CA, we told you so… predictable, unintended consequences of open primaries

We wish in cases like this that we were more frequently wrong in our predictions.

Update: 12/12/2012 California | All Bark, No Bite: How California’s Top-Two Primary System Reinforces the Status Quo | State of Elections or as we might say “Barking up the wrong tree”.

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Update: Brad points out that it also applies both ways e.g. the Senate race <read>
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It seems like a couple of years ago that Ralph Nader and CTVotersCount warned California against open primaries: CA Prop 14: Unsafe at any but greed? <read> You can read Nader’s comments there, here is what we added back in July 2010:

However, we can add to his arguments our vision of the dilemma facing the intelligent voter on primary day: Faced with five, ten, or thirty candidates for an office: Who do you vote for, your favorite, or one you think might have a chance at being in the top two; one that might be more acceptable than others the poll say have a chance? It is just another, perhaps more complex crap shoot.

Now Brad Friedman points to the dilemma facing Democrats in some California counties in Congressional primaries: Will CA’s New ‘Cajun Primary’ System Allow Minority GOP To Capture Congressional Seats? CA-26 House race exemplifies anti-democratic potential of 2010’s voter-approved ‘Top Two’ open primary system… <read>

One example is in the newly created CA-26 Congressional District, which reveals a potential formula by which the GOP can overcome adverse party registration numbers — in that case, 40% (D), 36% (R), 19% (I) — in order to seize a Congressional seat.

Because four Democrats are competing in the CA-26 primary, long suffering progressives, including this writer, who had previously been forced to cast a protest vote in the now defunct, heavily gerrymandered CA-24 District of the outgoing, extreme right-wing Republican Elton Gallegly, may awake on June 6 to the reality that, come next November, they will be forced to choose between a ‘Tea Party’ Republican and a County Supervisor who “changed her voter registration…from Republican to ‘no party preference’ in preparation for her bid for Congress”…

The upcoming CA-26 primary underscores the undemocratic potential of such a primary system. In a three-way race, all other things being equal, one would anticipate 40% to a Democrat, 36% to the Republican and the balance perhaps going to a genuine independent candidate. But here, the 40% for Democrats will be carved up amongst four Democratic candidates running in the same race with one GOP candidate openly running as a Republican and another who had been a Republican until she decided to shed the party label for the upcoming primary to run as an ostensible “Independent.”

Stealth Republican?

The CA-26 race provides a paradigm example of how a “Cajun Primary” can facilitate a seizure of power by a minority party through the use of a stealth Republican, who deceptively dons an “Independent” label.

We wish in cases like this that we were more frequently wrong in our predictions.

NIST: Internet voting not yet feasible. (And neither are email and fax voting)

Use of fax poses the fewest challenges, however fax offers limited protection for voter privacy. While the threats to telephone, e-mail, and web can be mitigated through the use of procedural and technical security controls, they are still more serious and challenging to overcome.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in response to an inquiry, summarized the risks of Internet voting <read>

Internet voting is not yet feasible, researchers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology have concluded. ”Malware on voters’ personal computers poses a serious threat that could compromise the secrecy or integrity of voters’ ballots,” said Belinda Collins, senior advisor for voting standards within NIST’s information technology laboratory, in an May 18 statement. ”And, the United States currently lacks an infrastructure for secure electronic voter authentication,” she added. Collins released the statement in response to an inquiry from Common Cause, a Washington, D.C. nonprofit active in campaign finance and election reform.

“This statement should serve as a blunt warning that we just aren’t ready yet and proves that we can’t trust the empty promises of ‘secure Internet voting’ from the for-profit vendors,” said Susannah Goodman, head of Common Cause’s Voting Integrity Project. ”We urge election officials and state and federal lawmakers to heed NIST’s warning and step back, support further research and STOP online voting programs until they can be made secure,” Goodman added…

The statement is based on two NIST reports:

This 2011 report http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/upload/NISTIR-7770-feb2011-2.pdf  Strongly articulates the many risks of Internet voting and the slight mitigations available. It references an earlier report that explains the risks of all types of electronic transmission of voted ballots. Perhaps email voting and fax voting were sufficiently covered in the early report that it was not necessary to spell that out in more detail than the earlier report:

In December 2008, NIST released NISTIR 7551, A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems [3], which documents the threats to UOCAVA voting systems using electronic technologies for all aspects of overseas and military voting. NISTIR 7551 considered the use of postal mail, telephone, fax, electronic mail, and web servers to facilitate transmission of voter registration materials, blank ballots, and cast ballots. It documented threats and potential high-level mitigating security controls associated with each of these methods. The report concluded that threats to the electronic transmission of voter registration materials and blank ballots can be mitigated with the use of procedures and widely deployed security technologies. However, the threats associated with electronic transmission, notably Internet-based transmission, of cast ballots are more serious and challenging to overcome and the report suggested that emerging trends and developments in that area should continue to be studied and monitored.

Here is that earlier report: http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/upload/uocava-threatanalysis-final.pdf

Voted ballot return: Sending completed ballots from UOCAVA voters to local election officials can be expedited through the use of the electronic transmission options. However, their use can present significant challenges to the integrity of the election. Use of fax poses the fewest challenges, however fax offers limited protection for voter privacy. While the threats to telephone, e-mail, and web can be mitigated through the use of procedural and technical security controls, they are still more serious and challenging to overcome.

Sadly the CT Legislature passed a bill this year the included email and fax voting, without hearings. The Governor is considering vetoing that bill which may be unconstitutional and risks democracy in the name of soldiers who are dedicated to preserving that democracy.

CO Legislature, Election Officials want to create “a favored class of citizens”

The ballot access issue has been debated in Colorado for too long. It is time for ballots to be confirmed as public records

Colorado is considering a law to restrict their Freedom of Information Law to limit ballot access to ballots to most citizens. They say it would create “a favored class of citizens” we say it would make most Coloradans second class citizens. Denver Post editorial: Hickenlooper should veto ballot access measure <read>

A rapidly growing coalition of groups from across the political spectrum — from Common Cause to the Colorado Union of Taxpayers — is urging the governor to veto a bill governing public access to voted ballots. We hope he listens carefully to their arguments, because an important principle is at stake.

Does access to public records apply equally to all citizens in this state, or should the law open some records only to special classes?

The Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) states that “all public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times.”

By contrast, the ballot bill — which began as Senate Bill 155 but was grafted onto House Bill 1036 at the eleventh hour — says an “interested party” won’t have to wait like the rest of us until an election is certified to enjoy transparent government. And it defines interested parties as not only the candidates themselves but also political parties and even representatives of issue committees that gave money to ballot measures.

Why should the principle of open government be accorded to them and not to other groups just as interested in an election’s outcome?

Why should their ability to inspect records be greater than that of the humblest citizen with no clout or money to spend on politicking?

As members of the Colorado Lawyers Committee Election Task Force wrote in an analysis, the bill’s “restriction of CORA rights during an election to political parties and candidates creates — for the first time — a favored class of citizens … .”

When we first wrote about this bill in March, we described it as a flawed measure that left too much discretion to county clerks and failed to improve procedures that fueled worries about voted ballots being linked to specific voters. But we were also relieved that the clerks had retreated from their earlier opposition to any public access to voted ballots.

The more we consider this complex bill, however, the worse it looks — and our unease is heightened by its crude handling. Not only was it appended to an unrelated measure having nothing to do with elections, it also was rushed through the House with little notice and limited debate.

The ballot access issue has been debated in Colorado for too long. It is time for ballots to be confirmed as public records <read> <read>

60 Districts Selected for Post-Election Audits

Yesterday, with the assistance of Coalition members, Secretary of the State Denise Merrill selected sixty districts from the Republican Presidential Primary for post-election audit.

Yesterday, with the assistance of Coalition members, Secretary of the State Denise Merrill selected sixty districts from the Republican Presidential Primary for post-election audit <read>

Less than 10% of districts were selected since many towns used paper ballots without optical scanners. The audit only tests the accuracy of optical scanners, ignoring the regularly proven possibility that people can count inaccurately. Since the drawing was held after the official start of the audit period, we expect that many towns will not give the three days notice required in the Secretary of the State’s audit procedures. (In Connecticut audit procedures and likely also regulations are not enforceable.)

Which, if any, of Connecticut’s 169 towns would be secure for Internet voting (let alone email and fax voting)?

Some of the smaller Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70’s and 80’s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Last week the Legislature, without public hearings, passed email and fax voting, stuffed in an otherwise popular bill. It would mandate each of Connecticut’s 169 towns and 339 registrars of voters to implement voting via email and fax from any location in the world. As is well know, email and fax are totally insecure.

Less well known, is how unprepared and unable our nations cities are in securing the internet. It should be obvious since our corporations, including networking giants,  intelligence community, and military forces are not able to secure their networks. For a lesson in cyber security of the internet (with email being the most vulnerable), consider Homeland Security expert Bruce McConnell’s recent talk <read/view>

Recently the New York Times highlighted a report on the security of our nations cities: U.S. Study Cites Worries on Readiness for Cyberattacks <read>

A study commissioned by President Obama to assess the nation’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks and man-made and natural disasters has found that state and local officials have the most confidence in their public health and medical services but are the most concerned about whether agencies can respond to cyberattacks…

But it was the report’s findings about cybersecurity that appeared to be the most troubling, and they continued a drumbeat from the Obama administration about the need for Congress to pass legislation giving the Department of Homeland Security the authority to regulate computer security for the country’s infrastructure.

The report said that cybersecurity “was the single core capability where states had made the least amount of overall progress” and that only 42 percent of state and local officials believed that theirs was adequate.

Although a little more than 80 percent of officials said they had adopted measures to address the issue, 45 percent said they did not have a formal program to prevent and respond to attacks.

The report said that roughly two-thirds of those officials reported that they had not updated their “information security or disaster recovery plans in at least two years.”

The preparedness report said that a little less than two-thirds of the companies in the United States had sustained cyberattacks and that “only 50 percent of owners and operators at high-priority facilities” like electrical grids said that they reported such attacks.

Since 2006, there has been a 650 percent increase in the number of reported cyberattacks in the United States, rising to 41,776 in 2010 from 5,503 in 2006, according to the report.

Some the smaller of Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70’s and 80’s whose towns have not provided them with access to email.  Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Courant does So-So fact check of its latest editorial

The nation’s oldest continuously downsizing newspaper did a So-So job of fact checking its latest editorial, reviewing the legislative session. Here is our analysis, which actually is the Courant’s Report Card: Accuracy: C-; History: F; Prognosis: F

The nation’s oldest continuously downsizing newspaper did a So-So job of fact checking its latest editorial, reviewing the legislative session: This Legislature: The Good, The Bad And The So-So <read>

Here’s The Courant’s report card…

The bill also allows tests, in a handful of schools, of a rigorous teacher evaluation system and lets schools get inept teachers out of classrooms faster, among other things…

Election Day Registration: One in three eligible voters in Connecticut does not even bother to register to vote, so the bill allowing Election Day voter registration is good. Now, how about online registration? Voting by mail? Weekend voting? Making it less of a chore to do one’s civic duty, as many other states have done?

Here is our analysis, which actually is the Courant’s Report Card:

Accuracy:  C- The Election Day Registration bill, H.B. 5024, covered two items, the other one was Online Registration, taking up approximately the first half of the bill. Trusting this paper’s editorials could lead you astray, even on basic facts.

History: F  The Courant said  Government accountability would be a priority this year, yet never mentioned or used that standard in evaluating the year in the Legislature. Accountability also applies to our media.

Prognosis: F  This editorial is comes just before the latest round of downsizing takes effect.


Campaign finance bill hacked, with risky email and fax voting provision, passed

Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?
It seem like just last week that the Legislature mandated email access for all registrars.
We question the constitutionality of the secret vote waiver included in the bill.

Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?

H.B. 5556 is about campaign finance, but recently nestled in sections 23 to 25 is a provision for email and fax voting for military and overseas voters. Last night it passed both houses of the Legislature.

Sec. 23. Section 9-153e of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

A member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, may apply before a regular election for a blank absentee ballot to vote for all offices being contested at the election. The clerk shall make such ballots available for this purpose beginning not earlier than ninety days before the election. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State or on the federal postcard application form provided pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924, 42 USC 1973ff et seq. , as amended from time to time, or any other applicable law and shall be issued only if the applicant states that due to military contingencies the regular application procedure, as set forth in section 9-140, cannot be followed. Upon receipt of the application, the municipal clerk shall issue the ballot and a cover sheet pursuant to section 25 of this act, either by mail or electronic means, as requested by the elector, which shall be prescribed and provided by the Secretary of the State, and a list of the offices to be voted upon indicating the number of individuals for which each elector may vote. As soon as a complete list of nominated candidates, including the party designations of such candidates, and questions is available, the clerk shall send such list to each applicant. If the list of candidates and questions is not available when the ballot is issued, the clerk shall include a statement indicating that such list shall be mailed as soon as it becomes available. The ballot shall permit the elector to vote by writing in the names of specific candidates and offices for which he is voting. The elector may also vote on the questions in a manner prescribed by the Secretary of the State. If such ballot is issued by electronic means, the clerk shall include a certification prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector shall be required to complete, sign and return with the completed ballot in order for such ballot to be counted. If the military contingency no longer exists, application for an additional ballot for all offices may be made pursuant to the provisions of section 9-153b.

Sec. 24. Section 9-153f of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9-140, any elector who is living, or expects to be living or traveling before and on election day, outside the territorial limits of the several states of the United States and the District of Columbia and any member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, may apply for a blank absentee ballot to vote for all offices being contested at an election or primary. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State or on the federal postcard application form provided pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924, 42 USC 1973ff et seq. , as amended from time to time, or any other applicable law. The municipal clerk receiving such an application shall, as soon as a complete list of candidates and questions to be voted upon at such election or primary becomes available, issue the ballot and a cover sheet pursuant to section 25 of this act, either by mail or electronic means, as requested by the elector, which shall be the blank ballot prescribed and provided by the Secretary of the State under section 9-153e, as amended by this act. The clerk shall include with the ballot a complete list of the offices to be voted upon, the number of individuals for which each elector may vote, the candidates, and, in the case of an election, the party designation of each candidate and questions to be voted upon. If such ballot is issued by electronic means, the clerk shall include a certification prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector shall be required to complete, sign and return with the completed ballot in order for such ballot to be counted. If application for an absentee ballot is made at the time of availability of regular absentee ballots as provided in section 9-140, the provisions of section 9-140 shall prevail. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the procedures governing the issuance of ballots under this section shall conform as nearly as may be to the procedures provided in section 9-140.

Sec. 25. (NEW) (Effective from passage) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 145 of the general statutes, for any election or primary held on or after August 14, 2012, an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector who applies for an absentee ballot pursuant to the provisions of section 9-153e or 9-153f of the general statutes, as amended by this act, may return such ballot, and certification, if required by said section 9-153e or 9-153f, and the cover sheet prescribed by the Secretary of the State pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, by facsimile or electronic mail and such ballot shall be counted with other absentee ballots in accordance with the provisions of section 9-150a of the general statutes, provided (1) the municipal clerk receives such electronically returned ballot, certification and signed cover sheet prior to the closing of the polls on the day of the election or primary, as applicable, and (2) such elector does not also mail the original ballot or a hard copy of the ballot to the municipal clerk.

(b) Not later than June 1, 2012, the Secretary of the State shall prescribe a cover sheet for electronic transmission of absentee ballots. Such sheet shall provide instructions for returning a ballot by electronic means and to include the elector’s name, telephone number, facsimile number or electronic mail address from which the ballot was returned, as applicable. Such cover sheet shall include the following statement: “I understand that by faxing or emailing my voted ballot I am voluntarily waiving my right to a secret ballot only to the extent that the appropriate election official must receive and process my ballot. Signature: …. Date: …. “

There have never been hearings on fax and email voting in Connecticut. Last year there were hearings on Internet voting. Later last year a requirement for Internet voting was hidden in a long bill of technical changes to election law. Several weeks after its discovery, after strong opposition by the Secretary of the State, it was watered down to requiring a report on Internet voting by the Secretary. Subsequently the Secretary held a symposium with national experts exposing the risks of Internet voting, apparently” to no avail. This year the bill hacking occurred later in the process, leaving no time for opponents to discover and react to the provision.

The debate was mostly about the campaign finance disclosure provisions aimed at counteracting Citizens United. The Governor’s staff is questioning the constitutionality of the bill and raising the potential for a veto. We question the constitutionality of the provision for individual voters to waive “their” right of secret voting – our understanding is that the purpose of secret voting includes our right to not have their vote exposed, purchased, or intimidated – they cannot waive our right to a secret vote.

Implementing the bill might be a challenge for many of our election officials, it seems like just last week that a bill was passed requiring towns to provide registrars with email accounts to converse with the Secretary of the State. Perhaps it should have provided for faxes,  fax phone lines, and email to converse with military and overseas voters.

We applaud Secretary Merrill and her office for their stand against the bill <read>

Village Independent Democrats’ resolution against National Popular Vote initiative

Echoing the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Village Independent Democrats passed a resolution against the National Popular Vote initiative, urging the Governor and Legislature to vote against the initiative.

Last month the Village Independent Democrats passed a resolution against the National Popular Vote initiative (formally titled as the Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote an Interstate Compact forwarding it with a cover letter to New York Governor Cuomo and leaders of the legislature, urging them to vote against the initiative. Many of their thoughtful points echo our concerns with the generally unanticipated consequences of changing to a popular vote without election integrity reforms:

WHEREAS the popular vote in some States other than New York has been unfairly affected by barriers to voting, such as lifetime disenfranchisement due to felony conviction, requirement for government-issued photo ID and/or other documents, which creates unfair restrictions on certain groups of voters such as minorities, the poor, the disabled, and the elderly; and

WHEREAS many States use paperless electronic voting machines that cannot be independently audited, and only a few States perform any audits of their elections, so that in most states malicious tampering and innocent errors that increase or decrease vote tallies cannot and will not be detected; and

WHEREAS federal legislation would be required to compel all states to participate in meaningful audits of their elections for national offices, but Congress has not passed such legislation during the past nine years during which it has been introduced, and

WHEREAS New York State is the only state that worked diligently for four years to obtain electronic voting equipment that consists of secure machines and software by requiring electronic voting equipment to pass testing by an independent testing lab prior to purchase, so that our vote tallies are likely to reflect the votes cast; and

WHEREAS New York’s participation in the NPV initiative would constitute our endorsement and toleration of insecure voting systems, and of prejudices and restrictions against minority and less powerful voting groups; and

WHEREAS New York’s participation in the NPV initiative would be contrary to the principles of New York State and would compromise the voting freedoms and principles we endorse;

THEREFORE the Village Independent Democrats urges our State Assembly and State Senate to oppose any legislation supporting NPV.

The Village Independent Democrats reflect the concerns of the late New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who said:

There would be genuine pressures to fraud and abuse. It would be an election no one understood until the next day or the day after, with recounts that go on forever, and in any event, with no conclusion, and a runoff to come. The drama, the dignity, the decisiveness and finality of the American political system are drained away in an endless sequence of contests, disputed outcomes and more contests to resolve outcomes already disputed. That is how legitimacy is lost.

For all of CTVotersCount posts on the National Popular Vote, see <CTVotersCount Index>

EDR passes House and Senate

We opposed this unique form of Election Day Registration. We hope we are wrong. We hope that Connecticut’s 339 registrars implement the bill effectively, fairly, safely, and uniformly. That no one is lulled into complacency by low EDR voting in 2013 for the municipal elections and that chaos does not await us in a future high interest election in 2014 or 2016.

Yesterday, H.B. 5034 passed the Senate and is now heading to the Governor’s desk for his signature. The bill provides for Election Day Registration (EDR) and online voter registration. Since Governor Malloy proposed the bill and praised its passing, it will become law. Secretary of State Merrill also praised its passing.

CTVotersCount readers know that we are in favor of EDR and online registration. However, we did not support this bill because the EDR as proposed risks the rights of EDR voters, all voters, and is unlikely to achieve the same success as EDR in other states.<see our testimony for details>

According to a PEW report, other states have achieved 3% to 7% increased turnout with an increase in registration with 10% to 20% of voters registering by EDR (presumably once EDR is available many voters who would have registered earlier take advantages of the opportunity, as well as those who would not have registered earlier).

Despite such evidence from other states, Secretary Merrill attributes their higher than average turnout of 10% solely to  EDR. We doubt our less convenient method will match their increases of 3% to 7%:  <video>, press release:

Denise Merrill
Secretary of the State
Connecticut

For Immediate Release: For more information:
May 5, 2012 Av Harris: (860) 509-6255
Cell: (860) 463-5939
-Press Release-
Merrill: Final Passage of Election Day Registration, Online Voter Registration Moves Connecticut Elections into the 21st Century
Secretary of The State Looks forward to Enacting HB 5024 that Would Modernize Elections, Lead to Higher Voter Participation

Hartford: Secretary of the State Denise Merrill today lauded the final legislative passage of House Bill No. 5024 “An Act Concerning Voting Rights” – a measure proposed by Governor Dannel P. Malloy that once enacted will allow eligible Connecticut residents to register to vote and cast ballots on Election Day, and will also enable eligible Connecticut residents with a driver’s license to register to vote from any computer or mobile device with an internet connection. The Connecticut State Senate endorsed the bill today by a vote of 19-16. The measure was approved by the House of Representatives on April 30, 2012 by a vote of 83-59.

“This common sense yet long overdue reform is something we have tried to implement in Connecticut for years, and now we have made history by moving elections in our state into the 21st Century,” said Secretary Merrill, Connecticut’s chief elections official. “This will make the right to vote much easier to exercise for the eligible voters of Connecticut and lead to increased voter participation. We have the technology to allow eligible voters to register online from any computer or mobile device, and we have the security in place to allow those late deciding, busy and mobile voters to register and cast ballots on Election Day. This will also make our voter lists more accurate. I commend both Representative Russ Morin and Senator Gayle Slossberg, the chairs of the Government Administration and Elections Committee, and leadership in both the Senate and House for seeing this bill through to passage this year. I also commend the leadership shown by Governor Malloy in proposing this legislation and I look forward to watching him sign it into law.”

Connecticut becomes the 11th state to enact Election Day Registration. Some states such as Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin have had Election Day Registration on the books since the 1970s. Studies have shown that voter turnout in states with Election Day Registration is on average 10% higher than national voter turnout figures. Once signed into law, Election Day Registration would only be available for November General Elections, not for primaries, starting in 2013. The new law will also create an interface between the existing Centralized Voter Registration System and the database housed at the state Department of Motor Vehicles that would verify the identity of a voter wishing to register online prior to approval by the local Registrar of Voters.

Av Harris
Director of Communications
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill
(860) 509-6255 ofc
(860) 463-5939 cell

We hope we are wrong. We hope that Connecticut’s 339 registrars implement the bill effectively, fairly, safely, and uniformly. That no one is lulled into complacency by low EDR voting in 2013 for the municipal elections and that chaos does not await us in a future high interest election in 2014 or 2016.

International concerns with Internet voting

We note two articles this week, from Canada and Switzerland with citizen/scientists’ concerns with Internet voting.

We note two articles this week, from Canada <read> and Switzerland <read> with citizen/scientists’ concerns with Internet voting.

From our neighbors to the north:

In a letter to the chief electoral officer of Canada, Hallman laid out his concerns with online voting. Many are the same concerns he had with Huntsville’s voting method. The concerns include the loss of ballot verifiability and the ability to recount the ballots, the possibility of electronic tampering, loss of privacy when voting, lack of oversight by scrutineers and returning officers, loss of transparency, vote tracking through the use of personal identification numbers, vote buying, multiple votes, and software system bugs. Hallman argued that while commercial software suppliers who run electronic voting systems go to great lengths to guarantee the security of their systems, they cannot know if their systems have been compromised. And such a method intrinsically requires the use of unsecured computers by the voter, he said.

And from Switzerland, where they know something about keeping identities secret:

Swiss e-voting systems lack transparency and are vulnerable to attack by malevolent software, a study has found. The authorities are looking for solutions but officials point out that there is no such thing as absolute security, even with the traditional ballot paper vote. With the systems used so far in electronic voting trials “citizens cannot verify if their vote has been registered and counted correctly. They are obliged to trust the administration and authorities completely,” Eric Dubuis, information technology professor at the Bern University of Applied Sciences, told swissinfo.ch. Under the mandate of the Federal Chancellery, Dubuis co-authored a study on verifiable e-voting systems – systems that allow the voter to trace all the steps of his or her vote and to check that there has been no manipulation and that the vote has been duly counted.

The Bern researchers came up with a project system that allows each individual to verify the process from A to Z, without compromising voting secrecy. Thanks to a special autonomous “electoral machine” with an integrated camera as well as a personal voting card with a chip, the system set up by the researchers also eliminates the risk connected to malevolent software – or malware.

They are correct that all systems are vulnerable, yet paper ballot systems voted in person are less vulnerable than unverifiable electronic systems without paper records. We have seen schemes before for voter verifiable electronic systems, but are skeptical of systems close to impossible for the average voter to understand, requiring skill, and time to verify individual votes.

For all our posts on Internet voting <CTVotersCount Index>