CT | CTVotersCount.org

Connecticut: Land of Steady [and Slow] Habits

Connecticut takes criticism from Brad Friedman for the slow and unpredictable speed of election enforcement. As those of us who have submitted complaints know, they can take a long time to be completed. But as Brad points out, some are resolved much quicker than others.

Update 10/16/2013: Inconsistent Justice. Now a State Representative is accused in case dismissed against Ann Coulter: CTNewsJunkie: Elections Enforcement Hands Evidence Over To Criminal Prosecutors In Ayala Investigation <read>

An SEEC investigation revealed evidence that Ayala “falsely registered to vote at the address in Bridgeport in July 2009 and remained registered at this address until January 2013.”

There is evidence she used the address to vote in nine primaries and elections, according to Attorney Kevin Ahern of the SEEC who investigated the matter. There also is evidence she ran for elected office twice using the address and applied for funds from the Citizens’ Election Program using the false address, he wrote in a statement.

Rep. Ayala’s mother Santa Ayala is the Democratic Registrar of Voters in Bridgeport and “may have conspired with Representative Ayala to commit fraud,” Ahern wrote in his statement to the commission.

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Original Post:

It’s been nearly five months since the official complaint about Ann Coulter’s alleged voter fraud in 2002 and 2004 was filed in Connecticut, yet state election officials continue to refuse comment on the status of the case beyond acknowledging that it’s “still pending,” as recently confirmed by The BRAD BLOG.

Several charges of absentee voter fraud were alleged in the complaint against Coulter in Connecticut, where evidence shows she cast absentee ballots illegally while living in her then permanent New York City residence…

“The delay in this case is inexplicable given they need to prove two things: where she registered to vote/voted and where she lived when she registered to vote/voted,” the complainant in the case, Daniel Borchers, a Christian conservative who has long opposed Coulter’s behavior…

But sometimes things are resolved quickly:

In a case which almost identically mirrors the allegations against Coulter, New York resident Daniel Jarvis Brown, who had been registered to vote at his parents’ home in CT, voted in the November 2008 election illegally by absentee ballot. Coulter also used her parents home address, claiming it as her own, when she is alleged to have voted while a permanent resident of NYC in 2002 and 2004…

But the timing of Brown’s violation and subsequent settlement of the case is notable as well. While Brown’s violation [PDF] occurred in November of last year, he signed his agreement with the State Elections Enforcement Commission less than three months later, on February 23, 2009, and the Commission formally adopted the agreement on March 5th, just four months after the original violation.

In another more recent case [PDF], a CT voter was alleged to have voted improperly during a referendum in the Town of New Hartford on February 12, 2009. After an investigation by the Commission finding no impropriety, the complaint was officially adopted as “dismissed” on May 27th, less than two months after the election.

Connecticut has several nicknames in addition to “The Land Of Steady Habits”, including “The Provisions State”, the “Nutmeg State”, and perhaps most pleasing, “The Constitution State”.

Update: 10/6/2010 – some progress via BradBlog: Ann Coulter to Face Vote on Voter Fraud Charges in CT by State Elections Enforcement Commission <read>

Will Ann Coulter finally be held accountable for having committed voter fraud? We may find out on October 14th when the matter will come up at a public hearing by Connecticut’s State Elections Commission after an extraordinarily long two-year delay since the complaints about her allegedly illegal absentee votes in 2002 and 2004 were filed.

Update: Brad Friedman discusses Ann Coulter’s case <about 9 min in 1st hour>

Update: 10/14/2010 Charges Dismissed <read>

Courant: Iranians Sure Could Speed Up U.S. Voting System

CTVotersCount readers know we have often criticized Courant Editorials. In this case we are pleased to agree…

What we need to do in this country, I’m thinking, is to hire some Iranian election officials as consultants and see what they can do to speed up our own system.

Think about it:

We spend billions on high-tech voting machines.

CTVotersCount readers know we have often criticized Courant Editorials <e.g> <e.g> <e.g>. In this case we are pleased to agree – that this appeared in an acknowledges humor column. <Jim Shea’s Full Article>

We we need is less hanging chads, more paper ballots, more counting as accurately as the do in Minnesota, and less frivolous challenges in the aftermath of accurate counting.

Two CT Reps Co-Sponsor Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act

Today Representative Rush Holt introduced a new and improved Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act, H.R. 2894. CTVotersCount appreciates Representatives John Larson and Jim Himes for signing on as initial co-sponsors.

Update: New York Times Endorses Holt Bill: “The House leadership should make passing Mr. Holt’s bill a priority. Few issues matter as much as ensuring that election results can be trusted.”

Today Representative Rush Holt introduced a new and improved Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act, H.R. 2894. CTVotersCount appreciates Representatives John Larson and Jim Himes for signing on as initial co-sponsors. We encourage all of our representatives to support and co-sponsor the bill.

Representative Holt has been working for several years to provide the voting integrity missing for our elections and the Help America Vote Act. This Act improves over bills previously proposed in several areas. <ref> <ref> <ref> It will require every vote to be on a voter marked paper ballot! Advocates appreciate changes which make the bill stronger, election officials will appreciate some extended deadlines and other changes making it more palatable.

Connecticut will benefit because H.R. 2894 will:

Insure that all states conduct audits and use voter marked paper ballots. This will increase the integrity of all elections. This will help assure that the intentions of Connecticut voters are not thwarted by inadequate procedures and equipment in other states which could compromise the integrity of presidential votes nationwide or the balance in Congress.

Pay the cost of even year audits in Connecticut. Connecticut has completed several comprehensive post-election audits of our optical scanners. One of the strongest objections by registrars and towns was that audits are unfunded mandates. The 2007 and 2008 audits in Connecticut were reimbursed by HAVA funding. This bill will assure that audits in even years will continue to be funded by Federal funds.

Insure that Connecticut has Independent Audits. Connecticut’s audit law falls short of this bill’s standard for independent audits. Independent audits are supported by The League of Women Voters, Common Cause, The Brennan Center for Justice, Verified Voting, Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, and CTVotersCount.

Other key provisions as summarized by Verified Voting <read>

The Press Release:

News from
Representative Rush Holt
12th District, New Jersey
http://www.holt.house.gov

For Immediate Release Contact: Zach Goldberg
June 17, 2009
202-225-5801

HOLT REINTRODUCES VOTER CONFIDENCE AND INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY ACT

Bill Would Require Voter-Verified Paper Ballot and Random Audits

(Washington, D.C.) – Rep. Rush Holt today reintroduced the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act, legislation that would create a national standard of voting to help ensure that every vote is recorded and counted as intended. The bill would require paper ballot voting systems accompanied by accessible ballot marking devices and require routine random audits of electronic voting tallies. The bill has 75 cosponsors.

“It is time we stop using elections as beta tests for unreliable electronic voting machines,” Holt said. “The ability to vote is the most important right as it is the right through which citizens secure all other rights. Voters shouldn’t have any doubts about whether their votes count and are counted. Congress should pass a national standard ensuring that all voters can record their votes on paper and requiring that in every election, randomly selected precincts be audited.”

In every federal election that has taken place since the Help America Vote Act was enacted in 2003, citizen watchdog groups have gathered and reported information pertaining to voting machine failures. In the 2004 election, more than 4,800 voting machine were reported to the Election Incident Reporting System, from all but eight states. In the 2006 election, a sampling of voting machine problems gathered by election integrity groups and media reports revealed more than 1,000 such incidents from more than 300 counties in all but 14 states. And in 2008, the Our Vote Live hotline received reports of almost 2,000 voting machine problems in all but 12 states.

While many states and counties have addressed verified voting on their own – jurisdictions serving 10 million voters moved to paper ballot voting systems between 2006 and 2008 alone – in 2008, 19 states (7 complete states, and some number of counties in approximately a dozen other states) conducted completely unauditable elections.

Paperless electronic voting seems more modern and many election officials like it, but it is entirely unverifiable and unauditable. Because voting is secret, only the voter can verify that the vote is recorded properly, and when the only record of the vote is digital the voter cannot do so. Computer scientists say that computers are unreliable without an independent audit mechanism, and without paper ballots there is nothing to audit.

The 2008 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota demonstrated the importance of verified voting. In that race, approximately 3 million voter-marked paper ballots were counted by hand to confirm the result. Of those 3 million ballots, only 14 did not receive a 5-0 unanimous vote of the bipartisan canvassing board. Minnesota Secretary of State Mark Ritchie later said that because Minnesota uses a paper ballot voting system, it made it possible to “do the recount quickly, fairly, accurately, and with such a high degree of trust.”

“The clear trend is towards paper ballots. In fact, every jurisdiction that has chosen to change its voting system since 2006 has chosen to use paper ballots with optical scan counting. That should be the standard,”
Holt said.

Cosponsors include: Reps. Neil Abercrombie (HI-1), Jason Altmire (PA-4), Robert Andrews (NJ-1), Tammy Baldwin (WI-2), John Barrow (GA-12), Timothy Bishop (NY-1), Earl Blumenauer (OR-3), Corrine Brown (FL-3), Lois Capps (CA-23), Michael Capuano (MA-8), Christopher Carney (PA-10), Kathy Castor (FL-11), William Lacy Clay (MO-1), Steve Cohen (TN-9), Joseph Crowley (NY-7), Peter DeFazio (OR-4), Michael Doyle (PA-14), Donna Edwards (MD-4), Sam Farr (CA-14), Chaka Fattah (PA-2), Bob Filner (CA-51), Barney Frank (MA-4), Al Green (TX-9), Gene Green (TX-29), Alcee Hastings (FL-23), James Himes (CT-4), Maurice Hinchey (NY-22), Michael Honda (CA-15), Jay Inslee (WA-1), Steve Israel (NY-2), Jesse Jackson Jr. (IL-2), Hank Johnson (GA-4), Marcy Kaptur (OH-9), Ron Klein (FL-22), Leonard Lance (NJ-7), Rick Larsen (WA-2), John Larson (CT-1), Barbara Lee (CA-9), John Lewis (GA-5), Frank LoBiondo (NJ-2), David Loebsack (IA-2), Nita Lowey (NY-18), Carolyn Maloney (NY-14), Eric Massa (NY-29), Jim McDermott (WA-7), James McGovern (MA-3), Mike McIntyre (NC-7), Gregory Meeks (NY-6), George Miller (CA-7), James Moran (VA-8), Jerrold Nadler (NY-8), James Oberstar (MN-8), David Obey (WI-7), John Olver (MA-1), Solomon Ortiz (TX-27), Frank Pallone (NJ-6), Donald Payne (NJ-10), Thomas Perriello (VA-5), Chellie Pingree (ME-1), Jared Polis (CO-2), Steven Rothman (NJ-9), Linda Sanchez (CA-39), Janice Schakowsky (IL-9), Adam Schiff (CA-29), Jose Serrano (NY-16), Joe Sestak (PA-7), Albio Sires (NJ-13), Adam Smith (WA-9), Pete Stark (CA-13), John Tierney (MA-6), Timothy Walz (MN-1), Debbie Wasserman Schultz (FL-20), Henry Waxman (CA-30), Robert Wexler (FL-19), David Wu (OR-1).

Holt’s legislation is supported by a wide range of organizations, including the American Council of the Blind, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, the Center for Democracy and Election Management at American University, Common Cause, Credo Mobile/Working Assets Democracy Unlimited, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, True Majority, Verified Voting, Voter Action, Arizona Citizens for Fair Elections, Berks County (PA) Democratic Committee, Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota, Clarion County League of Women Voters (PA), Coalition for Peace Action – New Jersey Concerned Voters of Centre County (PA), Connecticut Voters Count Enduring Vote Montana, Florida Voters Coalition, Gathering to Save our Democracy – Tennessee, Georgians for Verified Voting, Green Party of Pennsylvania, Iowans for Voting Integrity, New Era for Virginia, New Yorkers for Verified Voting, Pennsylvania Verified Voting, Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections (SAFE), SAVE Our Votes Maryland, Southern Coalition for Secure Voting State College (PA) Peace Center, The Black Political Empowerment Project (B-PEP), VoteAllegheny (PA), VotePA, Voting Matters – Oregon.

Update: New York Times Endorses Holt Bill <read>

Mr. Holt’s bill would require paper ballots to be used for every vote cast in November 2010…

The bill would also require the states to conduct random hand recounts of paper ballots in 3 percent of the precincts in federal elections, and more in very close races. These routine audits are an important check on the accuracy of the computer count.

The bill has several provisions designed to ease the transition for cash-strapped local governments…

The House leadership should make passing Mr. Holt’s bill a priority. Few issues matter as much as ensuring that election results can be trusted.

Results of Post-Election Audit of the May 4th Municipal Election

This time we agree with the Secretary of the State on the post-election audit results in Naugatuck. Both people and machines can count very accurately. That is what we should always expect of election officials.

Article from:?????? Secretary of the State’s Electronic Newsletter
Issue 39 June 4, 2009:

POST-ELECTION AUDIT OF TWO NAUGATUCK PRECINCTS SHOWS
ACCURATE MACHINE COUNT ON MAY 4th MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

The results of the latest hand count audits of election results in Connecticut are in: once again, our machine counts were extremely accurate. Post-election audits conducted at two polling places in Naugatuck showed extremely accurate machine counts during the Municipal Elections held May 4, 2009. Polling places located at Central Avenue and Oak Terrace in Naugatuck were chosen at random on May 8th to undergo hand count audits of the machine totals for the May Municipal Elections, representing 10% of all voting precincts in Connecticut for that election. As required by Public Act 07-194, An Act Concerning the Integrity and Security of the Voting Process, 10% percent of the polling precincts used in the election are subject to an audit. Deputy Secretary Lesley Mara directed that the audit precincts be chosen from a pool of 13 precincts in the six towns that held municipal elections May 4th. This pool did not count precincts that required a recount. A review of the audit results has been completed by the Office of the Secretary of State and showed that there was no discrepancy in the counts at the Oak Terrace precinct, while there was only a discrepancy of one vote at the Central Avenue precinct in the race for City Treasurer out of nearly 800 cast. In the majority of cases, small discrepancies between machine totals and hand-counts are due to human error in the auditing process. Once again, these hand count audits have reinforced the integrity of our elections and show that our optical scan voting system is secure and extremely accurate. No matter the size of the election, Connecticut’s post-election audit procedures are the toughest in the nation and they exist to ensure that the will of the voters expressed by the paper ballots is reflected in the machine counts on Election Day. Connecticut voters can be confident in the integrity of our elections and that their votes are counted correctly.

We agree that “In the majority of cases, small discrepancies between machine totals and hand-counts are due to human error in the auditing process”. However, that the majority of discrepancies are manual count inaccuracies is insufficient. We raise the concern that when differences are found, at a minimum, recounts should be performed by local officials until two counts agree – either the machine and a manual count or two manual counts.

We observed the audit in Naugatuck. The first count of ballots for each district were each off by one ballot, the officials recounted and found where the initial manual count was incorrect. When vote counts were off they recounted until they were convinced that their manual counts were accurate. That should be the standard met by all audits, in every municipality, in every election. The Coalition reports show significant discrepancies in municipal counts in previous audits, while recounts of the manual counts by the Secretary of the State’s Office show that people can count inaccurately and that people can also count accurately <read>

We appreciate the Secretary of the State’s Office, Deput Mara, and Naugatuck election officials for conducting the audit and the Secretary of the State for reaffirming the value of audits. No election and no vote is exempt from the risk of error and fraud. There is more work to do, more gaps to close <read>

CT: 2009 Regular Session Legislative Roundup/Wrapup

This year, CTVotesCount supported several bills, opposed several bills, and took no positions on other bills related to elections and voting. The regular session ended at midnight June 3rd with a special session scheduled for later in June to address the budget and possibly some other issues. In this post we will provide updates on the status of bills of interest as we are made aware of their final status.

This year, CTVotesCount supported several bills, opposed several bills, and took no positions on other bills related to elections and voting. The regular session ended at midnight June 3rd with a special session likely to be scheduled for later in June to address the budget and possibly some other issues. In this post we will provide our understanding of the status of bills of interest. There may be updates as we learn more.

Finding the actual status of bills can be a challenge. Bills are often rewritten and introduced with a new bill number. Some bills are extensively changed or completely rewritten by amendments. In a few cases an amendment completely changes the intent and the subject of a bill, while the bill’s title cannot be changed!

Perhaps more challenging is determining the major reasons/cause of a bill’s demise without action by one or both houses of the legislature: Did the legislature just run out of time, with the Committee Chair and Leadership prioritizing other bills? Was there mild support or substantial opposition? Would one house pass the bill and the other trash it? Would a veto by the Governor be likely? How would a veto be viewed by the public? Or did the bill simply need more work to make in politically acceptable or workable in practice? We will take some educated guesses.

General Comments on the 2009 Session:

In our limited experience, this year is typical of the last few years. Many bills are introduced. A substantial number receive committee hearings, followed by a smaller, yet still substantial number passing committees. But, a small subset are ever introduced and debated in either the House or the Senate. The structure of the system provides many opportunities for members to express support or opposition to bills along with many “reasons” for hard work and support to end with no results. Many blame partisanship, leveling charges at one side or the other: Democrats are blamed for a “do noting” session and Republicans are seen as “obstructionist”. However, the system providing extended debate, in a relatively small window, at the end of the legislative session, with an absolute deadline, makes this all (or so little) possible.

Naturally, we are relieved when bills with concepts we generally oppose or bills that have unintended consequences are not enacted one way or another. But we are equally disappointed when important issues and bills do not receive the attention we believe is appropriate.

Bills:

H.B. 5226 AN ACT CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF POLLING PLACES FOR A PRIMARY.
Would have allowed towns to determine polling places for a primary, greatly reducing costs. Passed the GAE Committee but never introduced in either house.

H.B. 5903 -AN ACT CONCERNING ABSENTEE VOTING FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS.
This bill would provide additional time and support for military voters to receive and return absentee ballots. CTVotersCount and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz opposed the provisions in this bill that would have allowed risky voting via internet, fax, or email. It was passed without discussion by the GAE Commitee, but later amended by Chairman Spallone to remove that objectionable provision. According to the legislative web site it was not introduced for a vote in either house.

H.B. 6435 – AN ACT CONCERNING ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION AND PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT PROCEDURES.
CTVotersCount, the League of Women Voters, and Common Cause suported this bill. It was later amended to contain risky provisions for associated ballot security. The final version had an acceptable compromise treating associated ballots in a very similar manner to absentee ballots. It passed the House but was never taken up in the Senate. It was more likely than not to be vetoed by the Governor. However, it faced perhaps an even chance for a veto to be overriden.

H.B. 6437 – AN ACT CONCERNING AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE.
This bill would support the National Popular Vote Compact providing a back-door way for the popular election of the President. While sounding attractive it has serious unintended consequences. The bill was generally supported by Democrats and opposed by Republicans. CTVotersCount and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz opposed the Agreement. In early May, it squeaked by the House. Our reading is that it has luke warm support in the Senate and might not have passed there – it then would have faced an all but guaranteed veto, with no chance of override.

H.B. 6440 – AN ACT CONCERNING CERTAIN REVISIONS TO ELECTIONS RELATED STATUTES.
This was a so called “technical bill” requested by the Secretary of the State that would have made several minor changes in the election statutes, primarily changing details of wording and substance from lever “machines” to optical scan “tabulators”. Several groups opposed changes to loosen absentee ballot application distribution requirements – these provisions were removed. CTVotersCount opposed changes in the audit law that would have weakened the audit coverage of races; opposed provisons that would weaken the randomness of the audit while disproportionately adding audit costs to small and medium sized towns. We supported a provison to mandate completion of the audits within 10 business days of the election, replacing current provisions which mandate audits do not begin until 15 days after the election. A beneficial provision was added which would have provided for enforcement of audit procedures issued by the Secretary of the State. This bill passed the House on 5/21, but according to the legislative web site it was not introduced for a vote in the Senate. Overall we have mixed feelings on the bill given the plusses and minuses. We are surprised it was not passed by both houses by consent.

H.B. 6441 – AN ACT CONCERNING CONFIDENCE IN THE CONNECTICUT ELECTION SYSTEM.
Proposed and supported by CTVotersCount, this bill would have gone a long way to improve the integrity and efficiency of post-election audits, election results accounting, and the chain-of-custody in Connecticut. It would have closed many of the gaps identified by the Coaltion at negligible cost. We appreciate the support of our Senator and Representative (Handley and Kehoe) in initiating action. We appreciate the introduction and hearings on the bill initiated by GAE Chair Spallone. Unfortunately, the committee did not place a priority on the bill in this session. Our intentions are to continue to draw attention to the inadequacy of the current law, to propose an even more attractive bill next year, and to gather wider support.

H.J 113 – RESOLUTION AMENDING THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW EARLY VOTING. (And No Excuse Absentee Voting)
CTVotersCount is conditionally opposed to the expansion of absentee voting and early voting. There are integrity, security, and franchise concerns which need to be addressed. We do not have or see solutions to these concerns for scientific and practical reasons. This bill passed the GAE Committee but was not taken up by either house.

S.B. 909 – AN ACT CONCERNING TECHNICAL CHANGES TO ELECTION LAWS.
Supported by CTVotersCount. Technical changes proposed by the Secretary of the State’s Office. Passed by the GAE Commitee. Provisions largely rolled into an amendment to H.B. 6440 (see the discussion above on that bill)

S.B. 913 – AN ACT CONCERNING UNITED STATES SENATE VACANCIES
This bill would replace appointment of U.S. Senate vacancies by the Governor with an election. Was passed by the Senate and House. The Governor is expected to veto the bill. A veto override is likely. <Courant> < CT News Junkie>

S.J. 43 – RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION CONCERNING VOTING BY ABSENTEE BALLOT.
Passed the GAE Commitee, never taken up by either house. Provisons seem to have been rolled into H.J. 113 (see discussion under that bill above)

Same Day Voter Registration Passes Connecticut House

The bill, via an amendment which we understand was passed, provides essentially an absentee ballot for newly registered voters. This is a resonable compromise. We support the bill. However, we point out that absentee ballots centrally counted or hand counted remain exempt from Connecticut’s post-election audits.

CTNewsJunkie and the Courant have the story and the debate. We expect the Senate to pass the bill, but the Governor seems to be leaning toward a veto: From CTNewsJunkie:

While she’s reluctant to comment on any bill before it reaches her desk, Gov. M. Jodi Rell said Tuesday that it raises a lot of questions.

On her way up the stairs to her office Tuesday Rell said same-day voter registration may open up the process to “the possibility of fraud.” However, Rell said she hasn’t really considered the bill and doesn’t really have a firm opinion yet.

She said she can’t understand people who forget to register to vote. “You can’t help but know there’s an election coming these days,” Rell said.

We supported the initial version of the bill which provided a ticket to newly registered voters to go to their regular polling place – it could cause difficulties for voters with transportation issues. It was later replaced with a version that called for ballots to be filled out at the registration site with ambiguous direction for the handling of such votes – it provided very questionable security.

MN: Citizens for Election Integity: Audit and Recount Report

The voting machines used in the audited precincts were shown to be accurate. All recount observers felt the counting procedures were accurate and none questioned the integrity of the count. No systematic concerns were raised by observers in the post-election audit or recount. Some procedures are in need of improvement, such as the absentee ballot process.

We look forward to a day when the Connecticut audit results are equally reassuring

Citizens for Election Integrity, Minnesota, released a report on the 2008 post-election audit and recounts: CEIMN Non-Partisan Observation Report <read>

The voting machines used in the audited precincts were shown to be accurate. All recount observers felt the counting procedures were accurate and none questioned the integrity of the count. No systematic concerns were raised by observers in the post-election audit or recount. Some procedures are in need of improvement, such as the absentee ballot process.

The Citizens for Election Integrity should be proud of their observation and every citizen of Minnesota proud of the quality of the audit, recounts, and the election itself.

We look forward to a day when the Connecticut audit results are equally reassuring. From the Connecticut Coaltion November report:

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

Several audit supervisors attributed discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts to human limitations; other supervisors attributed these to inaccurate scanners. We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.

Minnesota Raw Numbers Reported To State: Differences in initial reported totals by counties between hand counts and the optical scanners: About 1 difference in 4800 votes

Connecticut Raw Numbers Reported To State: Differences in initial reported totals by municipalities between hand counts and the optical scanners: About 1 difference in 133 votes(*).

(*) These figures do not include cross-endorsed candidates and only recognize differences beyond those which could be attributed to votes classifed as questionable by election officials.

Update: Minnesota has a new Senator. It is about time, slow but very very sure democracy flurishes in Minnesota. Politico coverage <read>

Republican Norm Coleman has conceded to Democrat Al Franken in the Minnesota Senate race, ending one of the longest Senate races in American history and clearing the way for Democrats to hold a 60-seat supermajority in the Senate…

“The Supreme Court of Minnesota has spoken and I respect its decision and will abide by the result,” Coleman said. “It’s time for Minnesota to come together under the leaders it has chosen and move forward. I join all Minnesotans in congratulating our newest United States Senator – Al Franken

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 2 – Counting Not Extremely Accurate

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified. Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>. Yesterday, in Part 1, we covered the Memory Card Report. Today, in Part 2 we highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s commitment to solve the problems identified. Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Summary Three Reports On The November Post-Election Audits

From the Secretary of the State’s Press Release, December 12th, 2008, headlined: BYSIEWICZ: RESULTS OF POST ELECTION AUDIT SHOW ACCURATE ELECTION DAY MACHINE COUNTS:

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz announced today that post election audits conducted in 10% of all voting precincts in Connecticut have shown extremely accurate machine counts on Election Day November 4, 2008. An initial review of the audit results has been completed by the Office of the Secretary of State, and the results will now undergo a complete, independent analysis by the University of Connecticut’s Voting Technology Research Center under the direction of Dr. Alexander Shvartsman.

“We set a record in Connecticut on November 4th with 1.64 million people casting ballots and Election Day went remarkably smoothly,” said Secretary Bysiewicz. “The results of this audit indicate, once again, that the optical scan voting system is secure and extremely accurate. Connecticut voters can be confident in the integrity of our elections and that their votes were counted correctly. Still, I’m not asking anyone to simply take my word for it: that’s why these post-election procedures are so important. We want to shine the light on the electoral process, before and after all votes are cast…

While the audits did uncover accurate machine counts on Election Day, there were discrepancies in isolated cases involving the hand-count audits for some ballots marked with votes for major party candidates who were cross endorsed by minor parties.

From the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition Report, January 28, 2009 (I was the lead author of this report):

In this report, we conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of

* standards,
* detailed guidance for counting procedures, and
* consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

We also note continuing failures to follow audit and chain-of-custody procedures.

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

The Coaltion report highlighted many discrepancies in votes and ballot counts that exceded questionable ballot counts and that did not involve cross-endorsed candidates <read>

From the UConn Post-Election Audit Report, May 12 2009:

The VoTeR Center]s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unacceptably high unexplained differences between hand and machine counts…As a result the [Secretary of the State’s] Office performed additional information-gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand counting of ballots…

The main conclusion in this report is that for all cases where non-trivial discrepancies were originally reported, it was determined that hand counting errors or vote misallocation were the causes. No discrepancies in these cases were reported to be attributable to machine tabulation. For the original data where no follow up investigation was performed, the discrepancies were small, in particular the average reported discrepancy is lower than the number of votes that were determined to be questionable…

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the hand counting remains an error prone activity. In order to enable a more precise analysis it is recommended that the hand counting precision is substantially improved in future audits. The completeness of the audit reports also need to be addressed…

This analysis does not include 42 records (3.2% of 1311 [candidate race counts]) that were found to be incomplete, unusable or obviously incorrect. This an improvement relative to the November 2007 elections.

The Secretary of the State and her Office, are rightfully proud of proposing the audit to the Legislature in 2007. Based on the municipal reports from November, we asked for public follow-up investigations of the initial audit results, at least starting with the largest and most blatant discrepancies and incomplete forms. We appreciate that follow-up of the largest discrepancies was initiated. Yet, we are disappointed that the investigations were not open to public observation and that all incomplete forms were not investigated.

Our comments and concerns:

The investigations prove that Election Officials in many Connecticut municipalities are not yet able to count votes accurately. As we have noted, we appreciate that the largest discrepancies were investigated. We asked for that as a minimum. Yet without reliable counting, initially, or via follow-up we find no reason to agree that the audits prove the machines in Connecticut were “extremely accurate”. Reports in several other states show that officials and machines can count quite accurately. Some audits and recounts by hand show occasionally that initial reported election results created on election night by people and machines are inaccurate because of human and machine errors — that is what is supposed to happen, exactly what audits are designed to do. (We plan on developing a detailed post discussing counting accuracy and reasonable expectations in the near term)
The audit and the audit report are incomplete. The report “does not include 43 records (3.2% of 1311) that were found to be incomplete, unusable, or obviously incorrect”. When we overlook obvious errors, then in future elections creating obvious errors is another route to avoiding detection of errors or fraud — If the counts don’t match, just don’t report the result.
Even with all the investigations and adjustments we have many unexplained discrepancies. The largest discrepancies were investigated, leaving 98 cases of discrepancies greater than 4 and 34 cases greater than 9. Or 68 with discrepancies over 2% including 31 with discrepancies over 5% of the vote. (Table 1 and Table 2 of the UConn report) We are reminded of Ohio in the same November 2008 election, where a discrepancy of 5 ballots was a matter of serious national concern. With effective initial counting, there should be a small number of counts requiring investigation.
The Chain-of-Custody is critical to credibility. Even the some of the originally reported data which closely matched machine totals lacks credibility — based on lapses in the chain-of-custody of ballots prior to the initial municipal counting. In several cases the ballots were not resealed after the initial audit counts, and are thus less than fully credible. Once again, we do not have any reason to suspect errors or fraud, we just point out the lack of following procedures, the holes in credibility, and the openings for covering errors and fraud in elections.
The entire audit process should be open to observation. We do not doubt the hard work and integrity of the Secretary of the State’s election staff of seven, several of whom recounted ballots and performed research in a number of towns. If the recounting and field research had been open to the public, we might be in a position to vouch for the integrity of the process. We, not the public, were informed of the initial “site visits” but our request that they be open to the public, or at least open to us, was to no avail. If any critical part of the audit is performed out of public view, it leaves questions for the public and opens up another avenue for fraud or for errors to be covered up.
Either “questionable ballot” classification is inaccurate in many towns or we have a “system problem”. Based on our analysis of the audit results and our observations during 18 post election audits, we find that election officials classified way more votes as questionable than necessary. In most cases only a very small number, 1 or 2 votes per candidate, are filled out poorly enough not to counted by the machine, but several towns classify large numbers as questionable. This is a problem as it opens a hole for real problems to go undetected. When 10% of ballots are incorrectly classified as questionable it opens up the possibility of not recognizing a problem of a 10% undercount for a candidate.
Conversely, if the officials are reasonably classifying questionable ballets, then we have a system that 5%, 10%, or 25% of voters in several towns are actually unable to use properly. That would really be a serious “system problem” that needs to be addressed – by better systems not by smarter voters. (If we actually have such a “system problem” then we have a very poor ballot layout, much worse than other states, much worse than the legendary “butterfly ballot” in Florida 2000.)
Accuracy and the appearance of objectivity are important. We disagree with the Secretary of the State’s initial assessment on December 12 when all the data from the municipalities was available, but no UConn report was available. Secretary Bysiewicz said the audits “have shown extremely accurate machine counts”. While it may actually be the case, the accuracy of all scanners in the audit cannot be proven based on the data available now, and less so based on the data available in December.
Timeliness is important. We have reports and follow-up, long after the election: The election was November 4th, the audit was complete in early December, the Presidential electors were certified on December 14th, the initial “site visits” began on January 19th and were complete by January 23rd, the data from the initial “site visits” were sent to UConn on February 18th, and further follow up data on April 3, 2009. The report is dated on May 12, 2009 — over six months after the election. The longer the delay the colder the trail of evidence, the more opportunity for cover-up, and the less value the data.
When the Presidential electors were certified on December 14th, there were huge obvious discrepancies. What if a race for President, a U.S. Representative, or State Legislator was close? Would there have been a swifter response even though the machines were declared “extremely accurate” at that point?

Our bottom line:

The problem is not that there were machine problems. We have no evidence there were any. The problem is that when there are or ever were, dismissing all errors as human counting errors, we are unlikely to find a problem. In this audit, the worst discrepancies were investigated, which proved that many discrepancies in these audits were human errors — not surprisingly based on observation of inadequate counting. However, a sample does not prove all discrepancies are human errors.
We stand by our recommendations and the recommendations of other groups for what is required to have effective, credible audits. CTVotersCount Petition 2009, Coalition Recommendations, Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits, and The League Of Women Voters Report on Election Audits.
The current Audit Process in Connecticut demonstrates the need for audits to be Independent and focused on election integrity, not just machine certification reliability. Even with hard work and high integrity the appearance of integrity is questionable when the Election Officials and the State’s Chief Election Official are responsible for both the audit the election. We know of no other area of business or Government where something labeled an “audit” is this far from independent. If the purpose of the audit were to just check if the machines can work as certified and not to uncover and rectify instances of error and fraud, then improved audit execution and tweaks of the current law might suffice. Yet, for the audits to provide election integrity we need a credible audit that is completed in time to adjust election results, that includes an audit of the entire process, and one that subjects all ballots and machines to selection for audit. The current law has too many exemptions which all represent opportunities for error or fraud to go undetected.

Secretary Bysiewicz supported independent audits in 2008 when they failed to pass the Connecticut Legislature. She reiterated her commitment to independent audits and having a completely open process in a letter to CTVotersCount petition signers earlier this year, sent on January 23rd:

We supported the creation of an Independent Audit Board last legislative session as the next step in improving the administration of audits in our state. We also supported a bill that would require one hundred percent (100%) testing of memory cards prior to thier use. Of course, we will continue to support that type of refinement to our current process.

Our audit law requires that audits be conducted in public. I have long been a strong advocate of openness and transparency in government. We will advocate for the types of improvments suggested in the petition (e.g. that all audit activiteis should occur in public)...

We will work very hard to maintain the gains we have made against any effort to pull away from these basic security measures, like audits, on the ground that we face financial challenges in the state and local level. Like you, I strongly believe that such measures are critical to maintaining public confidence in our electoral process and constitute a small price to pay for ensuring that our elections function properly.

Nov 08 Election Audit Reports – Part 1 – Bad Cards, Procedural Lapses Continue

This week the University of Connecticut VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Introduction

This week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center released reports on post-election audits and memory card testing for the November 2008 election. These reports were announced by a press release from the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. <Press Release> <Post-Election Memory Card Report> <Post-Election Audit Report>. Today we will highlight and comment on the Memory Card Report. In Part 2 we will highlight and comment on the Post-Election Audit Report.

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

Summary

From the press release:

My office entered into this historic partnership with the University of
Connecticut VoTeR Center so that we could receive an independent, unbiased accounting of Connecticut’s optical scan voting machines,” said Bysiewicz. “The results of these two studies confirm that numbers tallied by the optical scanners were remarkably accurate on Election Day November 4, 2008. Voters should feel confident that their votes were secure and accurately counted.

From the Post-Election Memory Card Audit Report:

In summary. (1) all cards used in the election were properly programmed, (2) cards with junk data continues to be a problem, and additional analysis is in progress to determine the cause, (3) a number of cards show that the pre-election procedures are not followed uniformly and that cards continue to be duplicated; we recommend a stronger policy statement is needed on handling the cards before and during the election an disallowing memory card duplication.

The Secretary of the State, her Office, and UConn are rightfully proud of initiating the audit in 2008 and instituting the unique memory card testing program. We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s committment to solve the problems identified:

From the Press Release:

“Overall, I’m pleased that our first pre- and post-testing procedures with UConn demonstrate the security of our office’s chain of custody practices with election officials,” said Bysiewicz. “However, the percentage of unreadable cards is still too high and we await UConn’s forthcoming investigation into possible causes and recommended solutions for guidance on this issue. In the interim we will provide additional training to local election officials to make sure regulations concerning the handling and security of memory cards used by the optical scanners are uniformly followed throughout the State of Connecticut.”

From the Secretary of the State’s May 14th Newsletter:

Moving forward, my office will continue to improve the training we give to Registrars of Voters and local election officials to reduce any further errors in counting. We will also start new training within weeks to improve the security of memory cards used by the optical scanners to record votes on Election Day.

Our comments and concerns:

This is not a random audit of memory cards. We continue to applaud this unique memory card testing program, yet it is a registrar selected set of memory cards, not exhaustive, not a random sample. 297 cards used in the election were tested out of 833 districts. This opens a huge hole for covering up errors and fraud – just don’t send in your card. It also biases any statistics one way or another based on which cards tend to be sent to UConn.
9% error memory card failure rate is bad enough, but is it the actual rate? 9% of all cards sent to UConn had memory problems. These are all classified as cards not used in the election, if so, the rate would be 41/142 or 29%. We wonder if many bad cards are found in the process of testing and not used in the election thus not counted in the audit. Or could some of these cards have worked in the election and failed subsequently? Bottom line we don’t know the actual failure rate % since we don’t have a random sample. The 9% is within the range of previous UConn pre and post election tests <all UConn Reports> <Our Past Commentary>
There is a serious failure of officials to follow procedures. A rate of 34% or 144 failures to follow procedures on 421 non-junk-data cards is a serious pervasive problem. (52-Not Set for Election, 20 Results Print Aborted, 2-Set for Election, Zero Counters, 41-Duplication Events, 29-Zero Totals Printed Before Date of Election) In some cases multiple problems may have occurred on the same card so the number of districts detected as failing to follow procedures is likely a bit less that the 34%. (This paragraph has corrected numbers, in an earlier version we had double counted some of the errors)Once again, this is not a random sample yet it’s a totally unacceptable level of not following procedures. The report correctly suggests these should be changed through better training and instruction to municipalities. If procedures are necessary, then when they are not followed it means there is an opportunity for problems to occur. This should cause everyone to wonder to what extent other unaudited election procedures are regularly not followed. Most procedures are in place because they are intended to prevent election day problems, errors, and fraud. In fact, this memory card finding is very consistent with the Audit Coaltion Reports which have consistently shown a significant level of failures to follow procedures, for instance the chain-of-custody failures described in the most recent Coalition report <read>

Our bottom line:

A non-random partial post-election audit of memory cards is useful, but it is insufficient. A more rigorous sampling process would yield more accurate information and, just as importantly, it would eliminate the existing opportunity for errors or fraud to be covered up by not sending the cards for testing. Last year we proposed and the GAE Committee passed 100% pre-election independent testing of memory cards. We stand by that recommendation to protect the cards from front-end insider fraud and to make it less likely that election officials have to deal with junk data cards. Post-election random testing or 100% testing of memory cards is also advisable.
How many more tests, reports, and elections will it take before the junk data problem is significantly reduced? Ridiculous, Unacceptable, Unconscionable come to mind to describe the junk data problem. 5%, 9%, 20% or even 1% is way out of line for electronic equipment. Why do we stand for it? What about all the other states that use this exact same technology, why are they putting up with it?
Almost every failure to follow procedures is an opportunity to cause problems, cover up errors, or cover up fraud. Perhaps it is easier to understand human failure to follow procedures exactly, every time. Once again no mater if failure to follow procedures is 5%, 10%, 20% or 40% in handling memory cards it points to a likely much higher rate of failure to follow all procedures. How can we have confidence in elections with such a lack of ability or attention to following procedures, many of which are performed outside of public view, outside of audits purview to discover. We can only hope that the Registrars of Voters will join in the commitment to meet a much higher standard.

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Related story 5/28: Diebold memory card problems in Florida — a different model, this time it is high speed wireless cards <read>

National Popular Vote Squeaks Through Connecticut House

Initially defeated by 1 vote, legislators change their votes.

Most votes on this bill are along party lines with Democrats generally for the bill and Republicans generally against the bill. However, there are prominent Democrates who oppose the Agreement including Connecticut Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz and Minnesota Secretary of State, Mark Ritchie.

The National Popular Vote Agreement passed the Connecticut House after initially being defeated by one vote. See how your representative voted <here> As reported by the Hartford Courant <read>

The vote was a nail-biter to the end, and it passed only after four veteran Democrats switched their votes from negative to affirmative: Deputy House Speakers Robert Godfrey of Danbury and Emil “Buddy” Altobello of Meriden, and Reps. Peggy Sayers of Windsor Locks and Peter Tercyak of New Britain.

As frequent CTVotersCount readers are aware we strongly oppose the National Popular Vote Agreement. For more information read our Case Against The National Popular Vote or a recent talk by Conn College Professor Dorothy B. James.

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Update: Similar articles at CTNewsJunkie.com, TheDay, and ConnPolitics.tv . Here is a conglomerate of my comments on those sites:

There are other reasons to be against the National Popular Vote agreement: 1)The national vote number is not accurate, it is the result of error prone counts in various states which usually would not matter except in close swing states. 2)There is no national recount law to correct those results. 3)Close elections can be expected to all end at the Supreme Court as voters could sue their Secretary of the State for using unreliable results.

Mr. Ritchie’s opposition is based, in part, on the fact that there is no national recount law that would provide a number that would have any hope of being credible.

Since state electors would be awarded by Secretaries of the State based on questionable results in other states, I can see close elections all ending up in the Supreme Court based on voters suing their Secretary and others states’ Secretaries based on providing or relying on questionable results.

Also, in passing, I mention that the following argument is questionable:

“In 2008, candidates concentrated over two-thirds of their money and campaign visits in just six states and 98 percent of their money in just 15 states, a press release touting the bills passage said.”

This is a media centric concern. In recent elections almost all of the media money goes to out of state media moguls. Does the average voter in Connecticut need more phone calls and candidate ads to be better informed? No. Do candidates have to visit Connecticut for the election to be covered responsibly by the Connecticut media? I doubt it.

Several comments on those sites are from “mvymvy” who shows up on many blogs, with comments as useful and redundant as his or her name, but does not actually address the issues that we bring up. I suspect because the facts and logic are with our arguments.