Category: CT

Testimony against six bills and for one

All of these bills are well intended. In fact, I would support most of the concepts, yet in only a single case could I support one of these bills , based on huge gaps between the good intent and the actual details present and missing in those bills.

Let me echo again, Paul Krugmann:

Three decades ago, when I went off for my year in the United States government, an old hand explained to me the nature of the job: it was mostly about fighting bad ideas. And these bad ideas, he went on to explain, were like cockroaches: no matter how many times you flush them down the toilet, they keep coming back.
– Paul Krugman

All of these bills are well intended. In fact, I would support most of the concepts, yet in only a single case could I support one of these bills , based on huge gaps between the good intent and the actual details present and missing in those bills.

Oppose:

  • S.B. 901 – all but eliminate our post-election audits
  • H.B. 6428 – Town by town electronic check-in
  • S.B. 775 and S.B. 777 – Town by town, pollworker by pollworker check-in and polling-place lookup
  • S.B. 779 and H.B. 6429 – Make cross-endorsed voting easier on officials, more work for  voters

Favor:

  • S.B. 1058 – Minor change to destruction of blank absentee ballots – lots more we should address beyond this minor change

Each of the .PDFs has a link to the associated bill(s)

Groundhog Deja Vue for Fax, Email Voting

Now we have it, a redrafted S.B. 647. We do not know who was involved around the table rewriting it, yet what we have is almost an exact copy of the bill Governor Malloy vetoed last year as risky and unconstitutional.

Three decades ago, when I went off for my year in the United States government, an old hand explained to me the nature of the job: it was mostly about fighting bad ideas. And these bad ideas, he went on to explain, were like cockroaches: no matter how many times you flush them down the toilet, they keep coming back.
– Paul Krugman

The Veterans Affairs Committee held hearings on Feb 19th on S.B. 647, An Act Concerning Voting By Members Of the Military Serving Overseas. We testified against the bill which would allow fax and email return of ballots for presumably military serving overseas. The concept is risky, unconstitutional, ineffective, and unnecessary – there are better, more economical alternatives available, proven effective in other states. The Committee talked of working with others to rewrite the bill. Two days later they voted to draft S.B. 647 as a committee bill.

Now we have it, a redrafted S.B. 647. We do not know who was involved around the table rewriting it, yet what we have is almost an exact copy of the bill Governor Malloy vetoed last year as risky and unconstitutional, H.B. 5556 (see Pages 51-55).

Do not let the bill’s title mislead you. It is not just for the military, it includes all overseas voters(*). It is not just for overseas military and their dependents, it is for any military anywhere, presumably even a national guard member living and working in Connecticut:

any elector who is living, or expects to be living or traveling before and on election day, outside the territorial limits of the several states of the United States and the District of Columbia and any member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the ember’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed…

*Although we are opposed to online, email, and fax voting, we are in favor of treating all overseas voters equally, including military contractors, State Department staff, CIA staff, Peace Corps volunteers, and NGO staff and volunteers.

The problem with Internet voting, in video and in text


Timely for us in Connecticut as our Legislature contemplates online, email, or fax voting for military voters, while they also contemplate mandating towns to provide Internet access to all registrars.

All we can say is “If election officials cannot afford to be on the Internet, how can they provide online, email, or fax voting? If they do not use email, how can they understand Internet Security?”

Barbara Simons has a Ted Talk on Internet voting along with an extensive paper, co-authored with Doug Jones.

As they say: “We frequently are asked, ‘If I can bank online, why can’t I vote online?’ The question assumes that online banking is safe and secure. However, banks routinely and quietly replenish funds lost to online fraud in order to maintain public confidence.”

Timely for us in Connecticut as our Legislature contemplates online, email, or fax voting for military voters, while they also contemplate mandating towns to provide Internet access to all registrars.

All we can say is “If election officials cannot afford to be on the Internet, how can they provide online, email, or fax voting? If they do not use email, how can they understand Internet Security?”

 

Nov 2012 Post-Election Audit Report – Flawed From The Start

Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts

The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:

  • Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “We found significant, unexplained errors, for municipalities across the state, in the list of districts in the random drawing. This random audit was highly flawed from the start because the drawing was highly flawed.”

Cheryl Dunson, President, League of Women Voters of Connecticut, stated,, “Two years ago, the Legislature passed a law, at the Secretary of the State’s request, which was intended to fix inaccuracies in the drawing. For whatever reason, errors in the drawing have dramatically increased.

Weeks added, “Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work. This year one town investigated discrepancies and found errors to correct in their election procedures – that is one value of performing the audits as intended.”

Without adherence to procedures, accurate random drawings, a reliable chain-of-custody, and transparent public follow-up, when discrepancies are reported, if there was ever a significant fraud or error it would not be recognized and corrected.
<More Details>

<More Details>

Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts

 The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:

  • Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “We found significant, unexplained errors, for municipalities across the state, in the list of districts in the random drawing. This random audit was highly flawed from the start because the drawing was highly flawed.”

Cheryl Dunson, President, League of Women Voters of Connecticut, stated,, “Two years ago, the Legislature passed a law, at the Secretary of the State’s request, which was intended to fix inaccuracies in the drawing. For whatever reason, errors in the drawing have dramatically increased.

Weeks added, “Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work. This year one town investigated discrepancies and found errors to correct in their election procedures – that is one value of performing the audits as intended.”

Without adherence to procedures, accurate random drawings, a reliable chain-of-custody, and transparent public follow-up, when discrepancies are reported, if there was ever a significant fraud or error it would not be recognized and corrected.
<More Details>

Fax and email voting: Hearing Highlights

With the same success as Rhode Island, perhaps this bill would decrease Connecticut’s failed return rate from 40% to 36.8%.

CT-N has posted the video from the Veterans’ Affairs hearing. About a half-hour to three-quarters of an hour of the four and one-half hour hearing pertained to fax and email voting. Watching the Windows Media Player version, you can see the times and select testimony you would like to watch <video> (click on lower left where it says ‘open in media player’)

Earlier coverage <read>

Overall:

Sadly,  CT has a 40% failure return rate according to the Secretary of the State (SOTS)

 Here are some highlights:

0:34 Town Clerk of Waterbury for the Town Clerks Assn.

0:41 She discusses risks of fraud

0:44 Sen Slossberg the sponsor

0:51 Rep Alexander, a former Adjutant and Voting Assistance Officer

Describes the risks of Fax on the submission end
(Much worse than I had imagined, also where does
the ballot go after faxing? Would a soldier vote
the way he/she thinks higher ups would want,
assuming they might look?)

1:00 Deputy SOTS James Spallone

Good review of OVF data and security concern

1:10 Senator Slossberg
Has info from all 29 states that do email and fax return that there have never been any problems

1:54 Vet that had return problem

Sen Slossberg asks if he is smart enough to waive rights

1:59  Rhode Island SOS Office

         No fraud allegations in all these years

         Less risk in RI as they do centrally

         53/1700 were sent in email/fax

Note: At 53/1700 sent in for RI, even if all those would not otherwise have been counted, then the return rate would only have been increased by 3.2%, after the system has been available since  1999. With the same success as Rhode Island, perhaps this bill would decrease Connecticut’s failed return rate from 40% to 36.8%.

Testimony: Worse than online voting, fax and email voting

I applaud this Committee for holding hearings on this Unconstitutional, Risky, Unnecessary, and Discriminatory bill. Last year, without hearings, this concept it was placed far down in an unrelated emergency bill.

Today we submitted testimony against Senate Bill 647 to the Veterans’ Affairs Committee on a bill to allow email and fax return of votes for Military voters. The bill:

AN ACT CONCERNING VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY SERVING OVERSEAS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

That sections 9-153e and 9-153f of the general statutes be amended to allow any member of the armed forces who is an elector serving overseas, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, to return their absentee ballot by electronic mail or facsimile.

Statement of Purpose:

To allow military persons serving overseas to return their ballot by electronic mail or facsimile.

From our testimony:

I applaud this Committee for holding hearings on this Unconstitutional, Risky, Unnecessary, and Discriminatory bill. Last year, without hearings, this concept it was placed far down in an unrelated emergency bill.

Compared with Online voting email and fax voting is a riskier, cheaper alternative:

Email and Fax Voting Is More Risky Than Online Voting:

  • Every week we hear of the compromise of email, databases, and severs maintained by large businesses and government agencies.
  • We are all familiar with emails and faxes, we send or are sent    to us, never being received. All network communications are subject to interception, substitution, or deletion. Military voters and registrars are not exempt from these problems.
  • ·         President Obama has called the protection of government and private information and communications networks “one of the most serious … security challenges of the 21st century,” (Hartford Courant May 30, 2009.)

Registrars Are Not Equipped To Implement Email Or Fax Voting:

  • Currently some towns do not provide Internet to their registrars and some do not provide email.
  • Frequently, published email addresses for registrars are out of date.
  • To whom would soldiers email votes? The Democratic or Republican Registrar? To a common email account? Who will process that? How can anyone be sure ballots that successfully arrive at an email account are not dropped or changed?
  • Who manages the Fax? Who can see or discard the ballots that come via the Fax?

We quote Governor Malloy’s veto message on the Constitutionality of a similar bill last year:

I agree with Secretary of the State Denise Merrill that this provision raises a number of serious concerns. First, as a matter of policy, I do not support any mechanism of voting that would require an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in order to cast a timely, secret ballot, even if such waiver is voluntary. Second, as the Secretary of the State has pointed out, allowing an individual to email or fax an absentee ballot has not been proven to be secure. In 2011, the United States Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, issued a report on remote electronic voting. The report concluded that remote electronic voting is fraught with problems associated with software bugs and potential attacks through malicious software, difficulties with voter authentication, and lack of protocol for ballot accountability.

We will be disappointed, but not surprised if the Veterans’ Affairs Committee ignores the discriminatory nature of this proposal, as we said:

This Bill Is Discriminatory: Many overseas voters are veterans but not members of the Military. Some serve in remote areas or challenging conditions. Including: State Department, CIA, and NGO staffs, plus Military Contractors, and Peace Corps volunteers.

And Unnecessary:

This Bill Is Unnecessary: Conventional solutions for effective, safe, and economical Military voting are available and proven. The state with the best results for overseas voting, Minnesota, does not use online voting. Let’s emulate their example.

Among others, we were joined in opposition testimony by Verified Voting:

OPPOSITION TO BILL NO. 647 – Understanding that email and fax voting are forms of internet voting – in fact they are the least secure forms. We dishonor our military by providing them insecure means to vote.
Chairs Leone and Hennessy and Members of the Committee, Verified Voting works tirelessly around the country and in Washington D.C. to support expanded opportunities for our military personnel to vote.However we oppose Bill No. 647 because it would dishonor our military personnel with an insecure means to vote. Email and fax voting are internet voting and are not secure. Those serving to secure our democracy should not be provided an unequally insecure means to participate in that democracy. That is what 647 would do.

Verified Voting was a strong supporter of the federal MOVE Act, passed in October 2009. The MOVE Act continued to show excellent gains in voter enfranchisement amongst military personnel in the 2012 General Election. We are members of the Alliance for Military and Overseas Voting Rights (AMOVR), where we join many military personnel support colleagues to work on their behalf year round.
We take support for military voting seriously and oppose 647 on strict empirical grounds of insecurity.
We strongly recommend against allowing ballots to be cast over the internet, via email, internet?based fax, or through internet portals. Online voting presents a direct threat to the integrity of elections in Connecticut, because it is not sufficiently secure against fraud or malfunction. Cyber security experts with the Department of Homeland Security have publicly warned against internet voting…

Allowing ballots to be cast by email, internet?based fax, or through internet portals ? at least with the current security tools ? is an invitation to partisan operatives and nation?states to tamper with the integrity of our elections. The problem is particularly pernicious because it is unlikely that such attacks will be detected. Attacks on consumer and business bank accounts can be detected because the accounting systems are reviewed by multiple parties and auditable records exist. Bank statements, unlike our voted ballots, are not anonymous. This makes it critical that the physical ballot which the voter inspected is returned for counting. If a purely electronic form is transmitted, that unsecured vote is not verifiable by the voter and does not constitute an auditable record of the vote.

Also see CTNewsJunkie coverage of Sen Slossberg and Rep Morin’s press conference, surrounded by veterans and the Rhode Island Secretary of State. The article includes some of our testimony and a veteran apparently unaware of the free express mail return of voted ballots <read>

Testimony: Polling Place Posting, Enforcement, Early Voting, and Internet Voting

Yesterday, in the midst of the gun control hearings drawing a couple thousand, we spent an hour in a snowy entrance line to testify on two bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee. We had planned on testifying on H.B. 5600, however, with many testifying on H.J. 16, I offered additional information to the Committee on that bill and on Internet voting, which was also discussed.

Yesterday, in the midst of the gun control hearings drawing a couple thousand, we spent an hour and a half in a snowy entrance line to testify on two bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee. We had planned on testifying on H.B. 5600, however, with many testifying on H.J. 16, I offered additional information to the Committee on that bill and on Internet voting, which was also discussed.

H.B. 5600, generically titled “AN ACT CONCERNING THE REGISTRARS OF VOTERS” dealt with three items:

  • Requiring towns to provide Internet access for all Registrars of Voters
  • Requiring the posting of voter ID requirements at all polling places
  • Increasing the authority of the Secretary of the State by making procedures and directives enforceable by the State Elections and Enforcement Comission

We testified in favor of all three concepts. <testimony>.

  • Hard to imagine it, yet some towns do not provide Internet access in this day and age, even with it is available town staff.
  • Posting voter ID requirements is to provide uniformity such that voters are not illegally turned away or illegally allowed to vote. I suggested that lists of registered write-in candidates should also be posted.
  • In general we welcome more enforcement, yet the text of the proposed bill is in some areas two broad and in others too narrow. I also needs some further work to assure clarity and transparency. (Read the testimony)

H.J. 16 is the Constitutional Amendment from last year that needs to be approved again by this Legislature and then Connecticut voters in 2014 “RESOLUTION APPROVING AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO GRANT INCREASED AUTHORITY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION.”

The amendment would allow the Legislature to specify early voting such as in-person early voting or no-excuse absentee voting. We assumed, incorrectly, that there would be little discussion and that major debates would occur in 2015 if the amendment passes.

Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, made a brief statement summarizing and supporting the bill which lead to perhaps forty-five minutes of pro and con questioning by the Committee, which also included questions on the largely unrelated topic of Internet voting for the Military. Others added testimony on the bill as well.

Scrapping most of my prepared remarks, I dedicated about half of my allocated three minutes to H.J. 16 and Internet voting. I provided the committee with information on the risks, costs, and value of various early voting methods, Internet voting, and how Connecticut might best serve all Overseas voters, including the Military.

The Committee was very attentive and open to considering my testimony: <testimony>

  • Especially the sources of the information that all forms of early voting decrease turnout. I promised to followup with links to the references.
  • I suggested following the example of Minnesota which had the greatest success in serving overseas voters, without risky, expensive, and ineffective Internet voting.
  • I reaffirmed my support of polling place Election Day Registration (EDR), its potential to increase turnout, while also reaffirming my prediction of disappointing results and concerns for very long lines.

Update: CT-N video, my testimony is about 75% of the way in <watch>

OP-ED: Voting Requires Vigilance. Popular Isn’t Always Prudent

Our Op-Ed published yesterday by CTNewsJunkie, outlining the integrity risks of the National Popular Vote Compact, now being considered by the Connecticut Legislature, for the fourth time since 2007.

Our Op-Ed published yesterday by CTNewsJunkie, outlining the integrity risks of the National Popular Vote Compact, now being considered by the Connecticut Legislature, for the fourth time since 2007: Voting Requires Vigilance. Popular Isn’t Always Prudent <read>

by Luther Weeks | Jan 21, 2013 7:16pm
Posted to: Opinion

One third of Americans vote on machines, without the paper ballots we use in Connecticut. Our president is chosen based on faith in those unverifiable machines, vote accounting, and unequal enfranchisement in 50 independent states and the District of Columbia.

In 2000, we witnessed the precarious underpinnings of this state-by-state voting system combined with the flawed mechanism of the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Accounting Act. The Supreme Court ruled votes could not be recounted in Florida, because even that single state did not have uniform recount procedures. What could possibly make this system riskier?

The National Popular Vote Compact now being considered in states, including Connecticut, would have such states award their electoral votes to a purported national popular vote winner. The Compact would take effect once enough states signed on, equaling more than one-half the Electoral College. Then the President elected would be the one with the most purported popular votes. Sounds good and fair at first glance. Looking at the touted benefits and none of the risks many legislators, advocates, and media influence the public to make the Compact popular in some polls. Popular is not always prudent. Voting requires vigilance.

The Compact, cobbled on an already precarious system, would exacerbate its flaws, adding additional risks. Currently errors, voter suppression, and fraud can only sway the result in the few swing states. With the Compact errors, suppression, and fraud in every state would count toward the popular vote total.

Compact supporters overlook and proponents befog the reality that there would be no official national popular vote total available in time for states to choose their electors. The only official popular vote total is the sum of the Certificates of Attainment sent by each state to the national Archivist. They cannot be used for choosing electors, since certificates are not required to be sent until seven days after electors are chosen and are not required to arrive in Washington until fifteen days after the electors must be chosen. Supreme Court decisions in 2000 and 1876 stress that these dates must be strictly followed.

Even if the totals could be obtained in time from each state, they would not be audited and could not be recounted. Compact proponents obfuscate this by describing how some states routinely perform audits or recounts. They conveniently ignore that about one-third of the states do not have audits and recounts; many voting machines cannot be audited; state recounts are based on close-vote margins within a state, so even in those states, recounts would not be triggered by a close national vote. Just as critical, there would be insufficient time for recounts or audits given the strict Constitutional deadlines. The Supreme Court would likely reject any recount going beyond state borders, using the same reasoning used to reject the 2000 Florida recount, as insufficiently uniform.

Additional legal challenges and maneuvers under the Compact would also be available for partisans bent on sending any reasonably close election to the Supreme Court or Congress. States not signing the Compact could delay certifying and transmitting results until the latest deadline. Partisans could dispute results in their states or sue their Secretary of State for using uncertified results from other states, delaying reporting or negating the state’s Electoral College vote.

Nothing is available, but legal challenges, even in Compact states, to deter a future partisan Secretary of State from failing to follow the Compact.

Supporters and opponents debate other contentions for and against the Compact, most of which are subjective and speculative. e.g. Which is more ideal, the current Federal system or the popular vote? Would small states or large states benefit more from the Compact? Where would candidates campaign and join with PACs in media buys? How equal would every voter actually be, given the state-by-state system of voter enfranchisement, disenfranchisement, suppression, and registration?

An accurate, fair, and credible popular vote requires a uniform, workable national voting system we can trust. That is, a system with uniform enfranchisement, paper ballots, effective audits, and national recounts, enforceable and provably enforced as a prerequisite to a considering a national popular vote.

Luther Weeks is executive director of CTVotersCount.

Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

Thanks to Marilyn Marks we have this guide: Steal This Election!–Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election <read>

This guide is for novices to Colorado politics and elections. Colorado has recently gained a reputation as a lawless Wild West state where candidates and parties can rig an election with impunity. Given that most officials appear to have little interest in election reform, it’s only fair to level the playing field for all the would-be players.

Connecticut election administration has also been called the Wild West.

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. For now, we do not have unlimited absentee voting or automatic mail-in voting. However, that might change in the future. Yet we have little reason to take comfort. We do little checking of absentee ballot signatures. We also have a history of fraud by absentee ballot. Similar to many other states, many Connecticut voters would never question the integrity of even one of our registrars (especially those in our own town), and for the most part those registrars share absolute trust in each of their staff members and poll workers. Unfortunately, this is one of the 15 attributes of “Security Theater” from security expert Roger Johnston: “Strong emotion, over confidence, arrogance, ego, and/or pride related to security”.

A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then  provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

Did new elected Representative committ multiple voter fraud?

Elected initially to the Legislature last month, Christina Ayala, has been arrested for a hit-and-run shortly after the election, arrested for a domestic dispute, and then ordered to move to the district before being sworn in, is no under investigation for illegally voting and registering in that district. Also under investigation is her mother, the Registrar of Voters.

CT Post: Elections commission investigates Christina Ayala and her mom <read>

Elected initially to the Legislature last month, Christina Ayala, has been arrested for a hit-and-run shortly after the election, arrested for a domestic dispute, and then ordered to move to the district before being sworn in, is no under investigation for illegally voting and registering in that district. Also under investigation is her mother, the Registrar of Voters.

According to the registrar’s office, Christina lives at 604 Noble Ave. in the 128th District. Because of her address, she was allowed to vote there in the November 2011 general election and in this year’s Aug. 14 primary, the city’s special September election for school board, and in November’s general election.
However, when Ayala and her boyfriend were arrested for a domestic squabble two weeks ago, the police report stated they lived at 49 Hillside Ave in the 129th district. And when Ayala filed for a protective order, she told the court she lived at Hillside.
The same Hillside address was listed on a police report when Ayala was arrested the night after winning her August primary and charged with evading responsibility, failure to obey a traffic signal and failure to renew her vehicle’s registration.