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What might Plato say to us about election integrity?

“If we don’t understand our tools, then there is a danger that we will become the tool of our tools.”

Like Plato, we will leave you to contemplate his statement and our questions. Is that a worthwhile exercise?

I am about 80 pages into a fascinating, thought-provoking book, Plato at the Googleplex <view>

One of the 1st fascinating nuggets from the fictional Plato dropping in on our world could easily occupy us for the foreseeable future:

“If we don’t understand our tools, then there is a danger that we will become the tool of our tools.”

What could we endeavor to understand about the “tools” we use for elections:

How are our votes counted after we scan them at the polling place?
How are absentee votes counted? How do they get from our envelopes to the place that they are counted?
How are all those votes accumulated in a municipality and statewide to determine the election results?
How accurate are those counts and accumulations? How do we know? Do we know how many of those votes are counted and counted accurately?
How accurate or inaccurate is the list of registered voters?
How accurate are the lists of voters checked-in as voting in each election?

Some other questions:

How safe is the Internet for banking, email, and voting?
How safe are foods, drugs, GMOs, fracking, the electric grid, and Connecticut’s nuclear power plants?
When and how can we trust Government and the Media?
How do we already trust Government, the Media, and our election system?

Like Plato, we will leave you to contemplate his statement and our questions. Is that a worthwhile exercise?

If Internet voting is so safe, why is the power grid so vulnerable?

Of course the answer is that Internet voting is not safe, much more vulnerable than the power grid. But why don’t we know that?

How are grid vulnerabilities different from the vulnerabilities of electronic voting and Internet voting in particular? Lets look at a story from the LA Times highlighting vulnerabilities in the power grid

Of course the answer is that Internet voting is not safe, much more vulnerable than the power grid. But why don’t we know that? Could it be that voting is largely a Government managed function and therefor Government articulation of vulnerabilities, and public expenditures on security would be less welcome?

Today we have a story from the LA Times highlighting vulnerabilities in the power grid: Security holes in power grid have federal officials scrambling <read>

Adam Crain assumed that tapping into the computer networks used by power companies to keep electricity zipping through transmission lines would be nearly impossible in these days of heightened vigilance over cybersecurity.

When he discovered how wrong he was, his work sent Homeland Security Department officials into a scramble.

Crain, the owner of a small tech firm in Raleigh, N.C., along with a research partner, found penetrating transmission systems used by dozens of utilities to be startlingly easy.

How are grid vulnerabilities different from the vulnerabilities of electronic voting and Internet voting in particular? We can start with the article subtitle:

In Congress, the vulnerability of the power grid has emerged as among the most pressing domestic security concerns

Internet voting is hardly a concern in the Connecticut Legislature which unanimously passed Internet voting two years in a row mandating the Secretary of the State and Military Department do what the DoD, experts from Homeland Security, and the National Institute of standards say is impossible. And even here grid security is a big concern of state government.

Then again maybe they are also the same in some ways:

“There are a lot of people going through various stages of denial” about how easily terrorists could disrupt the power grid, he said. “If I could write a tool that does this, you can be sure a nation state or someone with more resources could.”…

Some members of Congress want to empower regulators to force specific security upgrades at utilities. Others are attacking whistle-blowers and the media, demanding an investigation into disclosures of how easily the country’s power grid could be shut down.

Here is a difference. Who would even attempt insuring the safety of our election system? Let alone Internet voting?

Lloyds’ appraisers have been making a lot of visits lately to power companies seeking protection against the risk of cyberattack. Their takeaway: Security at about half the companies they visit is too weak for Lloyds to offer a policy.

Power companies are actual monopolies, but so are local election departments. Some of the same issues apply:

The problem, said Scott White, a security technology scholar at Drexel University in Philadelphia, is that “you are basically dealing with these monopolies that are determining for themselves which expenditures are a priority. Security has not generally been one.”

Utilities deny they’ve ignored the problem, pointing to the billions of dollars they say they’ve spent to upgrade outdated computer systems and close security holes.

Here is a difference, something seldom seen when Internet voting is adopted and declared successful:

They are signing contracts with security firms like Booz Allen Hamilton to investigate such things as to how to keep potentially mischievous devices out of the equipment they buy, often from foreign suppliers. The security firms help clients sift through reams of confidential intelligence provided by federal agencies. They simulate cyberattacks.

“It is the equivalent of war gaming, like the military does,” said Steve Senterfit, vice president of commercial energy at Booz Allen Hamilton.

Here in Connecticut we pride ourselves in the safety of 169 autonomous elected election departments. But that also has its downsides. Like the power grid, electronic voting involves users’ computers or distributed military computers:

But critics, including many in Congress, say more needs to be done to shore up a grid increasingly exposed to attacks. They note that so-called smart grid technology, which allows operators to calibrate the flow of energy from an increasingly diverse pool of sources, has opened new security risks.

The technology relies on devices in remote locations that constantly send signals to substations to help control when juice needs to be brought on and offline. The smarter the grid becomes, though, the more entry points an attacker can exploit.

“The whole idea of a smart grid is to push equipment further and further away from the substations,” Crain said. “Some of it is even in people’s homes. It’s physically impossible to secure it all.”

Here is a difference: The grid is apparently not on the Internet, so it is actually just a little harder to compromise:

The vulnerabilities Crain exposed, for example, had been overlooked because taking advantage of them requires an attacker to have access to closed, local networks. Now, a cyberterrorist with a little knowledge and the right laptop can gain that access and cause chaos in a regional power system merely by linking up with the control panel at a secluded electric vehicle charging station.

Mid-Term Report: One more bill best left off the agenda

We conclude our summaries of the election bills we are watching that passed the Government Elections and Administration Committee this year.

As is too often the case, this bill is aimed at a concept we strongly support, yet the bill is so flawed that is misleading and dangerous. Without going into the details I can claim, in all modesty, that I have been a strong, supporter of the concept nationally, and a catalyst in Connecticut. I would be happy to sit back and let others take deserved bows for a great result, well implemented. However, the worst outcome would be the loss of the value of post-election audits, knowing that I was a likely cause.

We conclude our summaries of the election bills we are watching that passed the Government Elections and Administration Committee this year.

Machine Audit Prototypes

As is too often the case, this bill is aimed at a concept we strongly support – machine assisted audits – yet the bill is so flawed that is misleading and dangerous. Without going into the details I can claim, in all modesty, that I have been a strong, supporter of the concept nationally, and a catalyst in Connecticut. I would be happy to sit back and let others take deserved bows for a great result, well implemented. However, the worst outcome would be the loss of the value of post-election audits, knowing that I was a likely cause.

To be credible, post-election audits must have public verifiability. Connecticut’s current audits have public verifiability: The public can observe each ballot votes are counted manually, observe the totals being produced and accumulated. There are flaws in the current audit law and the audit law as it is currently conducted, yet public verifiability provides the opportunity for independent assessment and reporting of those concerns.a

The good/sad news is that trusted machine assisted audits are possible and they could provide a much more effective and efficient audit for Connecticut.

For a detailed list of our concerns and a paper suggesting how trusted machine assisted audits can be conducted, see our testimony <read>

Mid-Term Report: Two bills that should go forward

Today we highlight two bills important to election administration that we hope will be passed. As is often the case, nothing is perfect, yet sometimes testimony improves an inadequate bill, based on a good concept. Sometimes we support a bill that falls short, that none the less would be an improvement.

Authority of the Secretary of the State

This bill is basically a good idea that we can support – providing enforceability of “any declaratory ruling, instruction or opinion issued by the Secretary of the State. It also requires that towns provide email for every Registrar. While we like the intent of the bill it should be improved before passage. <written testimony> As I said in my prepared testimony:

I support H.B. 5480, yet would like to see two improvements to better serve the public. First, that the Secretary of the State’s instructions etc. be required to be posted to the Secretary’s web site in a timely manner. Second, that registrars provide an email address on their web site and/or the Secretary of the State’s web for communication with voters. This would be especially useful to military and overseas voters.

Electronic Check-In

This bill allows for electronic check-in of voters. Once again this is a concept that we support, yet testified against the original which had many problems that went well beyond electronic check-in <testimony>

We are pleased to report that our objections have been addressed in a substitute bill approved by the Committee. So, we can fully support it going forward.

Mid-Term Report: Two really dangerous bills and a duck

Yesterday, the Government Elections and Administration (GAE) held its last meeting of the year to approve bills originating in the Committee. Today we will recap three of be seven election bills we are tracking.

It is hard to compare and prioritize the importance and impact of bills for good or ill. Today’s three bills provide an instructive contrast. All three are well intended, yet ill conceived. One is extremely threatening to democracy, yet the threat may be way off or ultimately avoided. Another sets a bad precedent for Connecticut and the Nation, flaunts reason, with a message almost the opposite of that intended. The third aimed at fairness is unfair to most of those seeking redress for an imagined unfairness. UPDATED.

UPDATED.

The National Popular Vote Agreement

For about the fifth time in eight years, the National Popular Vote Agreement came up and passed the GAE. We can only hope it does get vote on in the House and Senate. The one time it passed the House, it lost originally by one vote, but several members changed their votes to provide a pass.

Perhaps Connecticut’s seven Electoral College votes will not tip the balance to put the Compact in effect. That would take states passing the Compact totaling half the Nation’s total Electoral College. The Compact is half-way there, so far, after seven years. But the danger is in that passing here, Connecticut’s yea or nay could make the difference or influence other states.

Maybe the danger is far off. Maybe there will not be another really close election like 1876, 1960, 2000, or 2004 for a long time. Maybe things will change and we will have more voting integrity, less suppression across the country. Maybe faced with an actual impending implementation, enough states will bow out of the Compact in time.

Maybe Not. The stakes are high. An essentially “stolen” presidency can be bad in itself, and also disheartening for democracy.

In my estimation, the most dangerous bill going forward this year.

Constitutional Amendment to Void the Secret Vote

For the last three or four years we have been fighting Internet voting, a bad idea, justified in the name of supporting our troops. Statistics show great results in supporting our troops based on the implementation of the MOVE Act. Connecticut paralleled other states in going from 61% absentee ballot return rates in 2010, to 94% in 2012, on the same order as the return rate for all absentee ballots.

Yet critics are not satisfied. They push for risky, expensive, and likely ineffective Internet voting. Yesterday, Representative Hwang called anyone who would vote against the bill “unpatriotic”. We applaud the three Representatives that voted against the bill, articulating the risks of coercion and the value of the Secret Vote. They are the true courageous patriots.

As we said in our testimony, “Like vaccination, it only works if everyone has the secret vote.”

Also I applaud Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill’s steadfast opposition to Internet voting and defense of the secret vote, in the face of such support for Internet voting.

Here we are torn with regard to the dangers. This bill is bad because it is a foot in the door of eliminating the secret vote. Yet, is it worse that it is a foot in the door of Internet voting? Or is the worst aspect that it is using flag waiving to accuse others of being unpatriotic, while actually assaulting the democracy our soldiers and ancestors fought and died for? And, like the Popular Vote Compact it sets influence and precedent for other states as well.

In my estimation, the second most dangerous bill going forward this year.

Limit Post-Election Audits to Three Per Town Per Election

This bill started off really, really, bad. It would have cut post-election audits in half, from 10% down to 5%, and worse by “auditing” by feeding the ballots through a different scanner and comparing the tapes.

As such it would have been a contender for the most dangerous bill of the year – it would impact only Connecticut, but seriously and immediately and had Connecticut be known as the 1st state ever to “effectively eliminate post-election audits”. Hopefully, like last year, it would never have been brought before the Senate or House. As we testified, audits should be strengthened, not weakened.

What remains is severely abbreviated version with only a clause limiting audits to a maximum of three districts per election or primary. There are several impacts of this well-intended, yet flawed remnant:

Audits work best when truly random across all districts. Limiting some towns causes the audit to be less protective, with certain votes and districts to have less opportunity for being selected. (Fortunately, a limit of three on 10% has only a moderate such a effect in Connecticut).
The intention is to save towns from “being audited almost every time” while others “hardly or never get selected”. This effort to spread the burden fairly will actually help towns with many polling places audit less, and place additional burdens on towns with fewer polling places, especially those with a single polling place.
It is worse than it might seem. When towns like New Haven and Hartford, get regularly selected for three to six polling places, they have about two hundred votes per polling place (and over the long run, audit a fair 10% of their votes). But when towns like Suffield, Lebanon, Clinton, Oxford, or Andover get audited, they have to count 2000, 3000, 4000, or approaching 9000 votes at once! Under the current law they get their fair share over time.
The towns with many polling places are right that ~~they~~ their scanners get audited almost every time, yet this bill will not change that. Yet, they will get a bit less than their 10% share. Yet large towns will continue to, fairly, get routinely selected even more often. (We marvel at how some with 20 to 30 districts in a 10% audit random drawing are surprised they are almost always selected.)

In the grand scheme of things this bill, unfair as it is, will have little effect on audit integrity. Yet, we are sympathetic to the towns with few polling places, who ironically are disproportionately represented within the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC) which is the bill’s proponent. Can we call this a ‘duck’, since maybe we ducked the a really bad bill, leaving one with a few quacks in the logic.

Testimony: Defending the Secret Vote and Check-in Integrity

Yesterday, I testified against two bills. I do not particularly like testifying against bills that promote concepts that I support, like electronic check-in, yet like all technology, it can be done in a way that helps, without adding risks.

On the other hand, it is a privilege to defend the Secret Vote, one of many, often under-appreciated, keystones of democracy. Also appreciated is the many thoughtful questions presented by the Committee which gave me an opportunity to stand for the Secret Vote.

Yesterday, I testified against two bills. I do not particularly like testifying against bills that promote concepts that I support, like electronic check-in, yet like most technology, it can be done in a way that helps, without adding risks.

My prepared remarks <read>

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount , a software technologist and a veteran.I oppose S.B. 441. I support the concept of electronic check-in. Unfortunately, this bill does not impose any requirements or standards with regard to the capabilities, reliability, and integrity of electronic check-in systems nor for associated manual processes. It has other serious flaws, that would reduce check-in integrity, reduce transparency, and extend waiting lines. The State of Indiana has initiated a robust certification process, perhaps Connecticut could base any certification on Indiana’s work, without duplicating it.

I oppose S.J. 24 for four reasons.

The secret vote protects us all. The true value of the secret vote is everyone’s right that every voters’ vote be secret, so that it cannot be sold or intimidated. The secret vote is not simply a right for an individual to keep their vote secret. No person can waive that right for every other voter. Like vaccination, it only works if everyone has the secret vote.

Military members are especially subject to intimidation and perceived intimidation, based on the authority of command and confirmed by continuing disappointing revelations. As my Basic Training Captain expressed it, “I am your mother, your father, your sister, and your brother”.

This bill is motivated by Internet voting, a risky, unsafe method of voting. In addition to overwhelming opposition by Computer Scientists and Security Experts, Internet voting has been discredited by a Department of Defense study, security experts from the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Institute of Standards and Testing.

This bill is motivated by a desire to help soldiers vote, yet, conventional means have proven successful and economical, when the MOVE (Military and Overseas Voting) Act has been followed by Election Officials and the Military.

This veteran says:

“Support our soldiers by waiving the Flag, but do not waive the secret vote. Do not thank me for my service — protect the secret vote that all of our soldiers and ancestors have fought and died for. Weakening the secret vote is ‘Democracy Theater’ at its worst, providing the illusion of helping our troops, providing an illusion of democracy.”

I also supplied extensive written testimony on both bills: <eCheck-In> <Secret Vote>

I spoke for the allotted three minutes. Then I was questioned extensively on the value of the Secret Vote. Unfortunately, the hearing was not recorded by CT-N. Sometime there will be transcripts, yet they cannot not replace a video or being there.

NPV – A graphic scenario

We are opposed to the National Popular Vote Compact, primarily because it would tend to make the current risky system for determining the President by the Electoral College, much more risky and subject us to open-season for vote suppression, insider fraud, outsider fraud, and legal challenges likely to end with the Supreme Court choosing the President. Paul Choiniere of The Day provides a graphic depiction of a related scenario.

Article published Mar 16, 2014
Connecticut should reject popular vote scheme
Paul Choiniere

The National Popular Vote folks are at it again in Connecticut. They want to end the practice of using the Electoral College system to determine the election of the president. Instead, the candidate who gets the most votes nationally would become president.

They don’t, however, want to amend the Constitution to make this change – the way it should be done – because the movement apparently sees that goal as too difficult.

Instead, its backers seek a clumsy and byzantine approach, one wrought with potential problems. What might happen if the Connecticut General Assembly endorses the plan, enters into the compact and the governor signs the legislation?

Picture this.

Connecticut voters make a clear choice who they want to be president. The state’s support is enough to give that candidate the electoral votes necessary to become president. However, because Connecticut’s choice to lead the country did not win the popular vote, Connecticut has to give its electoral votes to the other guy, electing him (or her).

I expect that would not sit well with many of those who voted in the majority, only to see their choice ignored.

How could such a thing happen? The National Popular Vote legislation requires states that sign on to this movement to agree to cast their electoral votes for the top voter getter nationally, regardless of who that state’s voters want to be president.

So far, nine states and the District of Columbia have passed National Popular Vote laws. They control 136 electoral votes, which means the movement is about halfway to its goal of locking up 270 electoral votes in this manner, the majority necessary to elect someone president.

So, the Electoral College system would remain in place, but all these states would basically be committed to ignoring it and making sure the popular vote, not the Electoral College system, determined the winner.

I can see that plan unraveling quickly. One can easily imagine the anger of voters in, for argument’s sake, a traditional Republican state seeing the state’s electoral votes handed to the Democrat – against the will of the people in that state – giving the Democrat enough electoral votes to win. Can anyone doubt the legislature would be pressed to return in special session, abandon the National Popular Vote compact, and back the voters’ choice?

A rush for the exits would soon follow among other states.

The National Popular Vote organization calls this impossible because the compact prohibits it. They also say such a reversal would face insurmountable constitutional hurdles. That’s debatable. At the very least, it invites potential chaos.

Motivating the popular vote movement are arguments of fairness and making more states relevant. The fairness issue is basic – the candidate with the most votes should win. A strong argument can be made for that position, but is this version of “fair” what is best for the country and Connecticut? The current system has arguably served the nation well for 207 years.

Less credible is the contention that election by popular vote will force the candidates to pay attention to more states. Currently, candidates focus their resources and their visits largely on contested states, particularly those with big electoral numbers. Yet, I suspect, even with a popular vote determining the winner, candidates would continue to give their attention to big population centers, which does not describe Connecticut or its cities.

In any event, if the people of the United States want to abandon the Electoral College system in favor of the direct election of the president, they should do so by formally amending the U.S. Constitution. It may be difficult, but it is preferable to the controversy the National Popular Vote arrangement invites.

Paul Choiniere is editorial page editor.

We agree that “Less credible is the contention that election by popular vote will force the candidates to pay attention to more states”. We would go further and suggest this may well be a reason most of the media supports the Compact. Most voters want more information on candidates, yet more attack ads, more robo calls, and the same soundbites delivered here will do little to quench that thrust.

Testimony on three bills – FOI is an issue in elections too

Today I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

Yesterday I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

My prepared remarks <read>

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount and a software technologist. Most of my career focused on developing software, evaluating software products, and recommending technology strategy for the Travelers, in its Computer Science Division. I also spent nine years developing and marketing software products in small companies, for use in large organizations.

Today I have submitted testimony on three bills.

I support H.B. 5480, yet would like to see two improvements to better serve the public. First, that the Secretary of the State’s instructions etc. be required to be posted to the Secretary’s web site in a timely manner. Second, that registrars provide an email address on their web site and/or the Secretary of the State’s web for communication with voters. This would be especially useful to military and overseas voters.

I oppose S.B. 348. It would make Connecticut the 1^st state to effectively eliminate post-election audits. It is the same bill approved in committee last year. Please do not make that mistake again. I am working with the ROVAC to propose a bill that would strengthen the audits and provide almost the same savings. I believe we are close to agreement, yet, we have not reached agreement on of all the details.

I oppose H.B. 5492 as proposed, a demonstration of electronic audits. I have long been a strong proponent of machine assisted audits, in Connecticut and nationally. Unfortunately, as written, I am concerned that it might be an unsatisfactory and redundant project – theater, not integrity – possibly delaying or precluding effective use of such technology in Connecticut. Possibly leading to what some would call a “pretend audit”. My written testimony details my concerns and proposes alternatives.

Post-election audits are different than other audits for several reasons:

Unlike other audits they are not independent. They are conducted by the same officials who are responsible for conducting the elections, specify the election equipment, and select vendors to program them.

Unlike financial audits, such as bank audits or campaign finance audits, because of the secret vote, there are no independent records similar to bank statements which can be compared with other financial records of the entity being audited. Election audits must be compared against the paper ballots held by election officials.

Thus, audits and recounts must be conducted publicly and transparently, providing for public verification. Without that they cannot be trusted. Without that they cannot provide credibility for our elections, that is, credibility for our democracy.

Thank you

S.B. 5480 AN ACT CONCERNING REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE AND THE STATE ELECTIONS ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, AND THE POSTING OF REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER IDENTIFICATION. <bill> <testimony>

For this bill concerns were for the central publication of enforceable directives, rulings, and instructions. And that registrars email address be made available to the public as they are for members of the General Assembly.

H.B.5492 AN ACT CONCERNING A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FOR CONDUCTING AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

Public transparency is important for two reasons with this bill. First, it is a project that deserves public observation and comment, yet there is no requirement for public notice of the demonstration and a requirement for public input. Second, it involves an alternative to post-election audits, that themselves require transparency and public verification. This should be a criteria to be demonstrated and proven as part of the project.

S.B. 348 AN ACT CONCERNING POST-ELECTION AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

In addition to other problems which would effectively eliminate post-election audits, this bills electronic audit provision would replace black-box voting with black-box auditing transparency and public verifiability.

As we said in our testimony, it is possible to strengthen the audits and save registrars almost as much effort.

What is lacking in Connecticut’s Post-Election Audits (Part 2)

Some contend that Connecticut has the Nation’s toughest post-election audit law. We contend it has several holes, is not well executed by officials, and if a voting machine were ever to count inaccurately the audit would be unlikely to recognize that. Almost certainly, there will be bills and proposals to weaken and strengthen the audit debated this year. Today, we will focus on:

WWWSD (What would Willie Sutton do?)

From the law:

…the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded in not less than ten per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable..

This has always been interpreted as including only the votes cast in polling places for a district, rather than votes for a district.

This means that all votes counted in central locations are not audited. Now we ask, if Willie Sutton robbed banks because “that is where the money is”. If you were a criminal insider prepared to rig an election, wouldn’t you rig the central count absentee machine(s) because “that is where the audit is not”?

Also the central count machines have ballot programming for the whole town, a bit more complicated than district machines, a bit more work to test. Now we ask, where is a bug or error more likely, in a machine with only one ballot, only one district, or one with more programming, where an error in any single district could cause a problem?

Now, we have EDR (Election Day Registration) in Connecticut, also counted centrally, also as complicated as central count absentee, also exempt from the audit!

With EDR and possibly no-excuse absentee voting on the horizon, we may have 30%-40% of our votes exempt from the audit before we know it – unless the audit law is strengthened to close this ~~loophole~~ gap.

Citizen Audit Observation: Flaws Remain after Seven Years

Crosspost: Observation Report – Flaws Remain after Seven Years

Citizen Audit Finds Little Improvement In Election Audits

Post-Election Audit Flaws Remain After Seven Years and Twelve Audits

The report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the continued:

Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
An unsatisfactory improvement in the random audit drawing integrity vs. the November 2012 audit, as reported in our recent Districts In Drawing Study.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “When compared with audits in 2011 and 2012 we found little difference, positive or negative, on the issues previously identified and the level of concerns affecting confidence.

Crosspost: Observation Report – Flaws Remain after Seven Years

Citizen Audit Finds Little Improvement In Election Audits

Post-Election Audit Flaws Remain After Seven Years and Twelve Audits

The report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the continued:

Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
An unsatisfactory improvement in the random audit drawing integrity vs. the November 2012 audit, as reported in our recent Districts In Drawing Study.

“Without adherence to procedures and effective follow-up, if there was ever a significant fraud or error, it might not be recognized and corrected.”

“Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work, yet a trusted audit requires that all the districts and all the votes be counted in the audit as intended.”