Diebold Documentation – CA Top-To-Bottom Review

Debra Bowen has recently released the “Documentation Assessment of the Diebold Voting Systems”. Having served as a software buyer and as a product manager, I can attest that software documentation is almost always an afterthought, usually poor, hard to keep up to date, and expensive to do well. Its also a very boring and mundane topic for the average software developer and untechnical user.

Yet, don’t overlook this report. There are Gems (no pun intended) and very valuable insights available from the report. Below are several excerpts to hopefully entice some to read at least a few pages of the report:

conscientious local election officials attempting to master the Diebold system will find the documentation presents numerous impediments to their managing the voting system correctly, in a manner that achieves high accuracy, security, and other core objectives…

Pursuant to the federal standards, Diebold submitted to CIBER [Independent Testing Authority] a set of voting system security policies…A comparative analysis shows that the security policies Diebold filed with CIBER were considerably more stringent and extensive than those it ultimately documented in Diebold’s product manuals..

Continue reading “Diebold Documentation – CA Top-To-Bottom Review”

Senator Dodd: Keep Bush’s Hans Off Our Elections

Although I appreciate many of Christopher Dodd’s heartfelt positions he is the one person in the Senate primarily responsible for the so called, Help America Vote Act. He compounds his error as he fails to oppose Hans Von Spakovsky for the Election Assistance Commission.

Senator Feingold and Obama are standing up for us. Standing up when Harry Reid is capitulating <read about the Senate> and Feinstein taking both sides . Dodd and Feinstein are on the Rules Committee. No word on how or if he voted, but he could join Obama and Feingold and block the nomination.

Lest you think we are nitpicking, here are some of Von Spakovsky’s accomplishments: <details list><and more>

Spakovsky stalled ruling on Mississippi redistricting, effecting electoral outcomes

Spakovsky pushed through Texas re-districting that violated the Voting Rights Act

Spakovsky urged Maryland officials to reject voter registration forms of lawful voters

Spakovsky blocked an investigation into voter discrimination against Native Americans

Spakovsky approved “modern day poll tax” over objections of career staff:

Council approves raises for poll workers using new technology

Post-election audits have been called unfunded mandates by registrars and municipalities (Note: audits are actually being paid for at this time by Federal HAVA funds). But raises justified by the new optical scan machines seem to be no problem in one Connecticut town. <read>

The Common Council has approved raises for poll workers, who will be doing twice the work on Election Day now that the city has switched to an optical scanner ballot-counting system.

Voting will be as simple as filling out a Lotto ticket for the voter, but involves much more work for election officials, who have been in what registrars call “boot camp training” in the use of the new machines.
Poll workers will have to know the technology so well that they can explain it to any voter who has a question or problem. And they have to do all the troubleshooting without looking at the completed paper ballots.

TalkNationRadio – Part 4 of 4

Dori Smith completes her four part service to Connecticut Voters with two interviews. <read>

Excellent interviews with Daniel Seligson from the PEW Research Center and Prof Michael Fisher, President of TrueVoteCT.Â

However, I must take exception to Daniel Seligson’s faith in Connecticut’s audit law.  Has he read it?  Or has he fallen into the trap of believing the press releases?  You be the judge.  Review the loopholes and inadequacies covered on this site.  Read the law for yourself.

Myth-Based Voting

Your editorial “Fail-Safe Voting?”, September 20, 2007, could be titled “Myth-Based Voting?”.

Last week the Hartford Courant had a fact lite editorial, “Fail-Safe Voting”. I sent a letter to the editor to provide an accurate view. It took almost 250 words, however, I wanted to provide facts and the Courant has often run letters longer than their 200 word ‘limit’.
It does not bother me that my letter was not published. However, it is a problem when there is no responsible alternate opinion printed. In the past week there were several letters addressing the renaming of Bradley Airport, but none addressing the voting machine editorial. Here is the letter:
Your editorial “Fail-Safe Voting?”, September 20, 2007, could be titled “Myth-Based Voting?”.  

It is inaccurate to state that”So far, no one appears to have figured out how to tamper with the machines” Dr. Alex Shvartsman, UConn, consultant to Secretary Bysicwicz, independently confirmed specific vulnerabilities and recently said “The concerns are very valid and very real.”  The Brennan Center for Justice, frequently referenced by the legislature and Secretary Bysiewicz, says “One of the primary conclusions of this report is…using Trojan horses or other Software Attack Programs provide the least difficult means to affect the outcome of a statewide election using as few informed participants as possible”.

It is precisely because “It would take a conspiracy by a lot of people to stuff a ballot box.” that Brennan concluded that a software attack would be most attractive.

It is true that “The 10 percent threshold [of districts audited] is highest among states”. What is seldom noted is that only three or 20% of races are audited, or that loopholes in the law reduce the odds of detecting fraud in most local elections and all State Representative races to about 2%-4%.

Yes,”It would be a shame if, after spending hundreds of millions of dollars to correct the mistakes of 2000, it were still possible to alter the results.” Let us invest the $0.25-$0.50 per voter it would take to provide a truly sufficient audit and assurance of the correct results.

Another Day, Another Loophole In PA 07-194

What if a post-election audit uncovers a problem with the machine count? Wouldn’t it be a good idea to examine the memory card and the voting machine for evidence that could be used to detect fraud or to understand the cause of the problem so it could be prevented next time?

Unfortunately, audits must start a minimum of 15 days after the election (for the most recent primary, September 26th). And there is a prohibition for unlocking the voting machines that expires 14 days after the election (for the most recent primary, September 25th). accompanied by a possible 5-year prison term.

 

So, the evidence in the memory cards or in the optical scanner can be destroyed before, during, or right after the audit, legally.

 

As we have pointed out before, holding the audits so far after the primary, and so far after the random district drawing provides plenty of time for ‘adjustments’ to make things look good in those districts chosen for audit. Now part of that can be planning the timely unlocking of the machine and memory cards before the audit report could result in an investigaton.

 

Also, are there sufficient proceedures to stop the hacking of the optical scanner itself between elections? What can be done while a machine is unlocked? What security is in place?

 

(Thanks to Mike Fisher for noticing the Sept 25 expiration date for machine locking on the Municipal Elections Calendar)

Statute details:

Continue reading “Another Day, Another Loophole In PA 07-194”

FAQ: Stop! What You Are Doing Will Scare The Voters Away From The Polls.

While not a question. This statement has been raised a couple of times in the last few days. A candidate was concerned that by raising the issue of election integrity it could cut voting at the polls. A registrar called to tell me that there were a lot seniors in her town that would be afraid to vote it they came to hear me. Neither of these people have heard my presentation. In fact, the registrar said she could not make my presentation as she has a day job and only does registrar work when she is paid.

There are several answers to this statement, let me give them:

  • I encourage everyone to vote. The only only way to guarantee your vote will not be counted is to avoid voting.
  • We agree that increasing voter confidence will increase participation and that increased participation is good.
  • Do you agree that actual integrity of the system is equally important as the perception of integrity?
  • My goal is to increase voter confidence in the election system by exposing vulnerabilities and causing the process to be improved. I do not condone sweeping anything under the rug.
  • I have confidence in the reliability of the democratic process with informed voters.
  • My intention is to protect and enhance the value of everyone’s vote. While CTVotersCount is dedicated completely to voting integrity and confidence, I personally support measures to increase voter participation which do not otherwise compromise election integrity and oppose those that could easily compromise election integrity.

Update 9/26: TalkNationRadio (no transcript yet) addressed this topic today. PEW Research shows no drop-off in voting in Florida or Maryland as voters become more cynical with regard to election integrity. (Not sure how comforting this information is, yet it refutes the entire premise of the concerns being raised.)

Continue reading “FAQ: Stop! What You Are Doing Will Scare The Voters Away From The Polls.”

Surely You’re Joking, Professor Altschuler!

Recently I attended a meeting of the Cornell Club of Hartford as a guest of a member. She had invited me and several other voting advocates because the speaker was Cornell Professor of American Studies, Glenn C. Altschuler. He is an expert on election history.

Professor Altschuler was an entertaining speaker, spiking the talk with jokes, and bantering with some members of the audience. He is obviously a popular faculty member. I found the whole talk quite interesting.

His basic thesis is that elections in the U.S. are primarily decided by three factors Timing, Tactics and Turnout. He analysed the 2008 presidential election based on that frame, pointing out similar aspects of past elections. Not being a history expert, I cannot comment on his theory’s relation to other alternative theories.

There is an old joke about the sandwich store with a sign that read “We have an agreement with the Bank, they don’t make sandwiches and we don’t cash checks.” I propose an agreement between computer experts and political historians: “We won’t attempt to clarify political history and you won’t certify voting machines.”

I asked a very simple question, very quickly, simply, honestly and innocently. (You were not there. You will have to trust me on this.) I asked approximately: “I would add another T, Tinkering. Could you tell me why politicians like John Kerry and the loser in our 2nd District Congressional race with a margin of 91 votes throw in the towel so quickly”

He then proceeded to characterize me as a conspiracy theorist, said that I only believed the machines were unsafe because of Mr. Diebold’s unfortunate statement (He indicated could not recall his name, which is Walden O’Dell.). Said there was no evidence of computer fraud. And that it was hard to do. It would take too many people. I would have loved an opportunity to debate him, I saw that as inapproprite, and did not continue. I did not want to offend anyone, especially since I was a guest in front of an admired, legendary professor.

He went on to state that Bush had stolen the election fair and square in Ohio as it has always been done. (My contention would be then that his theory of the three T’s is, at best, incomplete as an explanation of who won in the past and why.)

Continue reading “Surely You’re Joking, Professor Altschuler!”

CT News Roundup

TalkNationRadio.org Part 3 of 4 <read>

It’s not in LHS’s interest to have their machines viewed as failure prone and I don’t think that they should be in the pipeline between the moderator and the registrar on the one hand and the SOS on the other. So I think the whole flow of information that has been set up is wrong. — Prof. Michael Fisher, TrueVoteCT

Another “Good News” Press Release (press release)
(see other “Good News”)

“The initial recount results confirm that the optical scan machines performed well and that every vote was recorded accurately,” said Bysiewicz. “…Together, these post election procedures should send a strong and simple message to voters – your vote will be counted, we’ll make sure of it.” – Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, Press Release

When one truck from one trucking company goes down Avon Mountain and does not crash once, it is proof that Avon Mountain and can work as a truck route, but not close to proof that Avon Mountain is generally safe for every truck and driver, almost every time. At CTVotersCount we agree that the Diebold AccuVote-OS can count elections accurately. The fact is that no electronic voting machine can be proven reliable, the Diebold AccuVote-OS is far from secure, the Diebold AccuVote has been proven to be easily compromised, and Connecticut adds to that vulnerability by outsourcing the coding of each election to our vendor, LHS. What we do claim is that elections can be incorrectly decided electronically by error or fraud. The only solution we support is sufficient random audits of each race and question.

What’s the difference: Alderman or Selectman?

Shelton Weekly: Candidates question registrar’s position

A letter drafted by two candidates for city aldermen was sent to the secretary of state’s office questioning incumbent Alderman John “Jack” Finn’s dual roles as registrar of voters and his candidacy for alderman…

Continue reading “CT News Roundup”

Conference Call With Debra Bowen

Debra Bowen is California Secretary of the State responsible for the Top To Bottom Review, and the decertification of electronic voting machines from Diebold and two other vendors: <transcript and conference call>

Some people have criticized the Review as being biased and not conducted in the real world, and it certainly was not, it was conducted in a laboratory setting. The major criticism has been that it did not take into account the physical security that is used in many counties–most counties–but I think it is a mistake to assume that an attacker who wants to interfere with the outcome of an election will not find a way to get their hands on either a voting machine that is used in the polling place, one of the memory cards that is used, or on some other piece of equipment. Or the source code itself…

I’m often asked by people what they can do to support my efforts and to ensure that their votes are accurately counted. My answer would be to get even more involved. Clearly members of the Courage Campaign are already involved, but I’m asking people to go beyond that. If you have concerns about their being an adequate number of well-trained poll workers and you can afford a day, please become a poll worker.