Category: Recounts/Recanvasses

Courant stands for election integrity ( with Windsor/Hartford log of events)

Such questions must be answered so that all voters can have faith in the integrity of the system.

We would add to the Courant’s concern in this obvious and difficult situation, that part of the cure is more attention to detail ahead of time and in every election, this close or not. Learning from experience and reducing the odds of lingering questions.

It was a close primary in Windsor/Hartford with the first official count at a tie, then followed by a recanvass leaving two ballots missing or overcounted on election day. Today the Courant supports the current apparent loser in bringing questions to court: ‘Landslide Leo’: 1-Vote Margin In District 5 Bears Further Scrutiny <read>

Who could blame first-time candidate Brandon McGee for asking the state Superior Court to take a look at the vote-counting procedures in his state House district after the Aug. 14 primary election?

Last week, registrars said union activist Leo Canty defeated Mr. McGee by one vote — 774 to 773 — to win the Democratic nomination for the 5th House District seat in Windsor and part of Hartford. The Democratic winner will face Windsor board of education member Paul Panos, a Republican, in the Nov. 6 general election.

Enough doubt has been raised about the vote that taking it to court is a reasonable course for Mr. McGee to follow.

The initial tabulation on election night and a subsequent recount showed first a McGee victory by one vote, then a tie and then the one-vote margin for Mr. Canty. There apparently is a missing paper absentee ballot, as well as one lost McGee machine vote, after the recount, in Windsor. There are also procedural questions…

Such questions must be answered so that all voters can have faith in the integrity of the system.

We have long said that while, useful, Connecticut’s recanvass are weak versions of recounts. Recanvasses are insufficient in very close races. Even a recount in this situation may not be adequate to determine the actual choice of the voters.

The issue here seems to turn more on the two “missing” ballots. Are they actually missing or were there  miscounts on election day? As we and many officials point out people can count inaccurately, especially if they do not take measures to verify their work. It is possible for machines to count inaccurately, or for jams or ballots to be mishandled so that ballot(s) are counted twice. Also, Connecticut’s check-in procedures make it easy for counts to be off by small numbers in either direction.

We have no horse in this race. Even though I attended both recanvasses, I was not an official observer, was only able to observe from a distance, and was not privy to0 conversations/details discussed between officials and official observers – especially conversations relating to the “missing” ballots. I did see some inadequate procedures/actions in both recanvasses, that provide potential integrity holes, but have no evidence of a faulty count. One of my major concerns with recanvasses is the inadequate review of individual ballots for potential voter intent issues – this does not seem to be a significant factor in this case of a vary simple ballot, presumably experienced voters, and apparently few close calls in the actual ballots. Unfortunately, I missed the last exciting hours of the Windsor recanvass. (I went out for a quick meal, but found the building locked when I returned.)

We would add to the Courant’s concern in this obvious and difficult situation, that part of the cure is more vigilance and attention to detail ahead of time and in every election, this close or not. Learning from experience and reducing the odds of lingering questions. For example, to date, the system has never recognized a problem with the results in Bridgeport in 2010, or with the significant discrepancies in that election in the number of voters checked-in vs. ballots*. When campaigning, our current Secretary of the State recognized the problem in lack of uniformity in a recanvass crossing Bloomfield and Hartford. Unfortunately, no changes have been made to correct that problem, perhaps we would not be in this situation today if procedures, training, and vigilance had increased.

* Since the Bridgeport Recount was not official, we would not expect it to change official results. Still, there has never been any official recognition or attempted cure for the inaccurate counting and discrepancies between check-in lists and ballot counts. There are new laws to reduce the chances of running out of official ballots and to make copied ballots so that voting does not get interrupted by lack of ballots or weather emergencies. There is no routine audit of check-in lists vs. ballot counts.

Update:  Windsor Patch: McGee Files Complaint, Seeks Hearing on Primary Results   <read>

According to a statement released by McGee, the complaint filed in court alleges election officials:

  • “improperly allowed absentee ballots to be counted that were not counted by tabulation on primary Election Day or during the recanvass;
  • “improperly allowed absentee ballots to comingle, allowing for an improper count;
  • “and lost a ballot that was cast in McGee’s favor in Windsor’s John F. Kennedy voting district.”

The complaint says the actions specified are in violation of state statues, and requests a court hearing be held.

While alleging improper actions were taken by election officials, McGee was explicit in saying, “…nowhere in this action is my campaign alleging any wrongdoing by either Mr. Canty or Mayor Trinks.”

“I want to ensure that those who exercised their right were not deprived of their voice, and that the will of the people is ascertained without question of process,” he added.

In detailing the recanvass, the complaint, according to McGee, names Hartford Democratic Registrar of Voters Olga Iris Vazquez, Hartford Town and City Clerk John Bazzano, Windsor Democratic Registrar of Voters Anita Mips, Windsor Town Clerk Agnes Pier, Secretary of State Denise Merrill, the state elections enforcement committee, and fifth assembly district candidates Canty and Trinks.

Update 8/31/2012:  Hartford Clerk Testifies In Hearing On 5th State House District Primary Vote <read>

Update 9/6/2012: Testimony Continues In Disputed 5th Statehouse District Democratic Primary<read> Take some of the summary statements about the testimony with a few grains of salt.

Update 9/7/2012: Testimony In Disputed Democratic Primary Race Focuses On Elusive Ballot <read>

Update 9/12/2012:  Testimony Ends In 5th General Assembly District Election Complaint <read>

Among other things:

[Superior Court Judge A. Susan] Peck added that she was concerned about the fact that 525 ballots were cast in Windsor, but poll workers only crossed off 523 names, violating state law.

Yes, but we suspect  being a little off happens frequently. We have no statistics to go on, unfortunately the check-in lists and easy to make a small number of errors. We point to huge errors in Bridgeport in 2010 which, unfortunately, raised little concern at the time or since, from the unofficial Citizen’s Bridgeport Recount Report:

In several districts the counts of ballots differed from the check-in list counts, and in several districts, our counts of the check-in lists differed from the counts on the moderators’ reports.  In many districts check-in list counts closely paralleled ballot counts, yet some counts were over by 21 ballots or less or under by 30 ballots or less. While some variation can be expected due to the difficulty of interpreting some check-in marks, we found several districts where the check-in lists were clearly not counted accurately. In one district, results were under by 117 ballots less than voters checked- in based on our counts.

Update 9/14/2012 Peck Orders Second Recount In 5th Assembly District  <read>

Update 9/18/2012 Uncounted, Missing Ballot Found in 2nd Windsor Recanvass <read>

Update 9/18/2012 Town Clerk: Unopened Absentee Ballot Erroneously Marked “Deceased”  <read>

Update 9/18/2012: Now it is down to opening that one vote <read>

Update 9/19/2012: A revote Oct 2nd in Hartford/Windsor <read>

Update 9/19/2012: Third Shoe Drops, Trinks drops out <read>

Basics you need to know about election integrity in fifteen minutes

Kevin O’Neill, Capitol Thinking, interviews the authors of Broken Ballots – Will Your Vote Count, Prof Doug Jones and Dr. Barbara Simons <podcast> When it comes to elections and verifiability, Doug Jones and Barbara Simons are true experts that everyone can understand.

Kevin O’Neill, Capitol Thinking, interviews the authors of Broken Ballots – Will Your Vote Count, Prof Doug Jones and Dr. Barbara Simons <podcast>

When it comes to elections and verifiability, Doug Jones and Barbara Simons are true experts that everyone can understand.

They discuss the basics of election verification, pre-election testing, election auditing, and internet voting. They also offer graphic examples of what went wrong in recent elections in Iowa and Florida, that were corrected based on paper ballots and post-election audits.

Broken Ballots was released Apr 15, even thought Amazon and Barnes & Noble still list it as available May 15th. Look for a book review here in the near future.

Enthusiastic support for the Secretary’s Performance Task Force Recommendations

Given the many members, the brief meetings, and the lack of representation of all interests, we were skeptical when the Task Force was convened. To our delight, we find that we can offer endorsement of each of the twenty-one recommendations in the report.

There is a lot to do in all the recommendations. It will take time, money, and deliberate work with everyone at the table. Our hope is that each of the recommendations will be thoroughly explored, evaluated, and acted upon, that none get overlooked.

Last summer and fall, the Secretary of the State convened an Elections Performance Task Force to look at elections and what might be done to improve them in the State of Connecticut. Details, presentations, and videos of the Task Force meetings are available at the Secretary’s web site <here> The Secretary issued a final report and recommendations <here>

Given the many members, the brief meetings, and the lack of representation of all interests, we were skeptical when the Task Force was convened. To our delight, we find that we can  offer endorsement of each of the twenty-one recommendations in the report, starting on page 34.

We strongly endorse those recommendations in bold below [our comments in brackets]

Identify measures that will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the voting process.

1. The Secretary recommends an amendment to Article 6, Section 7 of the Connecticut State Constitution similar to House Joint Resolution Number 88 of the 2011 legislative session. The amendment would allow the General Assembly to adopt more flexible laws for voting.

2. The Secretary recommends partnering with Professor Heather Gerken to develop a Connecticut Democracy Index. This would allow for benchmarking across municipalities and with other states to track trends in the election process, to measure performance and to gain valuable data that can inform decisions going forward.

3. The Secretary recommends streamlining the absentee ballot process. A working group should be formed to examine and make recommendations around ideas like creating a single absentee ballot application and linking the absentee ballot tracking system with the Centralized Voter Registration System. [Assuming such streamlining does not increase integrity risks or confidence in the process]

4. The Secretary recommends further study of how regionalism could make Connecticut’s electoral  system more cost-effective and consistent. For instance, the use of a statewide online voter registration system, regional on-demand ballot printing, and regional voting centers should all be further explored. [Here we would go further to explore complete regionalizaton, “doing for elections what we have done for probate in Connecticut]

5. The Secretary recommends that the polling place for district elections be the same as for state elections. This will help eliminate voter confusion caused by having to go to different polling locations for different elections. [This would be convenient, yet if mandated, would be challenging for many towns due to different boundaries and contests]

6. The Secretary recommends exploring better ways of coordinating the printing of ballots with programming of memory cards in order to create a more efficient, reliable and cost-effective process.

7. The Secretary recommends the development of a certification process for Registrars of Voters. Additionally, standards and best practices should be developed for that office around issues such as election administration, voter registration and voter outreach. These standards and best practices may need to account for differences in small, medium and large municipalities. Finally, a mechanism for enforcement and, if necessary, the removal of a Registrar of Voters should be created. [We would especially recommend standardization and better practices for post-election audits and recanvasses, along with better manuals, including creating manuals for each pollworker position]

8. The Secretary recommends that a formal study of the cost of elections be undertaken, and that a standardized set of measures for such costs be established.[We would combine this into the Democracy Index, providing ongoing measures and comparison over time]

Maintain the security and integrity of the voting process.

9. The Secretary recommends the development of a secure online voter registration system in Connecticut. The system should be tied to other statewide databases, such as the Department of Social Services, the Department of Developmental Services, and the Department of Motor Vehicles, to allow for verification of data.

10. The Secretary recommends that the state acquire at least one high speed, high volume scanner to be utilized in the post-election auditing process. This centralization of the process will reduce the fiscal and logistical burdens on towns, as well as provide for a more accurate and secure auditing process.[We are a strong supporter of electronic auditing, done effectively and transparently. The number of scanners and their capacities should be a byproduct of an effective electronic auditing pilot, plan, cost benefit analysis, and appropriate law establishing and governing electronic audits]

11. The Secretary recommends that the post-election auditing process be amended to include all ballots that are machine-counted, including those counted centrally.[We would go farther and subject all ballots cast to selection for audit.]

12. The Secretary recommends that a greater emphasis be placed on ballot security. Ballots should be stored in a secure, locked facility. Additionally, two individuals should always be present whenever these facilities are accessed. This policy should be uniformly followed and enforced.

13. The Secretary recommends that the state join the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), an interstate data consortium that the Pew Center on the States is currently building. This data center would allow participating states to streamline the processes for registering eligible voters; update records of existing voters; and remove duplicate and invalid records from state voter files. The Secretary stresses the need to include multiple agencies in the database, including those that offer public assistance, interact with people with disabilities, and otherwise come into contact with eligible voters who may not normally visit the Department of Motor Vehicles. Evaluate ways to integrate technology into our election system.

14. The Secretary recommends further exploring the use of new technologies in the election process through pilot programs and examination of other states’ usage. However, the cost and security of any new technologies should be carefully examined. Examples of new technologies for consideration include:

a. Electronic poll books

   b. More advanced voting systems for the voters with disabilities

    c. Online voter registration

15. The Secretary recommends immediate implementation of a statewide web-based electronic reporting system for election results.

16. The Secretary recommends the use of web-based training to standardize election staff training across the state.[We would like to see video training and manuals having a pollworker focus, designed by professional technical writers]

Find ways to increase voter participation, particularly among minorities, young people, people with disabilities, and military and overseas voters.

17. The Secretary recommends Election Day registration in Connecticut and any necessary adjustments to the voter file system to ensure accuracy. Election Day registration has increased voter participation in states where it has been enacted.

18. The Secretary recommends an effort to increase voter participation in Connecticut, with a particular focus on youth, minorities, people with disabilities, and military and overseas voters.

a. Early voting bears further study as a possible mechanism for reaching minority voters. [We are skeptical that early voting has a particular focus on any group of voters]

   b. Since the electorate is becoming more mobile, voter registrations should be mobile as well.
   c. Connecticut’s curbside voting program should be better advertised to voters with disabilities, all polling  places should be easily handicapped accessible, and poll workers at all locations should be properly trained on utilizing the IVS vote by phone system. A viable, better alternative to the IVS system should also be sought.

   d. The military and overseas voting process should be amended to allow for the facsimile transmittal of completed absentee ballot applications. The original application would then be returned in the envelope along with the completed absentee ballot via mail, in order for the ballot to be counted.[Fax transmission should only be required to obtain a blank ballot in situations where the voter cannot print a blank ballot]

e. The military and overseas voting process should be streamlined by the electronic transmission of printable, mailable ballots. This, along with the above recommendation, would eliminate the mailing time of transmitting completed applications and blank ballots through manual post, and would allow for more time for participation by military and overseas voters.

f. The electronic transmission of ballots to military and overseas voters should be further streamlined through the use of the Centralized Voter Registration System.[Having the system aid the overseas voter in downloading their correct blank ballot]

19. The Secretary recommends that existing voter registration provisions included in legislation such as the National Voter Registration Act be fully enforced. The Secretary further recommends that Connecticut’s Department of Corrections be designated as an official voter registration agency.

20. The Secretary recommends a concerted effort to educate the public and the incarcerated population about the voting rights of those detained pre-sentencing and the restoration of voting rights to felons. The Secretary further recommends that the restoration of voting rights be extended to include parolees, as is the case in over a dozen states.

21. The Secretary recommends that Election Day be declared a holiday, as it is in many countries, and/or that elections include in-person voting on a weekend day. This would grant citizens more time to vote and would allow for the use of students and persons with the day off as poll workers.

We note several caveats:

Our endorsement of proposals is conditional. Conditional on the details of any proposed implementation or law. For instance, although we support Election Day Registration, we do not support the current bill before the Legislature which would call for Election Day Registration, because the bill is inadequate to protect the rights of EDR voters, other voters, and could result in chaos and uncertainty.

The report is the Secretary of the State’s, not approved by or endorsed by the Task Force as a whole.

Contained in this report are the findings of the Election Performance Task Force, organized by subcommittee subject matter, with the additional category of voting technology. The Secretary utilized these findings along with feedback from members of the task force, other interested parties, and the public to shape the recommendations that are detailed at the end of this report.

While we endorse the recommendations, we do not endorse the details in the report itself:

  • The statistical information and conclusions do not come close to meeting rigorous standards in justifying the conclusions reached.
  • As noted in the report, the cost of elections information provided is questionable. We find it wildly inaccurate to include data that elections might have been conducted at costs per voter less than the cost of printing a single ballot.
  • We strongly disagree that there is any basis to predict that online voting will be a safe and accepted practice within ten years.

There is a lot to do in all the recommendations. It will take time, money, and deliberate work with everyone at the table. Our hope is that each of the recommendations will be thoroughly explored, evaluated, and acted upon, that none get overlooked.

Scanners like ours: Optical scanner counts differ for same ballots

There should be an investigation, however, we suggest that determining the cause is not a complete cure. I could happen again. It could have happened in the past. Maybe in Connecticut.

Brad Friedman reported the story last week <read>

A close race on election night. Rescanned to check but the other candidate won. Then they did a hand count and confirmed the original result. UT like Connecticut is fortunate to have chosen optical scanners with voter completed paper ballots. But we need to verify the accuracy of scanners with audits, recanvasses, and recounts.

The first “recount” of Provo’s Municipal Council District 1 ballots — carried out on the same op-scan systems that tallied them in the first place — was held yesterday, only to be abruptly called off when the results were found to be “extremely in favor of the opposite candidate.”…

“The numbers were varying too much,” Utah County Chief Deputy Clerk/Auditor Scott Hogensen tells the Deseret News about the District 1 race. “It became obvious the machines weren’t counting things correctly.”

But whether the Diebold op-scanners tallied the ballots inaccurately on Election Day or during the so-called “recount” remains unknown at the moment.

According to Deseret News, “Morrow said she asked for the recount to be done by hand in the first place but the request was denied.”…

two hand-counts on Wednesday have now confirmed the accuracy of the original optical-scan count giving the election victory to Gary Winterton after all. The “recount” on the same op-scan systems seem to have been inaccurate, while the original count was accurate. We still don’t know why, of course.

It was not a small, trivial difference, we are talking over 700 votes!

No word yet on why the second scanner might have miscounted. There should be an investigation, however, we suggest that determining the cause is not a complete cure. No matter the cause:

  • It could happen again in Utah or Connecticut
  • Another time it might be the original scanner, not the second one, and/or election day officials making the error
  • It might be far enough off that there is no automatic recount or recanvass
  • It might not be the machine, it might be procedures, yet exonerating the machine does not provide comfort, whatever the cause it can happen again in Utah or Connecticut
  • Perhaps it has happened before – maybe last year in Connecticut one or more of the differences between hand counts and machine counts might not have been human errors as assumed by the Secretary of the State’s office. <read>

We leave with this further item from Brad illustrating the tendency for officials to leap to unfounded, yet assuring conclusions based on assumptions:

Amusingly, and for reasons unknown, [Utah County Chief Deputy Clerk/Auditor Scott] Hogensen told Deseret News that, according to the paper, he “does not believe machine malfunctions affect the outcome of any other races in the county.”

This has happened a couple of times before with other scanners. <one example><another>

Governor Extends Voter Registration Deadline via Executive Order

If the governor has such powers, perhaps in election emergencies, the governor could be called upon or even expected to do what the Secretary of the State cannot do – order polls to stay open late in an emergency, choose extra voting districts for audit, or order discrepancy recanvasses in districts with questionable results!

Example coverage from The Day <read>

Gov. Dannel P. Malloy has issued an executive order extending voter registration until noon on Monday, Nov. 7.

The original deadline was tonight at 8, but the change was made to accommodate voters who would have trouble getting to municipal offices because of the power outages and damage from the weekend storm, according to the Secretary of State’s office.

Residents can obtain voter registration forms at www.sots.ct.gov or by visiting town offices or the Division of Motor Vehicles.

Executive Order #12

If the governor has such powers, perhaps in election emergencies, the governor could be called upon or even expected to do what the Secretary of the State cannot do – order polls to stay open late in an emergency, choose extra voting districts for audit, or order discrepancy recanvasses in districts with questionable results! Se our earlier post: <Bysiewicz: Secretary of the State powerless to enforce election laws, count ballots>

Welcome to Post-Confidence Elections

Laws and procedures which are not enforced for elections in the name of “trust us” and “it would be too much work”, are no more real than the laws and Constitutional provisions ignored in the name of national security. “It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.”

Monday, Tom Englehardt wrote  a post: Welcome to Post-Legal America, subtitled: Dumb Question of the Twenty-first Century: Is It Legal? Post-Legal America and the National Security Complex <read>

Is the Libyan war legal? Was Bin Laden’s killing legal? Is it legal for the president of the United States to target an American citizen for assassination? Were those “enhanced interrogation techniques” legal? These are all questions raised in recent weeks. Each seems to call out for debate, for answers. Or does it?…

My answer is this: they are irrelevant. Think of them as twentieth-century questions that don’t begin to come to grips with twenty-first century American realities. In fact, think of them, and the very idea of a nation based on the rule of law, as a reflection of nostalgia for, or sentimentality about, a long-lost republic. At least in terms of what used to be called “foreign policy,” and more recently “national security,” the United States is now a post-legal society…

It’s easy enough to explain what I mean. If, in a country theoretically organized under the rule of law, wrongdoers are never brought to justice and nobody is held accountable for possibly serious crimes, then you don’t have to be a constitutional law professor to know that its citizens actually exist in a post-legal state. If so, “Is it legal?” is the wrong question to be asking, even if we have yet to discover the right one.

Then today, news that the “apparent” loser in the Wisconsin Supreme Court recount decided concede and not to pursue legal challenges. <Brad Blog overview and details> Sadly we agree with the candidate’s logic. From her statement:

Wis. Stat. §5.01(1) provides that the state election laws “shall be construed so as to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be ascertained, notwithstanding informality or failure to comply with some of its provisions.” It is questionable whether even the statewide extent of noncompliance uncovered by this recount would cross the bar raised by this statutory language. Moreover, Wisconsin courts have held that absent connivance, fraud or undue influence, substantial compliance with the statutory voting procedures is sufficient.

Which brings me to Waukesha and the question of whether– or if — there was manipulation of some ballots, given the fact that so many bags were unsealed to the point of being wide open. Here again, evidence of opportunity to manipulate or alter ballots is not enough. There would have to be compelling proof that the integrity of the ballots has been compromised. The numerous glaring anomalies in Waukesha certainly warrant further, independent investigation. However, the defects or irregularities in the sealing and securing of the ballot bags, as documented in the recount minutes, would not be sufficient to meet the threshold set by law.

As an attorney, as an officer of the court and as someone who understands both the power and the limits of the law, it is my obligation to evaluate and recognize the legal grounds on which I can and cannot act. I have reviewed the record, the evidence and the law. It would serve no purpose to bring a suit with insufficient legal basis. That is not the kind of lawyer I am.

I suppose it depends on what “substantial” means in “substantial compliance”.

Reading the story of the recount and the election itself, leaves us with little reason to have confidence that elections run like this one in Wisconsin, with fallible accounting and the lack of ballot security result in the winner actually chosen by the people. We have no reason to believe this election is atypical for Wisconsin – just that initial numbers were close enough to require a recount, so critical to receive national attention. Like the candidate, JoAnn Kloppenburg, we cannot say that the result is incorrect, only that elections run this way provide no confidence in the system and could be incorrect by error or won by skulduggery.

Wisconsin is not alone. The chain of custody and security of ballots in Connecticut is no more reliable than  in Wisconsin. Until election administration and security is fixed in every jurisdiction in the Nation, we are now knowingly in the era of post-confidence elections. Kloppenburg has asked that the system be improved:

We did the right thing in asking for a recount in this very, very close election. The recount shed light on significant and widespread issues with elections in Wisconsin. The magnitude of those issues surprised clerks, election volunteers, and observers from both campaigns. The problems and gaps ought to be addressed as quickly as possible. And they ought to be fixed.

That is why my campaign is submitting a letter to the Government Accountability Board which summarizes the anomalies, irregularities and in some cases the unexplained mysteries uncovered in this recount. I call on the GAB to take action, along with local clerks, to improve the security, accountability and transparency of the election process in Wisconsin, and to ensure that every vote counts and is counted accurately. The GAB must improve compliance with basic election procedures.

We are also doing the right thing by declining to pursue legal action. Based on the record established in this recount and based on Wisconsin law, the will of the electors has been determined. It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.

A good start would be appropriate penalties for officials at all levels responsible for breaking security and the law, followed by sufficient improved election procedures which are enforceable and actually enforced. Penalties should fit the consequences of the loss of public confidence in the system and the consequences of the potential for incorrect or fraudulent election results.

Laws and procedures which are not enforced for elections in the name of “trust us” and “it would be too much work”, are no more real than the laws and Constitutional provisions ignored in the name of national security.

Brad Friedman questions value of “Faith Based ‘Recount'” – we agree.

What’s the point of having a “recount”, or of using security procedures and physical seals for the ballots after the election, if violations of those procedures and seals are of little concern to the state’s top election agency?

Brad Friedman at BradBlog provides updates on the lack of integrity in the Wisconsin Recount: Tale of the Tapes: Wisconsin’s ‘Dog-and-Pony Show’ Faith-Based Supreme Court Election ‘Recount’ <read>

What’s the point of having a “recount”, or of using security procedures and physical seals for the ballots after the election, if violations of those procedures and seals are of little concern to the state’s top election agency?

Worse, if the results printed on the poll tapes are the ultimate proof of the accuracy of results, what happens when — as discovered among poll tapes from the City of Pewaukee in Waukesha County late last week — the “recount” uncovers “Official Results Report” poll tapes dated a full seven days before the actual election was held?

Or, worse still, what happens when poll tapes failed to print at all on Election Day, as has been seen in a number of towns across the state?…

Faith-Based ‘Recounts’

“Even if the container or [ballot] bag is somehow opened later, or if the chain of custody is broken,” the G.A.B. wrote on their website in response to the concerns late last week, “election officials have the original print-out tape from the machine, as well as the electronic memory device from the machine. This enables election officials to determine the election night vote count.”

Setting aside that the “recount” process in WI does not include examination of “the electronic memory device from the machine[s]” at all, the print-out tapes from the systems may enable election officials to know what the tabulation machines reported — either accurately or inaccurately — as the “election night vote count”, but do those digital elements actually tell us what the intent of voters was? If they do, then why bother to have a “recount” at all?

“If the ballots had been tampered with between the election and the recount, there would be a break in the chain of custody and an unexplained difference in the results [of the ‘recount’],” says the G.A.B., suggesting that they seem to have little or no idea how election fraud may be carried out under their very own noses…

As if the opened ballot bags, missing and scratched-out serial numbers, and mis-dated poll tapes aren’t enough, the minutes from the “recounts” in three different cities in two different counties have revealed that the so-called “Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails” on touch-screen voting machines didn’t actually print at all, because the paper rolls were inserted backwards.

Most disturbingly, no one noticed or bothered to complain about it during the election! What does that tell us about the validity of the so-called “paper trails” printed out with touch-screen voting machines in Wisconsin, and the many other states which use the exact same unverifiable voting systems?

We are always told we can “trust” the results of 100% unverifiable touch-screen voting machines because voters review the “paper record” before they hit the “Cast Vote!” button. Unfortunately, as we’ve been explaining for years, no, they don’t — and here, once again, is more evidence…

And if these new photos of duct taped ballot bags from the Village of Menomonee Falls in, you guessed it, Waukesha County (as taken by an observer who has asked not to be identified) doesn’t “invoke confidence”, we don’t know what will…

Sadly there is no reason to believe that a full statewide recanvass in Connecticut would generate more confidence than the recount in Wisconsin. Our observations of recanvasses reveals huge variations in the process from municipality to municipality, especially in the quality of the review of ballots for marks that might not have been read correctly by the machines. Also the Coalition observations of post-election audits continue to demonstrate concerns with ballot chain of custody.

When are recounts reasonable?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court election recount started this week. The margin was a bit over 7,000 votes and the percentage just under 0.5% as required by law. John Nichols writes of past instances where the loser asked for recounts in much wider margins and of cases with relatively close margins where the original result was overturned

The Wisconsin Supreme Court election recount started this week. The margin a was bit over 7,000 votes and the percentage just under 0.5% as required by law. John Nichols writes in Recount reasonable — just ask a Republican, of past instances where the loser asked for recounts in much wider margins and of cases with relatively close margins where the original result was overturned <read>

Back in 1960, when the closest presidential race in modern American history was decided for Democrat John Kennedy, the Republican National Committee and state Republican parties sought recounts in 11 states, including Texas. Kennedy’s advantage over Republican Richard Nixon in Texas in the initial count was 46,000 votes. While Democrats objected that Kennedy’s margin was too large to be overturned, Republicans argued that allegations of voting irregularities in a number of Texas counties justified the demand.

Similarly, in the 1976 presidential race, after Democrat Jimmy Carter beat Republican Gerald Ford in Ohio by more than 9,000, Republicans sought a recount of the votes in that state.

And just last year in Minnesota’s gubernatorial race, Democrat Mark Dayton led Republican Tom Emmer by a little less than 9,000 votes. A hand recount of the state’s ballots confirmed Dayton’s winning margin was 8,770 votes. Emmer’s campaign and the state Republican Party continued to wage court fights and challenge ballots until more than a month after the election, when Emmer finally conceded.

In all three cases, Republicans made reasonable requests for recounts, even if those requests failed to overturn the results.

But Wisconsinites know that recounts can alter results.

In 1970, it appeared that Les Aspin had lost a Democratic primary to Doug La Follette in southeastern Wisconsin’s 1st Congressional District. But after the official canvass, the margin of victory for La Follette — now Wisconsin’s secretary of state — was less than 0.5 percent of the vote. That enabled the former Pentagon aide to seek a recount paid for by the state. The recount found enough uncounted Aspin votes, most of them in Kenosha, to put him ahead of La Follette.

Barely a month after the primary was finally settled in his favor, Aspin defeated Republican Congressman Henry Schadeberg and began a distinguished career that would eventually see him chair the House Armed Services Committee before his appointment as President Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense.

In 1982, it appeared that Democrat Russ Feingold had lost his first political race to Republican state Sen. Everett Bidwell. But the vote in the south-central Wisconsin Senate district was close enough to entitle Feingold to a state-sanctioned recount. He pursued it and, after uncounted Feingold votes turned up in rural Sauk County and on a broken voting machine at a school in Dane County, the result was reversed. Feingold was elected to the state Senate and a decade later became a U.S. senator, serving 18 years as the chamber’s most independent and principled member.

Elections are huge endeavors, involving thousands, sometimes millions, of votes that are tabulated by poll workers and clerks who are — like all of us — imperfect human beings.

When dealing with so many variables, mistakes and missteps are to be expected.

Recounts set things right. They identify actual winners, as well as flaws in the voting and counting systems of the state.

Wisconsin law calls for machine recounts unless a candidate objects. In this case many precincts are being hand counted to preserve the memory card used in the election. They could use alternate memory cards, but their scanners are so old that the manufacturer cannot supply them. From what we have seen Wisconsin’s recount law is stronger than Connecticut’s – Wisconsin calls for each ballot to be reviewed by those representing opposing candidates to make sure they agree it can be counted by machine – Connecticut’s does not – only by procedure do we call for election officials, not candidate representatives, to check ballots. In fact, our recanvass law remains stuck in the lever age presuming that tabulators do no have ballots. Connecticut procedures but not our law may be reasonable for moderately close races, but insufficient when voter intent and absentee ballot adjudication becomes critical.

NY: Hard lesson in why we need recounts and uniform election laws

Supermajority and candidate doomed by vague election law crafted by his own lawyer.

New York Daily News: Dem Frank Skartados doomed by vague election law crafted by his own lawyer <read>

Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver’s former adviser wrote the state law that may have cost him his powerful, veto-proof, Democratic supermajority.

Democrat Frank Skartados was forced to concede the seat for the 100th Assembly District last week when he was a mere 15 votes behind.

In his heart of hearts, he believes he won.

But in a double whammy of irony, Skartados was seemingly doomed by a vague election law that was crafted by his own lawyer, Kathleen O’Keefe, while she worked as Silver’s chief election counsel. O’Keefe’s strict interpretation of her own law walled off one of Skartados’ last hopes of fighting for the seat…

In New York City, Board of Elections rules automatically require a hand inspection of the paper trail from voting machines in any election where the margin is 0.5% or less.

State election law doesn’t

Coalition Report: Bridgeport Recount and Recommendations

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Each candidate for the governor’s race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor’s race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

Simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Each candidate for the governor’s race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor’s race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

Simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

Full report, press release, and supporting details at Coalition site:  <read>