CTVotersCount.org

Losing democracy in cyberspace

Voting computers, like heads of state, must be held accountable to the people they serve.

As we have said, many times, with regard our audits in Connecticut: “If we dismiss all differences as human counting errors, if there ever was error or fraud it would not be recognized.”

Editorial by voting integrity advocated Penny Venetis in NorthJersey.com: Losing democracy in cyberspace – Voting computers, like heads of state, must be held accountable to the people they serve. <read>

What nobody is talking about is how votes will be cast in emerging democracies. For elections to be legitimate in such countries, it is critical to use voting technology that counts votes accurately. In the 21st century, chances are high that computers will be used in some form in the coming elections in Egypt and Tunisia. But voting computers, like heads of state, must be held accountable to the people they serve.

It is a tenet of computer science that computers can be programmed to do anything, including play “Jeopardy!” and steal votes…

The Princeton hacks are not unique. Studies commissioned by the secretaries of state of California, Ohio, Maryland and Connecticut outline in great detail the many vulnerabilities of various computerized voting systems.

The University of Connecticut and Professor Appel in New Jersey have produced several excellent reports on the vulnerabilities of voting machines and the lack of physical security provided by “tamper evident” seals in common use. Yet, as Professor Venetis points out, having paper ballots and knowing the risks is not enough:

But voter verified paper ballots, in and of themselves, cannot detect fraud. To fully ensure that the voting computers are not cheating, it is necessary to audit a certain percentage of voting machines in each election precinct by manually counting the paper ballots and comparing the hand-counted results with the computer-generated results. This system worked marvelously in Minnesota, when millions of voter verified paper ballots had to be hand-counted to determine the winner of the 2008 Senate race. Studies showed that the tally was 99.99 percent accurate.

Finally, to ensure that votes are counted accurately, it is imperative that totals be counted and announced at the precinct level. This protects against tampering with voting machines and paper ballots while they are being transported to centralized tabulation locations.

New Jersey falls short because they do not have paper ballots or paper records. Connecticut has paper ballot and audits, yet our audits fall far short. Our law has several glaring exemptions and flaws, including: Only polling place optical scanned ballots are audited – omitting most absentee ballots and hand counted ballots, like those copied ballots in Bridgeport; exemptions for districts that have recanvasses or contested elections; results audited against are not published; there is no deadline for publishing results of the audits which are not binding on the election; random drawings have not met the requirements of the law; audits showing differences that have been investigated behind closed doors; and the audit reports have dismissed all differences as human counting errors. <See: Inadequate Counting, Reporting, and Reporting Continue>

As we have said, many times, with regard our audits in Connecticut: “If we dismiss all differences as human counting errors, if there ever was error or fraud it would not be recognized.”

Virtual war a real threat…to water and democracy

LATimes reports on cyber threats to a Southern California water system. This is why we have been testifying against “online” voting and highlighting that even good size cities cannot protect their systems. Clearly each of Connecticut’s 169 towns could not afford even the expense of threat assessment of online voting systems. A good start would be vulnerability assessment of our existing paper ballot and voting machine security.

When a large Southern California water system wanted to probe the vulnerabilities of its computer networks, it hired Los Angeles-based hacker Marc Maiffret to test them. His team seized control of the equipment that added chemical treatments to drinking water — in one day…

“There’s always a way in,” said Maiffret, who declined to identify the water system for its own protection.

The weaknesses that he found in California exist in crucial facilities nationwide, U.S. officials and private experts say.

The same industrial control systems Maiffret’s team was able to commandeer also run electrical grids, pipelines, chemical plants and other infrastructure. Those systems, many designed without security in mind, are vulnerable to cyber attacks that have the potential to blow up city blocks, erase bank data, crash planes and cut power to large sections of the country.

Update: New York Times post reviews several recent attacks on businesses by individuals. Clearly no reason to be assured by the by the above article’s assertion that “Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda don’t yet have the capability to mount such attacks”. The Asymmetrical Online War <read>

“It’s a completely surreal realization that nation states can be seriously confronted by teenagers, but that’s where we’re at,” said John Perry Barlow, the Grateful Dead lyricist who co-founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 1990 to help defend young computer hackers. “One very smart person can take on an entire nation state.”

One can take on the security apparatus of the Web as well. In the space of a little more than a month, two computer security firms have been publicly humiliated, one by an anonymous computer hacker who claimed in an e-mail interview with a Forbes columnist to be a 16-year-old girl and a second by someone who is apparently a 21-year-old Iranian…

Hardly a week passes when there isn’t some new incident underscoring the fundamental imbalance of power in cyberspace between attacker and defender, where a highly motivated and reasonably skilled intruder, operating in secrecy from almost anywhere in the world, can with apparent ease unravel digital fortifications intended to offer banking-grade security.

In February, an executive at HBGary, a Sacramento, Calif., security software and consulting firm, made the mistake of publicly boasting that he had unmasked the identities of the members of Anonymous, a secretive collection of cyber-vigilantes who had attracted attention by launching Internet denial-of-service attacks in defense of Wikileaks. The security company, which was engaged in a series dubious business propositions, soon found that the details of its business were exposed to the world. Anonymous, whose ringleader was possibly a teenager, tricked one of the company’s systems administrators into giving them password information, making it possible to steal more than 50,000 of HBGary’s e-mail messages and placing them on a Russian web site.

Update: Man hacks Federal Reserve and other financial institutions <read>

According to court documents, Poo found a security vulnerability in the Federal Reserve’s network in June 2010, resulting in thousands of dollars worth of damages. However, it is believed that he stole the huge booty of credit card numbers and other account information from other financial institutions.

The American government claims to have also obtained extensive evidence of how Poo’s alleged criminal hacking activity targeted the US’s national security, military and financial sectors.

Security Theater: Scary! Expert Outlines Physical Security Limitations

Connecticut’s ballots and voting machines are vulnerable. We are subject to many of the characteristics of “Security Theater” outlined by Dr. Roger Johnston of Argonne Lab’s Vulnerability Assessments Team. “Security” seals can be compromised, undetected in seconds. That is only the tip of the iceberg. Forget those Dracula movies. Contemplate the value of ballots to our democracy while watching the video.

Back in January, we covered reports on six failed attempts by New Jersey to successfully secure voting machines with “security” seals – seals like those used in Connecticut to “protect” our ballots and voting machines. A computer expert and a security expert provided reports outlining the ease with which those seals can be compromised by an amateur and an expert.

“Security” seals can be compromised, undetected in seconds. That is only the tip of the iceberg. Full security often involves a lot more, locks, vaults, chain-of-custody, alarms, video surveillance, and guards. Unfortunately, most physical security can also be easily defeated, according to one of the experts, Roger Johnston of the Argonne National Lab Vulnerability Assessments Team.

Last week I was fortunate to hear Dr. Johnston speak at a voting integrity conference in Chicago. Although I don’t have his slides or a video from that conference, I do have video’s of a short appearance on NBC and a longer talk he gave last year:

Getting paid to break into things: Argonne’s Roger Johnston on NBC <watch 4min>
Proving Voltaire Right: Security Blunders Dumber Than Dog Snot <watch 127min>

What I found most enlightening last week was a slide showing fifteen characteristic attributes of “Security Theater” (you can see it at about 5 min into the second video). Some of the attributes we often observe in Connecticut ballot security are:

“Sense of urgency”
Urgency can be seen and felt on election night as officials are rushing to finalize results, complete paperwork, and complete a seventeen hour day. Is the seal applied correctly to prevent access without tampering? Do two officials check the seal number on the ballot case and the moderator’s return? Is the return completed in ink or pencil? Are the ballots under observation by at least two officials until they are locked in town hall? Is the seal number on the bag checked against the moderator’s return when the ballots are locked in town hall? Officials complain that may take days for both registrars to be available to checking ballots and sealed paper work after an election.
A very difficult security problem
Budgets are tight. Very few towns keep their ballots in vaults or securely locked facilities. We observe weak single locks or padlocks, ballots stored in isolated storage rooms with weak building security. Or no locks at all.
Involves fad and/or pet technology
We have seen seals made by with office printer labels with no numbers and seals that are entirely written by hand.
Questions, concerns, & dissent are not welcome or tolerated
Any suggestion that someone might compromise security is instead defensively interpreted as an accusation against the integrity of a registrar or all registrars. We are told that Connecticut towns cannot afford to improve security. Security does cost money, yet there are economical alternatives to dramatically increase ballot security. Can we afford to leave our democracy conveniently vulnerable?
Strong emotion, over confidence, arrogance, ego, and/or pride related to security
(see above)
Conflicts of Interest
Most registrars and election officials are closely aligned with parties – that is why we have at least two registrars in each town, of opposing interests. Everyone in town hall is dependent on the outcome of budget referendums and the plans of those elected. (as a counter example, the owner of a jewelry store, bank president, or jail guard normally has little conflict of interest in security)
No well-defined adversary
Most individuals, election officials, candidates, candidate supporters, and town employees are honest. Yet, almost every person, agency, or business has stakes in election outcomes.
No well-defined use protocol
Our statutes are on ballot security are weak and ambiguous, it is unlikely that the pending technical bills will change that. Towns follow (or don’t follow) a variety of procedures, mostly unpublished, vulnerable, and unverifiable.
No effective [vulnerability assessments]; no devil’s advocate
You could say that CTVotersCount and the Coalition have been devil’s advocates, yet so far to little avail.
People who know little about security or the technology are in charge
Many of our registrars and their staff demonstrate and will admit lack of knowledge of our voting technology. How many actually understand security? How many understand security technology such as the vulnerability of seals, locks, and the lack of security in a chain-of-custody filled out using an “honor system”? What security is there when most towns provide access with a single key and many provide access to that key for anyone working in the registrars office? How secure is access to the key or to the ballot storage by other means?

Forget those Dracula movies. Contemplate the value of ballots to our democracy while watching the Dog Snot video.

Not up for a scary movie? Here is a recent interview of Dr. Johnston on Op-News. He provides suggestions for improving voting security. <read> Here the context is voting machines but the same considerations also apply to ballots. How many of these are in effect in your town?

Suggestions for better election security:

1. Let’s try to separate concerns, questions, and criticisms about election security from political attacks on election officials (who are often elected themselves). Security should be controversial and we need to listen to all input about it.

2. Election officials need to think like the bad guy. How would you cheat?

3. Establish a health security culture and climate, where security is constantly on everybody’s mind and open for discussion and debate and review and outside analysis.

4. Ironically (and counter-intuitively), the best security is usually transparent.

5. Security is hard work, so expect to put in hard work.

6. Do periodic background checks on people who move and maintain the voting machines.

7. Somebody has to sign for the machines when they reach the polling place prior to the election (there can’t be a delay in delivery), and at least semi-watch them. Use custodians, teachers, secretaries, and school kids (a great civics lesson!) to keep an eye on the machines if you can’t lock them up.

8. Consider escorting the machines to and from the polling places.

9. Lean on manufacturers of voting machines to get serious about security.

10. Have a real, secure chain of custody, not bureaucratic forms to sign or initial purporting to be a chain of custody.

11. Try bribing your people, then make them public heroes and let them keep the money if they decline. (Wait at least one day, though.) Word will get around it isn’t a good idea to accept a bribe.

12. Form a pro bono citizens panel with local security experts to provide guidance.

13. You must randomly select some machines before, during, and after the election to completely tear apart, examine, and reverse engineer. Just seeing if they appear to run correctly is not good enough! It’s too easy to turn cheating on and off.

14. If you are going to use seals, provide at least a few hours of training in how to spot attacked seals. Give lots of examples of attacked seals. Discuss how the seals will likely be attacked.

Laws interact – be careful what you legislate

Earlier this month we cautioned the legislature about enacting the UMOVE Act without providing election officials an opportunity to check for conflicts with existing laws. We highlight an example of a similar conflict in existing state and local laws that frustrates officials and disenfranchises voters.

Earlier this month we cautioned the legislature on enacting an unspecified “Uniform” Military and Overseas Voting Act (UMOVE Act). The “Uniform” bill requires forty-five days advanced availability of absentee ballots for optionally specified state and local elections, primaries, and referendums. The proposed law had only the following text available for the public hearing:

That the general statutes be amended to adopt the Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act.

In our testimony (page 13), we warned and recommended, among other things:

The uniform law text has options that each state may or may not include primaries, run-offs, and referendums in the “uniform law”. For any of these included, absentee ballots must be available 45 days in advance, just as they are in Federal elections. Currently under Sec. 9-369c of the statutes, absentee ballots must be made available three weeks in advance of a referendum and in some circumstances, less. This may pose even more difficult timing challenges if run-offs are included…

I caution against passing this bill without public hearings, providing for review and comment on the actual text of a proposed bill – especially, giving election officials an opportuntity to point out implementation challenges and conflicts with current statutory deadlines.

Today we highlight an article which brings our point home. It is a story of election officials trying to cope with conflicting state and local laws for election deadlines and absentee ballot deadlines. In the Monroe Patch: Absentee Ballots Won’t be Mailed Out. Who’s at Fault? <read>

Town Clerk’s Office employees will be busy preparing for the April 5 budget referendum, issuing absentee ballots over the counter to residents who will not be able to vote in person and processing mailed in ballots voters obtain online…

On Friday, Town Clerk Marsha Beno said she wants to avoid another State Elections Enforcement complaint…

The statute requires a town clerk to have the exact language on a ballot at least three weeks before absentee ballots are mailed out to voters. Beno said the town could not meet that timeline for the April 5 referendum…
[Democratic Town Committee Chairwoman Patricia] Ulatowski says Town Attorney Jack Fracassini, Beno and Town Council leadership are to blame, because they were informed of the State Election Enforcement Commission’s decision on her complaint agreeing that the town violated General Statute 9-369c during two referendums in 2009, and could have influenced a speeding up of the budget process to meet the three week deadline to mail out absentee ballots.

Democratic Registrar of Voters Sue Koneff looked at the Town Charter and came up with a schedule that could allow the town to meet the three-week deadline and comply with the state statute, according to Ulatowski.

The result is frustrated officials and disenfranchised voters.

A little bit of nonsense in well intended proposed law

“If you cannot fit all the races or candidates on a paper ballot…then use a paper ballot”

The Government Administration and Elections Committee recently passed H.B. 6330, AN ACT CONCERNING TECHNICAL AND MINOR REVISIONS TO ELECTIONS RELATED STATUTES.

Three years in the making, it revises some of the law to take into account that we vote with optical scanners rather than lever machines. Many of the changes substitute text for “he”, change “registrar” to “registrar of voters”, and “machine” to “tabulator” etc. Reading and writing such can be a bit boring, raising the potential for errors. One paragraph on page 27, that we had previously not noticed, caught our attention:

After the changes, in essence it says: “If you cannot fit all the races or candidates on a paper ballot…then use a paper ballot”

Here is the final text that would become law:

(a) Voting tabulators shall be used at each primary, provided, (1) if, because of the number of offices and positions to be voted upon at a primary, there is an insufficient number of vertical columns on any ballot to be used in a municipality, the vote in such municipality at such primary for such offices or positions as the Secretary of the State determines shall be taken by paper ballots, and (2) if, because of the number of candidates for any office or position to be voted upon at a primary, there is an insufficient number of horizontal rows with respect to such office or position on any allot to be used in the municipality, the vote in such municipality at such primary for such office or position shall be taken by paper ballots.

Here is the full text with the old and new language:

(a) Voting [machines] tabulators shall be used at each primary, provided, (1) if, because of the number of offices and positions to be voted upon at a primary, there is an insufficient number of vertical columns on any [machine] ballot to be used in a municipality, the vote in such municipality at such primary for such offices or positions as the Secretary of the State determines shall be taken by paper ballots, and (2) if, because of the number of candidates for any office or position to be voted upon at a primary, there is an insufficient number of horizontal rows with respect to such office or position on any [machine] ballot to be used in the municipality, the vote in such municipality at such primary for such office or position shall be taken by paper ballots.

Hopefully, the final bill be will be corrected before it is enacted. In any case, we can rest assured that we will continue using paper ballots.

Efforts to make Internet secure are ineffective

Could Connecticut or any or our 169 municipalities accomplish what the U.S. Government and the Defense Department has not?

“cyber crime and cyber espionage are daily occurrences in the United States and are doing long-term damage to the nation’s economy and global competitiveness. What’s more, they set the stage for cyber attacks. ‘Some of our opponents use cyber criminals as mercenaries,'”

Last week we testified against a bill <page 9> which would have authorized online voting in Connecticut. We have been asking:

Would each of Connecticut’s 169 municipalities be able to afford such systems and accomplish what Washington D.C. has not?
Could Connecticut accomplish centrally what Washington D.C. has not?

An article in Government Security News reminds us to ask:

Could any State or any City accomplish what the U.S. Government and the Defense Department has not?
Could Connecticut or any or our 169 municipalities accomplish what the U.S. Government and the Defense Department has not?

“What we are doing now to secure cyberspace is not working,” a House subcommittee was told March 16 by James Lewis, director and a senior fellow in the Technology and Public Policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC…

Military establishments in some countries have the capability to launch a cyber attack on the United States…

He declared that cyber crime and cyber espionage are daily occurrences in the United States and are doing long-term damage to the nation’s economy and global competitiveness. What’s more, they set the stage for cyber attacks. “Some of our opponents use cyber criminals as mercenaries,” he said.

“Our most advanced opponents in cyber crime and cyber espionage can overpower even the most technologically sophisticated U.S. company,” he maintained.

It might take a lot to attack a highly secure military system, but it only took an accomplished professor and some graduate students a couple of days to attack the Washington D.C. voting system in a public test.

Update: 3/20/2011: For doubters, we learn today of a successful attack on a company that provides Internet encryption technology, RSA Security <read>

Op-Ed: Photo ID’s downsides for voting

Photo ID may be a well-intentioned idea, but it is expensive “security theater” that will disenfranchise far more voters than any fraud it will prevent.

Joyce McCloy of the NC. Coalition for Verified Voting outlines the case against current proposals for Photo ID’s <read>

Requiring voters to present a photo ID at the polls sounds like a good idea – but it is everything we hate about government: a complex and expensive nonsolution to a problem that doesn’t exist.

To implement such a law would cost millions each year, would likely disenfranchise tens of thousands of voters – especially women, the elderly and minorities – and would not prevent fraud that it is designed to stop. Now the issue is coming to a head in North Carolina: The House Elections Committee is scheduled to take public comments on photo ID at 2 p.m. Tuesday in Room 643 of the Legislative Office Building in Raleigh.

At issue is not “voter ID” but rather the matter of imposing photo ID restrictions at the polling place. There’s no problem, in general, with “voter ID,” providing that there are many options for establishing identity, as there are in Alabama and Missouri, where many types of documents suffice.

Currently 18 states require “voter ID,” and eight states require “photo ID.” These eight states, however, do not have a way to verify the ID. Someone determined to commit voter impersonation could simply use a fake ID. Obtaining fake ID cards is easy enough – kits can be bought cheaply. In reality, the most common and difficult to detect voter fraud happens in absentee balloting. Requiring picture IDs on Election Day does nothing to prevent that…

The Brennan Center for Justice cites three basic principles that must be satisfied to avoid a constitutional challenge of any photo ID law:

First, photo IDs sufficient for voting must be available free for all those who do not have them. States cannot limit free IDs to those who swear they are indigent. North Carolina would need to pay the costs of obtaining the supporting documents necessary to obtain photo IDs.

Second, photo IDs must be readily accessible to all voters, without undue burden. To make ID easily accessible, our state might have to expand the number of ID-issuing offices and extend their operating hours.

Third, states must undertake substantial voter outreach and public education efforts to ensure that voters are apprised of the law’s requirements and the procedures for obtaining the IDs they will need to vote…

Photo ID may be a well-intentioned idea, but it is expensive “security theater” that will disenfranchise far more voters than any fraud it will prevent.

Testimony on eight bills, including the National Popular Vote

Today the Government Administration and Election Committee (GAE) held hearings on a variety of election related bills. We testified against seven bills and lukewarmly for one.

Since 2007, I have been the only person to testify against the National Popular Vote (NPV) Compact in Connecticut. Finally, this year I was not alone. But I remain the only Connecticut citizen to testify against the NPV Compact.

I challenge anyone to a responsible public blog debate on any and all of the issues we raised in our testimony on the National Popular Vote Compact.

Note: The General Administration and Elections Committee has taken up several election bills and concepts for this session. We are optimistic that some of the concepts will be developed and passed to provide increased election integrity. Many of the bills taken up, often well intended, have unintended negative consequences. We are highlighting several of them to point out highlighting several of them to point out the good, the bad, and the unbelievable.

Today the Government Administration and Election Committee (GAE) held hearings on a variety of election related bills. We testified against seven bills and lukewarmly for one. We would like to be testifying for bills that would improve election integrity in Connecticut, but when a bill would harm election integrity we testify against it. When a bill would be a help to voters, but has some potentially risky issues, we we will point them out. <our testimony>

Bills included two that would gut the post-election audit, one that would eliminate the secret ballot, one for Internet voting, one to help military voters that was inadequately specified, and one for the National Popular Vote Compact. Since 2007, I have been the only person to testify against the National Popular Vote (NPV) Compact in Connecticut. Finally, this year I was not alone. But I remain the only Connecticut citizen to testify against the NPV Compact. As usual, many of our friends testified for the NPV Compact. Fortunately, we have the facts and logic on our side. It is easy to advocate for something that you understand. I will have more to say on the NPV Compact. Here is the main testimony page. Please also read the additional supporting material in our full testimony it was the first bill on the agenda and is the first few pages of testimony.

I oppose the National Popular Vote Compact. I understand the theoretical advantages of the national popular vote, yet there are extreme risks in its mismatch with our existing state by state voting system.

Three minutes is far too short to change anyone’s opinion. Today, my goal is to open minds to consider a more comprehensive analysis.

What often appears simple is not. The Compact would cobble the national popular vote onto a flawed system designed for the Electoral College, with no means to change that system. It would result in unanticipated, yet predictable consequences that are overlooked and glossed over by advocates for the national popular vote

There is no official national popular vote number compiled in time, such that it could be used to officially and accurately determine the winner in any close election.

Even if there were such a number, it would aggrivate the flaws in the system. The Electoral College limits the risk and the damage to a few swing states in each election. With a national popular vote, errors, voter suppression, and fraud in all states would count against the national totals.

There is no national recount available for close elections, to establish an accurate number. Only in some individual states, if close numbers happened to occur in those states, would there be even a fraction of a national recount.

For Example: The inaccuracies in Bridgeport did not change the winner here in the race for governor and would not have been enough to change the Electoral College. If it was closer we would have had a recanvass and presumably those errors corrected. However, with the Compact the errors would have counted in a national popular vote number reported by the media or any other number calculated nationwide.

With the Compact there is every reason to believe that any close election would be decided by partisian action of the Congress or the Supreme Court – the same Court that ruled in Gore v. Bush, that not having a uniform recount law in Florida was grounds to stop the recount to avoid harm to the apparent winner. Would that same Court rule differently, faced with a close national popular vote and, even less uniformity between states than existed between Florida counties in 2000? Citizens and candidates can be expected to bring court challenges of Governors and Secretaries of State for relying on and providing inaccurate results in awarding Electoral College votes. As in Gore v. Bush, since the founding, close election controversies have all been decided in seemingly partisian decisions by Congress, special commissions, or the Supreme Court.

This is not a partisan issue. It is opposed by promintent members of both major parties. Those who have publicly spoken against the Compact include former Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz (D), Connecticut College Political Scientist Dorothy B. James, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R), and Minnesota Secretary of State and current President of the National Association of Secretaries of State Mark Ritchie (D).

I urge you to consider the risks and chaos made possible if Connecticut were to endorse the National Popular Vote Compact.

I challenge anyone to a responsible public blog debate on any and all of the issues I raised in testimony on the National Popular Vote. If you think I am wrong in any objection, let us us debate it. Right here on CTVotersCount.org. (If you wish to debate, you must use your own name and satisfy me that you are who you say you are, you must be civil, and must avoid excessive redundancy. I am open to changing my mind on my objections. If they are all refuted, I may have more, but I am open to changing my overall conclusions. Email me which item you wish to debate and I will start a post for that item and the debate will begin.)

Clerks: No-Excuse Absentee Voting Creates Problems

The opinion piece hits all of the bases, articulating the costs, the increased opportunity for fraud, increased disenfranchisement, and that it will not increase turnout.

Courant article by Joseph V. Camposeo, town clerk of Manchester and president of the Connecticut Town Clerks Association. <read>

The opinion piece hits all of the bases, articulating the costs, the increased opportunity for fraud, increased disenfranchisement, and that it will not increase turnout:

Research from other states has shown that when offered no-excuse absentee ballot voting, the volume of people using this method has doubled or tripled. But it is important to note that in these states overall voter turnout has not increased.

Further, our current system for processing absentee ballots could not handle the increase in volume under a no-excuse system. The no-excuse option would quickly strain an outdated, inefficient and manual process for mailing, accounting for and counting of absentee ballots. A no-excuse option for voting will have a significant effect on our municipal budgets as an unfunded mandate.

A significant concern among town clerks and the state Elections Enforcement Commission is the potential for voter fraud in this highly manual process. The current system does not provide for the security and storage of a large number of ballots within the town clerks’ vaults. Also, with higher volumes, there is greater opportunity for counting errors.

Under a no-excuse system there is no way to guarantee the applicant is voting the ballot. The absentee voting system already has been the focus of forgery, coercion, bribery and multiple-voting complaints. In contrast, at an early voting polling site, which opens prior to Election Day, individuals would need to produce identification before getting a ballot.

Furthermore, clerks are concerned that an increased number of voters would be disenfranchised under a no-excuse absentee ballot system. Already many absentee votes are disqualified and not counted because voters fail to sign the envelopes, mail them back too late or mismark their ballots. During the 2008 election in Missouri, 8,000 absentee ballots were not counted for these reasons. Those ballots could have changed the outcome of the election. At an early voting polling site, these voters would have been given another chance to vote their ballots correctly and not be disenfranchised…

No-excuse voting would also change the election season for candidates if residents were allowed to vote up to 30-days prior to Election Day, causing campaigns to start much earlier. Voters could be casting votes before they have all the information necessary to make an informed decision.

Once again, myth of accurate official vote counting debunked

South Carolina voting system audited by citizens shows votes lost, images of ballots do not support numbers. Like Bridgeport, this is an example of where transparency, FOI, and independent citizen investigation eventually provided the facts. Yet, again where government and the official system failed to certify accurate election results. Machines, hand counting, and communication procedures should be expected to occasionally breakdown, but the official system should be expected to find and correct those errors.

South Carolina voting system audited by citizens shows that votes, images of ballots do not support numbers. Like Bridgeport, this is an example of where transparency, FOI, and independent citizen investigation eventually provided the facts. Yet, again where government and the official system failed to certify accurate election results. Machines, hand counting, and communication procedures should be expected to occasionally breakdown, but the official system should be expected to find and correct those errors.

Charleston City Paper: Voting process must be simple and transparent – Too complicated for its own good <read>

A group of citizens, in association with the S.C. League of Women Voters, has conducted an audit of Richland County voting machine results from last November, and the numbers don’t lie. According to the LWV, more than 1,000 votes from various precincts were missing from the certified totals in November’s General Election. Elsewhere in the county, the detailed vote image file did not provide confirmation for the 1,362 votes that were certified.

The Richland County voting machine data was independently analyzed by Duncan Buell, a computer science professor from the University of South Carolina, and Chip Moore, a Massachusetts programmer and South Carolina native.

“The failure to count votes from some voting machines and the failure to document votes from other voting machines is a human failure, but it’s a human failure that the software should have caught, so the root cause is a software system that isn’t doing what it’s supposed to do,” Moore said in a LWV statement. “What we have done is to run some self-checks that should always have been in the system.”

This is only the latest controversy over the 1,200 iVotronic touchscreen voting machines that the state uses exclusively. A few weeks ago, Colleton County reported 13,045 votes for statewide offices on Nov. 2. But an election audit showed that only 11,656 ballots were cast that day, according to the signature rolls. That means an extra 1,389 votes were reported and certified.

More from the Press Release, Q&A, and Report. Conclusion from the report:

Conclusions
We are not suggesting or making accusations of fraud, conspiracy, or similar
deliberate attempts to corrupt the vote in Richland County. What we feel we
can justifiably say, however, is that the election system (hardware,
software, and procedures) has failed. Software that is not written to perform
obvious checks and balances to anticipate and check for the errors likely to be
made by fallible (and mostly volunteer) poll workers at the end of a long
election day is unacceptable, and it is a software failure that such checks and
balances apparently do not exist in the election system used in South Carolina.

What we have done is really no more sophisticated than totaling a spreadsheet
across rows and down columns and then totaling the row sums and column
sums to get a grand total in the bottom right corner. From the event log we
can get (or should be able to get, if the logs are complete) a list of machines
used and a count of votes cast per machine. From the vote image file we can
get detailed counts by precinct, machine, ballot image, and candidate. If the
problems we have observed in Richland County can be exposed as easily as
this, by citizen observers without access to hardware, software, or procedures
manuals, then we suggest that the system has failed and that post-election
audits such as ours should be mandated. If the software as written and in use
will not find these errors, then software should be written and used that will
find these errors.