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Rational reasons against the National Popular Vote

Jason Paul joins a group of distinguished, prominent, and thoughtful democrats who have warned of the risks of the Compact: Former Wesleyan Professor and U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Former Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, Former State University Chancellor William Cibes, and Minnesota Secretary of State Mark Ritchie.

CTNewsJunkie hosted dueling op-eds for and against the National Popular Vote Compact: Procedural Problems Plague National Popular Vote Compact Bill <Jason Paul against> <Andrea Levien against>

Jason echoes some of the same concerns we have expressed in our earlier op-ed at CTNewsJunkie and our testimony to the General Assembly.

Unfortunately, too much of the discussion and debate has revolved around the normative question: Would it be better to have a national popular vote or an Electoral College process? This is an interesting discussion and I am honestly quite torn on the question. From a normative perspective, I would probably pick the National Popular Vote.

Too many people are answering the normative question, however, and then ending the inquiry. When it comes to this bill that simply cannot be where the discussion stops. The practicalities and the details of running elections matter immensely. Shortcuts are problematic.

Under the current system, the Presidential election is decided based on the outcomes in 56 districts (50 states, plus D.C. and five congressional districts in two states that give a vote to the winner of their Congressional districts). These are all separate election contests, administered by 51 different state bodies (the 50 states, plus D.C.] Each of these 51 bodies has different rules, different guidelines, and different standards. This is fine because each body’s rules only affect the result in its own state or district. Federal laws cover the most egregious potential voting abuses; beyond that, states administer their own elections. That would change if we adopted a National Popular Vote Compact. Instead of giving them control of their own territory, these 51 different bodies would have a degree of control over the entire election system. This poses serious problems.

Here’s one example. A national recount could be a nightmare under any system. Consider that for the 2012 election, revised vote totals were still coming in all the way into February 2013, with new votes in the tens of thousands and the margin of victory changing by the thousands. The margins were large enough that each state was able to declare a winner in time for the electoral college. The late tallies didn’t matter to the outcome — this time. Under the National Popular Vote Compact, the problems would be even worse, and potentially unresolvable.

Currently, in case of a very close election in a state, there is a well-established procedure for conducting a recount according to that state’s rules. Under the compact, because there is no national system, there is no mechanism for conducting a nationwide recount. What is worse, there is no way to force states to participate in a national recount. Because the compact need only be among states with a total of more than 270 electoral votes and not all states, there will be some states that will quite rightfully take the position that they are still in the old system of 51 differing bodies. They will feel no obligation to even consider the impact of the new system. The compact-participating states won’t be able to do anything about it. States can’t force each other to do things. This would make it incredibly difficult to even have a nationwide recount.

If we are going to go from one system (sum of state outcomes) to another, (national popular vote), we need to have an understanding of how the procedural problems will be worked out. Otherwise, it is easy to conceive of a nearly endless number of problems, which would mean lots of trips to court. I would contend it is bad for elections to be decided in court. It might be possible to work out these problems under a compact system, but right now, I do not think they are even reasonably addressed. Until it is possible to answer basic questions — such as how to conduct a national recount — the idea is too flawed to implement. We should not chose the normative value over practical considerations, because it puts the credibility of our electoral system at risk. The proponents need to work out the bugs.

Paul provides a very articulate description of the problems. In the 1st comment on the op-ed we have extended his concerns with a summary our op-ed and testimony.

Andrea Levien is a “Researh Fellow at FairVote”, one of the well-financed national groups working toward the National Popular Vote agreement. Her arguments seem to have more to do with money than voting integrity. While these are among many considerations, to us, they do not stack up against the added risks of a national popular vote without a uniform trusted national election system.

I have lived and voted in three cities since I turned 18: New Haven, New York City, and Washington, D.C.

While I have been extremely proud to call each of these unique cities my home, they all have one big disadvantage for a young voter who cares about presidential politics: none of these cities are located in swing states, the only states that ever receive any attention in presidential elections.

Barack Obama and Mitt Romney spent 99.6 percent of their television advertising money in the general election targeting voters in just 10 states, including the usual focus on Ohio and Florida. Neither candidate held a single campaign event outside those 10 states after the party conventions. The 2008 election wasn’t much different, with only a few more states receiving any attention at all.

I am not so sure that any Connecticut voter would be more informed by a candidate rally or visit to Bridgeport than a similar rally reported from Philadelphia. It would be great for the media moguls out of state who would get the bulk of profits from advertising in the Courant or on Comcast.

Levien also points to a study by a Ph.D. candidate which demonstrates that Presidential administrations distribute grants based on political considerations <read>. We certainly do not dispute that. Yet, the national popular vote would be a deck chair move in return for a ticket on the Titanic. It would change the distribution criteria based on alternative political considerations from swing states to areas that would be considered ripe for raising or decreasing votes for and against candidates.

LA: Two campigns debate absentee ballot fraud. Meanwhile in Hartford and New Haven plans to prove early voting works.

In La, apparently there is evidence and no disagreement that fraud occurred. The issue is which campaign did it. Maybe it is both? Absentee voting is a convenience, not just for voters, it really helps fraudsters as well.

Cash strapped New Haven would be a bad place to test early voting in 2013. It is the first competitive election in New Haven in 20 years. Turnout is all but guaranteed to increase – early voting or not – we can predict that early voting would get the credit.

Apparently there is evidence and no disagreement that fraud occurred. The issue is which campaign did it. Maybe it is both? Absentee voting is a convenience, not just for voters, it really helps fraudsters as well.

Brad Friedman reviews the story and reflects the same concerns with mail voting that we have: Absentee Ballot Fraud Allegations in L.A. Underscore (Again) Dangers of Vote-By-Mail <read>

The BRAD BLOG has long detailed the dangers of Vote-by-Mail and absentee balloting, describing the practice as “terrible for democracy,” for a number of reasons. Among those reasons are the ease by which absentee ballots can be undetectably gamed, bought or sold, used for intimidation (“Show me that you voted this particular way or you will be fired/beaten, etc.”) or otherwise lost in the mail, never added to the optically-scanned computer tally, etc., just to name a few.

Usually when we point these matters out, we’ll get some amount of push back, most notably from someone from Oregon, where many voters love their all Vote-by-Mail elections (despite all the dangers, as demonstrated once again by the recent stories out of the state where, in one, a man was convicted of fraud after offering $20 for blank, unvoted ballots prior to the 2012 election, and another where an election official was charged with fraud after it was discovered she was filling in unvoted races in favor of Republicans while processing incoming mailed ballots.)

Those allegations in Oregon are new to us. It just confirms that claims that everything is fine with their all mail-in system are not justified.

Meanwhile in LA, from the LA Times as quoted by Brad:

Prosecutors are investigating allegations of voter fraud in Little Armenia, part of a Los Angeles City Council district where two candidates are waging a bitter battle for an open seat.

According to a spokeswoman for L.A. County Dist. Atty. Jackie Lacey, prosecutors are trying to determine whether backers of one candidate illegally filled out mail-in ballots for dozens of voters in the Armenian enclave in East Hollywood. The May 21 election will decide who succeeds Eric Garcetti, who is running for mayor…

The complaint alleges that O’Farrell campaign workers filled out voters’ ballots for their candidate while telling them they were voting for Sam Kbushyan, a candidate of Armenian descent who ran and lost during the primary election.

Kbushyan and many of his former campaign volunteers are now working on behalf of O’Farrell.

The O’Farrell campaign rebuts the allegations, saying it was [opposition candidate John] Choi workers who filled out and took ballots from voters. “These are Choi people who are doing this,” O’Farrell spokeswoman Renee Nahum said.

Meanwhile, in Connecticut, for Hartford Courant Editorial Board, anything goes, it supports the safer option in-person early voting and unlimited absentee voting : Early Voting Options May Be Premature <read>

Changes that might be in the offing could include early voting in all its manifestations: no-excuse absentee voting, voting before Election Day at the precinct or a voting center, voting by mail and so forth.

As it stands now, the Connecticut Constitution forbids early voting in statewide elections except for voters casting absentee ballots under very strict circumstances such as illness, infirmity, religious proscriptions or being absent from the state on Election Day. This narrow early-voting rule could be scrapped by the legislature if the constitutional amendment is approved by voters.

As for the early-voting pilot program in this year’s municipal elections being pushed by three New Haven representatives: Lawmakers need to ask state Attorney General George Jepsen for an opinion on its legality.

As for the early-voting pilot program in this year’s municipal elections being pushed by three New Haven representatives: Lawmakers need to ask state Attorney General George Jepsen for an opinion on its legality…

The state constitution doesn’t speak specifically to the question of voting early in municipal elections. Neither did then-Attorney General Richard Blumenthal specifically address local elections in a 2009 informal opinion to lawmakers saying a constitutional amendment would be required to permit no-excuse absentee voting in Connecticut.

The pilot might pass constitutional muster — or it might not.

Early voting will spur turnout in elections for local office. Far too few voters go to the polls to choose mayors, selectmen and members of boards of education and finance. Low turnout drains the life from municipal government, the level of government closest to the people.

We agree that the Constitutionality should be evaluated. Where we also disagree is the claim that forms of early voting increases turnout. They increase convenience, yet are proven by the best science available to actually decrease turnout.

National Popular Vote Risks – Think Before You Encourage Passage

We are getting the annual emails requesting that voters encourage the Connecticut General Assembly to join only eight other states and the District of Columbia that have signed on to the National Popular Vote Agreement/Compact since 2007. There are many reasons to the like the concept of one person one vote, however, there are strong reasons to require that the current system be corrected first, in order that we actually have a fair, credible, and accurate process. Without a trusted, equal, auditable, recountable uniform national election system for President, it is not worth the risks. The devil is truly in the details.

We recommend reviewing our op-ed from earlier this year: Voting Requires Vigilance. Popular Isn’t Always Prudent<read>

And William Cibes op-ed from last year The “National Popular Vote” Interstate Compact Is a Bad Idea <read>

Or Chris DeSanctis echoing Daniel Patrick Moynihan NO: Electoral College Votes Should Represent State Voters’ Choice <read>

For even more in depth discussion see our testimony, earlier this year <read>

Bills Approved Earlier by the GAE Committee

As promised, comments on earlier bills passed through the Government Administration and Elections Committee.

As promised, comments on other bills passed through the Government Administration and Elections Committee.

S.B. 901 Post-Election Audits This bill would allow officials to perform the post-election audit by counting with an identical AccuVote-OS scanner and memory card. Connecticut would go down as in history as the first state to effectively kill post-election audits. Machine Assisted Audits that are publicly verifiable are possible, but not this way.

S.B. 1058 Destroying Unused Absentee Ballots By Town Clerks We would like to see a comprehensive strengthening and standardization of the retention of all ballots. Currently clerks retain voted absentee ballots in manila envelopes in unnumbered tamper evident tape, for six months or twenty-two months. Polling place ballots are retained for the same period by registrars, and are sealed in bags with numbered tamper evident seals, for only fourteen days. Without comprehensive reform, this is essentially a harmless bill.

S.B. 1118 Prohibits Some Criminals From Certification As Moderators A common sense idea, although we know of none who have been. We would like to see the same criminals prevented from becoming Registrars of Voters and Registrars at minimum required to be certified as Moderators.

S.B. 6630 Allowing Delivery of Absentee Ballots At An Agreed Upon Time Codifying what is largely already the actual practice.

H.B. 6635 Requiring Election Results To Be Certified By Local Officials Seven Days After An Election We would be for this bill if an earlier or later date were chosen. Recanvasses must be complete eight days after an election. Specifying seven days is too late to cause a necessary recanvass, and too short to reflect the difference made by a recanvass. Looks like more work at a less than useful time.

S.B. 647 A Report On Laws To Be Changed For Online Voting We see no need for another report. We know it is risky, we know it is unconstitutional. Better than S.B. 283 that mandates fax and email voting this year, just like the bill vetoed by Governor Malloy last year.

S.B. 432 National Popular Vote Agreement/Compact An act we have long opposed because it would make a flawed system for electing the President even worse. We would be in favor of the popular election of the President if we had a, verifiablyaccurate, uniform, enforceable, and enforceable election system.

S.B. 433 Creating a Democracy Index A well intentioned idea to collect, publish, and track data around election performance. We like the idea, but will remain skeptical until we see what is collected, how accurately it is collected, and if the program is well done for several cycles. Otherwise it may just produce some feel good statistics or be quietly ignored. As Norman Augustine said, tong in cheek, “Most projects start off kind of slow, and then sort of taper off”.

H.B. 5999 Provisional Ballots For State And Municipal Offices A good idea, still needed even with Election Day Registration. e.g. When a voter claims to be eligible to register or to vote when already checked-off and officials question that.

H.J. 36 To Change The Constitution To Allow The Legislature To Decide Early Voting We supported this because the Legislature may be in a better position to choose and correct voting methods than the blunt method of specific Constitutional Amendment. But we wonder some times when we see inadequate early voting bills proposed to take effect before and amendment, after years of insisting an amendment is necessary. Either it is or it is not necessary – pass one set of bills with confidence or perhaps face court challenges.

Committee Approves 39 Bills In Last Meeting

The Government Administration and Elections Committee met for the last time before its deadline to consider and approve 39 bills. After an hour long Democratic caucus they discussed the bills for about three hours. In honor of the late Roger Ebert we provide graphic summaries of our comments.

The Government Administration and Elections Committee met for the last time before its deadline to consider and approve 39 bills. After an hour long Democratic caucus they discussed the bills for about three hours. <agenda> In honor of the late Roger Ebert we provide graphic summaries of our comments.

S.B. 4 Early Voting This would mandate early voting for eight days before each state (even year) election. We are not against early voting, yet this bill needs more details to protect voters and guide officials, especially in the areas of ballot security, registration, and check-in coordination. It also might be unconstitutional. It will be quite costly, especially for small towns. It also includes an unrelated provision attempting to force the Secretary of the State and Registrars to limit lines to 15 minutes at most.

S.B. 5 Campaign Finance Disclosure This bill would increase disclosure requirements for independent campaign spending, including listing top donors in advertisements. Ironically for disclosure, a similar bill last was written behind closed doors, with no opportunity for testimony, and later a “rat” provision for email and fax military voting was added. We are half-way to a better process this year, and hopefully to passage of a clean bill for cleaner campaigns.

S.B 1146 Ending Cross Endorsements From the discussion almost no member of the GAE was in favor of the bill. It seems only Senate President, Senator Williams is in favor. Several members echoed the public testimony all but uniformly against the bill. They appreciated the cross endorsements they have received, said the bill was a “solution in search of a problem”, noted cross endorsements might decrease the spoiler effect and enliven democracy. Several said maybe there was a way to reduce “voter confusion”. Our take is that there is no voter confusion, but registrar confusion and resistance to the straight-forward, yet bothersome allocation of dual votes for the same candidates to parties. Most confusing to the public, is the many members who voted for the bill after speaking against it.

S.B. 777 Allowing Voters To Be Checked-in Electronically We favor electronic check-in. It is not proven to speed up lines, it might slow them down a bit, requiring more pollworkers. But done well it can make check-in more accurate and updating who voted faster and more accurate. With connectivity it could cut down calls to the registrars office for voters who have moved, and let voters check-in in any line. We testified against the original bill because it set no standards for electronic check-in equipment and processes. UPDATED. Based on reviewing the approved bill, not yet online, we are pleased that the Committee took our advice and required approval of check-in equipment by the Secretary of the State.

S.B. 778 Consolidation of Polling Places for Primaries We are all for allowing for the consolidation of polling places for primaries. Many towns do this already for referendums. The Governor vetoed this bill last year because he said it might be confusing to voters and the provision for secret objection by candidates. We agree with the Governor on the second point, we do not see how such objections would actually remain secret. We do not know if we would veto it just for that, but would much rather see only an-on-the-record public objection.

H.B. 5600 Making Rulings, Instructions, and Opinions Issued by The Secretary of the State Enforceable We asked for something similar several years ago. We see this bill is unchanged from the original draft. We would like it to include regulations which are not currently agreed to be enforceable. We would like it to require a specific posting method for all such items and require them to cite this law. We like the provision that voter ID requirements be posted in all polling places. Overall we would be pleased to seethis become law.

S.B. 729 Pilot Program for Early Voting in Municipal Elections. Allows up to nine towns of varying sizes to apply to pilot early voting, this November. We are all for pilot programs. We are concerned that this on lacks the same security and check-in requirements of S.B. 4 discussed earlier. It requires a report by the Secretary of the State by last January, (hopefully to be corrected) . We wish that report were specifically required to cover costs, security, and check-in coordination issues. We also wonder how many towns, especially small towns will be willing to pay for a pilot. We are also concerned that it will simply result in a feel-good approval of the idea, especially if New Haven pilots in the first open mayoral race in years, almost guaranteed to increase turnout. Overall we hope some valuable lessons will be learned, but have concerns with constitutionality.

H.B 6111 Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act We testified against this bill. It was a sketchy, blank-check, with many potential provisions that required scrutiny for coordination with existing law, especially for primaries, special elections, and referendums. Maybe the GAE listened to us. The resulting bill will help military and overseas voters, but only apply to elections. We cannot be sure of all the details – registrars would know more if there were any conflicting provisions. It calls for a bit of work on the part of the Secretary of the State, but is missing deadlines for those requirements – that can be good or bad in this case. We are pleased to be able to support this bill which will help military and overseas voters.

S.B. 283 Email and Fax Military Voting. We remain opposed to all forms of Internet voting: online, fax, or email. This is the same concept stuck in the campaign finance bill last year, without hearings. The same bill vetoed by Governor Malloy because email and fax voting is risky and unconstitutional. We cannot figure out the GAE this year, passing this bill and passing earlier S.B. 647 which mandates for a report from the Secretary of the State due next January on how email and fax voting could be accomplished and how the law would need to change. One representative keeps calling this a “Veterans Bill”. This veteran does not get how it helps anyone to risk votes and destroy the secret vote guaranteed by the Connecticut Constitution.

H.B 5903 Resolving Tie Votes A sensible minor change requiring that after tie votes, only the tied candidates should be on the ballot for the run-off election.

H.J. 3 Resolution To Congress RE: Protecting Free Speech Rights of Persons Against the assault of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision.

So much for one day. In the next few days, I will go back and do the same for the bills approved earlier in the session. Given past practices, many of these bills may change dramatically going forward and be consolidated together or into other bills, so our assessments may change.

Kentucky and Connecticut (for now) choose to evaluate online voting

We are not done in Connecticut, even for this year. Two other bills are still in play. A competing online voting bill, and the UMOVEA bill. The last Committee meeting that can approve bills is Friday April 5th. Perhaps the competing bill will be dropped or also changed to a study. Perhaps the UMOVEA bill was mentioned because it contains provisions to help military vote, but likely not provisions for online voting. Beyond that all bills are subject to dramatic change and consolidation prior to votes by the Senate and House. Like last year, a section authorizing online voting could be stuffed into any other bill by the Committee, even a bill otherwise especially attractive the Governor.

This week Kentucky and Connecticut chose to evaluate online, email, and fax voting for the military.

On Thursday, Kentucky the Secretary of the State is a strong proponent of Military voting. The Legislature has been pushing back and finally chose to support online delivery of ballots (required by the Federal MOVE Act for Federal elections) and to study electronic returns <read>

Kentucky military personnel serving overseas will be able to get ballots electronically under legislation approved late Tuesday in the Kentucky General Assembly. How they send them back is still to be determined. Working until the last minute of the 2013 session, legislators went back to the original Senate version of the military voting bill that allowed for electronic sending of ballots to overseas military, but snail mail return of the ballot. The legislation also establishes a task force to study electronic returns—the preferred method of Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes. The task force will address safety concerns with that option.

Like many individuals and articles, the Kentucky article assumes the alternative to electronic return is “snail mail”, ignoring the option of free express return for Federal elections and the options of states paying for free express mail in other elections – hard to imagine a price approaching the $1000 a ballot typical of online military voting. Hard to imagine anything more risky than email and fax voting.

In 2011 the Connecticut Legislature went through a similar trajectory with online(*) voting opposed by Secretary of the State Merrill. Near the end of the session the bill was changed from a mandate to a requirement that the Secretary provide a report on online voting. She responded with a Symposium on Online Voting, with national experts. By our count about 50-60 voters attended, including only three legislators <video> At least one who attended was not impressed, another who did not attend was also not impressed <read> Given the developments in 2012 and 2013 very few, if any, Legislators were impressed.

Undeterred in 2012, fax and email voting, with no public hearings was stuffed into an emergency bill for campaign finance. That bill ended in a veto by Governor Malloy, based partially on the risks of such voting and the unconstitutionality of violating the right of a secret vote. <read>

On Wednesday the Connecticut GAE Committee passed a bill forward asking for a report from the Secretary of the State, not yet available online with the rest of the information on the bill:

AN ACT CONCERNING VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY SERVING OVERSEAS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective from passage) The Secretary of the State, in consultation with the Military Department, shall develop a method for returning any ballot issued pursuant to section 9-153f of the general statutes that (1) may be used by any elector or applicant for admission as an elector who is a member of the armed forces and expects to be living or traveling outside the several states of the United States and the District of Columbia before and on election day, or such member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, (2) gives due consideration to the interests of maintaining the security of such ballot and the privacy of information contained on such ballot, and (3) guarantees the immediate receipt of such ballot if such method is properly utilized by such member or member’s spouse or dependent prior to the closing of polls on the day of the election or primary. Not later than January 1, 2014, the Secretary of the State shall submit a report, in accordance with section 11-4a of the general statutes, to the joint standing committees of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to elections and veterans’ and military affairs describing such method and any legislative changes necessary for its implementation.

The bill does not seem to expect the Secretary to object, but to design a method that meets the requirements of the bill. Even so, it is a tall order. A quick analysis suggests:

“Guaranteeing Immediate Receipt” would seem to preclude email voting since email is neither immediate nor guaranteed.
Also “Guaranteeing Immediate Receipt” would likely preclude a state centralized fax or web based voting system unless the law were changed to classify that central receipt as sufficient to equal official receipt by the Town Clerk, which is now required for absentee ballots.
Including “member’s spouse or dependent” would seem to preclude email or web based return by Military computers – we doubt the Military authorizes use for such dependents.
Gives “gives due consideration to the interests of maintaining the security of such ballot and the privacy of information contained on such ballot” would seem to require consideration and adherence to the Connecticut Constitution’s requirement that “The right of secret voting shall be preserved”. Short of requiring a change to the Connecticut Constitution, email and fax voting would be precluded as demonstrated by the text of last year’s bill requiring an unconstitutional waiver of secret voting for email and fax voting.
Perhaps at a huge cost, commercial online web voting systems could be judged, or better still proven to not violate the secret ballot.
Another issue, perhaps especially with online web voting, is the issue of a voter-verified-paper-record required by all voting machines in state law. In any of these online methods neither the state nor local officials have a voter-verified-paper-record. Of course that law could be changed if necessary or overridden in specific cases.

We are not done in Connecticut, even for this year. Responding to objections to only a study by some GAE Committee members, a co-chair said that two other bills were still in play. A competing online voting bill, and the UMOVEA bill. The last Committee meeting that can approve bills is Friday April 5th. Perhaps the competing bill will be dropped or also changed to a study. Perhaps the UMOVEA bill was mentioned because it contains provisions to help military vote, but likely not provisions for online voting. Beyond that all bills are subject to dramatic change and consolidation prior to votes by the Senate and House. Like last year, a section authorizing online voting could be stuffed into any other bill by the Committee, even a bill otherwise especially attractive the Governor.

* As a long time computer scientist, programming computers since 1966, the term “online” to me is an application with a person using a computer tied to a central database. To me, “Online voting” in 2013 would be a voter entering votes on a web page to be entered into a database. But the common usage for “online voting” seems to include creating a .pdf and submitting it through a web page, emailing votes, and even using fax for submitting votes. I would call that all “Internet voting”, since the phone system used for faxing and calling these days is difficult to distinguish from the internet (with a small ‘i’). But for clarity I have started using “online web voting” for any method of voting involving interactive access to a system designed specifically to collect votes or voted ballots.

Testimony on two bills – Disclosure and Early Voting

Almost all the legislators from both parties made “political hay” (that is intended as a cliche like “fox in the hen house”) out of former and future candidate for Governor, Tom Foley’s testimony on legislative ethics. He admitted authorship of questionable concepts not worded to match his intent. I can only wonder what would happen if all bills were required to identify the author? Would I have tempered my remarks on early voting, had everyone known the source of that inadequate and contradictory text? Would the result be less bills with better text?

Yesterday, the Government Administration and Elections Committee held hearings on several bills covering political ad disclosure, ending cross-endorsements, Legislative conflicts of interest, and early voting. I testified in favor of more disclosure and urged that early voting be sent back to the drawing board <Prepared Remarks> <Disclosure> <Early Voting>

Earlier in the session I complained about bills being too sketchy to testify for or against, including early voting. This time we had a longer early voting bill full of holes and, as I said in my testimony ,it “couples omissions with ambiguity”. George Cody, Registrar, New Canaan and I each found several glitches the other one of us missed.

Please defer action on early voting for a time when Connecticut is prepared to pay for it. And when there is time to develop and hear testimony on a detailed bill with guarantees of protection and voter service.

Almost all the legislators from both parties made “political hay” (that is intended as a cliche like “fox in the henhouse”) out of former and future candidate for Governor, Tom Foley’s testimony on legislative ethics. He admitted authorship of questionable concepts not worded to match his intent. I can only wonder what would happen if all bills were required to identify the author? Would I have tempered my remarks on early voting, had everyone known the source of that inadequate and contradictory text? Would the result be less bills with better text?

[Why NOT] Let Overseas Military Fax Votes Home ?

Connecticut does need to improve the voting process for military voters — but Internet voting is not the answer.

Every day, headlines reveal just how vulnerable and insecure any online network really is, and how sophisticated, tenacious and skilled today’s attackers are. Just last week, we learned that the U.S. has already experienced our first-ever documented attack on an election system, when a grand jury report revealed that someone hacked into the Miami-Dade primary elections system in August 2012.

Earlier in March, the Courant ran an editorial in favor of online, email, and fax early voting: Let Overseas Military Fax Votes Home <read>

We have testified twice this year against this risky, expensive, unconstitutional concept, providing information on safer, economical alternatives <here> <here>

Today, to its credit, the Courant published an op-ed by Pam Smith of VerifiedVoting. org, articulating Why Not: Internet Voting Puts Election Security At Risk <read>

Connecticut lawmakers are considering legislation to allow military voters to cast ballots over the Internet. The intention of this legislation is well-meaning — Connecticut does need to improve the voting process for military voters — but Internet voting is not the answer.

Every day, headlines reveal just how vulnerable and insecure any online network really is, and how sophisticated, tenacious and skilled today’s attackers are. Just last week, we learned that the U.S. has already experienced our first-ever documented attack on an election system, when a grand jury report revealed that someone hacked into the Miami-Dade primary elections system in August 2012.

A chilling account in The Washington Post recently reported that most government entities in Washington, including congressional offices, federal agencies, government contractors, embassies, news organizations, think tanks and law firms, have been penetrated by Chinese hackers.

They join a long list that includes the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Bank of America, and on and on. These organizations have huge cybersecurity budgets and the most robust security tools available, and they have been unable to prevent hacking. Contrary to popular belief, online voting systems would not be any more secure.

Not surprisingly, a senior cybersecurity official with the Department of Homeland Security warned election officials last year that online voting is premature and not advisable at this time. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (the federal body tasked with researching Internet voting) issued a statement shortly after, warning that secure Internet voting is not feasible with the tools currently available. Because the agency determined that Internet voting cannot be done securely, it has not developed testing or certification standards for systems.

So why are state lawmakers considering online voting for the military?

First, there is a mistaken perception that because we can shop and bank online, we should be able to vote online securely. But shopping or banking online are far from secure. Banks and online merchants lose billions every year to online fraud. They factor this into the cost of doing business.

There is, however, no acceptable level of vote fraud or manipulation. Moreover, elections have unique properties that are unlike banking or e-commerce. In a financial transaction, both parties can check each online transaction by reviewing a statement or receipt. But we vote by a secret ballot. Neither the voter nor the election official can verify that a ballot has been received the same way it was sent. This makes online voting especially susceptible to undetected hacking.

Second, we have seen a big push for Internet voting (including via email and digital fax) because the vendors of online voting systems have targeted state lawmakers and election officials with aggressive marketing and sales campaigns. The vendors have made extraordinary claims of security and auditability — all of which are unsubstantiated by any publicly reviewable research or documentation. None of these systems are subject to any standardized security testing or certification and claims of security are backed only by the vendors’ words.

There are things we can do to improve the voting process for our military voters without risking the integrity of their ballots or the security of our elections.

We can:

1. Move registration deadlines closer to the election. Virginia did this in 2012 and it paid big dividends, allowing service members to receive and return their ballots up to Election Day.

2. Allow our troops to use the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot to register and vote. Many states now allow service members to do both. It’s the military voter equivalent of Election Day Voter Registration. This widely used, practical reform would make absentee voting much easier for service members stationed outside of Connecticut.

3. Count military ballots postmarked by Election Day, and received seven days after. This would still give election officials enough time to count the ballots before certification, and would give our troops an opportunity to vote on Election Day.

Our legislators are right to act to improve voting for our brave men and women in uniform, but online voting is not yet the answer. Instead, the General Assembly should look to make the voting process easier and more accessible with some simple, common-sense improvements.

ACLU Forum on Electoral Dysfunction

On Wednesday night I participated on a panel in Waterford, CT on Electoral Dysfunction, sponsored by the ACLU, Common Cause and the LWV. It was a very good discussion with a variety of views from the panel, a wide range of excellent questions, and unsurpassed moderation. In the near future we may have video available. I promised to provide more information here on the topics covered.

Introduction

I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you tonight.

CTVotersCount is dedicated to voting integrity for the benefit of the voters of Connecticut. We want your vote to count; We want your vote counted accurately; And we wanted it counted exactly once.

As a technologist, I am dedicated to the responsible, effective and efficient use of technology.

Beyond elections and technology, I am committed that Democracy Flourish and to Government that Works for Everyone.

Basic and Bold Steps

Last November, President Obama saw the long lines and said “We need to fix that. In response we posted three sets of basic and bold steps to fix our elections and democracy; For Connecticut Elections; For U.S. Elections; and steps Beyond Election Integrity. Ten basic and bold steps in all. Tonight I will highlight just four.

First, for Democracy: Media Reform – A necessary requirement for democracy according to the founders. Saving the Internet is a last ditch start.

If you want more details on these or any of the other topics I discuss today, visit CTVotersCount.org tomorrow.

Second idea, for U.S. Elections: Mandate paper ballots optically scanned, nationwide; With recounts and independent manual audits; H.R. 12 co-sponsored by each of Connecticut’s House Members would do just that.

Next, fix the 12^th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act; [I wonder how many of you know what they are? I will have more to say later].

Finally for Connecticut: Do For Elections What We Have Done For Probate:

Regionalize, Professionalize, Economize

Our town-by-town election system relies on 339, registrars of voters, often very part time, inadequately funded and trained. This system limits our capacity for serving voters and providing voting integrity. We can save money, yet also improve service and integrity.

Regionalization is key to efficient early voting and fixing our woeful ballot chain-of-custody.

IRV

Now for IRV and the NPV. I have three concerns with IRV

First, surveys show voters do not understand IRV. I am opposed to any voting scheme that requires a smarter voter.

Second, in close elections, where it might have value, it can take days or weeks to determine a winner, IRV is technically challenging to count, audit, and recount. The challenges grow with the size of the jurisdiction.

Finally, IRV does not deliver as promised – it provides the smarter voter with an impossible challenge to help and not hurt their candidate.

That is all I will say for now on IRV. Like all voting methods can be a crap shoot.

National Popular Vote Agreement

There are more serious issues with the National Popular Vote Agreement.

Like many of you, I learned in the fifth grade, in Ms. Hesbelt’s class, of the odd and unique Electoral College. She taught that we should elect our President by National Popular Vote. I believed that. I still do.

I have come to view our election system, through the eyes of a computer scientist. Reading the Agreement in 2007, I immediately saw unrecognized problems. Since then, I have continued to study our presidential election system, the Agreement, and those unrecognized problems,

I am convinced that the Agreement, cobbled onto an already risky system for determining the winner adds to that systems flaws. Seriously so.

I suspect, many of you also believe in electing the President by popular vote.

Today I do not expect to change many long held beliefs, but ask you to be to open some to ideas that you are not aware of, some consequences you have yet to consider –unintended, unrecognized, and unacknowledged consequences of the Agreement.

Choosing the President is governed by the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act. The Supreme Court has ruled that they must be followed exactly — Causing the debacles in 1876 and 2000. Legal scholars call these laws a “Ticking Time Bomb”. The Agreement would not change that.

Just some states have audits and recounts. In 2000 the Supreme Court ruled that there was no time for Florida’s recounts and that they were insufficiently uniform.

Some say Recounts and Audits are unnecessary in a national popular vote. Some say they are possible under current law. I beg to disagree.

Many believe Al Gore won the popular vote in 2000. I say, “Without audits, how do you know”.

If just Florida had sufficient, timely recounts in 2000, and just Ohio had sufficient audits in 2004, we might have had a different candidate declared President. Or! Or we might have a lot more evidence and confidence that the winner was correctly decided.

Under the Agreement there would be no recount or audit to verify results in any election. Current audits and recounts, available in only about half the states are based, on close votes within a single state. Most could not be accomplished in time to satisfy Electoral Count Act. There is no national body to call for a recount, audit, or assess results.

Even worse, there is no official national popular vote number available in time to determine a winner, for Secretaries of State to choose their electors.

The official numbers are required to be sent to the Federal Government days after electors must be chosen and vote in each state. If you think that a future Ken Blackwell or Catherine Harris would not delay their official results to hamper the process, I would like to know what planet you live on.

Add to these risks several items;

There are many reasons under this scheme that voters, candidates, and officials could challenge the results provided and used by Secretaries of State. Any close election would likely end in a Supreme Court; likely to choose the President based on the precedents set in 2000 and 1876.

The Agreement does not make every voter equal, and cannot make every vote equal. Each state has a different franchise. A different level of voter suppression or encouragement.

The result of the Compact will be a race to the bottom without uninform voting methods, access, enfranchisement and integrity from state to state.

Currently fraud, error, and suppression is limited to swing states, with the Agreement it would be open season, without audits, recounts, or an official popular vote number.

Many of you will ask “If we elect our Governor by popular vote, why not the President.” The answer is that we have uniform election laws across Connecticut. We have an equal franchise, audits, and recanvasses.

Finally, let me encourage you to keep an open mind. Consider these unrecognized consequences. There are prerequisites to a trusted, credible National Popular Vote.

Thank you,

We had two minutes each to reply to questions from the audience. A couple of those merit additional links.

Media Reform – for ideas on where to start, I suggested John Nichols excellent book: The Death and Life of American Journalism
Better Voting Systems – I could only allude to the possibility and promise of better voting systems designed to serve the voters and officials, while providing election integrity. We are aware of two efforts, led by Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Texas, and Dean Logan, LA County, California. We will have more to say soon on Debeauvoir’s latest update presented at NIST and Logan’s effort. For now here is our coverage of DeBeauvoir’s effort as of two years ago <read>

Note: Deputy Secretary of the State James Spallone participated in the panel, replacing Cheri Quickmire from Common Cause, who unfortunately could not attend.

Online voting bill moves while Cyber Security Command outlines risks

Here in the land of steady habits, we are ready to move forward with blinders at the ready, apparently confident that our registrars, town clerks, and state IT department will never discover any attacks on on our voting systems, email systems, or fax machines.

On Friday the Government Administration and Elections Committee voted to draft H.B. 6111, for “online voting” putting it one step behind the bill from the Veterans Affairs committee bill for “email and fax voting”.

Meanwhile from the New York Times: Security Leader Says U.S. Would Retaliate Against Cyberattacks <read>

General Alexander’s testimony came on the same day the nation’s top intelligence official, James R. Clapper Jr., warned Congress that a major cyberattack on the United States could cripple the country’s infrastructure and economy, and suggested that such attacks now pose the most dangerous immediate threat to the United States, even more pressing than an attack by global terrorist networks…

General Alexander has been a major architect of the American strategy on this issue, but until Tuesday he almost always talked about it in defensive terms. He has usually deflected questions about America’s offensive capability, and turned them into discussions of how to defend against mounting computer espionage from China and Russia, and the possibility of crippling attacks on utilities, cellphone networks and other infrastructure…

“In some cases,” Mr. Clapper said in his testimony, “the world is applying digital technologies faster than our ability to understand the security implications and mitigate potential risks.” He said it was unlikely that Russia and China would launch “devastating” cyberattacks against the United States in the near future, but he said foreign spy services had already hacked the computer networks of government agencies, businesses and private companies.

Two specific attacks Mr. Clapper listed, an August 2012 attack against the Saudi oil company Aramco and attacks on American banks and stock exchanges last year, are believed by American intelligence officials to have been the work of Iran.