CTVotersCount.org

Surprising statements by Denise Merrill and Neil Jenkins

Denise Merrill, Secretary of the State and President of the National Association of Secretaries of State and Neil Jenkins from Homeland Security spoke on NPR on election integrity. <listen>

We disagree with both their similar statements:

.”Because our system is highly decentralized there’s no way to disrupt the voting process in any large-scale meaningful way through cyber attacks because there’s no national system to attack,” [Merrill] said Tuesday at a hearing before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on the impact of the critical infrastructure designation.

Jenkins was quoted as saying “having thousands of elections offices each with their own systems making hacking elections nearly impossible”

Denise Merrill, Secretary of the State and President of the National Association of Secretaries of State and Neil Jenkins from Homeland Security spoke on NPR on election integrity. <listen>

We disagree with both their similar statements:

.”Because our system is highly decentralized there’s no way to disrupt the voting process in any large-scale meaningful way through cyber attacks because there’s no national system to attack,” [Merrill] said Tuesday at a hearing before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on the impact of the critical infrastructure designation.

Jenkins was quoted as saying “having thousands of elections offices each with their own systems making hacking elections nearly impossible”

Others may wish to believe differently, but based on science, recent history, and common sense, we point out:

Secretary/President Merrill is almost correct when she says “Because our system is highly decentralized there’s no way to disrupt the voting process in any large-scale meaningful way through cyber attacks because there’s no national system to attack,” However, it is possible to attack Federal elections in a “meaningful’ way, especially a non-cyber way, in that a few thousand votes could sway a state’s electoral votes, senator, or representatives. That may or not be large-scale, but it is meaningful. Put a few of states together and it could change the apparent President and the balance in the Senate and House. In 2016 attacks in three states, PA, MI, and WI, could have done the job. In 2000, FL, and 2004, OH, just one state could have changed the result.
Elections are not as decentralized as the Secretary and Jenkins imply. It is inaccurate to say that thousands of jurisdictions have their own systems: I.e. all of Connecticut’s scanners are programmed and maintained by a single out-of-state vendor. That same vendor does the same for most of New England. Nationwide some jurisdictions are very large in many states such as LA County in CA, Cuyahoga County OH, or several FL counties. Some cities are rather large. In this past election there were major errors in Detroit. Philadelphia all votes are “counted” on unauditable touch screen machines.
A single entity is now responsible for the non-random auditing of all of Connecticut’s memory cards, reporting on our post-election election audits, and programming and supervising the software dependent machines now doing our electronic post-election “audit”.
Connecticut’s new voting machines for those with disabilities are programmed by another single entity, not tested in a meaningful end-to-end way, and are now used in most municipalities to test the optical scanners in a way that reduces the value of the pre-election tests. (Rather than an actual test of the interface, a canned set of ballots is printed by the machine. Those ballots produce huge black squares rather than filled in bubbles. When they are used to test the scanners it does not test that the scanners actually detect bubbles at the correct coordinates.)

These do not meet my definition of decentralized (or independent). I am not necessarily arguing for more centralization. I am arguing for more skepticism, more vigilance, more awareness, more transparency, and less obfuscation.

We and officials cannot prove negatives, that there were no cyber-attacks; that there were no conventional attacks; that there were no significant errors in the results reported.

Officials have not proven that the election results were accurate enough to support the . With paper ballots uniformly required, with effective post-election audits, and process audits they would be able to prove it.

*****Update 4/15/2017

Alex Halderman agrees <read>

Halderman said that most people think that the United States’ voting machines are secure because they are different in each county and they aren’t connected to the Internet. “In fact, many of these things break down,” said Halderman.

Halderman said an attacker can select the machines that are the most vulnerable or attack the third-party vendors that provide the memory cards for each machine. By using this method, an attacker could have altered the votes in 75 percent of Michigan counties, according to Halderman. He said that although he thinks that no states carried out sufficient forensics to determine whether their voting machines were hacked, he does not believe that those votes were manipulated.

NPV Forum in Greenwich

Tuesday I participated in a forum/debate on the National Popular Vote Compact. Greenwich Time has a vary fair article on the event <read>

In one of the photos I am holding a 1118 page book that is free. Instead, I recommend two books that are shorter, that are worth reading, and worth much more than you will pay for them!

I also have some comments on the uniqueness of an event where individuals claim that Connecticut voters would appreciate more money in politics.

Tuesday I participated in a forum/debate on the National Popular Vote Compact. Greenwich Time has a vary fair article on the event <read>

Nearly 150 people were curious enough about plans to change how presidential election votes are counted to devote nearly two hours Tuesday night to the discussion…

“Frankly this is something that makes sense for all the states,” said Pam Wilmot, a member of Common Cause, who had pushed for Massachusetts to be a part of the compact.

“It particularly makes sense for states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, Texas, Idaho and Oklahoma because they are all part of the three-fourths of states that are ignored in the current system. The current system doesn’t help small states. It doesn’t help big states. It helps battleground states.”

Countered Luther Weeks of the grassroots Ctvoterscount.org, which describes itself as dedicated to election fairness and integrity: “I understand the theoretical advantages of the popular vote, but there is a mismatch with the electoral college system and one the compact does not change. There are things like nuclear power and DDT and fracking that all sound good but have unintended consequences that might not be apparent at the beginning.”

The compact, crafted more than a decade ago, has been picking up political backing since November’s election of President Donald Trump. Despite losing the popular election by more than 3 million votes, Trump won the electoral college and the presidency.

Its bipartisan support includes former Democratic Vice President Al Gore, who famously lost the 2000 race despite winning the popular vote; former Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Republican Congressman and Libertarian presidential candidate Bob Barr.

Actually opposition is bi-partisan as well. I noted this list from my recent testimony:

Susan Bysiewicz (D), former Connecticut Secretary of the State
Arnold Schwarzenegger (R), former California Governor
Mark Ritchie (D), Minnesota Secretary of State and former President of the National Association of Secretaries of State
Daniel Patrick Moynihan(D), former Wesleyan professor and U.S. Senator
William Cibes (D), former State University System Chancellor

In one of the photos I am holding a 1118 page book that is free. Instead, I recommend two books that are shorter, that are worth reading, and worth much more than you will pay for them!

The book Every Vote Equal is a tiresome read and quite redundant. Reading it is like being locked in a room with an infomercial blaring away 24×7. It claims to refute my claim that “There is no official national popular vote number available in time for states to choose their electors”. They leave out the “in time” and point to the Certificates of Ascertainment which are submitted to the National Archivist. That claim was repeated in the debate. Fortunately, I brought along and held up the two forms from 2016 that were signed and submitted on the date the electors vote (a week after they must be selected) and the two certificates that were signed the day after. For more see my recent testimony, page 3.

Instead I recommend Ballot Battles which articulates the partisan nature of battles over close election results. It is clear to me that it portends the battles that would ensue if the Compact were enacted. I also recommend Broken Ballots which details the risks inherent in our voting methods.

I also got in some comments on the uniqueness of an event where individuals claim that Connecticut voters would appreciate more money in politics. I did not say everything in the debate but here is what I have said:

There are valid reasons for a National Popular Vote and against the Compact, yet more money in Connecticut Politics is not one of them. I do not agree with the argument that increasing political spending in Connecticut is a benefit of the Compact:

Most Connecticut voters and several sponsors of this event want less money in Connecticut Politics, not more.
Connecticut voters do not need more calls, robo-calls, and 30 second attack ads to choose how they will vote.
I don’t think Trump’s visit to Connecticut last year, nor any other candidate in person, sways many voters who can see the same talking points on the news, almost every night.
The money raised here from Drug companies, Insurance Companies and Traders mostly would not be spent here anyway.
In any case, the money spent for adds and robo-calls would largely go to out of state political consultants, vendors, and media moguls.

Controlling Voting Algorithms is Critical

A short op-ed in the Courant from Bloomberg View, by Cathy O’Neil describes the risks of artificial intelligence algorithms used by the likes of Facebook and Google: Controlling A Pervasive Use Of Algorithms Critical

We should have concerns with algorithms beyond Artificial Intelligence. The same concerns apply to any algorithm (computer code/manual process), such as voting machines. We have no access to the code in our AccuVoteOS optical scanners. Yet we know from studies such as the California Top-To-Bottom-Review, Hacking Democracy’s Hursti Hack, and studies by UConn that the system is vulnerable to attack. We do not know and cannot know for sure if the software running on a particular AccuVoteOS and its memory card is correct and accurate.

Humans are gradually coming to recognize the vast influence that artificial intelligence will have on society. What we need to think about more, though, is how to hold it accountable to the people whose lives it will change…

In short, people are being kept in the dark about how widely artificial intelligence is used, the extent to which it actually affects them and the ways in which it may be flawed. That’s unacceptable. At the very least, some basic information should be made publicly available:

Scale: Whose data is collected, how, and why? How reliable are those data? What are the known flaws and omissions?

Impact: How does the algorithm process the data? How are the results of its decisions used?

Accuracy: How often does the algorithm make mistakes — say, by wrongly identifying people as criminals or failing to identify them as criminals? What is the breakdown of errors by race and gender?

Such accountability is particularly important for government entities that have the power to restrict our liberty. If their processes are opaque and unaccountable, we risk handing our rights to a flawed machine.

The best defense is a comprehensive, sufficient Post Election Audit.

Yet now Connecticut audits with the UConn Audit Station with undisclosed software. Even if we knew the software and tested it, there still would be no assurance that we missed something in our tests, there was a hardware error, or the software was compromised. As we wrote in a recent op-ed in the CTMirror and as covered in the most recent Citizen Audit Report the only defense is a manual audit of that Audit Station, every time it is used.

Covering the items in the Courant Op-Ed:

Scale: Whose data is collected, how, and why? How reliable are those data? What are the known flaws and omissions?
Our voting data is collected. It is only as reliable as the optical scanner as deployed. The system is vulnerable to attack in a variety of ways.

Impact: How does the algorithm process the data? How are the results of its decisions used?
It is supposed to be a straight-forward interpretation of marks to vote counts, provided the scanner is properly configured and programmed. The results are used to determine who leads our democracy AND if our votes actually determine that.

Accuracy: How often does the algorithm make mistakes — say, by wrongly identifying people as criminals or failing to identify them as criminals? What is the breakdown of errors by race and gender?
Here this is, how often does in inaccurately count votes? Did it count them accurately enough in this election? If we had trustworthy audits of the voting machines and the Audit Station we could answer these questions.

Report: Presidential Election Audit: Suffers Two Blows to Credibility

Citizen Audit: Two Blows to Connecticut Election Audits
Leave Them Weaker, Less Credible

From the Press Release:

In spite of growing national concerns about election integrity, election credibility in Connecticut has suffered two devastating blows:

The Connecticut General Assembly cut post-election audits in half from 10% to 5% of voting districts, and failed to fix glaring weaknesses in the state’s audit law.

Shockingly, Connecticut has become the first state to replace verifiable hand-count audits with unverifiable electronic audits. Now the public can’t verify audit results.

“It need not be this way. Electronic audits can be manually verified without sacrificing efficiency,” said Luther Weeks, Executive Director of Connecticut Citizen Election Audit. “Because audits are conducted by the same officials responsible for conducting elections, audits must be transparent and publicly verifiable,” he said.

The Citizen Election Audit also found continuing problems with how municipalities conducted audits. “The Secretary’s Office should take the lead in ensuring that audits are complete, credible, and publicly verifiable,” Weeks said. “The public, candidates, and Secretary Merrill should expect local election officials to organize audits that produce accurate audit reports,” he said.

Citizen Audit: Two Blows to Connecticut Election Audits
Leave Them Weaker, Less Credible

From the Press Release:

In spite of growing national concerns about election integrity, election credibility in Connecticut has suffered two devastating blows:

The Connecticut General Assembly cut post-election audits in half from 10% to 5% of voting districts, and failed to fix glaring weaknesses in the state’s audit law.

Shockingly, Connecticut has become the first state to replace verifiable hand-count audits with unverifiable electronic audits. Now the public can’t verify audit results.

Electronic audits were conducted for six municipalities, while 22 towns conducted manual audits. Post-election audits are required by law.

Georgia on my mind. Paper not on Georgia’s radar.

Georgia and Cobb election officials are rejecting calls from advocacy groups for voters to use paper ballots while the FBI investigates a data breach at Kennesaw State University.

Voters will continue to use electronic voting machines during upcoming elections, said Candice Broce, spokesperson for Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp. The use of paper ballots is reserved as a backup system in case there is a problem with the voting machines, she said…

Earlier this month, KSU announced a federal investigation at the Center for Elections Systems located on the Kennesaw campus to determine if there was a data breach that might have affected the center’s records, according to Tammy DeMel, spokesperson for the university.

When will they ever learn? We firmly believe that the days of paperless elections are coming to an end. It may take a few more years, yet we believe it is unlikely that any jurisdiction in the U.S. well make a major purchases of paperless voting equipment in the future. The useful life of most paperless equipment will end within the next decade or so.

Recall that the potential hacking of Georgia’s touch-screens was a very early example that started concerns with electronic voting. The dangers and suspicions were highlighted in Chapter 11 of the book, Black Box Voting, by Bev Harris. Especially, Chapter 11, Noun and Verb? rob-georgia.zip

Now Georgia is back in the news. Election officials reject advocacy groups’ call for paper ballots <read> <or here>

Georgia and Cobb election officials are rejecting calls from advocacy groups for voters to use paper ballots while the FBI investigates a data breach at Kennesaw State University.

Voters will continue to use electronic voting machines during upcoming elections, said Candice Broce, spokesperson for Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp. The use of paper ballots is reserved as a backup system in case there is a problem with the voting machines, she said.

Cobb voters will also use the voting machines in next week’s special elections for the 1 percent special purpose local option sales tax for education and the vacant Marietta school board Ward 6 seat, said Janine Eveler, director of Cobb elections.

Earlier this month, KSU announced a federal investigation at the Center for Elections Systems located on the Kennesaw campus to determine if there was a data breach that might have affected the center’s records, according to Tammy DeMel, spokesperson for the university.

Tuesday, the watchdog group Common Cause called on Georgia election officials to use paper ballots to ensure the integrity of next month’s congressional special election on April 18. That election is to fill Georgia’s Sixth District congressional seat left vacant after Tom Price was confirmed as the Health and Human Services secretary.

Testimony on Early Voting and Registrar’s Bills

Yesterday, we submitted testimony on a number of early voting bills and a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.

The primary reason to avoid expanded mail-in or no-excuse absentee voting is the opportunity for and documented record of absentee voting fraud. There are other reasons:

Contrary to a touted benefit – early voting DECREASES turnout…

And a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.

As an election official, I am sympathetic to the wish of Registrars to make their jobs simpler. Yet, my sympathy ends when it results in barriers to participation in democracy for candidates and citizens.

Yesterday, we submitted testimony on a number of early voting bills and a bill likely submitted by the Registrars of Voters Association.

Our testimony of a variety of early voting bills <read>

We oppose expanded mail-in voting in any form, including no-excuse absentee voting. As I testified several times in the past, we have no objection to a Constitutional Amendment authorizing the General Assembly to legislate early voting, provided, that voters are clearly informed of the amendment’s intent for the form(s) of early voting to be authorized.

The primary reason to avoid expanded mail-in or no-excuse absentee voting is the opportunity for and documented record of absentee voting fraud. There are other reasons:

Contrary to a touted benefit – early voting DECREASES turnout – An academic report concluded that early voting, including mail-in voting, decreases turnout by 3%. An earlier report showed a reduction of 2.6% to 2.9%.

It disenfranchises voters, not providing the opportunity to revote when they mistakenly overvote.

It disenfranchises voters, when applications or ballots are lost or delayed in the mail.

…We could support a version of in-person early voting as suggested by S.J.27.

However, any such approach should have sufficient provisions to provide:

Assurance that voters can receive impartial voting instructions and the opportunity for spoiling ballots and trying again.

Sufficient provisions for security of ballots, check-in lists, and voting machines in periods when voting does not occur.

Absentee ballots should be included in all post-election audits. This becomes more and more important as the number of absentee votes increases.

Our testimony on the Registrars bill <read>

The Citizen Audit supports one provision:

Lines 86-90 requiring the permanent posting of declaratory rulings, opinions, and regulations by the Secretary of the State on the web.

The Citizen Audit opposes one provisions as currently written:

Lines 131-132 require that random audit drawings be held within 72 hours of the election. We agree that a deadline should be set for the random drawing which has often occurred very late in the process, causing problems for election officials and the public. However, vote counting does not complete until 48 hours after the election. The drawing should be held sometime after all results are reported to the Secretary of the State and available for public review on the Secretary’s election reporting system. Also, the random drawing should have a required advanced notification. See our testimony on S.B. 540. We suggest the following substitute language:

“and take place not later than the 8^th day after any election or primary and be noticed to the public by press release at least three business days in advance.”

The Citizen Audit completely opposes one provision:

Lines 149-156 would remove the requirement that the Secretary of the State consult with the University of Connecticut for the approval of electronic pollbooks. Was this proposed be because Prof. Shvartsman of UConn has tested several available electronic pollbooks and found them all lacking? (Ref: Video of NH Forum on Electronic Pollbooks, on May 10, 2016 at 30min: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtYJkVNIGMA or as covered by the Manchester Union Leader: https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/16/05/UnionLeader20160511.pdf)

I personally oppose one other provision:

Sections 8 and 9 preclude voters who register after petitions become available from being counted for the petition. This would reduce ballot access for petitioning primary candidates. It would reduce participation and preclude a standard practice that results in more eligible voters registering.

It is normal and vital to success for petitioning candidates and their supporters to approach citizens that are unaffiliated and ask them to sign the petition by simultaneously reregistering in the candidate’s party – this change would preclude that. They also approach eligible citizens to encourage them to sign the petition and simultaneously register for the first time – this change would preclude that.

As an election official, I am sympathetic to the wish of Registrars to make their jobs simpler. Yet, my sympathy ends when it results in barriers to participation in democracy for candidates and citizens.

We respond to Secretary Merrill’s testimony opposing audit transparency bill

Last Monday we testified for S.B. 540, a bill that would increase audit transparency and public verifiability.

Later we noticed that Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, submitted testimony opposing one provision of the bill and therefor recommending against the entire bill. Her testimony misinterpreted our bill, recommending against it based on something we did not ask for and was not part of the bill.

In response we wrote a follow-up letter to the GAE Committee.

Last Monday we testified for S.B. 540, a bill that would increase audit transparency and public verifiability. The bill would:

Set common sense minimal standards for ballot security.
Set common sense prior public notice requirements for all aspects of the audits which should be transparent and publicly verifiable.
Based on sound science, make the recently implemented machine audits, manually verifiable, transparent, and publicly verifiable.

Our testimony <read>

Later we noticed that Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, submitted testimony opposing one provision of the bill and therefor recommending against the entire bill. Her testimony <read>

Her testimony misinterpreted our bill, recommending against it based on something we did not ask for and was not part of the bill:

My main objection is that it potentially jeopardizes the sanctity of ballot secrecy. Some people do initial or sign a ballot if a mistake is made. In smaller towns, deducing identity from these details is actually possible.

Creating images of ballots that anyone can take home and study could result in people’s ballots being posted online, something that we are already contending with vis-à-vis the voter file.

She went on to suggest a solution similar to the one actually proposed in the bill.

If there is public uncertainty about our new audit equipment or there is a desire to “audit the audit equipment”there areless intrusive ways to ensure accurate results such as a random sampling of ballots that can be compared to computerized result s while at the audit session. These types of simple solutions could be implemented at no cost and with much less intrusion to the sanctity of our voted ballots.

In response we wrote a follow-up letter to the GAE Committee. Our letter <read>

The Secretary’s testimony incorrectly stated that the S.B. 540 requires the posting of ballot images online. In fact, S.B. 540 bill does not require the release of ballot images to the public and does not require the posting of ballot images online.

S.B. 540 requires the release of Cast Vote Records (CVRs) to the public present at a machine audit, with no requirement for online posting. CVRs are not ballot images. They do not include stray marks by voters. They are data records, one record for each ballot that contains the digital interpretation of the votes on the ballot i.e. numbers indicating which bubbles on the ballot were filled in. They are totaled to determine the votes for each candidate or question in the audit

In the paper included in my testimony, CVRs are described:

“In a machine-assisted audit, the retabulation system produces an interpretation of votes on each ballot (a Cast Vote Record, or CVR) that can be matched with that ballot. The CVRs are exported from the retabulation system. Observers verify that these exported CVRs produce the same electoral outcome(winners, etc.) as the voting system. Then observers compare a random sample of actual ballots against the corresponding CVRs.”

There is no law in Connecticut exempting CVRs from the Freedom of Information Act. A quick survey of election officials and advocates indicates that CVRs for entire elections or audits are regularly provided to requesters in the states of AZ, NY, CO and SC. In SC, they are published online.

In addition to correcting the her misinterpretation, we also pointed out our stand that voted ballots are, in fact, subject to Freedom Of Information requests in Connecticut.

PS: Although it is irrelevant to S.B. 540 we disagree with the Secretary’s interpretation that voted ballots or ballot images are exempt from Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Act (FOI). We are not aware of an explicit exemption in Connecticut statutes. To our knowledge, FOI of ballots has never been tested before the FOI Commission or in court. We are aware of several states where allots and ballot images are subject to FOI.

Testimony on bill to improve election audits, transparency, and security

Yesterday, we testified in support of our bill to improve the post-election audits, audit transparency, and ballot security.

Common sense reforms to require all aspects of audits to be transparent and open to the public.
Common sense reforms to establish minimal standards for ballot security.
Electronically Assisted Manual Audits that are transparent and publicly verifiable, based on sound science.

Yesterday, we testified in support of our bill to improve the post-election audits, audit transparency, and ballot security.

Common sense reforms to require all aspects of audits to be transparent and open to the public.
Common sense reforms to establish minimal standards for ballot security.
Electronically Assisted Manual Audits that are transparent and publicly verifiable, based on sound science.

Here is our testimony <read>

Testimony on several bills, including the National Popular Vote Compact

Yesterday, we testified on several bills, submitting three packages of written testimony. Most of the bills were proposals for the National Popular Vote Compact. We half agree with those testifying for the Compact and half disagree. We would be in favor of a National Popular Vote with a sufficient Constitutional Amendment. We oppose the Compact. Its misfit with our presidential election laws portent chaos.

We also testified against two partisan changes to the presidential election <Proportional Electors>

We testified in favor of needed changes to the Election Day Registration law. We have long argued that the 8:00pm cutoff is a civil rights violation waiting to happen . Although it happened in New Haven in 2014, it apparently happened all over the state in 2016. Secretary Merrill received much criticism in the hearing for her past opposition and proclamations keeping the cutoff in place. <EDR and Civil Rights>

Don’t Kill the Election Assistance Commission

The new administration and state election officials have the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in their crosshairs. It is not a watchdog agency. The EAC is intended to help assist officials across the country share information and create voluntary standards for election systems. Many states look to and require Federal certification of election equipment. In a stranglehold for years, the EAC was on life support until commissioners were finally appointed a couple of years back. Efforts to update outdated standards, improve and streamline the certification process are close to fruition, yet may never be completed.

It is not just the Republicans. It is the National Association of Secretaries of State, currently headed by Connecticut’s Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill. Good Grief! the EAC is intended to help them do their jobs. Maybe they will change their stand this week, yet we doubt it.

Every odd-numbered year since 2011, Republicans in the House have tried to kill the Election
Assistance Commission—the tiny federal agency responsible for helping states improve their
voting systems. None of their previous efforts made it very far, and with Barack Obama in the
White House…

The EAC went fallow for a few years when the Senate stalled in confirming new commissioners,
a period that delayed the introduction of new voting machines in some states because the agency
could not approve new guidelines. Now housed outside Washington in a small suite of offices in
suburban Maryland, the EAC is waging a public battle for its very existence. The commission’s chairman, Thomas Hicks, issued a statement denouncing the GOP move to eliminate the EAC as being “seriously out of step with the current U.S. election landscape.” And in a subsequent phone interview, Hicks noted that among its other activities during the 2016 election, the agency had provided critical guidance to states seeking to bolster their systems against the threat of cyberattack.

In the interview, Hicks responded to Harper’s criticism of the EAC’s relevance by comparing its unheralded work to a city sanitation department that clears the streets after a snowstorm. “If you
don’t notice it,” Hicks said, “that means we’re doing our job.”

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National Association of Secretaries of State, expressing their continued consistent position in 2015, reaffirm their resolution of 2005 and 2010 and encourage Congress not to reauthorize or fund the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.