Category: CT

Ray Hackett: Let citizens decide issue of early voting

Surely Connecticut’s election officials are capable of setting up a system that would provide the necessary safeguards to prevent voter fraud — just like election officials in all those other states have.

Mr. Hacket’s article is balanced, yet there are more details to consider. CTVotersCount took a position as “Conditionally Against” early voting in any form during our testimony at the Legislature earlier this year.

Ray Hackett, Norwich Bulletin weighs in on early voting <read>

Last week, there were borough elections held in the state. Turnout for those was often just as bad or worse — mostly a result of no contests on the ballots. At least in Norwich, there was a contest between two candidates.

But is poor turnout at the polls sufficient enough reason to change the rules? And would allowing voters  to vote when it’s convenient for them actually result in greater participation?
The Connecticut Town Clerks Association has expressed its opposition to the idea of early voting, claiming it hasn’t been studied sufficiently to ensure voter fraud will not run rampant. I certainly appreciate the concern about fraud, but I find that argument weak. Many states allow early voting, and pictures of thousands of voters in long lines waiting for the opportunity to cast a ballot in last year’s presidential election were seen in newspapers and on television.

Surely Connecticut’s election officials are capable of setting up a system that would provide the necessary safeguards to prevent voter fraud — just like election officials in all those other states have.

Mr. Hacket’s article is balanced, yet there are more details to consider.  CTVotersCount took a position as “Conditionally Against” early voting in any form during our testimony at the Legislature earlier this year:

Early Voting, Mail-In Voting, and Unlimited/No Excuse Absentee Voting

– Conditionally Against*: Significant numbers of absentee voters are disenfranchised in every election by rejection of their ballots – usually for good reason, but they are disenfranchised and their intentions are not realized.  These methods in general have security and secrecy challenges, invite fraud, error, and disenfranchisement.  We also note in these tough economic times that early voting can be a significant expense, especially in New England with town administered voting.

(*) When we say we are “Conditionally Against” a proposition, we mean that nobody has proposed a realistic safe way to accomplish the proposition. We remain open to the possibility that a means may be found that would pass the scrutiny of the majority of computer scientists, security experts, election officials, and voting integrity advocates.

We are not as confident as Mr. Hackett is that early voting in Connecticut could be done as easily as in other states out west.  Most states manage elections by county with full time civil service election officials — they do early voting in a few polling places in each county — Connecticut manages elections by two elected registrars, often part-time,  in each of 169 towns, making early voting much more of a challenge and potential expense.  Changing this structure to allow early voting centers would be quite a change, requiring in our opinion, a constitutional amendment of much greater scope than the one currently under consideration.

We are open to the possibility that early voting could work in Connecticut, however, we are skeptical that the state, towns, and citizens would be willing to pay for the added costs of early voting in polling places.  We will remain conditionally opposed unless and until a plan is presented which provides security accompanied by an honest cost assessment.   If the citizens are to decide, they deserve a complete plan describing how it will be accomplished and what it would cost.

We are also skeptical of no excuse absentee voting  which has questionable security, privacy, and when so many absentee ballots are discarded due to errors on the part of voters, effectively disenfranchising them.

May Elections: Random District Selection for Post Election Audit

Connecticut towns must hold municipal elections in May or November of odd years. On May 4th, elections were held and as required by law 10% of districts holding municipal elections are subject to the Post-Election Audit. CTVotersCount attended the drawing this morning, representing the public.

Analysis and Opinion: Some might question the value of such a small audit. Considering the value of elections and statistics, we disagree.

Connecticut towns must hold municipal elections in May or November of odd years.

The Secretary of the State’s pre-election Press Release:  Bysiewicz:  Polls Will Be Open Monday May 4th, 15 Connecticut Communities Holding Municipal Elections In May <read>

As required by law 10% of districts holding municipal elections  are subject  to the Post-Election Audit.  CTVotersCount attended the drawing this morning, representing the public.  Some might question the value of such a small audit.  Considering the value of elections and statistics, we disagree.  (see our analysis and opinion below)

The law:

Not earlier than the fifteenth day after any election or primary and not later than two business days before the canvass of votes by the Secretary of the State, Treasurer and Comptroller, for any federal or state election or primary, or by the town clerk for any municipal election or primary, the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded in not less than ten per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality, whichever is applicable.

However, not all these elections were “municipal elections”, several were “borough elections”.  As such, the “borough elections” do not fall under the post-election audit laws, adding another item to our list of  “loopholes” or exemptions in the law.

By the numbers:

  • 6 Municipalities had municipal elections  on May 4th
  • 13 Election districts* in the election
  • 2 10% of districts in the election that must be audited
  • 3 Municipalities had recanvasses** in at least one race, exempting districts in those municipalities from audit

The law:

If a selected voting district has an office that is subject to recanvass or an election or primary contest pursuant to the general statutes, the Secretary shall select an alternative district

The process:

The 10 districts in the three towns without districts are printed and separated.

The public has the opportunity to review the list of districts:

The eligeable districts
The eligible 13 districts

The slips of paper are folded uniformly.  The public is invited to randomly draw districts:

CTVotersCount Co-Founder, Denise Weeks selects districts
CTVotersCount Co-Founder, Denise Weeks, selects districts

The chosen districts and alternates*** are announced as they are drawn:

 

Deputy Secretary of the State, Lesley Mara, announces district
Deputy Secretary of the State, Lesley Mara, announces district

The eligible districts include eight from Naugatuck along with one each from Andover, and Woodbridge.  That would give about a 62% chance that Naugatuck would be selected for both districts to be audited:

 

Two selected districts and alternate, all from Naugatuck
Two selected districts and alternate, all from Naugatuck

What is next:

The individual municipalities (in this case just one) will be notified of their selection.

The municipal clerks in each town will randomly select three races to audit for the districts selected.  (We’d like to report on these to provide confidence that they are truly random and fair, however, they are not required to be public or noticed to the public)

The municipal registrars will determine and publicly notice a date of the local counting session which must occur between May 19th to, we understand, May 29th.  The Election Audit Coalition will observe the audit counting sessions.

Election Audit Coaltion will analyze and report the results.  Independently, The University of Connecticut is required by law to analyze and report audit results.

Analysis and Opinion:
Some might question the value of such a small audit.  Considering value of elections and the statistics, we disagree.

We question the wisdom of not subjecting all elections, all contests, and all ballots to the possibility of being selected for audit.  In addition to the recanvassed races in this election several contests and ballots are entirely exempt from audit.  Exemptions include other races in recanvassed districts, all questions, all referendums, all ballots initially counted by hand, and all centrally scanned absentee ballots.  Exemptions open up opportunities for error and fraud to go undetected, and openings for fraudsters to know in advance what will never be audited.   Every type of election, contest and ballot should be subject to being selected for audit.  No election contest is unimportant, no ballot is exempt from changing election  results.

We also point out that the statistical implications of auditing municipal elections are different than the implications for Congressional or statewide contests.  Statistically each municipal election is independent, selection 10% of districts produces the same level of confidence in a race if the municipality is one of six in May or one of 163 in November.

Other coverage: Orient Lodge Secretary of the State’s Press Release

—————
* Districts are similar to precincts in other states

** Recanvasses are similar to recounts in other states, with perhaps less rigor.  They are done with a combination of machine and manual counting.  According to the Recount Proceedures Manual, revised last July, there is no public notice requirement.

*** Alternates are chosen in case a district is subsequently subject to an election contest prior to the audit counting session.

Town Clerks Oppose Unlimited Absentee Balloting

Town clerks statewide are opposing bills seeking a constitutional change to allow early voting in Connecticut because they fear the proposals lack sufficient safeguards to deter election fraud.

Hartford Courant story: Connecticut Town Clerks Concerned About Proposals To Expand Absentee Balloting <read>

Town clerks statewide are opposing bills seeking a constitutional change to allow early voting in Connecticut because they fear the proposals lack sufficient safeguards to deter election fraud.

“We’re not against the concept of having more people vote. But we’re concerned about the loss of accountability in any law allowing anyone to use absentee ballots for any reason,” said Joseph Camposea, Manchester town clerk and president of the Connecticut Town Clerks Association. “There’s no reason to rush into this.”…

The expansion is supported by Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, who said she believes that it will allow more people to vote.

“This is an opportunity to expand participation in our electoral process,” she said. “The impetus came during the presidential election, when people saw early voting that was allowed in some states. Thousands of people cast ballots prior to Election Day in those states.”

We understand the attraction of unlimited absentee voting, yet the attraction is accompanied by risks that votes will not be counted.   We we have several concerns beyond the potential for voter fraud expressed by town clerks.  One risk is of votes being lost or fradulently destroyed between the time the voter places the votes in the mail and they are delivered to the counting officials. Ballots pass through the U.S. Mail and then through receipt, storage, and delivery in town hall.  Not a potential, but a real problem, is the significant percentage of absentee ballots disqualified through  innocent mistakes made by voters.  <Example:  Minnesota Senate Race>

What Did The November 2008 Post-Election Audit Cost?

How much did our November audit cost? Election officials and towns complain about the cost of the audits and that they threaten town budgets.

No matter what your politics, you can find many many votes in Hartford, Washington, or your town that you disagree with, costing one way or another more than the cost of an audit. What is the value of confidence that all those officials were elected without error or fraud?

After the November 2008 election, Secretary Bysiewicz ordered the post-election audit of all five races in the election which added about 40% to the votes required to be counted by law.  We appreciate this as the law only called for the audit of a randomly selected three races and does not exempt uncontested races.  As we pointed out at the time, using statistical methods we could have done much better auditing all races and the two questions counting the original number of votes <read>

But how much did our November audit cost?  Election officials and towns complain about the cost of the audits and that they threaten town budgets.

We have two sets of information provided very responsively  from the Secretary of the State’s office.  The reimbursement requests from towns from the November 2008 election as of February 12 <read> and for the November 2007 election as of yesterday. <read>

We analyzed the November 2008 data, comparing the costs for the towns with the number of ballots and votes counted <read>

Preliminary conclusions.

Some towns don’t actually seem all that concerned with the costs:

  • In November 2008 47 towns requested reimbursement from the State 9 selected for the audit did not (we use 46 for our calculations as we were not able to classify one town)
  • In November 2007 13 towns requested reimbursement  27 did not.

The costs of auditing vary widely between in November 2008  towns:

  • Cost per ballot counted range from $0.09 to $1.88
  • Cost per vote counted range from $0.02 to $0.38|We have a hard time believing the lower costs reported and the higher costs.

Costs on average and in total for Municipalities:

  • The most reasonable number to use for November is the median cost of $0.48 per ballot
  • If all towns had requested reimbursement at the median cost per ballot, the total cost of the audit in November 2008 would have been: $72,103
  • Since we audit 10% of the districts we audit approximat3ely 10% of the ballots cast so the cost per voter is 1/10th of the cost per ballot actually counted, or about $0.05 per voter.

Total costs of the Audit:

The estimate of $72,103 does not include all the costs to the State for the audit, just the Municipalities.  Some of the additional costs, primarily for the Secretary of the State’s Office are:

What would we do for an audit? And how much would that cost?

CTVotersCount proposed a revision to the audit law in this session of the General Assembly, it was died in committee. <read>.  It would audit ALL statewide and congressional races and ALL questions on the ballot based on statistical principles and eliminate several loopholes in the law.

  • It would audit only three races per district except under exceptional circumstances, consistent with the current law, or 40% less than the November 2008 audit, or $72,103 * .6 = $43,262
  • Eliminating the loopholes would add less than 10%, or $43,262 * 1.1 = $47, 588 or about $0.03 per vote.

But, based on our observations the current methods of counting provide insufficient transparency, accuracy, and confidence.  So we would adjust these costs:

  • Most towns use two person counting teams, we would use three or four person teams so the cost of a single count might as much as double.
  • Counting more accurately would reduce the need for counting multiple times and the costs for unnecessary investigations.
  • Costs might go up anywhere from 25% to 90%
  • As an estimate we would increase costs to the municipalities by 50%,  or about:

So it might be about $72,000 or $0.045 per vote for a sufficient audit. To put that in context:

  • Cost of paper ballot $0.35 per voter
  • Stamp for letter to your representative requesting single payer heath care, $0.42
  • One teabag and a postage stamp $0.60
  • Cost of a standalone race to replace a Senate vacancy $6,000,000 not including audit costs or campaign costs.
  • Cost of clean elections for a single State Senate candidate in on district, $85,000.
  • Cost of just one highly contested Senate race, tens of millions,
  • Cost of a wrong vote in congress, billions of dollars, and thousands of lives.

No matter what your politics, y0u can find many many votes in Hartford, Washington, or your town that you disagree with, costing one way or another more than the cost of an audit.  What is the value of confidence that all those officials were elected without error or fraud?  We say priceless, certainly worth  much much more than $72,000 for last November’s election.

Is it worth $0.05 per voter or $0.03 per voter for integrity and confidence?  We think so.

Act Now! – Oppose H.B. 5903 – Protect Soldiers’ Votes

The Government Administration and Elections Committee (GAE) has passed a bill that will threaten the security and privacy of military absentee votes, H.B. 5903. And it could be expensive!

It sounds good but, in addition to CTVotersCount, it is opposed by computer scientists, TrueVoteCT members, and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz.

The Government Administration and Elections Committee (GAE) has passed a bill that will threaten the security and privacy of military absentee votes, H.B. 5903

And it could be expensive!

It sounds good but, in addition to CTVotersCount, it is opposed by computer scientists, TrueVoteCT members, and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz.

NOW is a critical time. The bill will soon be before the full CT House and Senate.

Call or email your State Senator and Representative NOW. Tell them you want to preserve the security and privacy of military votes.

Find your CT Senator and Representative: http://www.cga.ct.gov/maps/Townlist.asp

From the testimony of Susan Bysiewicz,Secretary of the State

This bill serves a noble purpose…After repeated attempts to initiate a secure online voting system, members of the original DOD peer review panel found a number of security risks. Further, I their June 2007 elections report, the United States Government Accountability Office stated that the federal government has not yet developed sufficient absentee voting guidelines for this kind of use.

Until an internet system is designed to safeguard against security risks, I have proposed extending the timeframe by which military personnel can obtain a blank ballot from 90 days before the election to the first business [sic] of the calendar year of the election. In addition, I propose that Connecticut allow the electronic transmission of absentee ballot applications and blank ballots. These simple steps would greatly extend voting opportunities for members of the Armed Forces without posing additional security risks.

Here is the bill: <read>

What are the problems with H.B. 5903?

  • It will threaten the privacy and security of soldiers’ votes.
  • Any threat to the private vote threatens everyone’s votes and Democracy.
  • It may be costly, perhaps several million $ in start-up costs and $500 per vote cast.

There has been a strong coordinated move to pass such bills in many legislatures across the country. So far few states have been taken in. However, in Connecticut this bill passed the Government Elections and Administration Committee without discussion, unanimously. We assume, because it sounds good and has the claim of helping our military.

Even though the Office of Fiscal Analysis says it will have no costs to the State or municipalities, it is hard to believe that the Secretary of the State could create regulations to accomplishes this without a great deal of expensive research and implementation costs, when computer scientists are skeptical that it is possible and believe it is risky to military voters and the rest of us as well. Vendors are proposing accomplishing this in other states at great costs such as $4,000,000 start-tup costs and $100,000 per county annually.

Connecticut has a problem with facilitating overseas military voting, however, Minnesota has already solved the same problems we have without resorting to the unnecessary risks and costs of this bill. In fact, the improvements in Minnesota have been cited by a veterans group: <read>

Here is the Technologists’ Statement On Internet Voting: <read>

Timely Reminders From the Secretary of the State and CTVotersCount

The Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz reminds voters of the importance of local elections and the importance of registering to vote in advance.

CTVotersCount reminds voters that referendums are not exempt from the risk of error and insider fraud, yet are entirely exempt from post-election audits.

The Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz reminds voters of the importance of localelections and the importance of registering to vote in advance.  Courtesy of CTNewsWire:  <read>

“Crucial budget and educational issues are facing many towns in
Connecticut as voters go to the polls to choose municipal leaders this
year, so it is imperative to register to vote!” said Secretary
Bysiewicz.  “Anyone who wants a say in the future direction of their
community in these tough times should make sure they mail registration
materials to their Registrar of Voters office by Monday April 20th or
else go to town hall and fill out the registration card in person by
8:00 p.m. on April 27th.”

CTVotersCount agrees.

We also remind voters that referendums are not exempt from the risk of error and insider fraud, yet are entirely exempt from post-election audits:

Two motivations and opportunities: <FAQ>

The Town has the budget referendum turned down frequently at $20,000+ per referendum for a turnout of a small % of registered voters.

  • All the insiders of all parties are for it
  • Many town hall jobs are dependent on it
  • The insiders convince themselves that “if the right voters showed up then it would pass”
  • They think they are helping out the town out by passing the budget and saving multiple election costs
  • All look the other way

One insider is convinced the budget is too big.

  • Convinced that “If the people really knew then they would vote it down”
  • When nobody is looking, the insider takes advantage of sole access to voting machines and ballots, to hack the machine with the Hursti Hack before the election.

A recent example, Referendum: Front Page Story, Yet Paper Ballots Will Be Ignored, <read>

Among the current exemptions from post-election audits in CT are:  Referendums, Questions, Central Count Absentee Ballots, and All Ballots Counted By Hand.   Perhaps worse, some towns where election officials have had issues counting ballots during audits are now considering going to all paper ballot referendums – saving $100’s while voting on issues of $1,000,000’s <read>

FL: Internet Voting Skepticism Has Promise

Opponents of Internet voting argue that security risks are too plentiful and blatant to ignore. They point to the threat of hackers and other forms of fraud, as well as glitches that could prevent votes from being counted or result in a miscount.

Those are legitimate concerns. Any efforts to expand the role of Internet voting must be vetted in the most public way possible, open to examination by the nation’s top computer experts.

Editorial, Internet voting has promise, discusses their wish for Internet voting, but in the end correctly points out that it should be subject to “open to examination by the nation’s top computer experts.”

That is all that is asked by the Technologists’ Statement On Internet Voting.

But in the Connecticut Legislature is full speed ahead for Internet voting despite the opposition of CTVotersCount, TrueVoteCT, and the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz. See HB-5903. Hopefully, the Office of Fiscal Analysis will point out the expense of whatever process is used for Internet voting for each of our 169 municipalities. Our earlier coverage.

Fort Meyers News-Press Editorial <read>

Opponents of Internet voting argue that security risks are too plentiful and blatant to ignore. They point to the threat of hackers and other forms of fraud, as well as glitches that could prevent votes from being counted or result in a miscount.

Those are legitimate concerns. Any efforts to expand the role of Internet voting must be vetted in the most public way possible, open to examination by the nation’s top computer experts.

But it doesn’t make sense that citizens can perform so many other vital transactions online, using Web sites that are trusted to be secure, yet can’t have a secure option for voting online – or at least registering to vote.

We agree that registration and even sending ballots to the Military can be accomplished.  We are less sure of the journalists’ predictions:

Finding a way to incorporate one of the world’s greatest technological advances – the Internet – should only be a matter of time.

Sometimes technology evolves as we wish and sometimes it does not — remember Nuclear Fusion, Toxic Waste Storage…I remember a childhood friend that just kept smoking assuming “scientists will come up with a cure before I get lung cancer”.  I hope he changed his mind and quit.  Unfortunately, when we risk Democracy on  an unproven technology the cure may also be too late.



Policital Scientist Describes Obstacles To The National Popular Vote

Before scrapping a system that has been in place for more than 200 years, however, political scientist Dorothy B. James cautioned that the NPV has more than a few obstacles to overcome before becoming reality…”Until you can take care of these technical issues, then you are not going to get closer to one person one vote,” James said.

Mystic Times story on League of Women Voters forum <read>

Before scrapping a system that has been in place for more than 200 years, however, political scientist Dorothy B. James cautioned that the NPV has more than a few obstacles to overcome before becoming reality…

James also noted that the United States is a nation with an overabundance of lawyers who would dissect the wording of any NPV proposal and ultimately tie up the issue in litigation. She reminded her audience of a former president’s question on language that depended on the definition of what “is” is.

Also, she said, the NPV has no provision for recounts, which, given the current state of the contested Minnesota senate race, would seem necessary.

Even more problematic, she said, is that we have 51 different electoral systems across the nation and a general sloppiness in vote counts. Keeping track of voters is an issue.

For more on this see our earlier articles <here> <here>

Soldiers’ Votes and Democracy At Risk In CT

Despite opposition by the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, TrueVoteCT members, CTVoters Count, and the League of Women Voters, HB-5903 was as voted out of the General Administration and Elections Committee unanimously today. The bill will allow members of the military to submit absentee votes electronically.

This not a wild theoretical concern: Ironically, CNN has just reported that the Chinese or others have software they have used to infiltrate critical computers around the world

Despite opposition in testimony by the Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, TrueVoteCT members, CTVoters Count, and the League of Women Voters,  HB-5903 was as voted out of the General Administration and Elections Committee unanimously today.  The bill will allow members of the military to submit absentee votes electronically. <testimony>  Our testimony was not listed under the bill but is available online at <CTVotersCount Testimony>.  As covered by the Secretary of the State, the Department of Defense and Goverment Accountability Office have concerns with the security of internet voting.  Our testimony referenced the Technologists Statement On Internet Voting.

Because of the increasing frequency of proposals to allow remote voting over the internet, we believe it is necessary to warn policymakers and the public that secure internet voting is a very hard technical problem, and that we should proceed with internet voting schemes only after thorough consideration of the technical and non-technical issues in doing so.

Here is the critical text from the bill:

28        (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,

29   the Secretary of the State shall work in conjunction with the Sta te

30    Elections Enforcement Commission and the United States Department

31    of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program to ensure that any

32    absent uniformed services voter, as defined in 42 USC 1973ff-6, may

33    utilize a secure electronic transmission system for the transmittal of: (1)

34    The federal postcard application form provided for pursuant to the

35    Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924,

36    42 USC 1973ff et seq., as amended from time to time, and (2) any

37    absentee ballot issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this section or

38    section 9-140.

39      (c) The Secretary of the State, in consultation with the State Elections

40    Enforcement Commission and the Office of Military Affairs shall adopt

41    regulations,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  chapter  54,  to

42   implement  the  provisions  of  subsection  (b)  of  this  section.  Such

43    regulations, at a minimum, shall provide that an absent uniformed

44    services voter shall not be required to submit a paper absentee ballot in

45    addition to the electronic submission of such a ballot pursuant to

46    subsection (b) of this section.

Putting soldiers’ votes at risk threatens us and democracy as well.  The election results and our democracy depend on the privacy, security, and accuracy of every vote.

This not a wild theoretical concern: Ironically,  CNN has just reported that the Chinese or others have software they have used to infiltrate critical computers around the world: <read>

One report was issued by the University of Toronto’s Munk Center for International Studies in conjunction with the Ottawa, Canada-based think tank The SecDev Group; the second came from the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory.

Researchers have dubbed the cyber-espionage network GhostNet. The network can not only search a computer but see and hear the people using it, according to the Canadian report.

“GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers, including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including microphones and web cameras,” the report says.

Hardly reassuring is that it might not be the Chinese Government, but could in the future be citizen hackers, the U.S. Military itself or Israel:

“Chinese cyber espionage is a major global concern… (b)ut attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by the Chinese state is wrong and misleading,” says the Canadian report, titled, “Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network.”

“The sheer number of young digital natives online can more than account for the increase in Chinese malware,” it adds.

But the report also points out that China is among a handful of countries, also including the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom, which are “assumed” to have considerable cyber-espionage capabilities

Town Considers All Paper, No Scanners

[Easton Connecticut] is looking into using paper ballots for the upcoming budget referendums to save money.

We would recommend against all paper. Audits have shown that Connecticut election officials have difficulty counting even a few hundred ballots accurately. We also remember a very frustrating day observing the Easton election officials attempting to accurately count ballots for the audit after the November 2007 Municipal Election.

Easton Courier, Town considers paper ballots for referendums; Would likely save money due to cost of scanner ballots: <read>

[Easton Connecticut] is looking into using paper ballots for the upcoming budget referendums to save money.

The two registrars of voters, Republican Eunice K. Hanson and Democrat Nick Soares, plan to watch how the process of using paper ballots works in Monroe when that town has its budget referendum April 7.

The biggest question is how long it would take to count the paper ballots…

It costs the town at least $2,800 to hold a referendum. The major expenses are the special ballots needed for the new optical scanner voting machines and hourly pay for poll workers. The polls are open 14 hours for elections.

The ballots are 45 cents each. “That’s very costly,” Soares said, “so the biggest savings would be in the ballots….

He said hes unsure if paper ballots will save money because of the time needed to hand-count the ballots. “The new machines are quick” Soares said.

Eunice Hanson agreed. “It gives you instant results,” she said of the optical scanning devices that were supplied by the state as a way to modernize the election process. “They’re actually kind of cool. We’ve gotten used to them.”

Susan Koneff, Monroe’s Democratic registrar of voters, said paper ballots are cheaper and simpler. She said referendum results often are known within 25 minutes after the polls close.

“It’s a very efficient way to do a referendum,” Koneff said.

Koneff said the average turnout for a budget referendum in Monroe is from 3,000 to 3,500 voters. The town has about 12,000 registered voters and four polling places, she said…

Easton has 5,200 registered voters and one polling place, Samuel Staples Elementary School. While turnout obviously varies for referendums depending on the contentiousness of the issues involved, Soares said 2,500 to 2,600 people usually vote.

The town has to print a ballot for everyone in town just in case the turnout is exceptional. Extras also are needed for spoilage and, with budget referendums, for Easton property owners who live out of town.

We recommend against all paper. Audits have shown that Connecticut election officials have difficulty counting even a few hundred ballots accurately <Most recent audit report statistics>.  We also remember a very frustrating day observing the Easton election officials attempting to accurately count ballots for the audit after the November 2007 Municipal Election.

Although we disagree, election officials across Connecticut repeatedly complain that counting 10% of the ballots in audits will break the bank while they express a lack of confidence in their ability to count accurately.  It is refreshing to hear agreements that counting is not that costly.  However, we would rather see an optical scan count that can be compared to a manual count.  Counting at night after the polls close, after a 14 hour day, is much more difficult than counting for a audit after several days rest.  In addition an audit is closely observable by the public.

One final point.  We believe there is no requirment that ballots be printed for 100% of the voters in an election. An attempt to require 100% printing in law was not passed when proposed in the 2008 legislative session.