CTVotersCount.org

Lawmakers Seek To Change Presidential Elections [To make them more risky, reduce confidence]

What often appears simple is not. The Compact being proposed would get around the requirement for a constitutional amendment. It would cobble the popular vote onto a system designed for the Electoral College. Such a system has largely unanticipated, but predictable consequences that are overlooked and glossed over by national organizations supporting the proposition – similar to the situations when we focus on the national debt one week and lowering taxes the next.

CTNewsJunkie: Lawmakers Seek To Change Presidential Elections <read>

Once again, Connecticut faces the prospect of the well intended but risky National Popular Vote Compact/Agreement. From the article:

A winner-take-all rule has permitted a candidate to win the presidency without winning the popular vote in four out of 56 elections. Sen. Gary LeBeau, D-East Hartford, wants to stop that trend by implementing something called the National Popular Vote.

If enacted, Electoral College delegates from the state would be mandated to cast their votes for whichever presidential candidate wins the national popular vote.

“It’s simple,” LeBeau said Wednesday, “the person who’s elected president becomes the president.”

The goal is to restore voter confidence in the electoral system, LeBeau said. His own confidence was shaken after the 2000 presidential elections when President George W. Bush won the election despite losing the national popular vote to candidate and former-Vice President Al Gore, he said.

Like Senator LeBeau, most people, Democrats and Republicans, believe that Al Gore would have won in 2000 if we had the national popular vote then.

But we do not know who would have won then, because as the national popular vote supporters claim different voters would be motivated to vote under the national popular vote, so the national total would have been different.in 2000.
Under the current system, the damage due to error, fraud, and voter suppression is limited to the few so called, swing states. Under the national popular vote, errors, fraud, and suppression in every state, by anyone, any party would count toward the totals. Rather than restore confidence enacting the national popular pote on top of our flawed state by state system will start open season on fraud and suppression.
Finally, if Florida had a good, uniform, automatic recount law in 2000, then Al Gore would also have won with the Electoral College. More that anything, it was likely skulduggery in Florida and a partisan Supreme Court that decided the 2000 election.

“One could argue that the total disenfranchisement and repression of African Americans throughout the end of the 19th century was largely enabled by the dysfunction of the Electoral College,” [Fleishman] said.

This is the 21st century. Yet, one could also still argue that legitimately today, that the claim that the national popular vote will result in one person one vote is bogus, since states vary in who is franchised today and the obstacles placed in the way of various groups in registering and voting.

Our comments on the post (edited and combined):

While I understand the good arguments for the national popular vote and would support it, except there are some extreme risks to the Compact which attempts to force fit it onto our inaccurate state by state voting system.

There is no official national popular vote number complied and certified nationally that can be used to officially and accurately determine the winner in any reasonably close election.

There is no national recount available for close elections to establish an accurate number. Only in some individual states with close numbers in those states would there ever be a recount.

Currently the Electoral College limits the damage to states with close votes. With the national nopular vote errors, voter suppression, and fraud in all states would count against the national totals.

With stronger election laws, national uniformity, enforceable and enforced laws in place I would favor the NPV.

For more see: https://www.ctvoterscount.org/the-case-against-the-npv/

For example: The inaccuracies in Bridgeport did not change the winner here in the Governor’s race and would not have been enough to change the Electoral College. If it was closer we would have had a recanvass and presumably those errors corrected. But with the Compact they would all have counted against one candidate toward that national popular vote number reported by the media or any other number calculated nationwide.

We also point to this story we came across today, pointing out just one more example of the normal errors in vote counts that get certified across the country. Human error, not voting machines, skewed Colleton County election results <read>

The Colleton County Board of Elections reported nearly 1,400 extra votes in the November election. The discrepancy came to light after the Election Commission certified the results…

Frank Heindel of Mount Pleasant, who maintains a website documenting problems with electronic voting machines, lined up an independent audit to see if the machines were at fault.

“Why do we have such poorly written software that allows candidates to receive more votes than the number of ballots cast?” Heindel said today. “Poorly written software creates human error.”

He said the independent auditors were still waiting for the files to finish their work.

Whitmire’s explanation differs from Colleton County Elections Director Eric Campbell’s guess at what happened. Campbell had said he suspected some votes got counted twice when he held the memory cards from six smaller precincts in the machine too long while tabulating the votes. That raised questions whether the computer software was at fault. Whitmire said there’s no indication the mistake had anything to do with the machine reading the memory cards.

“It wasn’t a problem with the machines, and it wasn’t something mysterious,” Whitmire said. “Whenever there are humans involved, there is always going to be the chance of error.”

We also point out that apparently this error came to light only through citizen expense and diligence. Instructively, like Bridgeport and Connecticut, the original inaccurate results still stand.

Update: Another post from the Norwich Bulletin. <read> Be sure and read the comments on this and the ones on the article at CTNewsJunkie above.

Voter ID: Good Idea? or Bad Idea? and Costly

“little evidence of actual voter fraud, and plenty to suggest that the laws will end up costing states millions of dollars that they don’t have…But criticism of the Voter ID bills often falls starkly along party lines. While Republicans say that they’re necessary to combat growing fraud, there’s little to suggest rampant fraud is actually taking place. Meanwhile, Democrats argue that there’s plenty of evidence to suggest that it’s the elderly, African American, and Latino voters who are most likely to vote without the types of identification that’s being required in the new legislation.”

ColorLines: The Real Cost of the GOP’s Push for Voter ID Laws <read>

One of those highly partisan issues where the facts are obscured by dug in opponents:

The effort is part of much larger push by Republicans nationwide to enact stronger Voter ID legislation. In addition to Texas, party leaders are already in talks to introduce similar bills in Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina and Wisconsin. But as Chris Khrom wrote last week at the Institute for Southern Studies, each bill comes at a substantial cost.

Take Texas, for instance. The state faces a budget shortfall of over $10 billion. But Republican Gov. Rick Perry declared voter ID a legislative emergency to help fast-track the bill. All this despite little evidence of actual voter fraud, and plenty to suggest that the laws will end up costing states millions of dollars that they don’t have. Khrom writes that officials in Missouri estimated last year that a similar program there could cost the state’s taxpayers $20 million over three years.

And there’s more:

Studies show that up to 11% of citizens don’t have a photo ID. Forcing voters to buy cards has made states the target of lawsuits claiming such costs amount to a modern-day poll tax. To solve the problem, many states now issue free ID cards, but it’s expensive: In 2009, Wisconsin (3.5 million voters) projected a total $2.4 million cost [pdf]; Missouri estimated $3.4 million [pdf].

So what’s behind the push? Surely it’s at least partially an effort to gear up for the 2012 presidential elections. But criticism of the Voter ID bills often falls starkly along party lines. While Republicans say that they’re necessary to combat growing fraud, there’s little to suggest rampant fraud is actually taking place. Meanwhile, Democrats argue that there’s plenty of evidence to suggest that it’s the elderly, African American, and Latino voters who are most likely to vote without the types of identification that’s being required in the new legislation.

It is difficult not to believe that it is partisan politics, not voting integrity behind much of the debate. As we have said before, “As we have said before, When we are in favor of something, we ignore the costs, no matter how great. When we are against something, we highlight the costs, no matter how small.“

We are skeptical of the need for voter-ID, especially considering the costs and inconvenience involved. We would like to see more proof of significant fraud and a detailed plan for serving the needs of those without conventional voter ID’s, along with the costs. Compared to no-excuse absentee voting the proven risks of fraud are much lower, while the convenience of no-excuse absentee voting seems to have the negative effect of reducing turn-out.

In Connecticut, a senator has introduce a bill for Voter ID <read>. Two representatives would go further, requiring not only Voter ID, but proof of citizenship.<read>

CO Chain-of-Custody: Rest assured, we would never see this in Connecticut

Once again we can rest assured that Connecticut, “The Provisions State”, has provided little provision in our statutes for discovering problems like those surfaced in Colorado

Colorado Springs Conservative Examiner: Secret count preceded Saguache election ‘retabulation’ <read>

What a great idea for election and chain-of-custody transparency:

Examination of election videotapes reveal that the Saguache County Clerk’s office and two judges conducted a secret vote count Nov. 4 from 2 p.m. to about 7:12 p.m. prior to the Nov. 5 “retabulation.”

The video recording copies were obtained through a Colorado Open Records Act request Nov. 16. The county clerk’s office is required by law to keep continuous recordings of all election areas and activities, beginning two months before the election, up to and including any recounts, for two years

They were caught ballot handed. Activist Marlyn Marks summarizes what happened and what is wrong. From the article:

“Reports of a significant private hand count on the afternoon of Nov. 4 appear to validate just how severely the election process and citizen oversight had degraded by Nov. 5, the date of the so-called ‘re-tabulation.’ Reports indicate that ballots were pulled from storage bins and hand-counted by three individuals without notification to candidates, special districts, press, canvass board, or poll watchers. Parties, candidates, special districts, and the press all have statutory rights to have authorized watchers present during every step of the election process. The fact that the count was done in secret and results never disclosed, nor interested parties informed are all serious breaches of trust by the clerk.

“The timing of this alleged hand count one day in advance of a scheduled machine “re-tabulation” raises even more questions as to the purpose of that private count, and the goals of the “re-tabulation.” Why was such a close-door count necessary? Furthermore, the initial machine tabulation and the “re-tabulation,” were not legitimate and not allowed by Colorado election law due to the security incidents prior to election day. The law prohibits the machine from being used to tabulate the election on Nov. 2 and required hand counts instead. That law was ignored by the clerk. We should remember that a Nov. 5 “re-tabulation,” does not legitimize using a faulty, prohibited machine on Nov. 2 or 5, when a hand count was required all along.

“In summary, the machine tabulation was illegitimate, the private count on Nov. 4 was illegitimate, and the “re-tabulation” Nov. 5 was illegitimate, all worsened by a lack of proper security. There is nothing on which to base reasonable conclusions as to the outcome of the close races in this election.”

The Colorado State Attorney General’s Office, Criminal Investigations Division is reviewing complaints made by a growing number of local residents and other Coloradans, including Marks, concerning the conduct of the election.

This was not a very independent recount: Saguache County: A test case in Colorado election integrity <read>

When a county clerk in a poor, rural county in south-central Colorado reversed the results of the Nov. 2 election three days later and declared herself the winner, many of the residents there cried foul. Not only did Saguache County Clerk Melinda Myers go from loser to winner during what many consider to be an improper retabulation, so did the incumbent county commissioner of the same party affiliation. A slew of bipartisan complaints to the secretary of state have fallen on deaf ears…

A trail of private e-mails and public documents shows that even though the Colorado Secretary of State’s Office acknowledges a number of problems with the election, the agency has failed to do much about it. Worse, the secretary of state’s lead officials may have even made untrue claims in their attempts to make the matter go away.

We would never see this sort of thing in Connecticut

Yesterday, we covered the flawed chain-of-custody and court actions in New Jersey. We pointed out how such problems would be unlikely to be surfaced in Connecticut. Once again we can rest assured that the “Provisions State” has provided little provision in our statutes for discovering problems like those surfaced in Colorado:

We have no law or chain-of-custody requirement similar to the video requirement in Colorado. We have no standards for the facilities where ballots are stored. In most Connecticut municipalities it is easy for one official, to obtain and use a single key, to access ballots alone, undetected, for hours at a time. Ballots are stored in hallways, schools, closets, under desks, and abandoned classrooms. [If you think they are protected by seals, read yesterday’s post]
We are unaware of any Connecticut election law that prohibits machine counting due to “security incidents prior to election day”, but we would certainly expect better than this incident in Colorado – we would expect that any security incidents would be corrected or compensated for unless discovered at too late a date. Even in very close elections we count ballots a second time in recanvasses using the same type of machine and duplicate memory cards.

Update 3/15/2011: Denver Post: Secretary of state, clerks battle over Saguache ballots

Update 3/25/2011: Center Post Dispatch: Secretary of State sues clerk to review ballots

Update 4/6/2011: The ballot access debate continues, between the Secretary of the State and local officials:

The Chieftain: State official lacks review authority, Saguache clerk says <read>

Myers’ response, filed Thursday in Saguache County District Court, said the state constitution required her not to disclose how an elector voted and the proposed review of voted ballots may violate that duty.

The Denver Post: Saguache clerk tells court ballots should be kept secret, even from state <read>

The Colorado County Clerks Association says they shouldn’t. The association’s president, Larimer County Clerk and Recorder Scott Doyle, has said ballots are “sacred” and keeping them private is essential to democracy. Allowing the secretary of state to review Saguache County ballots would set a dangerous precedent, he has said.

A group of Saguache County residents and election integrity activists argue that because ballots are anonymous, inspecting them should not reveal how anyone voted. While voting should occur in private, voted ballots should be publicly interpreted and counted, they say.

They point to previous instances in which the secretary of state has inspected voted ballots and to notable examples in other states — namely the 2000 presidential election in Florida in which a group of newspapers reviewed every discounted ballot after the election was certified.

Update 8/11/2011: ES&S facing contempt charges <read>

NJ Chain-of-Custody: Six unsuccessful attempts to seal voting machines

Nothing approaching these six regimes and court challenges could happen in Connecticut! Unlike New Jersey, we have no standard seal “regime”, no standard for seals or ballot containers and any election regulations and procedures going beyond the law are unenforceable. Similar court challenges in the “Nutmeg State” would be about as useful as carved wooden nutmeg seals.

New Jersey has attempted six “Seal regimes” to protect their voting machines. Two new reports demonstrate the inadequacies of the seals and associated procedures. The reports document court testimony and contain sometimes graphic demonstrations of how easily various “tamper evident” seals can be compromised. [May not be deemed appropriate reading for officials and voters in some Connecticut towns]

Nothing like this could happen in Connecticut! Unlike New Jersey, we have no enforceable standards. See our editorial below.

The Reports

Security seals on voting machines: a case study, by Andrew W. Appel”Security seals on voting machines: a case study”, by Andrew W. Appel, Princeton University

Insecurity of New Jersey’s seal protocols for voting machines, by Roger G. Johnston

From Johnston:

In 2008 and 2009 the plaintiffs in the New Jersey voting-machine lawsuit, Gusciora v. Corzine, asked me to study the use of tamper-indicating security seals proposed by the New Jersey Division of Elections to secure their voting machines. In this paper I am making some of my assessments available to the public.

I found that the proposed seals and security measures are insufficient to guarantee election integrity. The skills, time, and resources to spoof these seals and security measures are not a major barrier to an adversary, and are, in fact, widely available. The design of the AVC Advantage voting machines themselves is not conducive to good security, especially the lack of security on the voter’s end of the machine. There are vulnerability and other problems with the seals chosen by New Jersey. Another serious problem is New Jersey’s failure to have well-designed seal use protocols in place. The lack of internal inspections of the voting machines is unfortunate, as is the State’s lack of concern about possible attacks on small numbers of voting machines (not just statewide attacks). I found that New Jersey does not exhibit a healthy security culture for elections, has no independent physical security experts and vulnerability assessors to advise the state, and misunderstands key security concepts. The poor security practices involved in storage, transport, and chain-of-custody for the voting machines are troubling as well…

154. In summary, I can state to a reasonable degree of certainty that the seals and security measures proposed by New Jersey to provide security for the AVC Advantage voting machines are insufficient to guarantee election integrity. The skills, time, and resources to spoof these seals and security measures are not a major barrier to an adversary, and are, in fact, widely available.

155. Various factors contribute to New Jersey’s ineffective security. The design of the AVC Advantage voting machines themselves is not conducive to good security, especially the lack of security on the voter’s end of the machine. There are vulnerability and other problems with the seals chosen by New Jersey. Another serious problem is New Jersey’s failure to have well-designed seal use protocols in place. The lack of internal inspections of the voting machines is unfortunate, as is the lack of concern about attacks on small numbers of voting machines given the number of close elections in the past.

156. Other negative factors include New Jersey’s failure to exhibit a healthy security culture for elections, the absence of independent physical security experts and vulnerability assessors to advise the state, and the state’s misunderstandings about key security concepts. The poor security practices involved in storage, transport, and chain-of-custody for the voting machines are troubling as well.

From Appel:

Tamper-evident seals are used by many states’ election officials on voting machines and ballot boxes, either to protect the computer and software from fraudulent modification or to protect paper ballots from fraudulent substitution or stuffing. Physical seals in general can be easily defeated, and the effectiveness of seals depends on the protocol for their application and inspection. The legitimacy of our elections may therefore depend on whether a particular state’s use of seals is effective to prevent, deter, or detect election fraud. This paper is a case study of the use of seals on voting machines by the State of New Jersey. I conclude that New Jersey’s protocols for the use of tamper-evident seals have been not at all effective. I conclude with a discussion of the more general problem of seals in democratic elections…

Simply slapping seals on a device does not magically protect it. Physical seals in general are can be defeated with simple techniques and at low cost [Johnston 1997a]. In addition the effectiveness of seals depends on having a protocol for their application and inspection [Johnston 1997b], otherwise one will notice if a seal has been replaced with a different one…

Appel demonstrates how, he as an amateur easily defeated several seals, one like many used in Connecticut to seal ballots:

The seals used by Union County are very easy to defeat in a few seconds, by poking a jeweler’s screwdriver into the opening and thereby disengaging the teeth. Strap seals in general are easy to defeat with simple tools [Johnston 1997a]. The jeweler’s screwdriver is not necessarily even the best or fastest way to defeat this seal; it is the one that occurred to the author, who was (at that time) entirely an amateur at defeating seals.

Like Connecticut there is no specific training on seal inspection for pollworkers or Moderators. Such training would likely be more challenging to implement in Connecticut, since we do not have specified standard seals or containers. In New Jersey:

Pollworkers are hired from among the general public to work 15 hours on election day for $200, with two hours of training before election day. This training covers how to run a polling place and conduct elections; it is not specific to seals. I have inspected the pollworker instruction manuals from three different counties; these manuals give no instruction in the purpose of the seals or in inspecting them for tampering.

Of course Connecticut uses different voting equipment and we have paper ballots to recanvass, recount, and audit. Yet, but the same seal challenges and risks apply. From Appel:

Therefore most computer scientists recommend methods of voting that allow computers to count the vote, with random audits to verify that (with high statistical probability) the computers are not cheating. For this to work, there must be a record of each ballot that is not mediated by a computer that could possibly cheat in creating this record. One method that satisfies these criteria is to let the ballots be paper optical-scan forms… Immediately at the close of the polls, the computer can report the candidate totals for that precinct, and in addition there are paper ballots that can be audited in a hand count of randomly selected precincts…

There remains a security problem to solve: how is the integrity of the ballot box to be maintained between the close of the polls and the time of the audit? One method would be to perform the audit immediately, in the presence of the same witnesses (from both political parties and from the State) that have been (presumably) watching the ballot box all day. This might be the best approach, but it has disadvantages: those witnesses may have been working for 14 hours already running the election, and it requires the random selection of precincts to audit to be made by the time the polls close.

Therefore it is usually presumed that some combination of security seals with chain-of-custody arrangements will provide for the integrity of the paper ballots. Therefore, the considerations discussed elsewhere in this paper—regarding security seals and their associated protocols—are very relevant to optical-scan balloting.

In Connecticut, we need to protect the ballots in order to trust the result of recanvasses, recounts, audits and investigations. But the results can only be no more reliable and credible than the chain-of-custody. And that chain-of-custody, is completely dependent on the seals used, seal protocols, actual practices, enforcement and enforceablity.

Editorial

Even if we had standards for seals and their inspection, not much would happen. Most of our statutes remain locked in the lever age, specifying that lever machines will be sealed with “a numbered metal seal” and some statutes covering earlier paper only elections where statutes require “ballot boxes” be sealed with “one adhesive ballot box sealing stamp” supplied by the Secretary of the State. We have no enforceable standards for ballot containers, ballots seals, tabulator seals, and “tamper evident” tape. Most interpret our statutes to mean that ballots do not have to be sealed beyond fourteen days after an election – with post-election audits commencing on day fifteen.

We located one section of the Connecticut statutes that was specifiably updated to address what happens if an optical scanner is found with a broken seal:

9-259 (c)…The seal on the tabulator shall remain unbroken. If the seal is broken, the registrars of voters shall be notified immediately and the tabulator tape shall be produced. If the tape does not show all zeros, the registrars of voters shall be notified immediately and the tabulator shall not be used.

So, even if a seal were broken, allowing an insider or outsider to change the memory card or “permanent” chips on the machine, as long as the the machine produced a zero tape then the election would go forward.

We have discussed seals and security before; highlighting the apparently unforeceable seals on our scanners specified by the Secretary of the State; and an earlier report on seals, also by, by Roger Johnson, and portions of the California Top-To-Bottom Review: FAQ – How can the scanner be hacked? It is kept in a canvas bag protected by a tamper-evident seal!

We also point to the Coalition post-election audit reports which have documented the failure of election officials to follow chain-of-custody procedures, for example <read>

For more on Connecticut chain-of-custody, read our next post about a recent election in Colorado.

In 2008 and 2009 the plaintiffs in the New Jersey voting-machine lawsuit, Gusciora v. Corzine, asked me to study the use of tamper-indicating security seals proposed by the New Jersey Division of Elections to secure their voting machines. In this paper I am making some of my assessments available to the public.
I found that the proposed seals and security measures are insufficient to guarantee election integrity. The skills, time, and resources to spoof these seals and security measures are not a major barrier to an adversary, and are, in fact, widely available. The design of the AVC Advantage voting machines themselves is not conducive to good security, especially the lack of security on the voter’s end of the machine. There are vulnerability and other problems with the seals chosen by New Jersey. Another serious problem is New Jersey’s failure to have well-designed seal use protocols in place. The lack of internal inspections of the voting machines is unfortunate, as is the State’s lack of concern about possible attacks on small numbers of voting machines (not just statewide attacks). I found that New Jersey does not exhibit a healthy security culture for elections, has no independent physical security experts and vulnerability assessors to advise the state, and misunderstands key security concepts. The poor security practices involved in storage, transport, and chain-of-custody for the voting machines are troubling as well.

No-Excuse for Mail-In Voting and three “interesting” bills

Today we sent the following email to nine legislators proposing a total of six bills this year in Connecticut for no-excuse absentee voting. Some of the bills state the purpose of increasing voter participation. The facts don’t seem to support the claim of increased participation.

Subject: No-Excuse Absentee Voting Bill: __

Senator/Representative ___,

I am writing because you are a sponsor of the above bill for early voting via no-excuse absentee voting.

Consider this PEW sponsored. University of Wisconsin research, that shows early voting has the effect of DECREASING turnout. And candidates are having challenges with advertising and GOTV. https://ctvoterscount.org/researchers-early-voting-alone-decreases-turnout/

Here is another article about various concerns with mail voting: https://ctvoterscount.org/vote-by-mail-cheaper-but-advocates-have-concerns/
Including a study of three CA counties showing a similar drop in turn-out in all but special elections: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/votebymail.htm

PS: CTVotersCount is primarily opposed to, expanded mail-in or no-excuse absentee voting because of the opportunity and record of fraud – it seems that after every national election we find stories of fraud, prosecution, and conviction based on mail-in voting. Recent examples:
OH: https://ctvoterscount.org/absentee-ballot-fraud-in-ohio/
FL: https://ctvoterscount.org/no-excuse-absentee-voting-unintended-consequences/
AZ, CA, FL: https://ctvoterscount.org/absenteeearly-voting-raise-questions-and-risks/
TX: https://ctvoterscount.org/how-not-to-increase-voter-participation/

Readers may also be interested in three bills that will likely be dead on arrival:

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/TOB/h/pdf/2011HB-05727-R00-HB.pdf

Purpose: To reform post-election audit procedures.

(1) after an audit, a town shall have a four-year exemption to relieve the town from holding a post-election audit, provided such town is a small town; and (2) registrars of voters shall no longer be held personally liable for finesfor failure to comply with audit procedures. Instead, such fines shall be levied against the municipalities.

Reform? It would gut the post-election audit law since random audits of all districts are required to catch fraud and error, at the expense of mid and large municipalities. After an audit, a small town would have a four year open season for covering errors and insider fraud.

A rather unique concept that municipalities pay fines for the failure of officials to follow laws and procedures. Should that be extended to Mayors and Governors? Perhaps election officials should be required to budget in advance for their future anticipated transgressions. (Note: We are aware of no fines as yet having been imposed for violations of the post-election audit law, and in Connecticut procedures and regulations are unenforceable.)

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/TOB/s/pdf/2011SB-00646-R00-SB.pdf

provide that the threshold for state-wide automatic recounts in closely contested elections be lowered to a three-thousand-vote difference.

Quite an accomplishment to lower it to 3000, since the current threshold is a 2000 vote difference. We would likely support the increase.

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/TOB/h/pdf/2011HB-05732-R00-HB.pdf

require a receipt for ballots cast by voters who vote by coloring in, with pencil, their selections and feed their ballots into a reader or by electronically recording selections using a station designed for physically disabled voters unable to use a paper ballot.

This would eliminate the secret ballot that protects us from vote buying and coercion. Anyone can use a machine designed for the disabled…so anyone can get a receipt and sell their vote or be coerced!!! PS: This would hardly help the blind voter, the most likely disabled users of our difficult to setup and use IVS system. Update: On closer reading of the part before the “or”, the act would not only apply to IVS voters, but to anyone who brings a pencil to the polls and uses it to fill out their ballot. No mention of how the receipt would be generated.

1984: Enfield suppresses film – Librarians defend access to information

Hats off to the “Constitution State” librarians and the Connecticut Library Association for defending our rights. They have done this before.

Four years ago we were scheduled to show “Hacking Democracy” at a library. A local election official put pressure on the head librarian to cancel the showing and the discussion.

CTVotersCount is dedicated to voting integrity for the benefit of Connecticut voters. Other issues are also critical to elections and democracy. Among those are a vibrant free press and free speech – an informed electorate is as critical to democracy as voting integrity.

Enfield, Connecticut has suppressed the film “Sicko”. We are proud to see the strong response from Connecticut Librarians. Courant Article: Library Cancels Showing Of ‘Sicko’ – Move Prompts Criticism, Outcry <read>

Under pressure from the town council to either reschedule or reformat the nature of the screening, the Enfield Public Library decided to cancel its Friday showing of Michael Moore’s 2007 film “Sicko,” which is critical of the U.S. health care industry.

The decision to cancel the showing, which stemmed from a complaint by a resident, has been criticized by the Connecticut Library Association, which called the decision “an insult to our form of government” and said that the library should be a “battleground for ideas.”…

In a press release, the library association applauded the Enfield Public Library for attempting to address health care issues, and asked that the town allow the library to reschedule the movie.

“No one is forced to read a book or see a movie at the library. The residents of Enfield are responsible enough to make choices for themselves and their children,” the release states.

“If politicians in Connecticut cities and towns felt free to remove or cancel showings of materials that they didn’t like or were controversial, the basic freedom of speech rights of town residents would be denied.”

Herman said that while it is still early, the library association is already in talks with the American Civil Liberties Union.

“We’ve had discussions with ACLU Connecticut concering a wide range of things including possible legal action,” she said. “I don’t know if that’s the direction it will go, but as defenders of intellectual freedom, we are very concerned about this.”

Four years ago we were scheduled to show “Hacking Democracy” at a library, as we have done at several libraries for “Hacking Democracy”, other films, and discussions. That one time, local a election official put pressure on the head librarian to cancel the showing and the discussion. To her credit, she never considered canceling the showing. Sadly the official did not take advantage of the opportunity to attend the showing and discussion to provide her prospective – she objected that she would not be paid for attending.

Hats off to the “Constitution State” librarians and the Connecticut Library Association for defending our rights. They have done this before: NPR: Librarians Denounce Gag Order in Patriot Act Case

Update: After much criticsm, Enfield to show variety of films: Rick Green: Why Should Library Have To Do A Balancing Act On ‘Sicko’? <read>

Merrill not sure about ballot reform

We agree that 100% of ballots may be overkill, especially in local municipal elections, primaries, and referendums. We would recommend stronger state laws, procedures, and enforcement.

From Ray Hackett, Norwich Bulletin <read>

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill told municipal leaders this morning that she isn’t sure calls for local communities to provide 100 percent ballots, one for every registered voter, is the appropriate answer to the problem in Bridgeport where election officials ran out of ballots at the last election.

Several bills have already been introduced in the legislature this year that would require communities to have one ballot for every registered voters, an added cost to local communities. Merrill said although she’s not sure that is the best way to go, she added that she is looking at what other states are doing, but offered no clear alternative.

She did suggest, however, that every community should have an “emergency plan” and offered that maybe her office might provide a template of sort so that if a problem arises during an election, there is a uniformed plan in place to deal with it quickly and effectively.

We agree that 100% of ballots may be overkill, especially in local municipal elections, primaries, and referendums. We would recommend stronger state laws, procedures, and enforcement. From the Coalition Recommendations:

Connecticut must do better in the future. This will require appropriate action by election officials and the legislature. At this point we suggest possible components of a comprehensive solution that deserve consideration :

Mandatory formulas for minimum ballot orders. In the wake of the events in Bridgeport, many have suggested a variety of remedies–from printing a number of ballots using formulas based on past history in similar in elections, to at least one ballot for every registered voter in every election. It should be noted that in the November 2010 election, several communities in addition to Bridgeport used emergency photocopied ballots. We recommend that the Secretary of the State work with various stakeholders to develop a mandatory formula to be used by local registrars.

Adoption of emergency plans: It’s important to note that, simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

Enforceable laws, regulations, and procedures for the monitoring of turn-out to provide sufficient warning of ballot shortages, so that photocopied ballots can be available at polling places in time. For example, many municipalities follow the practice of having polling places report hourly vote counts to the registrars of voters. This practice could be codified to mandate that registrars stay in their offices (not at the polls) on Election Day along with a requirement to report available ballots and turn-out.

Enforceable laws, regulations, and procedures for the creation, security, and accounting for all ballots and for the creation and handling of emergency photocopied ballots….

Update: Meanwhile in Bridgeport, from the Brideport News: Bridgeport to order enough special election ballots for 100% of registered voters <read>

Merrill said she commends Bridgeport’s registrars of voters for leading by example and ordering enough ballots to cover a 100% voter turnout in the 126th General Assembly district.

“As we look at ways to improve our election system in Connecticut following the problems we encountered in the 2010 general election, this is a good, safe rule of thumb to follow to ensure that there are always enough ballots for Connecticut voters, and no one is ever turned away from the polls,” she said. “I encourage other municipalities to take this step.”

Bridgeport to order enough special election ballots for 100% of registered voters

Update: Government Administration and Election Committee Chair, Gayle Slossberg weighs in, via Ken Dixon <read>

“Obviously this is an issue that needs to be resolved,” she said of the Bridgeport meltdown. “We’re trying to draft a reasonable solution to this problem. To require every town to have 100 percent of the ballots is absurd. We’re looking for a reasonable solution, making sure each community has the right amount of ballots.”

Absentee Ballot Fraud In Ohio

Another election, followed, as usual, by reports of absentee vote fraud. This time from Ohio. The good news is that under Secretary of State, Jennifer Brunner, it was not the Ohio of 2004. It is an Ohio where problems are detected, investigated, and hopefully corrected, prevented, and prosecuted.

Ironton Tribune: Absentee ballot report sent to Husted <read>

About a month before the November general election Lawrence County Board of Election workers noticed a number of applications for absentee ballots going to one of two post office box numbers. When voters apply for an absentee ballot, they are allowed to have the ballot sent to an address other than their home location.

However when election board workers noticed the same post office boxes appearing repeatedly, they did a random check to see where the voters wanted their ballots sent. On most of the calls, the workers found the phones listed on the applications were disconnected. However, those they did get in touch with said they wanted their ballot sent to their home address.

When Brunner learned of that situation, she ordered a special investigation, sending Columbus attorney Andrew Baker on Oct. 20 to the county courthouse to review those applications.

As we have said before, the risks of mail-in voting including no-excuse absentee voting are to great. Such voting should be limited to cases where it is absolutely necessary, as it is now in Connecticut. It also requires strong laws, procedures, and vigilance.

Coalition Report: Bridgeport Recount and Recommendations

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Each candidate for the governor’s race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor’s race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

Simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor

Full report, press release, and supporting details at Coalition site: <read>

Bridgeport Registrar offers fix, Secretary responds

[Republican Registrar of Voters] Borges also said that the Bridgeport registrar’s office is stretched too thin.
[Bysiewicz] feels the Bridgeport office is well-staffed — it spends $551,466 annually, most of that in salaries for two registrars

Fairfield Weekly: Notes from a Scandal <read>

[Republican Registrar of Voters] Borges says he’s faced is a dearth of competent personnel to staff polling places. In the past, polls in Bridgeport have closed when workers didn’t show up, he recalls. He suggests urban registrars partner with corporations to help get quality people at the polls, offering to reward the companies in some fashion. (The only requirement to work at a polling station is being registered to vote.)

The secretary of the state’s office offered its own solution to the problem in 2008 by recruiting 125 students at community colleges, including Housatonic Community College. The average age of poll workers is over 70 and they hoped to attract a younger generation. However, “registrars were reluctant to hire these people,” says Deputy Secretary of the State Lesley Mara, a Democrat, because they were perceived to be in Barack Obama’s camp.

Borges also said that the Bridgeport registrar’s office is stretched too thin. The state’s election laws grant complete control over local elections to municipalities and the decentralized system punishes large, cash-strapped cities, he says. Borges thinks registrars should work directly under the secretary of the state.

“That’s probably not going to happen anytime soon,” says outgoing Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, who adds that she feels the Bridgeport office is well-staffed — it spends $551,466 annually, most of that in salaries for two registrars (one for each major party), two deputy registrars, a secretarial assistant and seasonal employees. Santa Ayala, Borges’ Democratic counterpart who ordered too few ballots for Nov. 2, did not return the Weekly’s calls seeking an interview.