Early Voting, the good, the not-so-good, and the ugly

For Connecticut, we favor in-person early voting, if we are willing to pay for the convenience. We oppose no-excuse absentee voting for security reasons.

Yet another study confirms previous studies that Early Voting Reduces Turnout: Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform <read>

From the abstract:

State governments have experimented with a variety of election laws to make voting more convenient and increase turnout . The impact s of these reforms va y in surprising ways, providing insight into the mechanisms by which states can encourage or reduce turnout. Our theory focuses on mobilization and distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of election laws. We conduct both aggregate and individual level statistical analyses of voter turnout in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections . The results show that election day registration has a consistently positive effect on turnout while the most popular reform – early voting – is actually associated with lower turnout when it is implemented by itself . We propose that early voting has created negative unanticipated consequences by reducing the civic significance of elections for individuals and altering the incentives for political campaigns to invest in mobilization.

Instead of reading the paper, we suggest the authors’ article summarizing their findings: The Case Against Early Voting <read>

The authors actually contend more reasons for concern than a bit of reduced turnout:

As the Presidential Commission on Election Administration notes in its new report, “no excuse” early voting — meaning it is open even to those who don’t qualify for an absentee ballot — has grown rapidly in recent decades in what the commission called a “quiet revolution.” In the 2012 election, almost one-third of ballots were cast early — more than double those cast in 2000 — and 32 states now permit the practice, allowing citizens to vote an average of 19 days before Election Day.

The commission rightly notes that early voting has its advantages for individual voters — not just avoiding long lines, but in many cases also getting to vote on weekends without having to miss work or school. But early voting run amok is bad for democracy. The costs to collective self-governance — which the report refers to only in passing, in a single sentence — substantially outweigh the benefits. Instead of expanding the practice, we should use this moment as an opportunity to establish clear limits on it before it becomes the norm.

Why? For all its conveniences, early voting threatens the basic nature of citizen choice in democratic, republican government. In elections, candidates make competing appeals to the people and provide them with the information necessary to be able to make a choice. Citizens also engage with one another, debating and deliberating about the best options for the country. Especially in an age of so many nonpolitical distractions, it is important to preserve the space of a general election campaign — from the early kickoff rallies to the last debates in October — to allow voters to think through, together, the serious issues that face the nation.

The integrity of that space is broken when some citizens cast their ballots as early as 46 days before the election, as some states allow. A lot can happen in those 46 days. Early voters are, in essence, asked a different set of questions from later ones; they are voting with a different set of facts. They may cast their ballots without the knowledge that comes from later candidate debates

In reality, the authors apparently are not against all early voting, just long early voting periods:

Moreover, there are other ways of achieving some of the benefits of early voting, such as old-fashioned absentee ballots or setting up more polling places. Even a limited few-days-early voting period could convey most of the advantages of the practice while limiting the most severe democratic costs.

Early voting is a matter of degree: Even Election “Day” lets people cast ballots at different times. But at the moment, there is no upper bound at all on the growing practice, and the president’s commission made no mention of such an option. With the group’s report opening a new round of discussion over voting policy, now is the time to consider whether the “quiet revolution” of early voting has gone too far.

For an alternative view, we have a critique from Doug Chapin: So Yesterday: “The (Rather Outdated) Case Against Early Voting” <read>

There are, to be sure, evidence-based arguments that early voting isn’t the turnout machine it’s often sold to be – indeed, Barry Burden and three colleagues have a provocative new paper that suggests that early voting actually DECREASES turnout in the absence of opportunities for same-day registration. There is also a growing realization of the need to do cost-benefit analyses of lengthy voting periods and identify the best time to open the process when significant numbers of voters are ready to take advantage of early voting.

But the argument that early voting deprives voters of an opportunity to cast ballots in a simultaneous expression of public opinion “at a particular moment” is rather outdated given the current state of the field. That sense is amplified by the authors’ recommendations for fixing the problem via “old-fashioned absentee ballots or setting up more polling places” – options which are unattractive or unavailable to many election officials.

For Connecticut, we favor in-person early voting, if we are willing to pay for the convenience. We oppose no-excuse absentee voting for security reasons. 

  • For many of the reasons pointed out by the authors of the Politico article, we favor a relatively short period of early voting, perhaps a week or ten day period, not necessarily every day, with a variety of convenient times during the day, evenings, early morning and weekends.
  • In Connecticut, with local election management, such early voting could be expensive, especially for small towns that have a single polling place on election day. There are some compromises and and alternatives: Provide for in-person absentee-like voting, which would has the security benefits of in-person early voting and some of the disenfranchising aspects of absentee voting; bite the bullet and do for voting what we have done for probate: Regionalize, Professionalize, Economize.
  • We are opposed to no-excuse absentee voting because of the known and proven fraud issues. We point out that its long period does not reduce the concerns with a long in-person early voting period.

American Voting Experience: A Laudable Report

It seems we have several surprisingly refreshing Government reports in recent weeks, two on reigning in NSA spying, and now an excellent report on improving election administration, the election experience, and a contribution to realizing the ideals of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
Many will find a lot to like in the report. Some parts might be taken out of context as it often points out the benefits, costs, and risks of various solutions. Some will use the report to justify doing anything, such as their favored solution, to a problem. That said, we will likely be referencing many areas in the report going forward

It seems we have several surprisingly refreshing  Government reports in recent weeks, two on reigning in NSA spying, and now an excellent report on improving election administration, the election experience, and a contribution to realizing the ideals of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution. The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration <read>

Its long, yet refreshingly readable for the average citizen. The .pdf is 112 pages, yet the introduction and main body constitute a bit less at 84 pages. I have read it all, and so have many others.  Let me start with overall impressions:

  • It is readable tutorial covering several areas to a moderate level of depth and detail: Causes and cures for lines; The variety in voting methods, laws, and practices; The synergy between problems and solutions, especially improving registration systems; The need to soon replace aging systems and hardware; the systemic problems in making better systems available; The value, costs, challenges, and security tradeoffs expanding early voting; Serving Military and Overseas Voters responsively and responsibly.
  • The report remains true to its promise of staying within issues and solutions that can be agreed upon by members of both major parties.
  • Given its size, I find very very little to disagree with in the report. Two or three minor quibbles, too minor to mention.
  • There is a lot to be done in many many areas covered in the report, many details to be filled in. There in, will lie many issues to debate, potential for making things better, worse, or wasting huge sums with little actual change.
  • It is most detailed and potentially effective recommendation is in better online voter registration systems and cross checking between states for duplicate/out-of-date registrations and the benefits throughout the system.
  • Its best articulation of problems and opportunities are in the areas of reducing lines, pollworker training, pollworker recruiting and improving ballot design. Its all very common sense, but somehow the system got to be the way it is, and by-and-large not moving to solve the problems.
  • The toughest details to be determined are how to create, pay for, and determine the best way forward to truly better software, hardware, and manual systems.

Many will find a lot to like in the report. Some parts might be taken out of context as it often points out the benefits, costs, and risks of various solutions. Some will use the report to justify doing anything, such as their favored solution, to a problem. That said, we will likely be referencing many areas in the report going forward:

  • We completely agree with its take on Military and Overseas Voting, that recommends against online/Internet voting, yet effective online registration, ballot tracking, and ballot distribution systems.
  • We applaud its recognition that unlimited absentee voting or mail-in voting represents a significant risk for fraud, while early voting, voting centers, and in-person absentee voting can be safe.
  • We agree with its overview of the software/hardware challenges going forward. The problem may not be quite as imminent, yet the  challenges to get going and find good solutions will require a transformation, years of work in regulation, cooperation, and not so common sense between industry, computer scientists, other experts, officials, and government.

How can the NSA, Microsoft, Google etc. vote?

A post got us thinking: Every Scary, Weird Thing We Know the NSA Can Do. Lets add some corollaries relevant to voting and elections:

A post got us thinking: Every Scary, Weird Thing We Know the NSA Can Do.  <read>

It seems they missed that the NSA and others with access can vote!

This post originally appeared on the website of The Brian Lehrer Show.

The trove of documents leaked by Edward Snowden has revealed the elaborate tricks the NSA can use to monitor communications and data around the world. Here, a running list of things we now know the NSA can do, based on media reports and other publicly available documents—so far. If we missed any, let us know in the comments page or by tweeting @brianlehrer.

  • It can track the numbers of both parties on a phone call, as well location, time and duration. (More)
  • It can hack Chinese phones and text messages. (More)
  • It can set up fake Internet cafes. (More)
  • It can spy on foreign leaders’ cellphones. (More)
  • It can tap underwater fiber-optic cables. (More)
  • It can track communication within media organizations like Al-Jazeera. (More)
  • It can hack into the U.N. video conferencing system. (More)
  • It can track bank transactions. (More)
  • It can monitor text messages. (More)
  • It can access your email, chat, and Web browsing history. (More)
  • It can map your social networks. (More)
  • It can access your smartphone app data. (More)
  • It is trying to get into secret networks like Tor, diverting users to less secure channels. (More)
  • It can go undercover within embassies to have closer access to foreign networks. (More)
  • It can set up listening posts on the roofs of buildings to monitor communications in a city. (More)
  • It can set up a fake LinkedIn. (More)
  • It can track the reservations at upscale hotels. (More)
  • It can intercept the talking points for Ban Ki-moon’s meeting with Obama. (More)
  • It can crack cellphone encryption codes. (More)
  • It can hack computers that aren’t connected to the internet using radio waves. (More)
  • It can intercept phone calls by setting up fake base stations. (More)
  • It can remotely access a computer by setting up a fake wireless connection. (More)
  • It can install fake SIM cards to then control a cell phone. (More)
  • It can fake a USB thumb drive that’s actually a monitoring device. (More)
  • It can crack all types of sophisticated computer encryption. (Update: It is trying to build this capability.) (More)
  • It can go into online games and monitor communication. (More)
  • It can intercept communications between aircraft and airports. (More)
  • (Update) It can physically intercept deliveries, open packages, and make changes to devices. (More) (h/t)

Did we miss any? Mischaracterize any capabilities? Let us know in the comments, or tweet @brianlehrer.

Lets add some corollaries relevant to voting and elections:

  • It can set up fake Internet cafes
    • They can use those to monitor, identify, change and drop votes submitted over the Internet or by email. And change ballots presented to voters.
  • It can tap underwater fiber-optic cables
    • And monitor, identify, change and drop votes submitted over the Internet, by email or fax. And change ballots presented to voters.
  • It can monitor text messages.
  • It can access your email, chat, and Web browsing history
  • It can map your social network
  • It can access your smartphone app data
    • They could determine your politics and intercept your electronic or absentee vote and eliminate it before it is counted.
      Because—>
  • It can physically intercept deliveries, open packages, and make changes to devices

They could use these facilities in a variety of ways to disrupt elections:

  • Change electronic results as they are transmitted or posted, confusing or changing the initially reported winner.
  • Discover embarrassing past statements or activities of candidates and caused these to be published.
  • Discover embarrassing past statements or activities of candidates and use them to intimidate candidates once elected.
  • Plant rumors about candidates.

Why do we ignore science and facts?

We have often been perplexed when the public and the Legislature ignore science and simple facts. No more so than when it comes to Internet voting where there is overwhelming recognition of the risks by scientists AND overwhelming evidence that individual, business, and government computers have been repeatedly compromised.

New research provides some clues why.

We have often been perplexed when the public and the Legislature ignore science and simple facts.  No more so than when it comes to Internet voting where there is overwhelming recognition of the risks by scientists AND overwhelming evidence that individual, business, and government computers have been repeatedly compromised.

A recent article and a recent book hint that it might be human nature.

The Hartford Courant’s Science Columnist, Robert Thorson, looking at climate change and a new Yale study says: When Politicians Fight, Facts Take Beating <read>

The study attributes the problem to political conflict:

Psychologist Dan M. Kahan and his colleagues proved that political fighting diminishes our ability to think about evidence-based science.

Think climate change, which was well understood 20 years ago, yet conflict persists. Ditto for gun control, for which the data are compelling. Think nuclear power, genetically modified foods, national health care, commercial drones or any politically contentious topic that could be easily solved with evidence-based reasoning.

Congress is not alone. All of us are vulnerable to bias, prejudice, narrow-mindedness and tunnel vision. In short, seeing what we want to see, rather than what actually is.

This study’s technical name for this phenomenon is the “Identity-Protective Cognition Thesis” or ICT. It says cultural conflict disables the faculties we use to make sense of science that would better inform decisions. The key word here is “disabling.” When there’s no conflict, we’re fine. When there is, we’re disabled.

The ICT thesis is true. We maintain our allegiances by skewing our thinking. Kahan’s clever experiment yielded results so robust that no political partisan could explain them away…

The results are compelling. Both conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats did far worse on tests of evidence-based thinking when the scenario was politically contentious than when it was not. The more political things became, the more the subject’s mental biases kicked in to disable their reasoning skills. And the more scientifically inclined an issue was, the worse they did, perhaps because they were more facile at manipulating the numbers to match their versions of reality. Importantly, self-identified liberals were no more open-minded than conservatives, even though that’s how they’re defined.

Scientists like me have long tried to explain bad policy decisions on a dearth of scientific data or the lack of voter science, technology, engineering and mathematics education. Others fault an excess of highly paid lobbyists. Kahan’s study tags the ICT as a major culprit, advocating that governments must “adopt measures that effectively shield decision-relevant science from the influences that generate this reason-disabling state.”

That might explain some of the problems we see in some election integrity issues. Democrats and Republicans are generally on opposite sides for:

  • Voter Id where Republicans ignore the facts of very very little votER fraud.
  • Absentee voting or mail-in voting, where Democrats ignore the facts of frequent cases of organized votING fraud, and the obvious opportunities.
  • National Popular Vote where both sides ignore the technical risks.

Internet voting seems different in character, where the parties are aligned, not  divided, and in many cases, like Connecticut, the entire Legislature ignores all the risks and unanimously passes Internet voting two years in a row. Even the Governor, knowing the risks and unconstitutionality as articulated in his veto message, signs the bill the second time it hits his desk. By and large, the public goes along with favoring Internet voting, especially for the Military, saying “If we can bank online, why can’t we vote online?”, completely ignoring science, the frequently documented hacks, and NSA disclosures.

A perfect storm: a harder to verify application than banking, a less technically competent/financed election function expected to provide security, and high apparent motivations for insider manipulation of election results. Yet, in the face of all this legislative and public support for Military Internet Voting. Why?

One clue may come from the the Trolley Problem as covered in the book Moral Tribes recently reviewed here.  As we said in the review:

How do we make moral decisions and cooperate or not? It is the result of two systems, thinking fast and slow – a fast intuitive system and a slower logical system. Much of the book and the interesting aspects center around how these systems work, studying the brain, often by experiments in ‘trolleyology‘ – we can save five people who will be killed a trolley by sacrificing one, either by throwing a switch, throwing a fat man onto the tracks, or by other variations. Why do we make different choices based on the method of sacrifice? Research reviewed in the book provides an answer, and demonstrates the two modes of moral choice, their flaws, and their limits – limits we are challenged to transcend.

From the book:

(p. 111) Turning the trolley away from five and onto one…makes utilitarian sense and doesn’t trigger much of an opposing emotional response, causing most people to approve. Pushing the man off the footbridge…likewise makes utilitarian sense, but it also it also triggers a significant negative emotional response, causing most people to disapprove.

(p. 129)Thus, we see dual-process brain design not just in moral judgement but in the choices we make about food, money, and the attitudes we’d like to change. For most things that we do, our brains have automatic settings that tell us how to proceed. But we can also override those automatic settings, provided we are aware of the opportunity to do so and motivated to take it.

I speculate:

  • Providing for online voting by the military evokes a strong emotional response along the lines of “Solders in remote battlefields and other isolated locations obviously have challenges in voting. They are voluntarily sacrificing for us. My experience tells me that online voting would be a convenient way for them to vote. We must to do anything and everything for them to make up for our lack of sacrifice…”.
  • The risks of online voting are a secondary, rational risk, no matter how great or small, our emotional brain does not see that risk. It only sees the sacrificing soldiers.
  • The alternative facts are only available to the rational brain:
    • That all forms of Internet voting, online, email, and fax, face documented obvious, yet not intuitive threats;
    • That online voting is more risky than online banking; That online banking has proven vulnerable to the tune of several billion dollars in losses each year, yet those losses are not seen by individuals;
    • That other states have had great success with providing blank ballot download, effective help, and effective web information following the MOVE Act;
    • That states such as RI, touted as successful with Internet voting have on a small percentage of votes returned by fax, and the similarly “successful” WV pilot did not convince their legislature to move forward.
  • Legislators are additionally at risk of being emotionally persuaded that voters will interpret any vote against soldiers and being weak on the military, security, and defense.

So, we have quite a challenge in personally and collectively making the rational decision. Not just for online vetoing, but for other issues that get highly emotional, either from political polarization for emotional blockage

Denise Merrill does the right thing – by all voters and the CT Constitution

Merrill has remained steadfast in her commitment to protect us from the risks of Internet voting. She is recommending a system to aid the Military in downloading blank ballots and mailing them in quicker. A system that has proven successful in other states. She also reminds the Legislature that Internet voting (including Fax and Email return) would be unconstitutional in Connecticut,

AP Story: Conn. official recommends out-of-state military voters download ballot but still mail in vote <read> <update – the report>

Last year the CT Legislature, ignoring the technical impossibility of secure, secret Internet Voting, ordered the Secretary of the State and the Military Department to provide secure Internet voting for Military and their dependents.  This was in spite of testimony and reports from Computer Scientists, experts from Homeland Security, experts from the National Institute of Standards, and Department of Defense reports that Internet voting could not be made secure. She was also to report back this year with any legislation required.

Merrill has remained steadfast in her commitment to protect us from the risks of Internet voting. She is recommending a system to aid the Military in downloading blank ballots and mailing them in quicker. A system that has proven successful in other states. She also reminds the Legislature that Internet voting (including Fax and Email return) would be unconstitutional in Connecticut,  requiring a Constitutional Amendment to remove the right to a “secret vote”. (Some argue it is a right that can be waived by a voter. We contend it is every voter’s right that no other voter’s vote can be document, such that it can be sold or intimidated).

Meanwhile, the bill’s proponent, Senator Gayle Slossberg, plans to continue efforts to defy Science and the Constitution.

There is a dispute in the facts between Secretary Merrill, the Election Assistance Commission, and Senator Gayle Slossberg on the current rate of Military vote return (61% vs. 94%). In any case if Senator Slossberg is correct, and we adopted the Rhode Island system she recommends, it is only used there for 3.2% of the military votes returned after being in place for years, thus we would have a whooping 64% return rate. The 94% sounds really good, they rate right up there with the return of domestic AB votes, and up there with other states that already use the system recommended by Secretary Merrill.

We would encourage the Secretary and the Legislature to provide the same system to all overseas voters, including those beyond the Military that serve us, such as State Department employees, Military Contractors, Peace Corps, NGO staff, and business personel.

See all our posts on Internet voting, and its history in Connecticut <here>

Grand Theft Education – A Possiblity

Electronic testing is similar to electronic voting. The form of electronic testing is only as safe as the systems chosen and the administration and controls surrounding the system itself. What we know from electronic voting is that we need voter verified paper ballots (paper test forms), a good chain of custody on that paper, before and after the votes (tests) are electronically counted, along with scientifically rigorous audits.

Reading a Jon Pelto post we learned that the Core Curriculum, at least in Connecticut, requires computer testing. Apparently to make this possible the State is “investing” $22 million in loans to buy those computers. I have not had the time to study the Core Curriculum, but from what I understand it is being pushed by education “reformers” that have little educational experience or credentials. It is so popular in Connecticut that the state is spending $1 million on a publicity campaign to convince us of its benefits.

So, what does that have to do with voting?

Nothing directly. But indirectly, two things:

  • First if education is destroyed, we lose citizens required for the functioning of democracy. We can all agree that education needs improvement as a prerequisite for our democracy to thrive and to survive. Maybe the Core Curriculum is a good way forward, maybe not. In any case any way forward that depends on testing, depends on the integrity of that testing.
  • Second, electronic testing is similar to electronic voting. The form of electronic testing is only as safe as the systems chosen and the administration and controls surrounding the system itself. What we know from electronic voting is that we need voter verified paper ballots (paper test forms), a good chain of custody on that paper, before and after the votes (tests) are electronically counted, along with scientifically rigorous audits. It would be a helpful start, if the systems used were subject to the equivalent of the California Top To Bottom Review of voting equipment.

Motive, Opportunity, and Evidence

  • Motive: It is not called “High Stakes Testing” without good reason. Students can gain from passing grades, admission to better schools, and keeping parents at bay. Teachers can gain by keeping their jobs, better jobs, promotion and bonuses. Administrators can receive gains similar to teachers, plus local and national fame. Perhaps most of all those with a stake in education reform – achieving their favorite reform, or preventing it – have the most to gain or lose.
  • Opportunity: It is always possible for anyone with Internet/Computer skills to hack into a system and compromise it either directly or with the aid of an accomplice with those skills. Yet, it might be quite a challenge for students, teachers, and local administrators depending on how the system is built. Students, teachers, and administrators would have to have access to the questions and the correct answers, in addition to compromising the system (unlike voting, where there are just a few items on a ballot, and the ‘correct’ choice for a fraudster is clear).

    For system insiders, as opposed to outsiders, the opportunity is much much greater. Systems would presumably be more centralized, additional complexity would make testing very challenging. Similar to voting there is no exact expected result for each student or a collection of students, no double entry bookkeeping like electronic banking.

    Here we must mention that education “reformers” with goals of “transforming” education, via privatization and the elimination of unions include leaders in our Federal Government, many state governments, and leaders of companies that make our computers, such as Bill Gates. (He has donated millions in Connecticut and elsewhere to support the efforts of favored reformers). Recent NSA Snowdon revelations have shown, among other things, that the NSA watches bugs in Microsoft Windows and exploits them before they are fixed and that backdoors are added to systems during shipping – similar approaches could be used to compromise testing. There is clearly opportunity for insiders to take control of electronic testing whether it depends on centralized servers, decentralized servers, or the computers used by the individual students.Note:

    One advantage of electronic testing, depending on how it is accomplished, is that it may make cheating in the “old fashioned ways” a bit more difficult. Questions may not be known in advance, so that “teaching to the test” might preclude providing teaching to the exact questions and answers just prior to the test. With no paper tests, then the opportunity to compromise the paper before grading would be eliminated.  All of these would tend to make it more difficult for students and teachers to cheat, yet do nothing to mitigate the greater opportunities for insiders, especially those with the most to gain.

  • Evidence: There have been several recent test cheating scandals by teachers and administrators. None more instructive than the recent one in Hartford. A school achieving national fame (Newshour Report) for almost magical transformation of reading progress, was exposed as simple test cheating. What can we learn from this?
    • Cheating is real, and if undetected can provide fame and fortune. (At the expense of students and the reputations of all involved, guilty and innocent)
    • Here it was detected by statistical analysis showing questionable patterns.
    • And proven ONLY by the existence of student completed paper tests, even though they were held under lax security.

With electronic testing, we would not have that same paper record available to audit, nor necessarily the same statistics to review – and an opportunity for more sophisticated fraud that would more easily avoid statistical detection (For instance, with access to student data from the past, gains and test results could be correlated to students past results, while randomly selected easier incorrect answers corrected).

Secrecy/Privacy

One more issue is security of test data and the scope of its disclosure.  In voting we are concerned with the “secret vote”, so that votes cannot be bought, sold, or coerced. When it comes to student data, there are other privacy issues, similar to those with medical data. Any automated collection and retention of test data or other student data should be of concern.  What could be done with such data? What or would our Government do with such data?

Unfortunately, for many students we have an answer in an example. The U.S. Military currently, in violation of international children’s rights deviously collects extensive data on high school students and uses the data to help recruit for the military. Here is a current review based on FOI requests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Career Exploration Program <read> To make a long story short, the test is administered to high school students in school, often under false pretenses that it is mandatory, and then the data used in ways that violate U.S. Law, Military Regulations, and the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child.

This is an issue with any type of automated testing, even paper testing than is recorded permanently. It goes beyond the Military, to any Government agency such as the NSA, and to any private company that may accumulate that data, the data’s protection, sale, and potential use for all sorts of illegitimate purposes.

Book Review: Moral Tribes

Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and The Gap Between Us and Them, by Joshua Green, is a book about science, morals, psychology, how we make decisions, how the brain works, and how we “should” make decisions. Brain science would seem to have little to do with election integrity, yet when it focus on a discussion of how we make decisions and make moral choices, then it is relevant.

Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and The Gap Between Us and Them, by Joshua Green, is a book about science, morals, philosophy, psychology, how we make decisions, how the brain works, and how we “should” make decisions. I have always been interested in brain science since my senior year in college with my first seminar on the subject, with newly minted Ph.D., Robert Baron. Brain science would seem to have little to do with election integrity, yet when it focus on a discussion of how we make decisions and make moral choices, then it is relevant. We will leave the election integrity discussion for future post(s).

There is a lot in the book that will hold the interest of many readers. It does not require a background in brain science, philosophy, or psychology. The main theme centers around why we tend to cooperate with our own group (tribe), yet fight with other groups, or as the book says “The Tragedy of the Commons” – why can’t we work things out between different groups, between pro-live, and pro-cho ice or between religions or races?

How do we make moral decisions and cooperate or not? It is the result of two systems, thinking fast and slow – a fast intuitive system and a slower logical system. Much of the book and the interesting aspects center around how these systems work, studying the brain, often by experiments in ‘trolleyology‘ – we can save five people who will be killed a trolley by sacrificing one, either by throwing a switch, throwing a fat man onto the tracks, or by other variations. Why do we make different choices based on the method of sacrifice? Research reviewed in the book provides an answer, and demonstrates the two modes of moral choice, their flaws, and their limits – limits we are challenged to transcend.

The book makes a case for ‘utilitarianism’, blaming disrespect for the term on an unfortunate name and misunderstandings of its implications, calling for using the name ‘deep pragmatism’. As we often say “a rose by any other name would be just as thorny”.  The case is strong, yet in our agreement we remain uncomfortable. We are left adrift wondering, beyond hope that their might be an alternative or a better formula to apply deep pragmatism.

The author attempts to reconcile pro-choice and pro-life morals, yet is unable to provide a fully convincing argument. That should not be taken as a reason to discredit the book or its contributions. We are human creatures with brains shaped by evolution, imperfect, with some tough dilemmas, limitations, and imperfect, perhaps irreconcilable morals.

Finally, the book ends with six moral rules we may well all agree on.

Despite the limitations of the science, so far, we highly recommend this book. The science is powerful, and fresh. Joshua Green’s heart is in Moral Tribes, making it all accessible and engaging.

Chinese successfully attack U.S. Election Watchdog

Just a little practice for Internet voting. Or are attackers just a but more careful when they attack actual elections?

The Center for Public Integrity: FEC hamstrung by political bickering, case backlogs, staff departures — even Chinese hackers <read>

Just after the federal government shut down Oct. 1, and one of the government’s more dysfunctional agencies stopped functioning altogether, Chinese hackers picked their moment to attack.

They waylaid the Federal Election Commission’s networks. They crashed computer systems that publicly disclose how billions of dollars are raised and spent each election cycle by candidates, parties and political action committees.

As minutes turned to hours, the FEC found itself largely defenseless against what may be the worst act of sabotage in its 38-year history…

Just more to contemplate as we in Connecticut head into supporting Internet voting via mandate that the Secretary of the State and the Military Department (of CT) figure out how to make it secure.

I also note an interesting comment on the article:

The take away lesson from this article should be that computer driven American elections can be as easily hijacked as FEC computers. And the powers that be, be they Democrat or Republican don’t really give a damn. I offer my experience as prima fascia evidence of my comment: I am a weapons systems analyst wholly knowledgeable in the failings of the so-called high tech weapon system and therefore cognizant of the inherent weakness of the average electronic voting system. In 2004 I was a registered voter in the State of Nevada. Concerned that my vote had not been counted I challenged the 2004 election of George Bush by bringing suit against the State of Nevada and Sequoia Voting Systems with a demand for independent testing of Nevada’s Sequoia computerized voting system. Ironically, just prior to the 2008 Presidential primary the Court ruled that I, a fully franchised registered voter, had no standing in this matter and dismissed my lawsuit thereby securing the way to electronic treason. Many thanks to this fine reporter for exposing the truth about the FEC and our holey ‘free and fair’ elections.

Patricia Axelrod, Director, The Desert Storm Think Tank and All Veterans’ Advocate (seeded by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation).

Voter Fraud Non-Existent, Partisanship at Heart of Voter Laws

Study report covered by the Voting News and Houston News: National: Study: Voter Fraud Non-Existent, Partisanship at Heart of Voter Laws.

The Secret Ballot was proposed and passed for partisan reasons – to suppress the vote of illiterate African-Americans who would have trouble reading and correctly filling out their own ballot. An important principle to keep in mind – both good and bad reforms are most often touted based on supposed political gain.

Study report covered by the Voting News and Houston News: National: Study: Voter Fraud Non-Existent, Partisanship at Heart of Voter Laws <read>

This is similar to other recent stories. Much time and effort spent in search of voter fraud with little to show for it. It does exist but it seems to be a very few isolated events. Either a misunderstanding on the part of an illegally registered voter, or perhaps a very politically connected person that seems to have voted once, but in the wrong place, e.g.<here> or <here in our state>.

A couple of years ago we were researching the origins of the Secret Ballot and read The Hidden History of the Secret Ballot. One of the essays made the point that, like all election reforms, the Secret Ballot was proposed and passed for partisan reasons – to suppress the vote of illiterate African-Americans who would have trouble reading and correctly filling out their own ballot.  An important principle to keep in mind – both good and bad reforms are most often touted based on supposed political gain.

When it comes to voter fraud which realistically does not exist, Republicans in general, tout it as a reason to pass suppressive voter ID laws. On the other hand when it comes to voting fraud which is quite common via absentee voting, Democrats in general, ignore it while they propose unlimited absentee voting. Similarly Republicans tend to oppose, and Democrats tend to tout, in-person early voting for a variety of questionable reasons.

When it comes to voting laws, we focus on integrity balanced with costs and enfranchisement. In general, we find ourselves agreeing about 50% with Democrats, 50% with Republicans, and 50% with election officials. Partisans tend to favor laws that would tend to increase or decrease votes in their favor, focusing on costs and integrity issues on propositions they oppose. Officials tend to focus on costs only on those issues which cause them more work, tend to ignore costs and integrity when a change would reduce their effort.

Scientists to Evaluate Internet Voting, Will Legislators Listen?

This promises to be an important project. The powerful team all but guarantees a significant, trusted result. Yet, what is critical is that officials and legislators fully understand the result and undertake any Internet voting following any detailed requirements developed by the study. Our own educated prediction is that reasonably safe Internet voting is likely to be judged possible, yet unlikely to be feasible. There are significant security challenges, especially if voting were to be performed from voters’ computers, without requiring sophisticated verification techniques on the part of voters, and expensive security provisions by officials.

A project to evaluate Internet voting has been initiated by The Overseas Vote Foundation:  End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting Project Announcement <read>

Their efforts aim to produce a system specification and set of testing scenarios, which if they meet the requirements for security, auditability, and usability, will then be placed in the public domain. At the same time, they intend to demonstrate that confidence in a voting system is built on a willingness to verify its security through testing and transparency.

“The secure, tested, certified remote voting systems that election officials envision aren’t even for sale. Available online ballot return systems are not considered secure by the scientific community, nor are they certified. As a result, email has become the default stopgap method for moving ballots online. Email is especially weak on security, yet it is being used regularly by election officials because viable alternatives are not available,” says Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat, President and CEO of Overseas Vote Foundation, who spearheaded this project…

“There is a historical misunderstanding in the U.S. election community that this project aims to correct. Our country’s best scientists are not against technology advancements, nor are they inherently at odds with the election officials who seek technology improvements to meet their administrative challenges. What the U.S. scientific community takes issue with are the unproven claims of security regarding existing systems that are not publicly

tested or vetted. This study aims to recalibrate this situation. This group of scientific leaders has often pointed out security vulnerabilities in past systems, however they do agree on one thing: that if IV does happen, it should be in a system that takes advantage of end-to-end verifiability and auditability,” said Ms. Dzieduszycka-Suinat.

This promises to be an important project. The powerful team all but guarantees a significant, trusted result. Yet, what is critical is that officials and legislators fully understand the result and undertake any Internet voting following any detailed requirements developed by the study. Our own educated prediction is that reasonably safe Internet voting is likely to be judged possible, yet unlikely to be feasible. There are significant security challenges, especially if voting were to be performed from voters’ computers, without requiring sophisticated verification techniques on the part of voters, and expensive security provisions by officials.