Warning #2: Defying Common Sense, early voting DECREASES turnout

Voters considering the Constitutional Amendment on the ballot this November and legislators considering what to do if it passes, need to pay heed to the facts and experience of early voting in other state. Common sense is not always a reliable guide.

Did you know early voting of all types (polling place, no-excuse absentee, and mail-in) actually reduces turn-out?

Voters considering the Constitutional Amendment on the ballot this November and legislators considering what to do if it passes, need to pay heed to the facts and experience of early voting in other states. Common sense is not always a reliable guide.

Did you know early voting of all types (polling place, no-excuse absentee, and mail-in) actually reduces turn-out?

We have said it before, based on the best studies available. Early voting DECREASES turn-out. The only exception is that early voting coupled with election day registration does not decrease the turn-out generated by election day registration. (But in Connecticut we have a more time consuming, more effort election day registration than those states that have found it increases turn-out. Our bet is that election day registration done our way will have little impact on turn-out. We also warn that measuring its effect will be quite a challenge)

Unfortunately advocates and legislators rely on common sense, rather than the best research, e.g.: <read>

Rep. Livvy Floren of Greenwich, a former member of the Government Administration and Elections Committee who worked on the bill, was one of the two Republicans to vote for the proposal.

“I’m in favor of anything that increases voter participation,” she said. Floren said she received no pressure from her party to vote the other way.

“It happens all the time.” All over the place (Part 6)

Here we continue our review of some of our posts of past errors surfaced in Connecticut and around the country, selected from our over 900 posts. Last time we covered CTVotersCount posts from the 1st half of 2011.

<previous part>

Here we continue our review of some of our posts of past errors surfaced in Connecticut and around the country, selected from our over 900 posts.  Last time we covered CTVotersCount posts from the 1st half of 2011. Continuing from there:

Smoke, no fire seen. Once again see no problems <Jul 2011>

O Me O My O – Errors in Jersey and Fraud in Ohio <Jul 2011>

Colorado election issues, extreme, yet considered normal, reported in 2011 <July 2011>

State causes confusion in Bridgeport process for ballot access <July 2011>

P.T. Barnum’s city continues three-ring election circus <Aug 2011>

Ballot Skulduggery in Wisconsin? Or Inadvertent Errors? <Aug 2011>

No need to see the ballots, they are “sacred” – Faith based elections <Aug 2011>

Another election in Bridgeport…more absentee ballot allegations <Sept 2011> <Sept 2011>

Organized vote fraud in Florida (Sunshine anyone?) <Sept 2011>

CO: Chain-Of-Custody and Confidence broken <Sept 2011>

Rigged election or three human errors – we may never know for sure. <Sept 2011>

See no problems.  Hear no problems. Keep observers out of polling places <Sept 2011>

Bridgeport…a dozen decrees in absentee fraud since 1988 <Oct 2011>

See no problems. Hear no problems. Stop the audit <Oct 2011>

Scanners count same ballots with different results <Nov 2011>

Its an error. No its a typo. Wrong person elected <Nov 2011>

Voting machine investigation leads to serious issues and cover-up <Dec 2011>

Secretary of State removed for vote fraud <Dec 2011>

That brings through the end of 2011. Till next time.

Warning #1: Your absentee or mail-in vote might not count

Voters considering the Constitutional Amendment on the ballot this November and legislators considering what to do if it passes, need to pay heed to the facts and experience of early voting in other state. Common sense is not always a reliable guide.

Did you know that when you vote absentee or mail-in, you might be disenfranchised at a much higher rate than if you voted at the polls?

Voters considering the Constitutional Amendment on the ballot this November and legislators considering what to do if it passes, need to pay heed to the facts and experience of early voting in other state. Common sense is not always a reliable guide.

Did you know that when you vote absentee or mail-in, you might be disenfranchised at a much higher rate than if you voted at the polls?

There are three major reasons that we are aware of:

  • Your ballot might not be received in time to be counted.  It might be delayed or actually lost in the mail. In Connecticut such votes must be received by 8:00pm to be counted.
  • You might have made a mistake in the somewhat complicated process of placing your ballot inside outer and inner envelopes, or forgetting to properly fill out the envelopes. The law requires that ballots  with certain errors be rejected.
  • You might have overvoted i.e. voted for more candidates than allowed. This can happen when you make an inadvertent mark in a bubble or if you miscount the number of votes in a vote for multiple race. Such errors are caught for you when you vote in a polling, where the error is explained and you are offered a chance to vote again on a new ballot.

Here is a recent article on a study covering some of those problems, in California where mail-in voting is an increasing factor in elections California: Mail-in-ballot rejections analyzed in study | <read>

Voting by mail surpassed 50 percent of votes cast in a general election in California for the first time in 2012. A new study shows that nearly 69,000 mailed ballots, or about 1 percent, were not counted, and why they were rejected. The top three reasons mail-in ballots were rejected: not arriving on time, not being signed or because signatures could not be verified…

Romero said. “People have taken the time to study the issues, fill out the ballot and mail or deliver it. They trust it is going to be counted.”

Two Reminders: Transparency and the Limits of All Paper Elections

This week we have had two demonstrations of themes we have discussed in theory at CTVotersCount.
From Connecticut, the importance of transparency.
From abroad the limits of paper only elections.

This week we have had two demonstrations of themes we have discussed in theory at CTVotersCount.

First from Connecticut, amid the sad tale of our past Governor, heading once again for food and shelter at the expense of the public: Jury Finds Rowland Guilty On All 7 Counts; Attorney Vows Appeal <read>

A reminder from the prosecutor:

Prosecutors called the verdict a victory for transparency and the electoral process. The jury agreed that Rowland conspired to do work on two Republican congressional campaigns and had pitched a scheme to keep his pay hidden from federal election regulators.

“It ought to be — no it has to be — that voters know that what they see is what they get. In this case, the defendant and others didn’t want that to happen,” Michael J. Gustafson, Criminal Division Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, told reporters.

We would add that transparency is insufficient. Somebody, like the public, has to use the transparency. And occasionally the system needs to assist in assuring transparency.  As we have pointed out in theory: <Vote Audit Observe> <Public Transparency and Observability>

Second a reminder from Scotland, pointing to some of the same risks and the insufficiency of paper only counting. As we have discussed in theory:
Common Sense: Paper Ballots are Insufficient for Voting Integrity <read>

Take a look at this video alleging irregularities in the Scottish Independence vote:

We cannot vouch for the accuracy and know the actual implications of the allegations in the video. Perhaps some of the footage is rigged. Perhaps the incorrectly classified ballots and stacks were double checked and corrected. Yet the video reminds us of several theoretical questions and issues with paper only counting and elections:

  • It would be much more credible and provide higher confidence to have a machine publicly count and print results then followed by solid ballot custody and an audit or recount. To accomplish fraud or cover error then would be much harder, since the numbers have to at least come close to matching when machines are rigged ahead of time, and ballots must be changed in a corresponding way.
  • Paper counting demands double checking by multiple individuals, observed by opposing interests.
  • In addition, central counting of paper ballots requires strong ballot security from the polling place ballot box to the counting place.

In Connecticut we are fortunate to have paper ballots, recanvasses, and post-election audits. Unfortunately, we also have very weak, vulnerable ballot security, and a post-election audit that is weal in many regards, and far from adequately executed.

What is FVAP hiding? Whom if anyone are they assisting?

Electronic Privacy Information Center sues the Department of Defense to release Federal Voting Assistance Program test of Internet voting. <read>

We find it hard to believe the tests went well. What could possibly be the reason to withhold tests that could be used by states to learn about the risks and possibly any safe ways discovered to perform Internet voting?

Who would benefit by withholding such data? Internet voting vendors? Proponents of Internet voting? Those who would like to compromise elections or intimidate voters?

Electronic Privacy Information Center sues the Department of Defense to release Federal Voting Assistance Program test of Internet voting. <read>

We find it hard to believe the tests went well.  What could possibly be the reason to withhold tests that could be used by states to learn about the risks and possibly any safe ways discovered to perform Internet voting?

Who would benefit by withholding such data? Internet voting vendors? Proponents of Internet voting? Those who would like to compromise elections or intimidate voters?

From the complaint:

PIC has constructively exhausted its administrative remedies. EPIC asks the Court to order prompt disclosure of all  responsive records…

Computer scientists have long expressed concern about the reliability, security, and integrity of online voting. E-voting “not only entails serious security risks, but also requires voters to relinquish their right to a secret ballot…

n 2011 FVAP requested $39 m to study online voting. In the budget request to Congress, DOD wrote “Funds will complete the kiosk-based system testing eval uation of results, and support similar tests on remote PC-based systems…

Later in 2011 , the FVAP deputy director stated publicly “We also did voting system test laboratory testing against the UOCAVA pilot program testing requirements to give us an assessment moving forward and perhaps provide some additional context as to where we are when it comes to security and overall usability of these systems as we move forward
with standards to support the electronic voting demonstration project. And then lastly of the completed objectives so far we also did penetration testing on those same systems, the electronic voting support Wizard as well as those systems that originally are (unintelligible) for Internet voting.”

When asked if the tests of the online voting systems that the FVAP were funding would be made public, the FVAP deputy director responded, “Not publicly available as of yet but it will be publicly available.”…

On August 13, 2012, California Secretary of State Bowen wrote to FVAP and requested the results of its tests of the FVAP online ballot marking systems. Secretary Bowen wrote, “California and the state’s military and overseas voters that may use such a system would benefit from being able to examine the results of any testing of ballot marking wizards arranged, paid for, or conducted by FVAP.”…

EPIC, and many of its expert advisors, believe that it is absolutely critical for the documents sought in this matter be disclosed prior to further deployment of e-voting systems in the Unit ed States.

It should be obvious that California is not the only state starting with a “C” that could use that information. Perhaps you can think of such a state with a lot less resources than California, a state with a Legislature and Governor bent on Internet voting.

Read the complaint for more justification of releasing the report produced with taxpayer dollars and for more in the epic saga leading to EPIC’s  complaint.

Revisited: What could a Secretary of the State Do?

Four years ago, we posted a list of actions that a Secretary of the State could do on his or her own to improve the election process. Lets revisit that list as the 2014 campaign begins in earnest.

Four years ago, we posted a list of actions that a Secretary of the State could do on his or her own to improve the election process.  Lets revisit that list as the 2014 campaign begins in earnest.

**************

Much of what we hear from candidates is proposed cheerleading and leadership from the bully pulpit: the bills they would propose to the legislature, the leadership they would provide to improve the business climate, encourage voting, and voting integrity in Connecticut.  Don’t get me wrong these are useful and legitimate roles for the Secretary of the State.  However, there are items that the Secretary of the State can do on their own initiative to improve business registration, public access to information, and the election process.

When I talk to candidates for Secretary of the State, one of my main themes is what they could do on their own authority as Secretary of the State to improve election integrity and public confidence.

Here is my initial list of items from 2010:

  • Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site, while increasing the integrity of the post-election audit. Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested
  • Improve documentation and training for election officials,  in substance and format
  • Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

We recognize that everything costs money, however, most of these items are relatively modest items that appear to be within the authority of the Secretary of the State.

Further Details

Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site

In a PEW study the Connecticut site ranked 48th out of 50 states.  We could debate if we should be higher in the rankings, or instead work to emulate and surpass the top ranked states.

The process of accumulating voting results in Connecticut is an error-prone three step process of addition and transcription, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office, and to the web.  Citizens have identified errors large and moderate – errors of a magnitude  which could change election results, the initiation of recanvasses, or ballot access. See <here> <here>

Without reliable, publicly posted results, post-election audits cannot be accomplished which inspire confidence and provide integrity.  A trusted audit requires selecting districts for audit against previously posted results.  Since we audit against optical scanner tapes, and the tape results are not posted, then we fail to meet that requirement.

What can be done?

  • Post copies of the original documents: All district and central count absented ballot Moderator’s’ Reports and copies of scanner tapes should be faxed to the Secretary of the State’s Office and posted on the SOTS web site. (We know this is easily possible since the SOTS web site has recently included images of all local ballots, and is capable of the quick addition of press releases)
  • Post detailed and summary data: The SOTS could use temporary employees or outsourcing to input and double check the input of all that data, then post it to the web site in human and downloadable formats.
  • >Side benefit: A free public audit: As a byproduct the public, candidates, and parties could check and audit the data at no cost to the state.  To do that today would involve visiting town halls across the state and performing all the calculations done today by hand – efficient auditing of selected districts is not possible because detailed data is not currently posted.
  • Consider using the Overseas Vote Foundation facility for empowering military and overseas voters, now in use by seven states.  This is an example of what could be done to empower all voters. (Added 4/4/2010)
  • Improve post-election audit integrity: Stop accepting reports showing wild discrepancies as extremely accurate and make all audit investigations public and transparent. (added 7/31/2010) <Extremely Accurate> <Audit Reports>

Since 2010: We have had a little progress and  some attempts in this area:

  • Starting in recent election, the actual election results data faxed from towns is posted to the Secretary’s web site, so it can be checked by citizens and a bit more transparency is thus provided.  Yet the results are not in detail, covering each election district and each voting method.
  • The Secretary initiated a well intentioned project to have all data from all districts input over the web and immediately reported. Unfortunately, the system was a failure and for at least two years, the Secretary’s Office remained tone-deaf to the complaints of election officials that the system and its requirement that each polling place moderator have an ID and input their own data was effectively unworkable.  In 2013 there was some indication that a more effective system of collecting data by spreadsheet, which could be input to officials charged with that function would be made available some time in the future.  Many towns already compile detailed data in spreadsheets, using rested officials assigned to data entry, to take and double check data from moderators who are often elderly and who all have just completed a demanding seventeen-hour-plus day.
  • Nothing significant has been accomplished in post-election audit integrity. In 2013 the Citizen Audit did a study of the audit drawing and found huge discrepancies on the list. We have long been a critic of the official audit reports created by Uconn, the only change is that Uconn has apparently stopped producing the reports since the November 2011 election. We do acknowledge an improvement this year in the official audit procedures, with several corrections and small but useful improvements suggested by the Citizen Audit and accepted by the Secretary’s Office.
  • There is on the SOTS Election web page information specifically for Military and Overseas Voters <view>, yet nothing like what is possible <see MN>.
  • Yet we applaud the SOTS and Registrars because Connecticut now does a good job of implementing the Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act (MOVE), resulting in Military voters achieving ballot return rates comparable with all absentee voters.

We would be remiss if we did not applaud, once again, the report on the Secretary’s Election Performance Task Force, while its promise has yet to be matched with an equal measure of progress.

Another area of irritation and loss of integrity in the post-election audits is that while the Secretary of the State’s Office is able to post ballots for every municipality, they are not provided with a reliable list of polling districts in those municipalities.  By requiring the faxing of district Moderator’s Reports and posting them, this uncertainty would be eliminated.

As we said above: In 2013 the Citizen Audit did a study of the audit drawing and found huge discrepancies on the list.

Another problem is public notification of audit dates, times and locations.  By procedure (unfortunately not by law), registrars are required to inform the Secretary of the States’s Office three days in advance of the local audits.  If these dates were posted by the SOTS Office within 24 hours of receipt, then the public, candidates, and parties would have much better access to actually observing audits.

Beyond audits, having centralized voting district locations and assisting voters in finding their polling place would help the public and partially relieve that burden from towns.

Create jobs, efficiency and election integrity in Connecticut by changing the way memory cards are programmed and tested

Currently, before each election, memory cards are programmed in Massachusetts by our distributor, LHS Associates.   The cards are shipped to local election officials for pre-election testing.  There are two problems:

  • We have no effective supervision over the process.  One of the risks is insider fraud or intimidation of those who program and ship memory cards.
  • The process is not perfect, and the memory cards are physically unreliable.  Extra effort is required when bad cards are discovered by the Registrars and new cards need to be ordered and shipped.  See <UConn Report.>

What can be done?

  • Perform the programming in Connecticut: In other states (outside of New England) large counties program their own cards and often perform programming at a fee for small counties.  We have paid for two machines which we can use to program the cards. They could be used by state employees or outsource the programming within Connecticut.
  • Independently test the cards nearby the programming: UConn has developed, at taxpayer expense, a program to eliminate many causes of error in the cards and easily detect bad cards with “junk” data.  Currently this program is underutilitzed in no non-random testing of cards selected by local officials after pre-election testing and after the election.  We can exploit this program to 100% pre-test the cards, enhancing integrity and reducing wasted effort by local officials when they discover “junk” cards.
  • Side Benefit:  Jobs: It might be small, yet every job moved back to Connecticut would be a benefit to the state.  Like large counties in other states, we might provide the service to other states in New England – we could compete with LHS for business and with the added advantage of the UConn testing program.  Perhaps we could expand beyond New England to service other states.

We also note a large cadre of very part-time election officials, many of whom served as lever mechanics and later as vendor trained optical scan technicians.  We expect that several of these same individuals could quickly train to meet the seasonal demand for programming and testing, and appreciate the opportunity for work and public service.  It would not take many.

Once again, slow if any progress. Over the last couple of years memory cards have continued to degrade, while Uconn continues to report that less and less cards are sent in from towns for testing. Nobody seems to be taking responsibility to see that the cards are sent as requested by the Secretary (or is that a fiction that the Uconn reports continue to maintain).

In the meantime, some new cards of a new design are tested in each election, yet there seems to have been no systematic effort of the State to hold the vendor accountable for selling such unreliable technology, and quite a price.

Improve documentation and training for election officials,  in substance and format

The current Secretary of the State and her staff have worked to improve documentation and training.  This work should continue and be taken to a new level.

What can be done?

  • Update and improve the value of manuals: The Moderator Manual, the Absentee Ballot Moderator, the Recanvass Manual and the Post-Election Audit Procedures were modified after the commitment to optical scanners.  They need to be updated and expanded based on experience.  They need to be rewritten and edited by professional technical writers to make them more effective as training and reference documents.  For instance,Improve and expand certification: The Secretary has begin efforts for Registrar Certification and Training to complement the current Moderator Certification and Training.  The Registrars job is much more involved than that of a Moderator, yet Registrars have no formal training and certification program (And currently there is no requiremen for Registrars to be certified Moderators or to attend training.  Moderators are supposed to be certified, yet that is not enforced – these are issues for the Legislature and an example of where the Secretary of the State could be an effective cheer leader)
    • The Absentee Ballot Moderator’s Manual still calls for multiple counting throughout the day, but only one count is necessary with optical scanners. The Post-Election Audit procedures should provide more details in several areas:  Counting incomplete bubbles, counting write-in votes, exactly what levels of differences should call for recounting and investigation, and help with accurate and efficient counting methods.
    • The Recanvass Manual should also cover details of counting incomplete bubbles, counting for voter’s intent, voter identifiable ballots, and the role of designated observers.
    • There may be value in following the examples of other jurisdictions in creating observer manuals for post-election audits and recanvasses.

Here we have seen some laudable progress and some questionable progress.

  • The Moderators Manual has been completely revised and is much more readable, has clear sections and checklists for each position and function.  Not as polished and some we have seen in other states, yet a vast improvement.
  • The Moderator Training has been revised with an online course which must be passed as a prerequisite for taking the in-person training. Unfortunately, this apparently costly outsourced training, suffers from some problems that tend to irritate officials required to take the training.  The training itself and the quizzes, apparently done by out-of-state consultants makes some glaring errors in Connecticut election law, and the quizzes score is based on incorrect answers to some questions. The training suffers from too long, too simple presentations on the basics of elections and on serving those with disabilities – one suspects that it is easy boiler-plate sold to every state. Further, the training is very choppy with short videos and many different/inconsistent navigation between videos, slides and quizzes – it all takes extra hours of time and frustration, especially for those not especially skilled in the web or loaded with extra patience.  A good idea, not well done.  We have heard that many Moderators are reluctant to take it a 2nd time (required every 2 years) and threaten to quit.  We will see. Once again, we have heard anecdotes of a tone-deaf response from Hartford.

 Provide written directives and responses to inquiries from election officials

One responsibility of the Secretary of the State’s Office is to advise election officials on proper procedures according to law, regulations, procedures, and directives.  We have heard registrars complain that the advice given depends on who one talks to, and on what day.  We have no way of determining if that is true or how prevalent the problem is.  The uncertainty and over-reliance on verbal communication should be eliminated.

We hear the same from committee political treasurers. In fact it is the subject of a proposed law before the Legislature.  The law would require the State Elections Enforcement Commission to follow-up with a written version of any verbal advice within ten days. <H.B. 5470> However, it is difficult to write law that distinguishes from a simple inquiry from one that provides a critical distinction that the caller must rely on to avoid error and avoid potential fine or jail time.

What can be done?

  • All directives should be in writing and publicly available. Like any laws, regulations, and procedures there is usually some ambiguity, unanticipated situations, new regulations can take years to be approved, and problems which must be overcome.  The Secretary of the State Office from time to time must issue directives to cover these situations.  Such directives should be in writing and posted publicly.
  • All substantial advice and rulings should be recorded in writing. The current Secretary of the State’s Office keeps track of all citizen inquires.  The Office should keep track of all official inquires, and summarize any significant election advice and rulings for future reference.
  • Economies of Scale: Perhaps the state would be best served by a common system, that tracked similar advice for the Secretary of the State’s Office and Elections Enforcement.  Perhaps we should use the same or similar laws, and the same system for all agencies that have a similar requirement.  The Environmental Protection Agency comes to mind.  What do other agencies do today?  What do other states do?  We have only one Freedom Of Information law for all agencies.  Perhaps we need a uniform law for agency directives, rulings, and advice?  There will always be a need to consider economies of scale vs. excess bureaucracy – but the third option is to search for the ways that increase economy of scale, increase democracy, while also streamlining bureaucracy.  Once again, the Secretary cannot change the law alone, but could cooperate with other agencies to produce efficiency and provide leadership in going beyond requirements of the law.

Perhaps we ask too much. We did support a bill in the Legislature that would have at least made the Secretary of the State’s directives enforceable, with the caveat that they be marked as such and centrally posted.

Perhaps soon, we will do a similar review of the progress on the report on the Elections Performance Task Force referenced above.

Editorial: Improve Turnout By Making Voting Worthwhile

It seems that turnout is the holy grail of elections. Many election reforms are justified on a claim, true or not, that the reform will increase turnout. But, turnout is more a symptom of democracy, than an end in itself.

We have some suggestions to consider:

  • Make it easier for third-party candidates to get on the ballot, easier to qualify for public financing. Let us start with a level playing field for public financing, and officials that follow the law, with a “Chief Election Official” with actual responsibility for elections.
  • Reform the decentralized partisan election system.
  • Eliminate the “Spoiler” effect, provide more democracy, with a true runoff election when one candidate does not get 50_% of the vote.

Let us recall that in this generation, two third-party “spoilers” did win elections in Connecticut: Governor Lowell Weicker, and Senator Joe Lieberman.

Background <go to Editorial>

It seems that turnout is the holy grail of elections. Many election reforms are justified on a claim, true or not, that the reform will increase turnout. But, turnout is more a symptom of democracy, than an end in itself.

In our last post we summarized the case for and against no-excuse absentee voting. Proponents claim that it will increase turnout. Yet, what we find as the best science says it tends to decrease turnout – the reasons are not obvious, not intuitive, and far from clear.  Yet, either way the difference in turnout is just a very few points. It would be unlikely to take the 21% turnout we had in the recent primary and make it more than 25%.

What increases turnout? One factor could be voter interest in the election, that the election is important, and that their vote is important. We always have lower turnout in odd year municipal elections and higher turnout in general elections.  We have had more than our fair share of exciting general elections in even years lately, Lamont vs. Lieberman 2006, Malloy vs. Foley 2010, McMahon vs. Blumenthal 2010, and McMahon vs. Murphy in 2012.  Even when it is a slam dunk in Connecticut it seems that an election where voters want to register their enthusiasm for a candidate can bring voters out, e.g. Obama 2008.

Looking at the 2014 election, conventional wisdom is that it will be a close election rematch between Tom Foley and Dannel Malloy. Neither candidate is all that popular, both were expected to and are underway in very negative campaigns against each other. Columnist Kevin Rennie has characterized it as “A Race Between Two Dark Vaders”.  A close race between unpopular candidates, both well financed with lots of “outsider” funding as well – many voters will be turned off, yet many may still turnout.

How could it get more exciting? Enter two petitioning third party candidates, stage right and stage left. Is this exciting or more depressing?  For the two major party candidates and their supporters, depressing.  For supporters of the third-party candidates and those depressed by the major party candidates, exciting.

How could it get more depressing to voters and potential candidates? First, by the major party candidates and their supporters adding to the negativity by bashing the minor party candidates, and the system that allows them to petition their way onto the ballot. The case for additional candidates, best summarized by Connecticut native Ralph Nader, himself bashed for the 2000 election and for signing a petition for one of the candidates, resulting in a Courant Op-Ed <read>

Nader: Crashers Needed At The Two-Party Party

Giving voters more choices in an election year should be as American as the Fourth of July

The word “spoiler,” when applied only to small-party candidates, is an epithet of political bigotry. It says to people who want to enter the electoral arena and talk about ignored but important issues that they should not do so.

It says the two big parties own all the voters, and they should not be taken away by third-party candidates who can’t win. Nor should these candidates be given an opportunity to build voter familiarity and an eventual chance at winning over several elections.

Many Americans, despite their disgust with the behavior of the two major parties, think nothing of telling people not to run because they’ll be “spoilers.” That is equivalent to telling candidates to shut up — a nasty demand that one would not readily use in daily interactions.

Even so, I was surprised that my mere signing of former state legislator Jonathan Pelto’s petition, along with thousands of other Connecticut voters, to get him on the gubernatorial ballot made news. After all, giving voters more choices and voices in an election year should be as American as apple pie and the Fourth of July. Except that it isn’t…

How could it get more depressing to voters and potential candidates? Second, by a system that looks like insider manipulation by local party operatives, with a system headed by a Secretary of the State powerless to enforce the law and free from full actual responsibility as the State’s “Chief Election Official”.

The only good news in this: There is enough remnants of our formerly world-leading Freedom Of Information law, a smart candidate, and apparently no questions asked cooperation from the Secretary of the State’s Office in providing transparency. (At least that is what we have experienced from the Merrill and Bysiewicz administrations, and have no reason to doubt here).

On Sunday, petitioning candidate Jon Pelto, on his blog described his efforts of see what was actually happening with his petitions, it is a long sad, interesting story. W applaud his initiative to find what is so:  You call this a Democracy?<read> His blog post is well worth reading.  We also applaud the Courant for an article in today’s edition covering the story and summarizing the issues, based on the information developed by Pelto, hopefully they have been, or will, be joined by other media in the State: Pelto Sweating Out Signature Count, Says He May Sue If Denied Ballot Access  <read>

Merrill’s office has been allowing Pelto, under supervision, to examine hundreds of petitions that it already has logged in — and he said it’s now clear that “dozens” of signatures were wrongly rejected by local officials.

Pelto said some of the unjustified reasons given for those rejections included: the lack of a full birth date in a space on the petition form that isn’t mandatory; a woman including her married name after the maiden name under which she was registered, even though all other information matched local records; and petition signers being on a local list of “inactive” voters, after not voting for a couple of years…

As Pelto riffled through stacks of petition sheets Tuesday, he said that Merrill’s staff already had agreed with him that some of the local officials’ rejections are unjustified. But, he added, Merrill’s office cannot overrule the decisions of local officials, many of whom are party insiders. Merrill can only compile the local officials’ certified totals; if they add up to 7,500 or more, she puts the candidate on the ballot.

[Deputy Secretary of the State James] Spallone said it appears Pelto is correct in at least some of what he says. For example, Spallone said, a signature shouldn’t be rejected simply because a person is on the local “inactive” voter list. People on that list must be allowed to vote if they show up on Election Day and verify their identities, he said, adding that “simply being ‘inactive,’ on its own, is not enough to reject a signature.”

Editorial

This election demonstrates the worst of money in political campaigns with two sides with large stores of cash, along with only slightly “separate” groups assisting with even more cash. Much to the discredit of our once leading public financing system, struggling survival along with our FOI laws.

It also demonstrates the worst of our decentralized, dual partisan Registrars of Voters system of elections, with an almost powerless Secretary of the State. It is time to consider reforming the system by regionalization as we have suggested, and not make it worse as the Courant has been advocating.

And for turnout, that indicator and symptom of the value the electorate places on participation in elections. We have some suggestions to consider:

  • Make it easier for third-party candidates to get on the ballot, easier to qualify for public financing. Let us start with a level playing field for public financing, and officials that follow the law, with a “Chief Election Official” with actual responsibility for elections.
  • Reform the decentralized partisan election system.
  • Eliminate the “Spoiler” effect, provide more democracy, with a true runoff election when one candidate does not get 50_% of the vote.

Let us recall that in this generation, two third-party “spoilers” did win elections in Connecticut: Governor Lowell Weicker, and Senator Joe Lieberman.

Please Review the Facts – Constitutional Amendment on Ballot in Nov

Courant makes a mostly accurate case for and against amendment that would increase voter convenience and absentee vote fraud.

What is a voter to do? We suggest: Evaluate the evidence, read this post, read the Courant article, study some of our past posts on this issue and absentee fraud in Connecticut.

Courant makes a mostly accurate case for and against amendment that would increase voter convenience and absentee vote fraud.

What is a voter to do? We suggest:

Evaluate the evidence, read this post, read the Courant article, study some of our past posts on this issue and absentee fraud in Connecticut.

Courant story:   High Ideals and Partisan Politics Mix In Amendment Issue <read>

Here are the facts and ramifications we believe are accurate:

  • The amendment would allow the Legislature to enact no-excuse absentee voting and/or early voting.
  • It is very likely that our Democratic Legislature would pass no-excuse absentee voting on a close to partisan vote in 2015. A supporter, Governor Malloy, would sign it into law. A Governor Folley would likely follow his party and veto it.   Perhaps they and the other candidates on the ballot should each be asked that question.
  • No excuse absentee voting would increase convenience for some lazy and less committed, less interested voters.
  • No excuse absentee voting would increase the opportunity and level of absentee fraud, the most prevalent type of election fraud, with the possible exception of undetected insider fraud.
  • No excuse absentee voting, unlike statements in the Courant article, would be likely to decrease or not change turnout.
  • As the Courant states, it only matters in close elections, yet little else matters except when elections are close.
  • Most Democrats are for this amendment for partisan reasons.
  • Most Republicans are for this for partisan reasons.
  • It is unlikely that early voting will be passed and implemented in Connecticut as it would be expensive and logistically challenging, especially to small towns, given our town by town voting system – or moderately expensive, less satisfactory, likely discriminatory.

What is a voter to do? We suggest:

  • Evaluate the evidence, read this post, read the Courant article, study some of our past posts on this issue and absentee fraud in Connecticut here and here.
  • As CTVotersCount readers know, we come down against no-excuse absentee voting, and for early voting, if we are willing to pay for fair and safe early voting.

Here we want to elaborate on a couple points from above:

  • No excuse absentee voting, unlike statements in the Courant article, would be likely to DECREASE turnout.
    • We suggest reading our posts on what we believe are the most scientific studies of turnout, absentee voting, and same day voter registration. <here>
    • Read the statements of Professor Doug Chapin, an expert on election administration, invited by the Secretary of the State to speak to her Elections Performance Task Force, who has read many studies and agrees with the ones we find most convincing  <hear>
    • These studies conclude that no-excuse absentee voting actually DECREASES turnout. And that Election Day Registration (EDR) alone increases turnout, and in combination there is not increase or decrease in turnout caused by no-excuse absentee voting. (Yet we speculate that Connecticut’s unique low cost, inconvenient EDR system will not add significantly to turnout, nor stem a decrease caused by early voting)
  • As the Courant states, it only matters in close elections, yet little else matters except when elections are close.Here in Connecticut close elections happen, and matter:

 

Courant Editorial: Why Is State’s Election Website So Bad?

The Courant has done a service to the voters of Connecticut pointing out a flaw in the Secretary of the State’s web site that does not serve voters. The editorial is not an exaggeration, it might be a bit too kind. UPDATED.

The Courant has done a service to the voters of Connecticut pointing out a flaw in the Secretary of the State’s web site that does not serve voters. The editorial is not an exaggeration, it might be a bit too kind.

Just a bit of background.  What is the information voters most want from an elections web site, state or local?  One study says it is not how to register, how to do an absentee vote, nor where to vote. Those are important. Yet, what most voters want to know, most of all, is “What is on the ballot?”.

From the Courant:

Why Is State’s Election Website So Bad?

Want to know which candidates are running in Tuesday’s primary elections? Good luck finding them on the secretary of the state’s website.

This website is an unnavigable embarrassment. Voters should be able, with a click or two, to find out who’s on the ballot. Is that too much to ask?

The secretary’s office issued a news release July 31 saying a list of candidates was posted on http://www.sots.ct.gov/vote. But the list posted midday Friday was in the wrong place and with some of the wrong names.

And just getting to that inaccurate list was a labyrinthian exercise in frustration.

As of lunchtime Friday, the list of contenders for the Aug. 12 primary for governor and lieutenant governor was blank. The candidates were actually listed under the wrong date — “11/04/2014-General.” (Go figure.) Friday’s list included candidates not running in Tueday’s primary.

The secretary said that would be changed Friday afternoon.

This is important information. There’s no excuse for the state not getting it right — and in a place easy to find — just before an election.

We investigated by finding the same information the Courant did. Unlike a most voters, we are familiar with the Secretary’s web site, yet perhaps we are a little less patient.  We found the same information (or lack thereof) the Courant found. Then we went back and traced the steps a very patient and persistent voter might traverse:

First we looked under “Voter Information” and found the link for “Town by Town Sample Ballots”.  But the latest information there was for last November’s election:

Then after looking for a while, we found the link. Going back, attempting to pretend that we were that patient voter. We got to this screen about six (6) clicks from the home page. Not under “Voter Information”, but under “Election Information and Statistics”:

Note: it has no listing for the Primary 4 days away, only for the general election, and completely missing the race for Governor. The race for Governor might be missing because the candidates are incomplete, due to the Primary. But then why is Lt Governor listed, which is also subject to primary in the same party?

We are still two clicks away from a PDF for each individual office, which must be accessed separately, rather than one complete list, better delivered as a html web page.

Finally, we note that apparently the Secretary’s Office did not do as promised yesterday, and make the link touted in the Press Release have the promised information. In any case, we doubt many voters would expect to need to read press releases to find links to election information.

UPDATE:  As David Bidell points out in the 1st comment, as of sometime this morning it was updated.  I might have missed it earlier this morning.

Cyber Risk to Power – Is not just electricity and gas

Utility Regulator Arthur House writes on cyber risks and precautions for utilities in a Hartford Courant Op-ed. We point out the similar risks to Internet voting. While Utah takes a more studied approach to expanding their Internet voting.

Utility Regulator Arthur House writes on cyber risks and precautions for utilities in a Hartford Courant Op-ed:  Cyber Defense Requires National Coordination <read>

It does not take an overactive imagination to picture the fallout from a cyber attack on an
American public utility. The consequences of knocking out the generation and/or distribution of
electricity, water, natural gas or communications could ripple so far and wide, it could be
considered an act of war. No wonder that some call the efforts that nations, individuals and
groups make to “test” our systems and conduct intrusions “battlefield preparations.”

Our intelligence community and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are rightly concerned about cyber threats to our public utilities. As with air travel and financial services, the relatively open United States is vulnerable to an array of dangers involving computer management.

Intrusions are increasing in frequency and sop histication and reported in the media. Perpetrators  include those with ties to countries that have little commitment to, or even disdain for, cyber security. Individuals and groups can be particularly dangerous, because they do not fear the consequences that might befall a nation.

There is a gap between those at the federal level who are actively engaged against cyber threats and those in states who oversee public utilities and are trying to understand and develop approaches to the problem…

Using federal expertise and experience, the regulators and the utilities can jointly establish cyber security standards — covering modernizing management practices, vetting personnel, establishing cultures of security, implementing software defenses, ensuring physical security and participating in trade association cyber defense programs

We wrote a letter  to the editor, posted online and slightly modified by the Courant, still containing one of our typos: Cyber Risks To Voting As Well <read>

Arthur House’s July 21 op-ed, ” Cyber Attacks Require National Coordination” articulates the cyber risks to our power utilities, as should be expected from a former director of communications for the director of national intelligence.

Yet, voters and the legislature should be concerned beyond physical power. Cyber risks are just as threatening to political power — the power to vote and to choose our government.

Twice the Connecticut legislature has unanimously passed Internet voting. For good reasons the governor vetoed it in 2012, yet inexplicably signed it in 2013. Many computer scientists and security experts oppose Internet voting because in cannot be made safe. Internet voting has been discredited by a Department of Defense study, security experts from the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Thoughtful leaders of all persuasions oppose internet voting, including Secretary of the State Denise Merrill and former Federal Elections Commission member Hans von Spakovsky of the Heritage Foundation.

Mr. House’s central point us that, without federal expertise and assistance, cyber security is beyond the capabilities of state government and utilities. It follows that Internet voting cannot be accomplished safely by the state and each of our 169 municipalities.

Meanwhile, in Utah, they plan wider adoption of Internet voting. The only good thing over Connecticut is that they recognize some of the risks and plan on studying them before they move forward:  State committee studying feasibility of extending online voting to more Utahns <read>

Utah Director of Elections Mark Thomas said making online voting available more widely could be a challenge.

“The lieutenant governor wanted to look at if we were to expand that, what are some of the hurdles,” Thomas said. “It would be nice to have kind of a road map on where to go, what are the landmines we need to be aware of.”

The biggest issue, he said, is security.

“Security is going to be No. 1. Part of the reason security is such a big issue is because you have the issue of a secret ballot. If I cast my ballot online, it can’t be able to be traced back to me. That’s my constitutional protection,” Thomas said.

The hope is that the lieutenant governor’s iVote Advisory Committee that began meeting earlier this month will have identified a half-dozen or so issues associated with statewide online voting before the 2015 Legislature starts in January, he said.

At that point, the next step may be hiring security experts to tackle those issues, Thomas said.

“We certainly aren’t going to, by the end of the year, have this all figured out and put to bed,” he said. “There are some very complicated issues.”

Another member of the new committee, Salt Lake County Clerk Sherrie Swensen, also questions whether Utahns will be voting online anytime soon.

“I hope that sometime in the future it will be something that happens,” Swensen said. “I admire the lieutenant governor’s office for wanting to explore this and be progressive, but I think there’s a lot to overcome before we get to that point.”

Like Thomas, Swensen said she’s not sure how a system can both identify those voting online while maintaining the secrecy of their ballots. Election officials now keep the names of voters separate from their ballots.

“That’s a huge challenge,” Swensen said, along with an online system being hacked. “For all of the clever ways people figure out how to hack into various systems, I think that’s the biggest danger, if they could hack in and skew results.”

The longtime county clerk recalled the controversy over the switch in recent years to electronic voting machines that aren’t connected to the Internet. The public’s concern was eased by the paper trail created by the machines, Swensen said.

The paper records are audited each election and could be used to tabulate the results if the machines were to malfunction.

“We could recreate an entire election,” she said.