Revisited: What could a Secretary of the State Do?

Four years ago, we posted a list of actions that a Secretary of the State could do on his or her own to improve the election process. Lets revisit that list as the 2014 campaign begins in earnest.

Four years ago, we posted a list of actions that a Secretary of the State could do on his or her own to improve the election process.  Lets revisit that list as the 2014 campaign begins in earnest.

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Much of what we hear from candidates is proposed cheerleading and leadership from the bully pulpit: the bills they would propose to the legislature, the leadership they would provide to improve the business climate, encourage voting, and voting integrity in Connecticut.  Don’t get me wrong these are useful and legitimate roles for the Secretary of the State.  However, there are items that the Secretary of the State can do on their own initiative to improve business registration, public access to information, and the election process.

When I talk to candidates for Secretary of the State, one of my main themes is what they could do on their own authority as Secretary of the State to improve election integrity and public confidence.

Here is my initial list of items from 2010:

  • Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site, while increasing the integrity of the post-election audit. Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested
  • Improve documentation and training for election officials,  in substance and format
  • Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

We recognize that everything costs money, however, most of these items are relatively modest items that appear to be within the authority of the Secretary of the State.

Further Details

Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site

In a PEW study the Connecticut site ranked 48th out of 50 states.  We could debate if we should be higher in the rankings, or instead work to emulate and surpass the top ranked states.

The process of accumulating voting results in Connecticut is an error-prone three step process of addition and transcription, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office, and to the web.  Citizens have identified errors large and moderate – errors of a magnitude  which could change election results, the initiation of recanvasses, or ballot access. See <here> <here>

Without reliable, publicly posted results, post-election audits cannot be accomplished which inspire confidence and provide integrity.  A trusted audit requires selecting districts for audit against previously posted results.  Since we audit against optical scanner tapes, and the tape results are not posted, then we fail to meet that requirement.

What can be done?

  • Post copies of the original documents: All district and central count absented ballot Moderator’s’ Reports and copies of scanner tapes should be faxed to the Secretary of the State’s Office and posted on the SOTS web site. (We know this is easily possible since the SOTS web site has recently included images of all local ballots, and is capable of the quick addition of press releases)
  • Post detailed and summary data: The SOTS could use temporary employees or outsourcing to input and double check the input of all that data, then post it to the web site in human and downloadable formats.
  • >Side benefit: A free public audit: As a byproduct the public, candidates, and parties could check and audit the data at no cost to the state.  To do that today would involve visiting town halls across the state and performing all the calculations done today by hand – efficient auditing of selected districts is not possible because detailed data is not currently posted.
  • Consider using the Overseas Vote Foundation facility for empowering military and overseas voters, now in use by seven states.  This is an example of what could be done to empower all voters. (Added 4/4/2010)
  • Improve post-election audit integrity: Stop accepting reports showing wild discrepancies as extremely accurate and make all audit investigations public and transparent. (added 7/31/2010) <Extremely Accurate> <Audit Reports>

Since 2010: We have had a little progress and  some attempts in this area:

  • Starting in recent election, the actual election results data faxed from towns is posted to the Secretary’s web site, so it can be checked by citizens and a bit more transparency is thus provided.  Yet the results are not in detail, covering each election district and each voting method.
  • The Secretary initiated a well intentioned project to have all data from all districts input over the web and immediately reported. Unfortunately, the system was a failure and for at least two years, the Secretary’s Office remained tone-deaf to the complaints of election officials that the system and its requirement that each polling place moderator have an ID and input their own data was effectively unworkable.  In 2013 there was some indication that a more effective system of collecting data by spreadsheet, which could be input to officials charged with that function would be made available some time in the future.  Many towns already compile detailed data in spreadsheets, using rested officials assigned to data entry, to take and double check data from moderators who are often elderly and who all have just completed a demanding seventeen-hour-plus day.
  • Nothing significant has been accomplished in post-election audit integrity. In 2013 the Citizen Audit did a study of the audit drawing and found huge discrepancies on the list. We have long been a critic of the official audit reports created by Uconn, the only change is that Uconn has apparently stopped producing the reports since the November 2011 election. We do acknowledge an improvement this year in the official audit procedures, with several corrections and small but useful improvements suggested by the Citizen Audit and accepted by the Secretary’s Office.
  • There is on the SOTS Election web page information specifically for Military and Overseas Voters <view>, yet nothing like what is possible <see MN>.
  • Yet we applaud the SOTS and Registrars because Connecticut now does a good job of implementing the Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act (MOVE), resulting in Military voters achieving ballot return rates comparable with all absentee voters.

We would be remiss if we did not applaud, once again, the report on the Secretary’s Election Performance Task Force, while its promise has yet to be matched with an equal measure of progress.

Another area of irritation and loss of integrity in the post-election audits is that while the Secretary of the State’s Office is able to post ballots for every municipality, they are not provided with a reliable list of polling districts in those municipalities.  By requiring the faxing of district Moderator’s Reports and posting them, this uncertainty would be eliminated.

As we said above: In 2013 the Citizen Audit did a study of the audit drawing and found huge discrepancies on the list.

Another problem is public notification of audit dates, times and locations.  By procedure (unfortunately not by law), registrars are required to inform the Secretary of the States’s Office three days in advance of the local audits.  If these dates were posted by the SOTS Office within 24 hours of receipt, then the public, candidates, and parties would have much better access to actually observing audits.

Beyond audits, having centralized voting district locations and assisting voters in finding their polling place would help the public and partially relieve that burden from towns.

Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested

Currently, before each election, memory cards are programmed in Massachusetts by our distributor, LHS Associates.   The cards are shipped to local election officials for pre-election testing.  There are two problems:

  • We have no effective supervision over the process.  One of the risks is insider fraud or intimidation of those who program and ship memory cards.
  • The process is not perfect, and the memory cards are physically unreliable.  Extra effort is required when bad cards are discovered by the Registrars and new cards need to be ordered and shipped.  See <UConn Report.>

What can be done?

  • Perform the programming in Connecticut: In other states (outside of New England) large counties program their own cards and often perform programming at a fee for small counties.  We have paid for two machines which we can use to program the cards. They could be used by state employees or outsource the programming within Connecticut.
  • Independently test the cards nearby the programming: UConn has developed, at taxpayer expense, a program to eliminate many causes of error in the cards and easily detect bad cards with “junk” data.  Currently this program is underutilitzed in no non-random testing of cards selected by local officials after pre-election testing and after the election.  We can exploit this program to 100% pre-test the cards, enhancing integrity and reducing wasted effort by local officials when they discover “junk” cards.
  • Side Benefit:  Jobs: It might be small, yet every job moved back to Connecticut would be a benefit to the state.  Like large counties in other states, we might provide the service to other states in New England – we could compete with LHS for business and with the added advantage of the UConn testing program.  Perhaps we could expand beyond New England to service other states.

We also note a large cadre of very part-time election officials, many of whom served as lever mechanics and later as vendor trained optical scan technicians.  We expect that several of these same individuals could quickly train to meet the seasonal demand for programming and testing, and appreciate the opportunity for work and public service.  It would not take many.

Once again, slow if any progress. Over the last couple of years memory cards have continued to degrade, while Uconn continues to report that less and less cards are sent in from towns for testing. Nobody seems to be taking responsibility to see that the cards are sent as requested by the Secretary (or is that a fiction that the Uconn reports continue to maintain).

In the meantime, some new cards of a new design are tested in each election, yet there seems to have been no systematic effort of the State to hold the vendor accountable for selling such unreliable technology, and quite a price.

Improve documentation and training for election officials,  in substance and format

The current Secretary of the State and her staff have worked to improve documentation and training.  This work should continue and be taken to a new level.

What can be done?

  • Update and improve the value of manuals: The Moderator Manual, the Absentee Ballot Moderator, the Recanvass Manual and the Post-Election Audit Procedures were modified after the commitment to optical scanners.  They need to be updated and expanded based on experience.  They need to be rewritten and edited by professional technical writers to make them more effective as training and reference documents.  For instance,Improve and expand certification: The Secretary has begin efforts for Registrar Certification and Training to complement the current Moderator Certification and Training.  The Registrars job is much more involved than that of a Moderator, yet Registrars have no formal training and certification program (And currently there is no requiremen for Registrars to be certified Moderators or to attend training.  Moderators are supposed to be certified, yet that is not enforced – these are issues for the Legislature and an example of where the Secretary of the State could be an effective cheer leader)
    • The Absentee Ballot Moderator’s Manual still calls for multiple counting throughout the day, but only one count is necessary with optical scanners. The Post-Election Audit procedures should provide more details in several areas:  Counting incomplete bubbles, counting write-in votes, exactly what levels of differences should call for recounting and investigation, and help with accurate and efficient counting methods.
    • The Recanvass Manual should also cover details of counting incomplete bubbles, counting for voter’s intent, voter identifiable ballots, and the role of designated observers.
    • There may be value in following the examples of other jurisdictions in creating observer manuals for post-election audits and recanvasses.

Here we have seen some laudable progress and some questionable progress.

  • The Moderators Manual has been completely revised and is much more readable, has clear sections and checklists for each position and function.  Not as polished and some we have seen in other states, yet a vast improvement.
  • The Moderator Training has been revised with an online course which must be passed as a prerequisite for taking the in-person training. Unfortunately, this apparently costly outsourced training, suffers from some problems that tend to irritate officials required to take the training.  The training itself and the quizzes, apparently done by out-of-state consultants makes some glaring errors in Connecticut election law, and the quizzes score is based on incorrect answers to some questions. The training suffers from too long, too simple presentations on the basics of elections and on serving those with disabilities – one suspects that it is easy boiler-plate sold to every state. Further, the training is very choppy with short videos and many different/inconsistent navigation between videos, slides and quizzes – it all takes extra hours of time and frustration, especially for those not especially skilled in the web or loaded with extra patience.  A good idea, not well done.  We have heard that many Moderators are reluctant to take it a 2nd time (required every 2 years) and threaten to quit.  We will see. Once again, we have heard anecdotes of a tone-deaf response from Hartford.

 Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

One responsibility of the Secretary of the State’s Office is to advise election officials on proper procedures according to law, regulations, procedures, and directives.  We have heard registrars complain that the advice given depends on who one talks to, and on what day.  We have no way of determining if that is true or how prevalent the problem is.  The uncertainty and over-reliance on verbal communication should be eliminated.

We hear the same from committee political treasurers. In fact it is the subject of a proposed law before the Legislature.  The law would require the State Elections Enforcement Commission to follow-up with a written version of any verbal advice within ten days. <H.B. 5470> However, it is difficult to write law that distinguishes from a simple inquiry from one that provides a critical distinction that the caller must rely on to avoid error and avoid potential fine or jail time.

What can be done?

  • All directives should be in writing and publicly available. Like any laws, regulations, and procedures there is usually some ambiguity, unanticipated situations, new regulations can take years to be approved, and problems which must be overcome.  The Secretary of the State Office from time to time must issue directives to cover these situations.  Such directives should be in writing and posted publicly.
  • All substantial advice and rulings should be recorded in writing. The current Secretary of the State’s Office keeps track of all citizen inquires.  The Office should keep track of all official inquires, and summarize any significant election advice and rulings for future reference.
  • Economies of Scale: Perhaps the state would be best served by a common system, that tracked similar advice for the Secretary of the State’s Office and Elections Enforcement.  Perhaps we should use the same or similar laws, and the same system for all agencies that have a similar requirement.  The Environmental Protection Agency comes to mind.  What do other agencies do today?  What do other states do?  We have only one Freedom Of Information law for all agencies.  Perhaps we need a uniform law for agency directives, rulings, and advice?  There will always be a need to consider economies of scale vs. excess bureaucracy – but the third option is to search for the ways that increase economy of scale, increase democracy, while also streamlining bureaucracy.  Once again, the Secretary cannot change the law alone, but could cooperate with other agencies to produce efficiency and provide leadership in going beyond requirements of the law.

Perhaps we ask too much. We did support a bill in the Legislature that would have at least made the Secretary of the State’s directives enforceable, with the caveat that they be marked as such and centrally posted.

Perhaps soon, we will do a similar review of the progress on the report on the Elections Performance Task Force referenced above.

Random Drawing: 68 Districts in 40 Municipalities Selected for Post-Election Audit

Two members of the Citizen Audit Board assisted the Secretary of the State by randomly drawing 68 districts in 40 municipalities across Connecticut for the post-election audit.

See the Press Release from the SOTS Office.

Two members of the Citizen Audit Board assisted the Secretary of the State by randomly drawing 68 districts in 40 municipalities across Connecticut for the post-election audit.

See the Press Release from the SOTS Office: <press release>

“It happens all the time.” All over the place (Part 5)

We continue our review of some of our posts of past errors surfaced in Connecticut and around the country, selected from our over 900 posts.

<previous part>

Here we continue our review of some of our posts of past errors surfaced in Connecticut and around the country, selected from our over 900 posts.  Last time we covered CTVotersCount posts from 2010. Continuing from there:

Colorado chain-of-custody violation: Secret count by candidate before official recount <Jan 2011>

Six tries and NJ still can’t seal voting machines <Jan 2011>

Absentee ballot fraud in Ohio <Jan 2011>

Citizen audit show hundreds of votes not counted, more voters than ballots, elsewhere fewer voters than ballots – Bridgeport <Jan 2011>

Citizen audit shows hundreds of votes not counted, hundreds extra elsewhere – not Bridgeport, but SC <Mar 2011>

Indiana Secretary of State indicted on election fraud charges <Mar 2011>

Wisconsin channels Bridgeport and SC, with counts off <Apr 2011>

Election rigging in KY yields 156 years in slammer <May 2011>

Wisconsin, faith based recounts, tapes dated before election etc. <May 2011> <also>

That completes the 1st half of 2011. We will continue another time.

Editorial: Improve Turnout By Making Voting Worthwhile

It seems that turnout is the holy grail of elections. Many election reforms are justified on a claim, true or not, that the reform will increase turnout. But, turnout is more a symptom of democracy, than an end in itself.

We have some suggestions to consider:

  • Make it easier for third-party candidates to get on the ballot, easier to qualify for public financing. Let us start with a level playing field for public financing, and officials that follow the law, with a “Chief Election Official” with actual responsibility for elections.
  • Reform the decentralized partisan election system.
  • Eliminate the “Spoiler” effect, provide more democracy, with a true runoff election when one candidate does not get 50_% of the vote.

Let us recall that in this generation, two third-party “spoilers” did win elections in Connecticut: Governor Lowell Weicker, and Senator Joe Lieberman.

Background <go to Editorial>

It seems that turnout is the holy grail of elections. Many election reforms are justified on a claim, true or not, that the reform will increase turnout. But, turnout is more a symptom of democracy, than an end in itself.

In our last post we summarized the case for and against no-excuse absentee voting. Proponents claim that it will increase turnout. Yet, what we find as the best science says it tends to decrease turnout – the reasons are not obvious, not intuitive, and far from clear.  Yet, either way the difference in turnout is just a very few points. It would be unlikely to take the 21% turnout we had in the recent primary and make it more than 25%.

What increases turnout? One factor could be voter interest in the election, that the election is important, and that their vote is important. We always have lower turnout in odd year municipal elections and higher turnout in general elections.  We have had more than our fair share of exciting general elections in even years lately, Lamont vs. Lieberman 2006, Malloy vs. Foley 2010, McMahon vs. Blumenthal 2010, and McMahon vs. Murphy in 2012.  Even when it is a slam dunk in Connecticut it seems that an election where voters want to register their enthusiasm for a candidate can bring voters out, e.g. Obama 2008.

Looking at the 2014 election, conventional wisdom is that it will be a close election rematch between Tom Foley and Dannel Malloy. Neither candidate is all that popular, both were expected to and are underway in very negative campaigns against each other. Columnist Kevin Rennie has characterized it as “A Race Between Two Dark Vaders”.  A close race between unpopular candidates, both well financed with lots of “outsider” funding as well – many voters will be turned off, yet many may still turnout.

How could it get more exciting? Enter two petitioning third party candidates, stage right and stage left. Is this exciting or more depressing?  For the two major party candidates and their supporters, depressing.  For supporters of the third-party candidates and those depressed by the major party candidates, exciting.

How could it get more depressing to voters and potential candidates? First, by the major party candidates and their supporters adding to the negativity by bashing the minor party candidates, and the system that allows them to petition their way onto the ballot. The case for additional candidates, best summarized by Connecticut native Ralph Nader, himself bashed for the 2000 election and for signing a petition for one of the candidates, resulting in a Courant Op-Ed <read>

Nader: Crashers Needed At The Two-Party Party

Giving voters more choices in an election year should be as American as the Fourth of July

The word “spoiler,” when applied only to small-party candidates, is an epithet of political bigotry. It says to people who want to enter the electoral arena and talk about ignored but important issues that they should not do so.

It says the two big parties own all the voters, and they should not be taken away by third-party candidates who can’t win. Nor should these candidates be given an opportunity to build voter familiarity and an eventual chance at winning over several elections.

Many Americans, despite their disgust with the behavior of the two major parties, think nothing of telling people not to run because they’ll be “spoilers.” That is equivalent to telling candidates to shut up — a nasty demand that one would not readily use in daily interactions.

Even so, I was surprised that my mere signing of former state legislator Jonathan Pelto’s petition, along with thousands of other Connecticut voters, to get him on the gubernatorial ballot made news. After all, giving voters more choices and voices in an election year should be as American as apple pie and the Fourth of July. Except that it isn’t…

How could it get more depressing to voters and potential candidates? Second, by a system that looks like insider manipulation by local party operatives, with a system headed by a Secretary of the State powerless to enforce the law and free from full actual responsibility as the State’s “Chief Election Official”.

The only good news in this: There is enough remnants of our formerly world-leading Freedom Of Information law, a smart candidate, and apparently no questions asked cooperation from the Secretary of the State’s Office in providing transparency. (At least that is what we have experienced from the Merrill and Bysiewicz administrations, and have no reason to doubt here).

On Sunday, petitioning candidate Jon Pelto, on his blog described his efforts of see what was actually happening with his petitions, it is a long sad, interesting story. W applaud his initiative to find what is so:  You call this a Democracy?<read> His blog post is well worth reading.  We also applaud the Courant for an article in today’s edition covering the story and summarizing the issues, based on the information developed by Pelto, hopefully they have been, or will, be joined by other media in the State: Pelto Sweating Out Signature Count, Says He May Sue If Denied Ballot Access  <read>

Merrill’s office has been allowing Pelto, under supervision, to examine hundreds of petitions that it already has logged in — and he said it’s now clear that “dozens” of signatures were wrongly rejected by local officials.

Pelto said some of the unjustified reasons given for those rejections included: the lack of a full birth date in a space on the petition form that isn’t mandatory; a woman including her married name after the maiden name under which she was registered, even though all other information matched local records; and petition signers being on a local list of “inactive” voters, after not voting for a couple of years…

As Pelto riffled through stacks of petition sheets Tuesday, he said that Merrill’s staff already had agreed with him that some of the local officials’ rejections are unjustified. But, he added, Merrill’s office cannot overrule the decisions of local officials, many of whom are party insiders. Merrill can only compile the local officials’ certified totals; if they add up to 7,500 or more, she puts the candidate on the ballot.

[Deputy Secretary of the State James] Spallone said it appears Pelto is correct in at least some of what he says. For example, Spallone said, a signature shouldn’t be rejected simply because a person is on the local “inactive” voter list. People on that list must be allowed to vote if they show up on Election Day and verify their identities, he said, adding that “simply being ‘inactive,’ on its own, is not enough to reject a signature.”

Editorial

This election demonstrates the worst of money in political campaigns with two sides with large stores of cash, along with only slightly “separate” groups assisting with even more cash. Much to the discredit of our once leading public financing system, struggling survival along with our FOI laws.

It also demonstrates the worst of our decentralized, dual partisan Registrars of Voters system of elections, with an almost powerless Secretary of the State. It is time to consider reforming the system by regionalization as we have suggested, and not make it worse as the Courant has been advocating.

And for turnout, that indicator and symptom of the value the electorate places on participation in elections. We have some suggestions to consider:

  • Make it easier for third-party candidates to get on the ballot, easier to qualify for public financing. Let us start with a level playing field for public financing, and officials that follow the law, with a “Chief Election Official” with actual responsibility for elections.
  • Reform the decentralized partisan election system.
  • Eliminate the “Spoiler” effect, provide more democracy, with a true runoff election when one candidate does not get 50_% of the vote.

Let us recall that in this generation, two third-party “spoilers” did win elections in Connecticut: Governor Lowell Weicker, and Senator Joe Lieberman.

Please Review the Facts – Constitutional Amendment on Ballot in Nov

Courant makes a mostly accurate case for and against amendment that would increase voter convenience and absentee vote fraud.

What is a voter to do? We suggest: Evaluate the evidence, read this post, read the Courant article, study some of our past posts on this issue and absentee fraud in Connecticut.

Courant makes a mostly accurate case for and against amendment that would increase voter convenience and absentee vote fraud.

What is a voter to do? We suggest:

Evaluate the evidence, read this post, read the Courant article, study some of our past posts on this issue and absentee fraud in Connecticut.

Courant story:   High Ideals and Partisan Politics Mix In Amendment Issue <read>

Here are the facts and ramifications we believe are accurate:

  • The amendment would allow the Legislature to enact no-excuse absentee voting and/or early voting.
  • It is very likely that our Democratic Legislature would pass no-excuse absentee voting on a close to partisan vote in 2015. A supporter, Governor Malloy, would sign it into law. A Governor Folley would likely follow his party and veto it.   Perhaps they and the other candidates on the ballot should each be asked that question.
  • No excuse absentee voting would increase convenience for some lazy and less committed, less interested voters.
  • No excuse absentee voting would increase the opportunity and level of absentee fraud, the most prevalent type of election fraud, with the possible exception of undetected insider fraud.
  • No excuse absentee voting, unlike statements in the Courant article, would be likely to decrease or not change turnout.
  • As the Courant states, it only matters in close elections, yet little else matters except when elections are close.
  • Most Democrats are for this amendment for partisan reasons.
  • Most Republicans are for this for partisan reasons.
  • It is unlikely that early voting will be passed and implemented in Connecticut as it would be expensive and logistically challenging, especially to small towns, given our town by town voting system – or moderately expensive, less satisfactory, likely discriminatory.

What is a voter to do? We suggest:

  • Evaluate the evidence, read this post, read the Courant article, study some of our past posts on this issue and absentee fraud in Connecticut here and here.
  • As CTVotersCount readers know, we come down against no-excuse absentee voting, and for early voting, if we are willing to pay for fair and safe early voting.

Here we want to elaborate on a couple points from above:

  • No excuse absentee voting, unlike statements in the Courant article, would be likely to DECREASE turnout.
    • We suggest reading our posts on what we believe are the most scientific studies of turnout, absentee voting, and same day voter registration. <here>
    • Read the statements of Professor Doug Chapin, an expert on election administration, invited by the Secretary of the State to speak to her Elections Performance Task Force, who has read many studies and agrees with the ones we find most convincing  <hear>
    • These studies conclude that no-excuse absentee voting actually DECREASES turnout. And that Election Day Registration (EDR) alone increases turnout, and in combination there is not increase or decrease in turnout caused by no-excuse absentee voting. (Yet we speculate that Connecticut’s unique low cost, inconvenient EDR system will not add significantly to turnout, nor stem a decrease caused by early voting)
  • As the Courant states, it only matters in close elections, yet little else matters except when elections are close.Here in Connecticut close elections happen, and matter:

 

Courant Editorial: Why Is State’s Election Website So Bad?

The Courant has done a service to the voters of Connecticut pointing out a flaw in the Secretary of the State’s web site that does not serve voters. The editorial is not an exaggeration, it might be a bit too kind. UPDATED.

The Courant has done a service to the voters of Connecticut pointing out a flaw in the Secretary of the State’s web site that does not serve voters. The editorial is not an exaggeration, it might be a bit too kind.

Just a bit of background.  What is the information voters most want from an elections web site, state or local?  One study says it is not how to register, how to do an absentee vote, nor where to vote. Those are important. Yet, what most voters want to know, most of all, is “What is on the ballot?”.

From the Courant:

Why Is State’s Election Website So Bad?

Want to know which candidates are running in Tuesday’s primary elections? Good luck finding them on the secretary of the state’s website.

This website is an unnavigable embarrassment. Voters should be able, with a click or two, to find out who’s on the ballot. Is that too much to ask?

The secretary’s office issued a news release July 31 saying a list of candidates was posted on http://www.sots.ct.gov/vote. But the list posted midday Friday was in the wrong place and with some of the wrong names.

And just getting to that inaccurate list was a labyrinthian exercise in frustration.

As of lunchtime Friday, the list of contenders for the Aug. 12 primary for governor and lieutenant governor was blank. The candidates were actually listed under the wrong date — “11/04/2014-General.” (Go figure.) Friday’s list included candidates not running in Tueday’s primary.

The secretary said that would be changed Friday afternoon.

This is important information. There’s no excuse for the state not getting it right — and in a place easy to find — just before an election.

We investigated by finding the same information the Courant did. Unlike a most voters, we are familiar with the Secretary’s web site, yet perhaps we are a little less patient.  We found the same information (or lack thereof) the Courant found. Then we went back and traced the steps a very patient and persistent voter might traverse:

First we looked under “Voter Information” and found the link for “Town by Town Sample Ballots”.  But the latest information there was for last November’s election:

Then after looking for a while, we found the link. Going back, attempting to pretend that we were that patient voter. We got to this screen about six (6) clicks from the home page. Not under “Voter Information”, but under “Election Information and Statistics”:

Note: it has no listing for the Primary 4 days away, only for the general election, and completely missing the race for Governor. The race for Governor might be missing because the candidates are incomplete, due to the Primary. But then why is Lt Governor listed, which is also subject to primary in the same party?

We are still two clicks away from a PDF for each individual office, which must be accessed separately, rather than one complete list, better delivered as a html web page.

Finally, we note that apparently the Secretary’s Office did not do as promised yesterday, and make the link touted in the Press Release have the promised information. In any case, we doubt many voters would expect to need to read press releases to find links to election information.

UPDATE:  As David Bidell points out in the 1st comment, as of sometime this morning it was updated.  I might have missed it earlier this morning.

Common Sense: [How] Do you know if your vote counted?

The Citizen Audit has just opened up our signup for the audits for the primary, which start fifteen days after the primary. The primary is August 12th, so the audits will begin Aug 27th.

Q: So, why bother signing to spend a day observing the audits?
A: To understand and the question ” [How] Do you know if your vote counted?”

Note: This is then tenth post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <next> <previous>

The Citizen Audit has just opened up our signup for the audits for the primary, which start fifteen days after the primary. The primary is August 12th, so the audits will begin Aug 27th.

Q: So, why bother signing to spend a day observing the audits?
A: To understand and the question ” [How] Do you know if your vote counted?”

The Citizen Audit’s new flag promotes the  theme Vote, Audit, Observe.  It summarizes three of the keys to approaching “knowing” if our votes are all counted and accounted for correctly.  They highlight the importance of voting, auditing the vote, and independent observation of the audits. Given the requirement of the Secret Vote to prevent successful selling, buying, or intimidating votes it is impossible for any one person to determine if their individual vote was counted accurately, yet possible collectively for independent observers to determine if everyone’s vote was counted accurately – or at least to provide some assessment of how confident we are in the reported counts and winners.

From the Citizen Audit:

Voting is the foundation of democracy. Some say it is a per-Constitutional right, to choose our government, established by the Declaration of Independence. Today voting integrity is as important as ever, and perhaps we are even more aware and concerned with voting vulnerabilities.

Vote: Citizenship is of little value if we do not vote. Not voting assures that your vote won’t count. If you value democracy, vote! If you want change, vote! If you prefer stability, vote!

Audit Connecticut has paper ballots which provide evidence to verify election results and provide confidence. Paper ballots are of little value without sufficient recounts and audits. Connecticut is one of about half of the states with post-election audits.

Observe Checking ballots by officials is insufficient. Public confidence requires public verification – transparency and direct public observation and analysis. That’s where you can participate further in authentic Democracy!

NY: don’t follow CA in making “Top Two” error

NY considers “Jungle Primary” we call it another “Centrist Dream”

Political Insanity – doing the same thing that has failed elsewhere, over and over.

NY considers “Jungle Primary” we call it another “Centrist Dream”.

Political Insanity – doing the same thing that has failed elsewhere, over and over.

We have positions on a variety of election issues. The Top Two Primary is one we oppose with a moderate level of intensity. It is a failed idea, not a complete disaster, hopefully an idea that fails after a few tests in States. We and Ralph Nader warned California. Now it is time to warn New York not to make the same mistake..

For once we have progressive opposition from the American Prosepct/Madison Capitol Times editorial: ‘Jungle Primary] Brings Untended Consequences <read>

Would the dysfunction of U.S. politics be dispelled if we got rid of partisan primaries? That’s the contention of Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y. In an op-ed for The New York Times, Schumer argued that the primary system in most states, in which voters choose nominees for their respective parties who then run head to head in November, gives too much weight to the party faithful, who are inclined to select candidates who veer either far right or far left. The cure Schumer proposes for this ill is the “jungle primary,” in which all primary candidates, regardless of party, appear on the same ballot, with the top two finishers, again regardless of party, advancing to the general election. The senator cites the example of California — once the most gridlocked of states, now a place where legislation actually gets enacted — as proof that such primaries work. But Schumer misunderstands what got California working again. In so doing, he also misses the fatal flaws of the jungle primary…

Schumer misunderstands what got California working again. In so doing, he also misses the fatal flaws of the jungle primary…

And what has the jungle primary accomplished? Its adherents had hoped that, in heavily conservative districts where the top two primary finishers were both Republicans, the more centrist of the two would win the November runoff by corralling more Democratic and independent votes. So far, however, that hasn’t happened. Democrats representing more centrist districts, generally in inland California, do tend to be less liberal, but that was the case long before the jungle primary came into effect.

The jungle primary has had one stunningly perverse effect, however. In a new congressional district east of Los Angeles, Democratic voters had a clear majority — so clear that four Democratic candidates and two Republicans sought the seat in the 2012 primary. Democratic votes split four ways, enabling the two Republicans to advance to November’s ballot. The eventual winner, Gary Miller, chose not to run for re-election this year — understandably, since his record in no way reflected the desires of most district voters.

A weird one-off result? This June, three Democrats and two Republicans sought the statewide office of controller. More Democrats than Republicans tend to file for statewide office in California, and for good reason: The GOP is in free-fall in the state; its share of registered voters has dropped beneath 30 percent; just one Republican (Arnold Schwarzenegger) has been elected to any of California’s 10 statewide offices in the past 20 years. But since Democrats split their votes three ways for the controller’s slot and Republicans just two, a shift of less than 2 percent of the vote would have saddled voters with a Republican-vs.-Republican runoff.

And perhaps the most interesting prediction in the piece, based directly on the example above.

Fast-forward to 2018, when Democrat Jerry Brown, almost certain to be re-elected this November, will be term-limited out of the governor’s office. More Democrats than Republicans will surely line up to succeed him. But under the jungle rules, even though it’s all but certain that the Democratic candidates will collectively aggregate more support, it’s a distinct possibility that two Republicans will face off in November.

This is your solution, senator? Think again.

This all goes to show why it is called a Jungle Primary. We prefer to call it a Crap Shoot, because, like many reforms, its intention is to correct a perceived past problem, but just replaces one imperfect system with another – fighting the last war.

(And who said that centrism is a worthy goal – its usually defined only in the vision of a particular pundit or politician, completely in agreement with that pundit’s own views)

Senator Schumer’s Op-Ed in the New York Times: End Partisan Primaries, Save America <read> Anyone should be suspicions of such a dramatic headline “Save America”.

And a couple  of informed letters the Op-Ed generated to the New York Times  make additional points <read>

Rather than keeping fringe characters out of office, an open primary would allow a pair of well-funded zealots to lock up a “top two” primary by driving turnout of a few passionate voters in what are typically pretty apathetic primary environments, especially in a gerrymandered district…

California’s June primary under the new system resulted in the lowest voter turnout ever for a statewide election, with just 25.2 percent of voters participating.

The “top two” system has also led to a number of legislative and Congressional districts where voters will be able to choose only between candidates of one party in November, which is hardly democratic. Despite the fact that Democrats have an overwhelming registration advantage in the state, the top-two system nearly resulted in no Democratic candidate on the ballot for one office when multiple candidates split up the Democratic vote.

In addition, it has had the effect of eliminating third parties and write-ins from the November contest, giving voters less choice.

And perhaps the worst result of all — the proliferation of independent expenditure committees, which spent more nearly $4 million to try to win a Bay Area Assembly seat for corporate interests.

Cyber Risk to Power – Is not just electricity and gas

Utility Regulator Arthur House writes on cyber risks and precautions for utilities in a Hartford Courant Op-ed. We point out the similar risks to Internet voting. While Utah takes a more studied approach to expanding their Internet voting.

Utility Regulator Arthur House writes on cyber risks and precautions for utilities in a Hartford Courant Op-ed:  Cyber Defense Requires National Coordination <read>

It does not take an overactive imagination to picture the fallout from a cyber attack on an
American public utility. The consequences of knocking out the generation and/or distribution of
electricity, water, natural gas or communications could ripple so far and wide, it could be
considered an act of war. No wonder that some call the efforts that nations, individuals and
groups make to “test” our systems and conduct intrusions “battlefield preparations.”

Our intelligence community and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are rightly concerned about cyber threats to our public utilities. As with air travel and financial services, the relatively open United States is vulnerable to an array of dangers involving computer management.

Intrusions are increasing in frequency and sop histication and reported in the media. Perpetrators  include those with ties to countries that have little commitment to, or even disdain for, cyber security. Individuals and groups can be particularly dangerous, because they do not fear the consequences that might befall a nation.

There is a gap between those at the federal level who are actively engaged against cyber threats and those in states who oversee public utilities and are trying to understand and develop approaches to the problem…

Using federal expertise and experience, the regulators and the utilities can jointly establish cyber security standards — covering modernizing management practices, vetting personnel, establishing cultures of security, implementing software defenses, ensuring physical security and participating in trade association cyber defense programs

We wrote a letter  to the editor, posted online and slightly modified by the Courant, still containing one of our typos: Cyber Risks To Voting As Well <read>

Arthur House’s July 21 op-ed, ” Cyber Attacks Require National Coordination” articulates the cyber risks to our power utilities, as should be expected from a former director of communications for the director of national intelligence.

Yet, voters and the legislature should be concerned beyond physical power. Cyber risks are just as threatening to political power — the power to vote and to choose our government.

Twice the Connecticut legislature has unanimously passed Internet voting. For good reasons the governor vetoed it in 2012, yet inexplicably signed it in 2013. Many computer scientists and security experts oppose Internet voting because in cannot be made safe. Internet voting has been discredited by a Department of Defense study, security experts from the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Thoughtful leaders of all persuasions oppose internet voting, including Secretary of the State Denise Merrill and former Federal Elections Commission member Hans von Spakovsky of the Heritage Foundation.

Mr. House’s central point us that, without federal expertise and assistance, cyber security is beyond the capabilities of state government and utilities. It follows that Internet voting cannot be accomplished safely by the state and each of our 169 municipalities.

Meanwhile, in Utah, they plan wider adoption of Internet voting. The only good thing over Connecticut is that they recognize some of the risks and plan on studying them before they move forward:  State committee studying feasibility of extending online voting to more Utahns <read>

Utah Director of Elections Mark Thomas said making online voting available more widely could be a challenge.

“The lieutenant governor wanted to look at if we were to expand that, what are some of the hurdles,” Thomas said. “It would be nice to have kind of a road map on where to go, what are the landmines we need to be aware of.”

The biggest issue, he said, is security.

“Security is going to be No. 1. Part of the reason security is such a big issue is because you have the issue of a secret ballot. If I cast my ballot online, it can’t be able to be traced back to me. That’s my constitutional protection,” Thomas said.

The hope is that the lieutenant governor’s iVote Advisory Committee that began meeting earlier this month will have identified a half-dozen or so issues associated with statewide online voting before the 2015 Legislature starts in January, he said.

At that point, the next step may be hiring security experts to tackle those issues, Thomas said.

“We certainly aren’t going to, by the end of the year, have this all figured out and put to bed,” he said. “There are some very complicated issues.”

Another member of the new committee, Salt Lake County Clerk Sherrie Swensen, also questions whether Utahns will be voting online anytime soon.

“I hope that sometime in the future it will be something that happens,” Swensen said. “I admire the lieutenant governor’s office for wanting to explore this and be progressive, but I think there’s a lot to overcome before we get to that point.”

Like Thomas, Swensen said she’s not sure how a system can both identify those voting online while maintaining the secrecy of their ballots. Election officials now keep the names of voters separate from their ballots.

“That’s a huge challenge,” Swensen said, along with an online system being hacked. “For all of the clever ways people figure out how to hack into various systems, I think that’s the biggest danger, if they could hack in and skew results.”

The longtime county clerk recalled the controversy over the switch in recent years to electronic voting machines that aren’t connected to the Internet. The public’s concern was eased by the paper trail created by the machines, Swensen said.

The paper records are audited each election and could be used to tabulate the results if the machines were to malfunction.

“We could recreate an entire election,” she said.

Carter Center: Study of Norway’s Internet Voting

A recent post, brought the Carter Center’s report to our attention. Today we highlight Scott M. Fulton’s thoughtful post based on the report.

I look at a chart like this and see a gold mine of potential exploits–handoffs, air-gaps,… How long before such a system is cracked once, someplace in the world?

A recent post, brought the Carter Center’s report to our attention: Expert Study Mission Report The Carter Center Internet Voting Pilot: Norway’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections. <.pdf> The Carter Center report is highly enlightening, covering Norway’s pilot, Internet voting in general, and the challenges of credible observation of elections.

Today we highlight Scott M. Fulton’s thoughtful post based on the report: Scytl e-voting exposes the dangers of automating a democracy <read>

The truth is, any forward progress we make toward better communication with one another, toward social awareness, toward even expanded conscience of the world around us, can only be accomplished by each of us individually. Technology can empower us to do that, or to do the precise opposite. It is neither to credit nor to blame.

But the corollary to that principle is this, and it is a caution I try to repeat as often as possible: Because technology has no inherent polarization toward progress, simply applying it to a problem does not solve it…

The process of voting in Norway, according to that [Carter Center] report, was not at all dissimilar to the way B-52 bombers were told to attack Moscow in the movie Dr. Strangelove:

In order to vote, a voter had to register their mobile phone with a centralized government register (one could do so online while the voting was underway). The voter should have also received a special card… delivered through the postal service, with personalized numeric return codes. These cards provided the voter a list of four-digit numbers corresponding to each party running for election. The four-digit numbers were randomly assigned for every voter so that, for example, any two voters who wanted to cast their vote for Labour would unlikely have the same return codes associated to the Labour party.

The Carter Center charted the conceptual model of the technology involved:

Imagine your local school board election being charted by a process model this complex. Consider the degree to which people who are already disenchanted by the whole concept of contributing their 1/10,000 of a preference, will simply avoid the process altogether. Maybe this fact alone is what makes it so attractive to people in the election business.

As someone who has regularly sat next to security engineers, I look at a chart like this and see a gold mine of potential exploits–handoffs, air-gaps, SMS as the communications medium. Perhaps Scytl’s system is lock-tight today, but the very fact of its complexity, coupled with its wide-ranging impact on the public, makes it an automatic target. How long before such a system is cracked once, someplace in the world? And when that happens, how many other elections’ veracity will be called into question? How many Bush v. Gore cases will this nation withstand?

The Carter Center report goes into further details that add to the understanding of complexity of the system. Thinking about each part it is easy to speculate on the risks of attack, especially attacks by insiders – from public employees, vendor personnel from the system vendor, and various network support contractors.  Add that the near impossibility of independent verification of every possible critical point; along with the impossibility of public trust in any such complex and technically sophisticated evaluation.