be secure. In 2011, the United States Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, issued a report on remote electronic voting. The report concluded that remote electronic voting is fraught with problems associated with software bugs and potential attacks through malicious software, difficulties with voter authentication, and lack of protocol for ballot accountability. None of these issues are addressed in this bill. To be clear, I am not opposed to the use of technology to make the voting process easier and more accessible to our citizens. However, I believe that these legitimate problems have to be carefully studied and considered before enacting such a provision.

Contrary to the Governor’s message, my reading of the bill indicates it would have provided for email/fax voting for the military AND overseas voters, including voters on vacation abroad. See sections 23, 24, and 25.
http://cga.ct.gov/2012/ACT/PA/2012PA-00117-R00HB-05556-PA.htm

Others have differing opinions on the rest of the bill, and claim that the Governer would not negotiate. However, we do know that the email voting provision likely was never offered for negotiation with the governor, never had a public hearing, and was opposed by the Secretary of the State prior to placement in the bill. Still it was put in the bill shortly before the final votes by the full House and Senate, deserving of the title of “rat”.
http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16655/malloy-vetoes-campaign-finance-bill

Such rats risk bills being vetoed on occasion, yet more often rats and emergency certifications fuel criticism of the the Legislature and serve to make citizens disgusted with the Legislature, legislators, and Government in general.

Secretary of the State Merrill issued the following statement:

HB 5556 was a good faith effort to respond strongly to court decisions like Citizens United that have allowed an avalanche of private special interest money into our election system. Connecticut is a national leader in enacting clean election laws, and there can be no turning back. This bill would have strengthened our existing law in a number of ways, and I strongly support the concept. However, it is unfortunate that such important legislation included a section enacting voting by fax or email. As election technology, email or fax voting is not secure and could expose the electronically submitted ballots to hacking or other interference, calling into question the integrity of votes from our brave military serving overseas. These are citizens who put their lives on the line every day to protect our right to vote, and we should do everything we can to make sure their votes are actually counted with some assurance of accuracy and integrity. The technology that would make electronically submitted ballots secure has not yet been developed, and I am grateful that Governor Malloy concurs with this view. Therefore, I urge our Governor and General Assembly to work out a compromise on improvements to our Citizens Election Program and our response to Citizens United, and to do it soon. Our voters need to know if money or the public good drives our political system.

************** Update 06/23/2012

We have not taken a position on the campaign finance provisions of H.B. 5556. We are in favor of public funding of elections and the limitation of corporate money in elections. Today the Courant published an op-ed by the Executive Director of the CT ACLU articulating their position against the details within the bill: Veto Thwarts Bad Campaign Finance Bill <read>. We have referenced the arguments of those in favor of the bill in several of our posts. To the ACLU we would add that the threat is real in Connecticut: Two years ago protests by the Catholic Church against a bill before the Legislature resulted in threats to the lives of two legislators – we can easily see threats and intimidation directed at funders of the groups listed in the op-ed.

************** Update 06/25/2012

Governor and Legislature would have different goals in crafting a compromise bill: Malloy, legislature make last stab at campaign reform <read>

Letter: Email, Fax Voting Provisions Mar Campaign Bill

Many citizens and legislators do not understand that email voting is a risky form of Internet voting and that fax voting presents equivalent risks. If the system worked as it should, there would have been public hearings and a chance to educate our senators and representatives.

Our letter opposing H.B. 5556 was published in the print edition of the Hartford Courant today, available online by searching letters <read>

Email, Fax Voting Provisions Mar Campaign Bill

Luther Weeks, Glastonbury
The writer is executive director of CTVotersCount.
on 2012-06-03

There are additional reasons Gov. Dannel P. Malloy should veto the campaign finance bill [June 3, editorial, “Veto This Bill”].

Without public hearings, provisions were added mandating email and fax voting for military and overseas voters. Each of our 169 town clerks must implement email voting in time for the August primary, with no standards for security, no provisions for informing intended voters, and no funding.

There have never been public hearings on email or fax voting in Connecticut. Last year, the legislature held hearings on online voting resulting in a symposium at CCSU broadcast by CT-N. Three leading computer scientists confirmed for legislators that Internet voting is unsafe. Email and fax voting are less secure than online voting. We all have the experience of lost emails and fake emails from our bank. Large corporations and the U.S. military have been unable to protect networks from outsider and insider attacks.

The bill asks military and overseas voters to sign away their right to a secret vote, recognizing that the system will at minimum expose their votes to officials in town hall. Yet, the purpose of a secret vote, guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution, is each voter’s right that no other voter’s vote can be bought or coerced. One voter cannot sign away the rights of every other voter.

That is about all that could be fit into the 200 word limit. Many citizens and legislators do not understand that email voting is a risky form of Internet voting and that fax voting presents equivalent risks. They do not understand the technical and administrative challenges of implementing the law in 169 small, medium, and large towns, some of which have asked for exemptions from maintaining web sites.

If the system worked as it should, there would have been public hearings and a chance to educate our senators and representatives.

Newspapers join CTVotersCount, ACLU, and CBIA in objections to H.B. 5556

CTVotersCount opposes H.B. 5556 and has urged Governor Malloy to veto the bill because it contains a provision for risky, unconstitutional email and fax voting.

CTVotersCount also opposes H.B. 5556 and has urged Governor Malloy to veto the bill because it contains a provision for risky, unconstitutional email and fax voting.

The underdefined provisions for military and overseas voters were added to an otherwise unrelated bill at the last minute by Senator Gayle Slossberg. Email and fax voting were never the subject of public hearings this year or ever by the General Assembly.

Not only are those voting mechanisms risky, we believe they are unconstitutional. They require individual voters to sign away their right to a secret vote, since email and fax votes cannot be made secret. However, we believe the secret vote guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution is every voter’s right that no individual voter’s vote can be associated with the individual, such that their vote could be coerced or intimidated. So an individual voter cannot sign away that right for all other voters.

The newspaper, ACLU, and CBIA have other concerns and constitutional objections. Here is an article from the Hartford Courant discussing those concerns: Newspapers Ask Malloy To Veto Bill <read>

Under the interpretation of the bill by the Connecticut Daily Newspapers Association, newspapers that sponsor a political debate would be required to calculate “the value of the debate — i.e., set-up, airtime, advertising, etc. — coupled with the broadcasting of such debate” as an “independent expenditure” that would need to be reported publicly under the recently approved campaign finance bill.

In addition, the newspaper association board would need to approve those expenses, and the board “would then be required to disclose the votes of individual board members and ‘pertinent information’ that took place during the discussion of the expenditure,” according to a letter to Malloy by Chris Van DeHoef, the association’s executive director.

“If CDNA should partner with a local television station to host and televise a debate and CDNA placed ads in its members’ papers, would those ads constitute an independent expenditure?” Van DeHoef asked in his letter. “Would the airtime be an independent expenditure?”

NIST: Internet voting not yet feasible. (And neither are email and fax voting)

Use of fax poses the fewest challenges, however fax offers limited protection for voter privacy. While the threats to telephone, e-mail, and web can be mitigated through the use of procedural and technical security controls, they are still more serious and challenging to overcome.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in response to an inquiry, summarized the risks of Internet voting <read>

Internet voting is not yet feasible, researchers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology have concluded. ”Malware on voters’ personal computers poses a serious threat that could compromise the secrecy or integrity of voters’ ballots,” said Belinda Collins, senior advisor for voting standards within NIST’s information technology laboratory, in an May 18 statement. ”And, the United States currently lacks an infrastructure for secure electronic voter authentication,” she added. Collins released the statement in response to an inquiry from Common Cause, a Washington, D.C. nonprofit active in campaign finance and election reform.

“This statement should serve as a blunt warning that we just aren’t ready yet and proves that we can’t trust the empty promises of ‘secure Internet voting’ from the for-profit vendors,” said Susannah Goodman, head of Common Cause’s Voting Integrity Project. ”We urge election officials and state and federal lawmakers to heed NIST’s warning and step back, support further research and STOP online voting programs until they can be made secure,” Goodman added…

The statement is based on two NIST reports:

This 2011 report http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/upload/NISTIR-7770-feb2011-2.pdf Strongly articulates the many risks of Internet voting and the slight mitigations available. It references an earlier report that explains the risks of all types of electronic transmission of voted ballots. Perhaps email voting and fax voting were sufficiently covered in the early report that it was not necessary to spell that out in more detail than the earlier report:

In December 2008, NIST released NISTIR 7551, A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems [3], which documents the threats to UOCAVA voting systems using electronic technologies for all aspects of overseas and military voting. NISTIR 7551 considered the use of postal mail, telephone, fax, electronic mail, and web servers to facilitate transmission of voter registration materials, blank ballots, and cast ballots. It documented threats and potential high-level mitigating security controls associated with each of these methods. The report concluded that threats to the electronic transmission of voter registration materials and blank ballots can be mitigated with the use of procedures and widely deployed security technologies. However, the threats associated with electronic transmission, notably Internet-based transmission, of cast ballots are more serious and challenging to overcome and the report suggested that emerging trends and developments in that area should continue to be studied and monitored.

Here is that earlier report: http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/upload/uocava-threatanalysis-final.pdf

Voted ballot return: Sending completed ballots from UOCAVA voters to local election officials can be expedited through the use of the electronic transmission options. However, their use can present significant challenges to the integrity of the election. Use of fax poses the fewest challenges, however fax offers limited protection for voter privacy. While the threats to telephone, e-mail, and web can be mitigated through the use of procedural and technical security controls, they are still more serious and challenging to overcome.

Sadly the CT Legislature passed a bill this year the included email and fax voting, without hearings. The Governor is considering vetoing that bill which may be unconstitutional and risks democracy in the name of soldiers who are dedicated to preserving that democracy.

Which, if any, of Connecticut’s 169 towns would be secure for Internet voting (let alone email and fax voting)?

Some of the smaller Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70’s and 80’s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Last week the Legislature, without public hearings, passed email and fax voting, stuffed in an otherwise popular bill. It would mandate each of Connecticut’s 169 towns and 339 registrars of voters to implement voting via email and fax from any location in the world. As is well know, email and fax are totally insecure.

Less well known, is how unprepared and unable our nations cities are in securing the internet. It should be obvious since our corporations, including networking giants, intelligence community, and military forces are not able to secure their networks. For a lesson in cyber security of the internet (with email being the most vulnerable), consider Homeland Security expert Bruce McConnell’s recent talk <read/view>

Recently the New York Times highlighted a report on the security of our nations cities: U.S. Study Cites Worries on Readiness for Cyberattacks <read>

A study commissioned by President Obama to assess the nation’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks and man-made and natural disasters has found that state and local officials have the most confidence in their public health and medical services but are the most concerned about whether agencies can respond to cyberattacks…

But it was the report’s findings about cybersecurity that appeared to be the most troubling, and they continued a drumbeat from the Obama administration about the need for Congress to pass legislation giving the Department of Homeland Security the authority to regulate computer security for the country’s infrastructure.

The report said that cybersecurity “was the single core capability where states had made the least amount of overall progress” and that only 42 percent of state and local officials believed that theirs was adequate.

Although a little more than 80 percent of officials said they had adopted measures to address the issue, 45 percent said they did not have a formal program to prevent and respond to attacks.

The report said that roughly two-thirds of those officials reported that they had not updated their “information security or disaster recovery plans in at least two years.”

The preparedness report said that a little less than two-thirds of the companies in the United States had sustained cyberattacks and that “only 50 percent of owners and operators at high-priority facilities” like electrical grids said that they reported such attacks.

Since 2006, there has been a 650 percent increase in the number of reported cyberattacks in the United States, rising to 41,776 in 2010 from 5,503 in 2006, according to the report.

Some the smaller of Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70’s and 80’s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Campaign finance bill hacked, with risky email and fax voting provision, passed

Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?
It seem like just last week that the Legislature mandated email access for all registrars.
We question the constitutionality of the secret vote waiver included in the bill.

H.B. 5556 is about campaign finance, but recently nestled in sections 23 to 25 is a provision for email and fax voting for military and overseas voters. Last night it passed both houses of the Legislature.

Sec. 23. Section 9-153e of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

A member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, may apply before a regular election for a blank absentee ballot to vote for all offices being contested at the election. The clerk shall make such ballots available for this purpose beginning not earlier than ninety days before the election. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State or on the federal postcard application form provided pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924, 42 USC 1973ff et seq. , as amended from time to time, or any other applicable law and shall be issued only if the applicant states that due to military contingencies the regular application procedure, as set forth in section 9-140, cannot be followed. Upon receipt of the application, the municipal clerk shall issue the ballot and a cover sheet pursuant to section 25 of this act, either by mail or electronic means, as requested by the elector, which shall be prescribed and provided by the Secretary of the State, and a list of the offices to be voted upon indicating the number of individuals for which each elector may vote. As soon as a complete list of nominated candidates, including the party designations of such candidates, and questions is available, the clerk shall send such list to each applicant. If the list of candidates and questions is not available when the ballot is issued, the clerk shall include a statement indicating that such list shall be mailed as soon as it becomes available. The ballot shall permit the elector to vote by writing in the names of specific candidates and offices for which he is voting. The elector may also vote on the questions in a manner prescribed by the Secretary of the State. If such ballot is issued by electronic means, the clerk shall include a certification prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector shall be required to complete, sign and return with the completed ballot in order for such ballot to be counted. If the military contingency no longer exists, application for an additional ballot for all offices may be made pursuant to the provisions of section 9-153b.

Sec. 24. Section 9-153f of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9-140, any elector who is living, or expects to be living or traveling before and on election day, outside the territorial limits of the several states of the United States and the District of Columbia and any member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, may apply for a blank absentee ballot to vote for all offices being contested at an election or primary. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State or on the federal postcard application form provided pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924, 42 USC 1973ff et seq. , as amended from time to time, or any other applicable law. The municipal clerk receiving such an application shall, as soon as a complete list of candidates and questions to be voted upon at such election or primary becomes available, issue the ballot and a cover sheet pursuant to section 25 of this act, either by mail or electronic means, as requested by the elector, which shall be the blank ballot prescribed and provided by the Secretary of the State under section 9-153e, as amended by this act. The clerk shall include with the ballot a complete list of the offices to be voted upon, the number of individuals for which each elector may vote, the candidates, and, in the case of an election, the party designation of each candidate and questions to be voted upon. If such ballot is issued by electronic means, the clerk shall include a certification prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector shall be required to complete, sign and return with the completed ballot in order for such ballot to be counted. If application for an absentee ballot is made at the time of availability of regular absentee ballots as provided in section 9-140, the provisions of section 9-140 shall prevail. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the procedures governing the issuance of ballots under this section shall conform as nearly as may be to the procedures provided in section 9-140.

Sec. 25. (NEW) (Effective from passage) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 145 of the general statutes, for any election or primary held on or after August 14, 2012, an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector who applies for an absentee ballot pursuant to the provisions of section 9-153e or 9-153f of the general statutes, as amended by this act, may return such ballot, and certification, if required by said section 9-153e or 9-153f, and the cover sheet prescribed by the Secretary of the State pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, by facsimile or electronic mail and such ballot shall be counted with other absentee ballots in accordance with the provisions of section 9-150a of the general statutes, provided (1) the municipal clerk receives such electronically returned ballot, certification and signed cover sheet prior to the closing of the polls on the day of the election or primary, as applicable, and (2) such elector does not also mail the original ballot or a hard copy of the ballot to the municipal clerk.

(b) Not later than June 1, 2012, the Secretary of the State shall prescribe a cover sheet for electronic transmission of absentee ballots. Such sheet shall provide instructions for returning a ballot by electronic means and to include the elector’s name, telephone number, facsimile number or electronic mail address from which the ballot was returned, as applicable. Such cover sheet shall include the following statement: “I understand that by faxing or emailing my voted ballot I am voluntarily waiving my right to a secret ballot only to the extent that the appropriate election official must receive and process my ballot. Signature: …. Date: …. “

There have never been hearings on fax and email voting in Connecticut. Last year there were hearings on Internet voting. Later last year a requirement for Internet voting was hidden in a long bill of technical changes to election law. Several weeks after its discovery, after strong opposition by the Secretary of the State, it was watered down to requiring a report on Internet voting by the Secretary. Subsequently the Secretary held a symposium with national experts exposing the risks of Internet voting, apparently” to no avail. This year the bill hacking occurred later in the process, leaving no time for opponents to discover and react to the provision.

The debate was mostly about the campaign finance disclosure provisions aimed at counteracting Citizens United. The Governor’s staff is questioning the constitutionality of the bill and raising the potential for a veto. We question the constitutionality of the provision for individual voters to waive “their” right of secret voting – our understanding is that the purpose of secret voting includes our right to not have their vote exposed, purchased, or intimidated – they cannot waive our right to a secret vote.

Implementing the bill might be a challenge for many of our election officials, it seems like just last week that a bill was passed requiring towns to provide registrars with email accounts to converse with the Secretary of the State. Perhaps it should have provided for faxes, fax phone lines, and email to converse with military and overseas voters.

We applaud Secretary Merrill and her office for their stand against the bill <read>