Category: Post-Election Audits

Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits

(Full disclosure: I contributed to, participated in reviewing, and editing this document)

Released today at a press conference in Alexandria, VA, after many months of work:

http://www.electionaudits.org/files/best%20practices%20final_0.pdf

These principles were written to guide the design of high-quality post- election audits. They were developed by an ad hoc group comprising many stakeholders, including election officials, public advocates, computer scientists, statisticians, political scientists and legislators.

Nearly all US elections today are counted using electronic voting systems. Such voting systems have produced result- changing errors through problems with hardware, software, and procedures.[1] Errors can also occur in hand counting of ballots or in the compiling of results. Even serious error can go undetected if results are not audited effectively.

No person, voting official, legislator, or expert can comprehend the whole voting and auditing process. At some point we must rely on the considered judgment of experts rather than only on individual experience. Using these principles state legislators can assess and improve current election and post-election audit laws. Using the principles and best practices election officials can improve the integrity and confidence of the post-election audit process. In turn providing integrity and confidence in our elections and democracy.

The last page of the document has the list of endorsing groups:

VerifiedVoting – Common Cause
Brennan Center For Justice – American Statistical Association
Advocate groups from MN, MI, MA, CO, FL and CT

Update:  PCWorld Coverage

Update: New Mexico Independent Coverage

The Future Of Post-Election Auditing? – Faster, More Economical, Greater Confidence

Can we audit or recount by machine, rather than hand-counting? My conditional answer remains a strong NO. However, as we have discussed before it is quite possible in theory to develop voting machines or auxiliary scanners with capabilities that can greatly reduce the cost, while increasing the integrity of audits, and increasing the confidence in elections.

Now a team in Humboldt County, CA is providing a demonstration of technology and procedures that can provide all these benefits. The Humboldt County Election Transparency Project:

This type of system holds great promise for Connecticut and any other state with optical scan voting. We will address the possibilities for reducing the costs and increasing the integrity of our elections. Today we will address the Humboldt project as a demonstration of public auditing and recounting:

Our Project aims to provide images of each counted ballot, so that any person or organization wishing to do an independent count will have access to a complete set of ballot images.

They also note as we have pointed out many times:

Voting systems such as that used in Humboldt County, which use optically scanned paper ballots, do leave an audit trail of all cast ballots. This audit trail becomes far more valuable if it is actually used to verify the count.

Here is the basic plan:
Continue reading “The Future Of Post-Election Auditing? – Faster, More Economical, Greater Confidence”

Audit No Evil, Recount No Evil, Uncover No Evil

Update: The vote was close and high given that it was a referendum with reduced poll hours. The insiders’ choice won by 52% to 48%. There is no reason to believe the result is incorrect, yet with no audit there will always be a question of credibility in Connecticut referendums.

***********

Referendum: Front Page Story, Yet Paper Ballots Will Be Ignored

Business As Usual In the Nutmeg State – Another Electronic Vote Without A Post-Election Audit
Continue reading “Audit No Evil, Recount No Evil, Uncover No Evil”

In Memoriam: Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones

She was the leader in moving that the 2004 vote be examined by congress.

Here she is in “Help America Vote…On Paper” (about 4min 40sec in and 8min20 sec) <video>

This whole video is also a good 18 minute primer on electronic voting issues: The risks of electronic voting, the perils of outsourcing, the advantages of optical scan, the need for optical scan audits, and the taxpayer costs.

Official Statement: Continue reading “In Memoriam: Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones”

Secretary Bysiewicz Orders Expanded Post-Election Audit

Update: 8/20
Checking with Dr. Shvartsman about the Secretary’s “98% or 99% probability”, he said:

Indeed, 10% sample from the population of about 800, counting all CT districts, gives about the same statistical result as 33% sample from the population of about 250, counting only the districts involved in the August primary…there is no inference of any kind to be made about adequacy/inadequacy of the 10% sample. The recommendation was based purely on the basis of the population size being reduced from about 800 to about 250.

In general I agree with Dr. Shvartsman. If we were auditing one race over any reasonable number of districts, then what is important is the sample size so 10% x 800 = 80 and 33% x 250 = 83.

For instance, if we want to do a poll of Connecticut and New York voters, if we sample 1000 voters in each state, the resulting confidence is about the same, even though the number of voters in each state is very different.

And given the nature of Connecticut’s audit law and the interaction of the 10% district selection followed by the random selection of races, it is a wholly different calculation.

Further what the Secretary of the State seemed to be claiming had to do with a proof that the machines were working properly, which is a whole different situation – hard to even define given the nature of the audit.

*************
Original Post:
Secretary more than triples legislature’s 10% audit mandate for primary, 82 districts in 33 towns to be audited.

Along with several advocates, I participated in the post-election audit drawing this morning. Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz indicated they were “advised by Dr. Shvartsman of UConn” with such a small number of districts that this larger sample would provide “98% or 99% probability” that the machines functioned properly. She also reiterated that the November 2007 post-election audits showed that the machines performed “extremely accurately and securely” the only errors were those of voters filling out ballots incorrectly – We dispute that.

In general I am pleased to learn that the Secretary of the State sees that the current audit law is inadequate and that statistics should play a role in determining the level of post-election audits. On the other hand, I would spend additional and existing post-election auditing/recounting resources in ways that would provide higher levels of confidence more efficiently and effectively. These mechanisms as articulated in our petition include:

  • Variable audits by race, based on the number of districts and originally reported margin (i.e. much lower audit levels for races such as the biggest one in this election, the 4th congressional district primary with a margin over 70%)
  • Dropping the exemption of districts with recounted races from the audits
  • Dropping the exemption of centrally counted absentee ballots from the audits
  • Re-instituting hand-counts for close elections – the Secretary supported them for two elections, but now has gone back to machine recounting – one race in this election in New Britain was won by three votes, such races should be recounted by hand (as of this point we have not verified if this election was recounted by hand or was recounted by machine)
  • Dropping the exemption from the audit of counting ballots that were originally counted by hand – we support auditing all ballots – if the November 2007 audits proved anything, they proved election officials do not have confidence in their ability to count ballots by hand accurately without independent verification;
  • And with a chain-of-custody we can trust, registrars can follow, and that is enforceable.

The Secretary also indicated that this audit would prove that the machines were ready for the November election. Once again, CTVotersCount respectfully disagrees: The memory cards are programmed before each election so one post-election audit is limited in its ability to provide insight into the integrity of another election; This may help verify that the machines generally perform well and may not have been compromised by the mandatory vendor (LHS) maintenance performed on the machines this summer; However, as we have said and UConn reports have shown the machines can be programmed to change results based on all sorts of criteria. This makes real the Computer Science reality that any test cannot be conclusive.

Speaking of UConn and the Secretary of the State’s office, we continue to await the promised memory cards test reports from the February Primary and the legally mandated post-election audit reports from that same primary. So far we must go with the Coalition reports for that primary which indicate that due to procedural lapses the value of those audits remain questionable.

We half agree with the Secretary’s statement today:

“Auditing election results isn’t just a good idea, it’s absolutely essential in order to guarantee the integrity of our elections,” said Secretary Bysiewicz. “As Connecticut prepares for perhaps its highest turnout election in a generation, it is important voters have faith that their vote will be recorded accurately and that’s why the independent audits are so vital.”

Yet, we would prefer to have “confidence” rather than “faith” that everyone’s vote will be recorded accurately.

List of towns and districts:
Continue reading “Secretary Bysiewicz Orders Expanded Post-Election Audit”

Election Costs $ – Democracy? Priceless!

We have said that conducting elections cost from $5.00 to $20.00 per ballot cast and that our estimate of $0.20 to $0.50 for an audit is a small price to pay to assure that the votes are counted as the voters intended. But the news from Norwalk indicates we may need to revise the high-end cost of running an election upwards from that $20.00. <read>

“Everybody has their right to have a primary, but they should consider the costs and if they really statistically have a chance to win,” said Betty Bondi, Democratic registrar of voters in Norwalk, where 6.3 percent of registered Democrats voted.

Bondi said the primary will cost Norwalk taxpayers about $50,000 by the time the bills get sorted – all that for a contest in which Himes got 899 votes and Whitnum got 70

The calculation is $50,000 / (899 + 70) = $51.59 per ballot cast to run the election, totally dwarfing the cost of a strong, effective post-election audit.

A story earlier this week highlighted complaints of high barriers by third-party candidates. Today’s article features complaints from election officials of barriers being too low for primary challengers.

We cannot help but agree with one comment from Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz:

Lopsided results and low turnouts must be put in perspective, Bysiewicz said.

“Sometimes democracy costs money,” she said

We would add that the costs of the peoples’ intention not being followed can be trillions of dollars and thousands of lives, no matter how you look at it, Red, Blue or Green. The value of Democracy? Priceless!

CT Irony #3: Passed in 2005: Tougher Audits and Custody for Equipment/Paper We Don’t Use

In 2005 the Legislature passed the Voter Verified Paper Trail Bill. They also passed post-election audits along with a minimum one hundred and eighty day seal on the paper. Unfortunately, they had not anticipated optical scan, limiting the audit to DRE (Touch Screen) equipment. We actually have tougher post-election audits and custody laws on the books that would have applied to DRE than apply to the optical scanners we do have. We are not advocating DRE machines, Connecticut voters have a much safer, auditable, economical voting system with optical scan.

We have pointed out many weaknesses in the optical scan audit law passed in 2007 which applies to optical scan. Among the inadequacies of the law are that we don’t audit enough of the votes, we don’t do it soon enough after the election, and we have a questionable chain-of-custody provision which many believe only lasts fourteen days – with the audits starting on day fifteen. But on the books is a much tougher audit law for DRE’s which does not apply to optical scanners. This law has a much bigger audit, started sooner, audits all races and questions, and with a much longer and clearer chain-of-custody This would be an expensive audit as DRE paper tapes are much more time consuming to audit than paper ballots: Sec. 9-242b. Procedures for use of direct recording electronic voting machines

(5) Not later than five business days after each election in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least (A) two direct recording electronic voting machines used in each assembly district, or (B) a number of direct recording electronic voting machines equal to fifty per cent of the number of voting districts in the municipality, whichever is less. Not later than five business days after a primary in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrar of voters of the party holding the primary shall conduct such a manual audit by designating two or more individuals, one of whom may be the registrar, representing at least two candidates in the primary. The machines audited under this subdivision shall be selected in a random drawing that is announced in advance to the public and is open to the public. All direct recording electronic voting machines used within an assembly district shall have an equal chance of being selected for the audit. The Secretary of the State shall determine and publicly announce the method of conducting the random drawing, before the election. The manual audit shall consist of a manual tabulation of the contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records produced by each voting machine subject to the audit and a comparison of such count, with respect to all candidates and any questions or proposals appearing on the ballot, with the electronic vote tabulation reported for such voting machine on the day of the election or primary…

(6) The individual, permanent, voter-verified, paper records contemporaneously produced by any direct recording electronic voting machine in use at an election or primary held on or after July 1, 2005, shall be carefully preserved and returned in their designated receptacle in accordance with the requirements of section 9-266, 9-302 or 9-310, whichever is applicable, and may not be opened or destroyed, except during recanvass or manual audit as set forth in this section, for one hundred eighty days following an election or primary that does not include a federal office, pursuant to section 9-310, or for twenty-two months following an election or primary involving a federal office, pursuant to 42 USC 1974, as amended from time to time.

What we need in Connecticut is a stronger, independent, more comprehensive, more timely post-election audit of all types of ballots cast with a stronger chain-of-custody.

EVT ’08 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop

Last week I attended EVT ’08, 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workship, in San Jose. <program and papers>

It was pleasing to see a UConn paper on memory card testing accepted and presented. Their work has been previously covered here. Over the next few days I will cover a couple of the other papers presented.

This year the program expanded from one day to almost two days, complementing the papers with a keynote and panels including computer scientists, election officials, and federal election officials. Missing from the panels, for the most part were activists although they did include some computer scientists and election officials that could be considered activists.

Today the panels: Continue reading “EVT ’08 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop”

Connecticut Fails Lastest Holt Standard

Hats off again to Representative Rush Holt. Once again he offers emergency legislation to protect our vote. Even this streamlined bill is unlikely to pass. We admire Representative Holt for not giving up. We encourage him to persevere until we have election integrity. Meanwhile Senator Feinstein supports a phony, star-wars expensive, delaying plan. Here in Connecticut, the law our Secretary of the State calls the “strongest” and “toughest” falls far short of the minimum Holt bill standards. <read>

The bill would authorize funding for states that conduct audits that meet basic minimum requirements, including the use of a random selection, the requirement that audits be conducted with independence, at least a 2 percent audit sample, and public observation. All ballots must be included in the audit and they must begin within 48 hours and be completed prior to certification of the result. Only about a dozen states currently conduct audits.


Random Selection: Connecticut has it but the random selection of races is not always required to be public.

Independence: In Connecticut all decisions are made by the Secretary of the State and counting is done by local officials – this completely fails independence.

All Ballots Included: In Connecticut, hand counted ballots, central count absentee ballots, and provisional ballots are excluded. In addition districts with recounts or contests are excluded.

Begin within 48 hours: By law Connecticut audits cannot begin until after 336 hours.