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Testimony on three bills – FOI is an issue in elections too

Today I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

Yesterday I testified on three elections bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee (GAE). There was also testimony against another assault on Freedom Of Information (FOI). Very appropriate since access to information, transparency, public accountability, and serving the public played a role in my testimony on each bill.

My prepared remarks <read>

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks, Executive Director of CTVotersCount and a software technologist. Most of my career focused on developing software, evaluating software products, and recommending technology strategy for the Travelers, in its Computer Science Division. I also spent nine years developing and marketing software products in small companies, for use in large organizations.

Today I have submitted testimony on three bills.

I support H.B. 5480, yet would like to see two improvements to better serve the public. First, that the Secretary of the State’s instructions etc. be required to be posted to the Secretary’s web site in a timely manner. Second, that registrars provide an email address on their web site and/or the Secretary of the State’s web for communication with voters. This would be especially useful to military and overseas voters.

I oppose S.B. 348. It would make Connecticut the 1^st state to effectively eliminate post-election audits. It is the same bill approved in committee last year. Please do not make that mistake again. I am working with the ROVAC to propose a bill that would strengthen the audits and provide almost the same savings. I believe we are close to agreement, yet, we have not reached agreement on of all the details.

I oppose H.B. 5492 as proposed, a demonstration of electronic audits. I have long been a strong proponent of machine assisted audits, in Connecticut and nationally. Unfortunately, as written, I am concerned that it might be an unsatisfactory and redundant project – theater, not integrity – possibly delaying or precluding effective use of such technology in Connecticut. Possibly leading to what some would call a “pretend audit”. My written testimony details my concerns and proposes alternatives.

Post-election audits are different than other audits for several reasons:

Unlike other audits they are not independent. They are conducted by the same officials who are responsible for conducting the elections, specify the election equipment, and select vendors to program them.

Unlike financial audits, such as bank audits or campaign finance audits, because of the secret vote, there are no independent records similar to bank statements which can be compared with other financial records of the entity being audited. Election audits must be compared against the paper ballots held by election officials.

Thus, audits and recounts must be conducted publicly and transparently, providing for public verification. Without that they cannot be trusted. Without that they cannot provide credibility for our elections, that is, credibility for our democracy.

Thank you

S.B. 5480 AN ACT CONCERNING REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE STATE AND THE STATE ELECTIONS ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, AND THE POSTING OF REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER IDENTIFICATION. <bill> <testimony>

For this bill concerns were for the central publication of enforceable directives, rulings, and instructions. And that registrars email address be made available to the public as they are for members of the General Assembly.

H.B.5492 AN ACT CONCERNING A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FOR CONDUCTING AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

Public transparency is important for two reasons with this bill. First, it is a project that deserves public observation and comment, yet there is no requirement for public notice of the demonstration and a requirement for public input. Second, it involves an alternative to post-election audits, that themselves require transparency and public verification. This should be a criteria to be demonstrated and proven as part of the project.

S.B. 348 AN ACT CONCERNING POST-ELECTION AUDITS <bill> <testimony>

In addition to other problems which would effectively eliminate post-election audits, this bills electronic audit provision would replace black-box voting with black-box auditing transparency and public verifiability.

As we said in our testimony, it is possible to strengthen the audits and save registrars almost as much effort.

What is lacking in Connecticut’s Post-Election Audits (Part 2)

Some contend that Connecticut has the Nation’s toughest post-election audit law. We contend it has several holes, is not well executed by officials, and if a voting machine were ever to count inaccurately the audit would be unlikely to recognize that. Almost certainly, there will be bills and proposals to weaken and strengthen the audit debated this year. Today, we will focus on:

WWWSD (What would Willie Sutton do?)

From the law:

…the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded in not less than ten per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable..

This has always been interpreted as including only the votes cast in polling places for a district, rather than votes for a district.

This means that all votes counted in central locations are not audited. Now we ask, if Willie Sutton robbed banks because “that is where the money is”. If you were a criminal insider prepared to rig an election, wouldn’t you rig the central count absentee machine(s) because “that is where the audit is not”?

Also the central count machines have ballot programming for the whole town, a bit more complicated than district machines, a bit more work to test. Now we ask, where is a bug or error more likely, in a machine with only one ballot, only one district, or one with more programming, where an error in any single district could cause a problem?

Now, we have EDR (Election Day Registration) in Connecticut, also counted centrally, also as complicated as central count absentee, also exempt from the audit!

With EDR and possibly no-excuse absentee voting on the horizon, we may have 30%-40% of our votes exempt from the audit before we know it – unless the audit law is strengthened to close this ~~loophole~~ gap.

Citizen Audit Observation: Flaws Remain after Seven Years

Crosspost: Observation Report – Flaws Remain after Seven Years

Citizen Audit Finds Little Improvement In Election Audits

Post-Election Audit Flaws Remain After Seven Years and Twelve Audits

The report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the continued:

Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
An unsatisfactory improvement in the random audit drawing integrity vs. the November 2012 audit, as reported in our recent Districts In Drawing Study.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “When compared with audits in 2011 and 2012 we found little difference, positive or negative, on the issues previously identified and the level of concerns affecting confidence.

Crosspost: Observation Report – Flaws Remain after Seven Years

Citizen Audit Finds Little Improvement In Election Audits

Post-Election Audit Flaws Remain After Seven Years and Twelve Audits

The report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the continued:

Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
An unsatisfactory improvement in the random audit drawing integrity vs. the November 2012 audit, as reported in our recent Districts In Drawing Study.

“Without adherence to procedures and effective follow-up, if there was ever a significant fraud or error, it might not be recognized and corrected.”

“Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work, yet a trusted audit requires that all the districts and all the votes be counted in the audit as intended.”

What is lacking in Connecticut’s Post-Election Audits (Part 1)

A Very Critical Vote That will Not Be Audited

From the law:

The offices subject to the audit pursuant to this section shall be, (1) in the case of an election where the office of presidential elector is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (2) in the case of an election where the office of Governor is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (3) in the case of a municipal election, three offices or twenty per cent of the number of offices on the ballot, whichever is greater, selected at random by the municipal clerk, and (4) in the case of a primary election, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office, if any, but in no event less than twenty per cent of the offices on the ballot, selected in a random drawing by the municipal clerk.

Overall pretty simple, if not clear in detail. Certain offices are randomly selected for audit, so every office is subject to selection. The random selection is designed to catch error fraud, by randomly selecting districts any place there might be an error fraud would be equally likely to be audited, so it seems. And by randomly selecting offices for audit then any vote miscounted by error or fraud would be equally likely to be audited, so it seems.

I am sure you have guess by now, based on my saying “so it seems”, that it is actually not so. Just one of the problems is the word “Offices”. We do not just vote for offices, we also vote on questions on the ballot – a bonding issue, a budget in some towns, a change in a charter, or a change in the State Constitution. None of those are subject to audit and thus if there were an error or fraud anywhere or everywhere in Connecticut on one of those issues, an audit would never catch it.

Town have all sorts of bonding issues, budges, a change in a charter, or as my town and New London have had, a vote to remove or replace public park land. Do we have to point out that people care about those issues, voters, officials, and many insiders in the election process? Should those issues be exempt from the audit? We say no!

In 2008 there was and in 2014 there will be high interest questions on the ballot. In 2008 voters decided if we wanted a Constitutional Convention – a few days before the election polls said the vote would be ‘yes’. There was a campaign by officials to promote ‘No’. No won by a sizable margin. We think that was likely the correct winner based on the actual votes. Yet if it had been a bit closer, because of an error later discovered by activists, the result might have been in question, the error in the initially reported results might have been enough to avoid a recanvass to make sure a close vote was accurate. Should this question have been exempt from the audit? We say no!

In 2014 voters will a see a question to decide if we will give the Legislature the power to decide on early voting, including unlimited absentee voting for Connecticut – both of which are currently prohibited by the Constitution.

November is a long way off. But, in the Legislature and with the public there are strong feelings on both sides of this question. We expect it to generate a lot of op-eds, news stories, letters to the editor and blog posts. What if the vote is close? What if the vote is close, but just over the threshold for a recanvass? Should this question be exempt from the audit? We say no!

Should questions be exempt from the audit? We say no!
They are not exempt from the possibility of error and fraud.

PS: Here is an example of another gap that at minimum threatens credibility, a local election, very hotly contended, run by a single registrar <read>

Testimony: National Popular Vote

Yesterday was the annual public hearing on the National Popular Vote Compact. Yet it was different, the most thorough and thoughtful hearing I have seen in ten years of testifying and observing the Government Elections and Administration Committee. Unfortunately, it was not televised – you really needed to be there.

You can read our testimony here: <read> Here is the summary:

My testimony this year is similar to that in past years. Nothing has changed to make this Compact any safer, nothing to make it less risky to democracy. Yet, events over the last year make the dangers all the more apparent.

In the past year, partisans in various states continue to promote voter Id laws, and with the Supreme Court’s effectively eliminating the voting rights act, it has been open season in other states for laws aimed at suppressing the vote. That is the kind of inequality that is contained by the Electoral College.

I understand the theoretical advantages of the national popular vote, yet there are extreme risks in its mismatch with our existing state-by-state voting system.

Many concepts such as Nuclear Power, GMOs, DDT, and Fracking have benefits, but also have unintended, unrecognized, and unappreciated consequences. This Compact is another

What often appears simple is not. The Compact would cobble the national popular vote onto a flawed system designed for the Electoral College. It does not change that system. It heightens the risks.

This is not a partisan issue. It has been opposed by prominent members of both major parties, including:

Susan Bysiewicz (D), former Secretary of the State

Arnold Schwarzenegger (R), former California Governor

Mark Ritchie (D), MN Secretary of State and former President of the National Association of Secretaries of State

Daniel Patrick Moynihan(D), former Wesleyan professor and U.S. Senator

William Cibes (D), former State University System Chancellor

Major concerns include:

The 12^th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act which govern declaring the President have been called a “Ticking Time Bomb” because of strict rules, coupled with ambiguity, causing problems seen in 1876 and 2000. The Compact would exacerbate that risky system.

There is no official national popular vote number compiled in time, such that it could be used to officially and accurately determine the winner in any close election.

Even if there were such a number, it would aggravate the flaws in the system. The Electoral College contains/limits the risk and the damage to a few swing states. With a national popular vote, errors, voter suppression, and fraud in all states would count against the national totals.

There is no national audit or recount available for close elections, to establish an accurate popular vote number. Only in some individual states, if close numbers happened to occur in those states, would there be even a fraction of a national recount. About half of the states have audits or close vote recounts.

With the Compact there is every reason to believe that any close election would be decided by partisian action of the Congress or the Supreme Court.. As in Gore v. Bush, since the founding, close election controversies have all been decided in seemingly partisan decisions by Congress, special commissions, or the Supreme Court.

This Compact will not make every voter equal. The state-by-state variations in the franchise and access to voting will remain intact, enfranchising and disenfranchising different voters in states.

I urge you to consider the risks and chaos made possible if Connecticut were to endorse the National Popular Vote Compact, including reading the attached editorials and arguments.

You can read all the testimony from everyone, present and not, here: <read>

But that is insufficient to get a flavor for the hearings. The transcripts (available sometime soon) may help, but they cover a six and one-half hour hearing, only a small portion of which is represented by the written testimony.

Most of the hearing centered on just the issues I have been raising since 2007. They have never gotten as thorough an airing. It was not just the large number of individuals testifying, prepared to discuss those subjects, it was also the Chairs setting the tone, and members all asking great questions and getting thorough answers.

Rep McGee started by explaining that many of his constituents did not understand how the Electoral College worked, followed by Rep Becker starting the discussion of the difficulties in determining the winner under the National Popular Vote. Most of the rest was those in favor attempting to describe how well the system would work under the Compact. While those of us opposed refuted those arguments with facts, and speculation based on past actions of officials.

Some dismissed that any Secretary of the State anywhere, or Registrar in Connecticut would avoid accurate counting of a critical tally. Dismissing past inaccurate counts in NY, as a poor example, since they did matter in the result – that in a critical situation the counts would have been resolved sooner. Others like me are not so sure given the actions of Catherine Harris in Florida, Ken Blackwell in Ohio, and the history of 1876.

I pointed out an instructive situation close to home. In Bridgeport Connecticut in November 2010, the Secretary of the State stood by helplessly as a very questionable count was recorded, and many questioned the result in a close race for Governor. In the best interests the Secretary and the local Registrars worked out an agreement to audit all the districts to determine accurate counts. Yet, that agreement was nixed by the lawyers for Bridgeport, acting in what I assume was their view of the best interests of Bridgeport. Those inaccurate, questionable results remain on the books today. Nothing has been done to improve the system so that in a future debacle the Secretary or Registrars, no matter how well intending, could end up in a similar bind.

(I lead the Citizen Recount of Bridgeport in 2010. We concluded that many votes were not counted and totals inaccurately accounted, yet that the correct Governor was certified. Beyond ballots not being counted , there were in some districts many more ballots than checked-in voters, and in other districts many fewer ballots than checked-in voters. Nobody has or has reason to dispute our results. Yet they are not official and we still have a system we cannot trust to correct itself officially.)

3rd Harford Elected Registrar maybe eliminated by Council

So may the 1st and 2nd Elected Registrars

The Courant has long been opposed to a third and even a second Registrar in Hartford. The Editorial Board would rather see the Council appoint registrars, as authorized in a Charter Revision last year. As we explained at that time, contrary to claims by the Courant, the proposal could result in an untrained, unqualified, politically appointed registrar or registrars.

Now we learn that the Courant and supporters now believe they got something else wrong in explaining the Charter Revision to the public.

So may the 1st and 2nd Elected Registrars

The Courant combines news reporting with an Editorial: Third Registrar Is Nonessential Employee -Third Registrar Is Nonessential Employee <read>

The Courant has long been opposed to a third and even a second Registrar in Hartford. The Editorial Board would rather see the Council appoint registrars, as authorized in a Charter Revision last yea r. As we explained at that time, contrary to claims by the Courant, the proposal could result in an untrained, unqualified, politically appointed registrar or registrars.

Now we learn that the Courant and supporters now believe they got something else wrong in explaining the Charter Revision to the public, when they said:

The charter changes would allow the city to appoint “one or more” trained, nonpartisan registrars. It would require a small change in state law, which hopefully will be forthcoming.

Now we have the news in the Editorial:

Now another twist. It was widely thought that the city would need a change in state law to
implement the charter change. But this month lawyers for the council and the secretary of the
state reviewed the statutes and think the change can be implemented without a statutory change — in other words, a town can choose to appoint rather than elect registrars, as municipalities can do with town clerks. “The statutes seem to contemplate that registrars can be appointed, if allowed by charter,” said Av Harris, spokesman for the secretary of the state.

But not necessarily only one, if they are now correct the partisan Council may need to appoint at least two:

But there caveats. While not crystal clear, the laws appear to require that there be two registrars
and that they be from the major parties. This is because the registrars have duties involving party primaries, and only the major parties are allowed to hold primaries. Nonetheless, if you are paying the bills, two registrars is better than three.

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Crosspost: Coalition Districts in the Random Drawing Study, Nov 2013

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Inaccurate List of Election Districts

Based on concerns with the integrity of the random drawing in previous elections, the Coalition initiated a project to thoroughly check the integrity of the list of districts in the drawing for the November 2013 election.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “The credibility of our elections depends on the integrity of the Post-Election Audits. The integrity of the audits in-turn depends on the integrity of the drawing.”

The report found,

Fewer discrepancies in the random drawing list than were found in November 2012 and efforts by the Secretary of the State’s Office to improve the accuracy of the list.
Seventeen (17) voting districts missing from the drawing list or recanvass list. The selection of two (2) fewer districts for audit than required by law.
The audit law calling for the random selection and auditing of 10% of voting districts is not being faithfully executed, leaving the integrity and credibility of the audit and our election system open to question and expose it to the potential of future manipulation.
The law intended to fix past problems is not being followed. — A failure rate of 67
Fully complying with the law is complicated by the loose definition of voting district in the law.

Crosspost: Coalition Districts in the Random Drawing Study, Nov 2013

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Inaccurate List of Election Districts

The report found,

Fewer discrepancies in the random drawing list than were found in November 2012 and efforts by the Secretary of the State’s Office to improve the accuracy of the list.
Seventeen (17) voting districts missing from the drawing list or recanvass list. The selection of two (2) fewer districts for audit than required by law.
The audit law calling for the random selection and auditing of 10% of voting districts is not being faithfully executed, leaving the integrity and credibility of the audit and our election system open to question and expose it to the potential of future manipulation.
The law intended to fix past problems is not being followed. — A failure rate of 67
Fully complying with the law is complicated by the loose definition of voting district in the law.

Legally Questionable Solution Proposed for Bickering Registrars

The the West Hartford registrars do not get along, resulting in trading complaints, long lines at polls, and an inability to solve that without intervention by the Secretary of the State. The latest is an attempt by the town to fix the problem, despite the fact that the registrars are publicly elected officials charged with running the elections. In our opinion, best that the Town Council members can do is to work with their Town Committees to find candidates who, if elected would work together, or to find satisfactory candidates to win in primaries.

Courant report: West Hartford To Hire Administrator For Registrars’ Office <read>

As was reported last year, the West Hartford registrars do not get along, resulting in trading complaints, long lines at polls, and an inability to solve that without intervention by the Secretary of the State.

The latest is an attempt by the town to fix the problem, despite the fact that the registrars are publicly elected officials charged with running the elections:

The town will hire an office manager to take over the administrative functions of the embattled registrars of voters office, where town officials said long – standing problems between the registrars contributed to long lines and frustration among voters in the 2012 elections.

The plan will leave more time for the elected registrars to perform their statutory duties, such as running elections.

In a memorandum dated Feb. 6, Deputy Corporation Counsel Patrick Alair laid out a plan for a “complete overhaul” of the office. The memo was discussed at Monday’s meeting of the committee to review operations of the registrars o f voters, formed by Mayor Scott Slifka shortly after the 2012 election…

Under the plan, the registrars would serve as more of a governing body, while a paid staff member performs administrative tasks. The staff member will be an assistant town clerk, though the title may change as the job description is finalized, the memo stated. Town clerks and assistant town clerks are legally able to register voters…

“How the registrars execute all of their duties is largely left to them to work out between themselves with whatever support and advice their municipalities may provide. This system provides ample opportunity for error even in the best – managed situations,” Alair wrote. “When the registrars are unable to work together to sort out those details, however, the system collapses.”

Leading up to the problems on Election Day 2012, the office had been embroiled in conflict for nearly a decade since a failed attempt to revamp it.

Unfortunately, we do not see this as a solution as long as the registrars do not agree, since they are legally responsible for critical decisions.

Brazell continues to object to the idea of an assistant and says “she would not work willingly with a new administrator if one was appointed,” Alair wrote.

On Tuesday, Brazell said she was “not happy” about the new plan “because I think it’s running fine just the way it is.” When asked if she would cooperate with a staff member since one is going to be hired, she said, “of course…

Thornberry agrees with the new plan, officials said. She could not be reached for comment Tuesday.

Town council members on both sides of the aisle are supportive of the new plan

In our opinion, best that the Town Council members can do is to work with their Town Committees to find candidates who, if elected would work together, or to find satisfactory candidates to win in primaries.

Time to ignore Voter Id, Voting Rights Act, and other attempts to game the system.

Yesterday, the Government Elections and Administration Committee voted to take up the National Popular Vote Agreement/Compact. Today we have a CTMirror story on the efforts of highly funded national lobbyists working with Democrats and Republicans to tout the bill. Reading the article, one would get the impression that only Republicans are against the bill

In the last year, not much has changed. Except that the risks should be more obvious given the activity in some states to suppress votes, especially after the Supreme Court effectively ended the Voting Rights Act.

Yesterday, the Government Elections and Administration Committee voted to take up the National Popular Vote Agreement/Compact. Today we have a CTMirror story on the efforts of highly funded national lobbyists working with Democrats and Republicans to tout the bill: Presidential popular vote advocates lobbying CT GOP <read>

Reading the article, one would get the impression that only Republicans are against the bill. We posted this comment:

As well as Republicans in favor, there are Democrats opposed. Some of those on record as opposed include Bill Cibes, Susan Bysiewicz, the Late Dainel Patrick Moynihan, and Mark Ritchie SOS of Minnesota. Most see that the flaws in our system exposed by the 2000 election would be exacerbated by this compact. One issue would be the wide open contest to increase and decrease votes by all sides.Cognitive dissonance or lack of rational thought are needed to explain how a person can support this and simultaneously be disturbed by the voter suppression efforts launched after the Supreme Court ended the Voting Rights Act, and have been underway before that.

For the reasons to oppose the Compact, and for details on the objections by well respected democrats, you can review our testimony from last year: <read> And these Op-Eds from last year <here> and <here>

Experts demonstrate how to hack email voting

Security researchers say they have developed an interesting trick to take over Gmail and Outlook.com email accounts – by shooting down victims’ logout requests even over a supposedly encrypted connection.
And their classic man-in-the-middle attack could be used to compromise electronic ballot boxes to rig elections, we’re told.

Thanks to a friend for passing on this link to a ‘how to’ demonstration from last summer’s Black Hat 2013: Gmail, Outlook.com and e-voting ‘pwned’ on stage in crypto-dodge hack – Once you enter, you can never leave logout <read>

Security researchers say they have developed an interesting trick to take over Gmail and Outlook.com email accounts – by shooting down victims’ logout requests even over a supposedly encrypted connection.

And their classic man-in-the-middle attack could be used to compromise electronic ballot boxes to rig elections, we’re told.

Ben Smyth and Alfredo Pironti of the French National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control (INRIA) announced they found a way to exploit flaws in Google and Microsoft’s web email services using an issue in the TLS (Transport Layer Security) technology, which encrypts and secures website connections.

Full details of the attack are yet to be widely disseminated – but it was outlined for the first time in a demonstration at this year’s Black Hat hacking convention in Las Vegas on Wednesday.

In short, we’re told, it uses a TLS truncation attack on a shared computer to block victims’ account logout requests so that they unknowingly remain logged in: when the request to sign out is sent, the attacker injects an unencrypted TCP FIN message to close the connection. The server-side therefore doesn’t get the request and is unaware of the abnormal termination….

The attack does not rely on installing malware or similar shenanigans: the miscreant pulling off the trick must simply put herself between the victim and the network. That could be achieved, for example, by setting up a naughty wireless hotspot, or plugging a hacker-controlled router or other little box between the PC and the network.

The researchers warned that shared machines – even un-compromised computers – cannot guarantee secure access to systems operated by Helios (an electronic voting system), Microsoft (including Account, Hotmail, and MSN), nor Google (including Gmail, YouTube, and Search).

Maybe you use some other email system. But maybe that is a system that has yet to be hacked, publicly. If you send in a vote, what system does your recipient use?