Testimony on two well-intended, yet (hopefully) fatally flawed bills

A week ago Friday, I testified against two well-intended, flawed bills that hopefully will not go forward.  One illustrates a terribly written bill that may have some underlying merit, yet leaves the public with no opportunity to understand the merits, the risks, and propose reasonable solutions.  The other intended to save work for registrars of voters, would not save much work at the expense of the voters and pollworkers.

A week ago Friday, I testified against two well-intended, flawed bills that hopefully will not go forward.  One illustrates a terribly written bill that may have some underlying merit, yet leaves the public with no opportunity to understand the merits, the risks, and propose reasonable solutions.  The other intended to save work for registrars of voters, would not save much work at the expense of the voters and pollworkers.

My prepared remarks:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am Executive Director of CTVotersCount, a webmaster, and a Certified Moderator.

I have three objections to S.B. 27 as drafted.

First, as written the bill is way too broad, likely unconstitutional, and would shut down the Internet as we know it.

Second, Public access to voter lists is an important check – that only qualified individuals are registered and that people that did not vote, are in fact listed as not voting.

Finally, without knowing what might be proposed in a workable, detailed bill, it is difficult to provide testimony to the Committee that would articulate the benefits of keeping some information off the web vs. the risks to democracy of suppressing that information.

The public should have another opportunity to comment on a more fully formed bill.

I oppose S.B. 601. It is intended to reduce work for officials in counting and accounting for multiple votes for cross-endorsed candidates. However, the bill would do little to reduce work for officials and have unintended, negative consequences, especially for voters.

The first thing to note is that our current optical scanners likely cannot meet the certification requirements of this bill. If the certification requirements are interpreted to de-certify our scanners, then until they are replaced, the only legal method for voting in Connecticut would be paper ballots and hand counting.

In any case, S.B. 601 fails to do what the title implies, “eliminate overvoting for a candidate”. It would require a more error prone process than we have today.

It would result in a less positive voting experience for voters and for poll workers as voters are told they have “done something wrong” and need to vote again.

Time savings, if any, would be minimal and offset by increased time explaining the problem to voters, replacing their ballots and added hand counting of more ballots.

This change will be unnecessary, with electronic election night reporting, all calculations would then be handled automatically, relieving moderators of the allocation task.

Several times in the past I have testified against similar bills, pointing out similar concerns.
I encourage you to drop this bill as your predecessors have so wisely done.

Thank you.

You can see my full testimony at <S.B. 27> and <S.B. 601>.  All the testimony at <S.B. 27> <S.B. 601>

For S.B. 27 it is interesting to note than nobody in favor of the bill appeared in person to explain what the bill was intended to prevent.  A few days later, we can deduce the motivation from some of the testimony submitted, <here>.  Unfortunately, the bill is way overkill for the problem.  Perhaps there is a middle ground, yet the public needs access to voter lists including, name, address, age (if not birthdate), party and voting history.  Why should such information only be made available electronically to political parties and candidates, while leaving it only on paper in town hall for voters to check that only eligible citizens are registered and that individuals listed as voting actually did so.  Perhaps sites could be prohibited from posting the list, while the towns or the state required to publish it – in any case, it should already be a crime to use the list other than its intent. It seems that the Senate sponsor was not interested enough in the bill to come or event write testimony in favor of it, nor was anyone who proposed the bill. Hopefully the bill will not move forward, and perhaps someone will write a more reasonable bill, open to more responsive testimony.

Bills similar to S.B. 601 have been proposed in the past.  They actually are designed by the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC) to save themselves a small amount of work, imposed by the Legislature.  As you can see from my testimony the scheme would save little work, cause voters work, causes voters disenfranchisement, more work for pollworkers, and may even outlaw our current voting machines.  In any case there are simpler, better solutions, suggested by me and others who testified.  Notice that some registrars testified for the bill, others against, while everyone else, including the municipal clerks association testified against it.

So you want to connect voting machines to the Internet?

60 Minutes Shows Threats to Autos and Voting Machines are Real

We need a system that does not rely on trusting the Government or the abilities of officials and pollworkers. Sometimes the risks sound crazy and too theoretical and unlikely. For several years it has been known that many vehicles can be taken over via the Internet – but not really understood at a gut level. Last week 60 Minutes demonstrated the risks to Lesley Stahl so she will never forget, and perhaps by watching her we will also understand.

Among the other reform calls in Connecticut are those to “do anything to get results faster on election night – any results”.  One proposal is to connect our voting machines directly to the Internet to collect results. There is a reason our voting machines are not connected to the Internet. UConn and other researchers have long pointed out the risks <October 2007 article>

60 Minutes Shows Threats to Autos and Voting Machines are Real

We need a system that does not rely on trusting the Government or the abilities of officials and pollworkers. Sometimes the risks sound crazy and too theoretical and unlikely.  For several years it has been known that many vehicles can be taken over via the Internet – but not really understood at a gut level.  Last week 60 Minutes demonstrated the risks to Lesley Stahl so she will never forget, and perhaps by watching her we will also understand: DARPA: Nobody’s safe on the Internet <video at 6:45 > Or watch the entire video to understand that the Defense Department is regularly attacked and how they can attack the appliances in and around your house.

If the Defense Department can’t protect itself, if auto companies can’t protect us, why would we think the State of Connecticut could protect us? Or local registrars of voters in our 169 towns?

In fact, Arthur House, Chair of our utility control agency is concerned that utilities and the State together cannot protect our power infrastructure. <here>

Yet its even worse.  Not only can’t the Defense Department protect itself, the Federal Government actually makes it harder for private enterprise to protect us – in the name of “national security” they make us more vulnerable, while they also make “security theater” claims of increasing security, NYTimes:  Obama Heads to Security Talks Amid Tensions <read>

President Obama will meet here on Friday with the nation’s top technologists on a host of cybersecurity issues and the threats posed by increasingly sophisticated hackers. But nowhere on the agenda is the real issue for the chief executives and tech company officials who will gather on the Stanford campus: the deepening estrangement between Silicon Valley and the government…

Now, the Obama administration’s efforts to prevent companies from greatly strengthening encryption in commercial products like Apple’s iPhone and Google’s Android phones has set off a new battle, as the companies resist government efforts to make sure police and intelligence agencies can crack the systems…

“What has struck me is the enormous degree of hostility between Silicon Valley and the government,” said Herb Lin, who spent 20 years working on cyberissues at the National
Academy of Sciences before moving to Stanford several months ago. “The relationship has been poisoned, and it’s not going to recover anytime soon.”…

The F.B.I., the intelligence agencies and David Cameron, the British prime minister, have all tried to stop Google, Apple and other companies from using encryption technology that the firms themselves cannot break into – meaning they cannot turn over emails or pictures, even if served with a court order. The firms have vociferously opposed  government requests for such information as an intrusion on the privacy of their  customers and a risk to their businesses.

Meanwhile in the wake of the theft of health records from Anthem, Connecticut legislators are demanding encryption for health insurers <read> We wonder if they will ask the U.S. Government to stop compromising encryption. Others are asking who is benefiting from the Anthem attack? <read>

UConn Researchers: Turnout goes down as corruption goes up.

As we have mentioned before, turnout is the “Holy Grail” of elections.  Any election reform is touted as a means of increasing turnout. From touch screens to early voting that is one of the justifications, yet in actuality touch screens create annoying lines and early voting actually DECREASES turnout.

To increase turnout, lets avoid the gimmicks with integrity risks or unproven claims. Lets start with the hard work of rooting out corruption. There is a worse alternative, we could avoid looking. Maybe the public would be more likely to vote if corruption were ignored.

As we have mentioned before, turnout is the “Holy Grail” of elections.  Any election reform is touted as a means of increasing turnout. From touch screens to early voting that is one of the justifications, yet in actuality touch screens create annoying lines and early voting actually DECREASES turnout.  Here is a post from today, showing 5 Ways To Fix America’s Dismal Turnout Problem: <read>  Some of these might help, especially “Get people excited about politics between elections””. Of course, it might depend on what type of excitement:

We also have this recent report from three researchers, two from the University of Connecticut: Bribes and ballots: The impact of corruption on voter turnout in democracies <full report>

Abstract
While officials involved in graft, bribery, extortion, nepotism, or patronage typically like keeping their deeds private, the fact that corruption can have serious effects in democracies is no secret. Numerous scholars have brought to light the impact of corruption on a range of economic and political outcomes. One outcome that has received less attention, however, is voter turnout. Do high levels of corruption push electorates to avoid the polls or to turn out in larger numbers? Though of great consequence to the corruption and voter-turnout literature, few scholars in either area have tackled this question and none has done so in a broad sample of democracies. This article engages in this endeavor through an analysis of the broadest possible sample of democratic states. Through instrumental variable regression we find that as corruption increases the percentage of voters who go to the polls decreases.

Who could have imagined!  This might just be an area needing attention in Connecticut. In recent years,

  • One Governor jailed for taking favors
  • One Mayor convicted of taking favors, one jailed for taking bribes, and another for sex acts with youth in his office
  • A State Senator jailed for taking bribes
  • A road built with missing drain pipes, despite contracted inspections
  • New Uconn buildings on two campuses with faulty construction
  • Secretary of the State used state resources to make a mailing list for campaign purposes

In the last year, mostly since the last election,

  • Three registrars may be removed from office for multiple failures around election day
  • That same former Governor indicted for campaign fraud violations in a U.S. House Race, along with the candidate and her husband
  • That same State Senator out of jail, ran again, under investigation for multiple campaign finance violations
  • Two of three candidates in a three-way Senate primary have not paid their municipal taxes
  • The current Secretary of the State used a mailing list for a “newsletter” for campaign purposes, and under suspicion of renewing a questionable Notary appointment for political reasons

Most residents could add to the list!

So, to increase turnout, lets avoid the gimmicks with integrity risks or unproven claims. Lets start with the hard work of rooting out corruption.

There is a worse alternative, we could avoid looking. Maybe the public would be more likely to vote if corruption were ignored.

 

Two days at the Voting and Elections Summit

Three simple ideas standout among the many things I learned and relearned:

  1. When we are concerned about every cost associated with voting, small and large, compare those costs to what we spend “spreading democracy” elsewhere.
  2. Contemplate what people spend in time and expense for the excitement of the Superbowl. Why are we not similarly engaged in Election Day, where the who wins is much more significant to our lives?
  3. Should we be at least as concerned with protecting and auditing paper ballots, as we are with the footballs used in the semi-finals?

I always get rejuvenated with new ideas and camaraderie of a conference.  For the last two days I have participated in the Voting and Elections Summit in Washington, D.C.

If you or anyone you know needs help with registering to vote or absentee voting the source of help is the U.S. Vote Foundation or the Overseas Vote Foundation.

Three simple ideas standout among the many things I learned and relearned:

  1. When we are concerned about every cost associated with voting, small and large, compare those costs to what we spend “spreading democracy” elsewhere.
  2. Contemplate what people spend in time and expense for the excitement of the Superbowl.  Why are we not similarly engaged in Election Day, where who wins is actually much more significant to our lives?
  3. Should we be at least as concerned with protecting and auditing paper ballots, as we are with the footballs used in the semi-finals?

Monday and Tuesday, I will be back at the Capitol considering what might be possible in the future, while wondering if we are willing to pay for a voting system worthy of the potential value of trustworthy elections, at the NIST Future of Voting Symposium II.  Yes, I went to the 1st Symposium and Connecticut benefited.

Sanity returns (mostly) to Maryland

Paper Ballots Return to Maryland Elections. Once Maryland implements optical scan, there will only be five states left without a voter verified paper record for voting.

Paper Ballots Return to Maryland Elections <read>.  Once Maryland implements optical scan, there will only be five states left without a voter verified paper record for voting. Apparently Maryland is very very slow at starting what they mandate.

The Maryland Board of Elections’ state administrator, Linda Lamone, said the coming year will be spent preparing polling center volunteers and educating voters.

Lamone said the General Assembly was given the go-ahead for the paper system in 2007, but only received funding for the switch last year. The cost to lease the machines alone is roughly $25 million, but that does not include additional costs such as storage and transportation of the units before and on Election Day.

She said one of the reasons for the mandate was that lawmakers “felt that it was safer” to have a paper record of every vote cast.

Lamone is know for opposing optical scan.  We recall a Connecticut study in 2006 by TrueVoteCT’s Michael Fisher that demonstrated the total costs of acquiring and using optical scan at about half the comparable costs of  DRE (Touch Screen) voting systems now in use in Maryland – Optical scanners cost a lot more, but you need only one and a backup to a polling place, you only have to program two, and the last longer.

We point out the obvious that Lamone must have had to transport and store the larger number of DREs as well.

Digital Democracy Good – for Voting Bad Bad Bad!


Our friends across the pond are thinking of Internet Voting. Tech unsavvy elders apparently want to entice young voters. Hopefully, the young are savvy enough to understand the security risks and are too smart to trust democracy to smart phones.

Editorial in ComputerWorldUK highlighted at TheVotingNews: Digital Democracy? – Yes, Please; but Not Online Voting


Our friends across the pond are thinking of Internet Voting. Tech unsavvy elders apparently want to entice young voters. Hopefully, the young are savvy enough to understand the security risks and are too smart to trust democracy to smart phones.

Editorial in ComputerWorldUK highlighted at TheVotingNews:  Digital Democracy? – Yes, Please; but Not Online Voting <read>

Enabling people to vote online would indeed draw in many young people who otherwise wouldn’t vote, and that’s hugely important. So why am I against the idea? Well, the report quotes a good encapsulation of the key issues here by the Open Rights Group:

Voting is a uniquely difficult question for computer science: the system must verify your eligibility to vote; know whether you have already voted; and allow for audits and recounts. Yet it must always preserve your anonymity and privacy. Currently, there are no practical solutions to this highly complex problem and existing systems are unacceptably flawed.

Another warning [.pdf] comes from a formidable trio of security researchers in their submission to the Digital Democracy Commission:

In our view, the adoption of online voting technology would present extremely grave challenges to the integrity of UK elections, and risk disadvantaging significant sections of the population, which would present a real danger of undermining public confidence in democracy rather than strengthening it as the Commission rightly seeks to do.

Finally, people who oppose the use of new technology for well-established activities are sometimes accused of being Luddites and of letting their ignorance stand in the way of perfectly acceptable change. In the case of e-voting, we believe that the more familiar people are with the technology, the more they understand the very substantial risks that it poses to the democratic process. It is ignorance that leads people to suppose that e-voting is risk-free and desirable; and it is technical experts such as us (and our colleagues whose carefully-argued papers we have cited) who are cautioning against embracing e-voting for the foreseeable future.

Citizen Audit Cites Improvements, Faults Flaws, in Official Election Audits

SOTS Office makes improvements, significant Registrars of Voters flaws continue

Improvements noted by the Citizen Audit include:

  • Small, yet significant improvements in and corrections to the Official Audit Procedures made by the Secretary of the State’s Office (SOTS Office) at the request of the Citizen Audit.
  • Increased integrity and credibility of the audit based on a Citizen Audit of the random drawing of districts and races. (As reported separately on 1/21/2015)
    • Significantly fewer errors in the random drawing list in November 2014 compared to November 2013.
    • Public and transparent drawing of races to be audited after the November election.

The audit observation report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence after eight years and fourteen audits, because of the continued:

  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
  • Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

The audit observations also uncovered tabulator errors and inadequate election procedures which cause some votes for registered write-in candidates to not be counted.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “We appreciate improvements made by the Secretary of the State’s Office. We remain disappointed after eight years that significant improvements remain to achieve a credible audit, especially by local election officials, in too many municipalities.”

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release>
Detail data/municipal reports <Nov> <Aug>

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release>
Detail data/municipal reports <Nov> <Aug>

SOTS Office makes improvements, significant Registrars of Voters flaws continue

Improvements noted by the Citizen Audit include:

  • Small, yet significant improvements in and corrections to the Official Audit Procedures made by the Secretary of the State’s Office (SOTS Office) at the request of the Citizen Audit.
  • Increased integrity and credibility of the audit based on a Citizen Audit of the random drawing of districts and races. (As reported separately on 1/21/2015)
    • Significantly fewer errors in the random drawing list in November 2014 compared to November 2013.
    • Public and transparent drawing of races to be audited after the November election.

The audit observation report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence after eight years and fourteen audits, because of the continued:

  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
  • Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

The audit observations also uncovered tabulator errors and inadequate election procedures which cause some votes for registered write-in candidates to not be counted.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “We appreciate improvements made by the Secretary of the State’s Office. We remain disappointed after eight years that significant improvements remain to achieve a credible audit, especially by local election officials, in too many municipalities.”

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release>
Detail data/municipal reports <Nov> <Aug>

Hartford Election Report: Sad, yet an easy recommended read.

As they and we often say, “Diagnosis before cure”. Lest the cure be ineffective or worse than the disease.

The Hartford Common Council empowered a Committee of Inquiry to gather facts on the widely reported late opening of polls on election day, the long known disfunction in the Registrars Office, and the less reported inaccurate, yet to be corrected reports of election results. We recommend reading the whole report. It is an easy read, yet sad, disappointing, and as some have said outrageous

The Hartford Common Council empowered a Committee of Inquiry to gather facts on the widely reported late opening of polls on election day, the long known disfunction in the Registrars Office, and the less reported inaccurate, yet to be corrected reports of election results.  Here is the summary.  We recommend reading the whole report. It is an easy read, yet sad, disappointing, and as some have said outrageous. <full report>

The Committee’s investigation confirmed that several Hartford polling places did not allow voting to commence at 6:00 a.m., as required by law. In addition, the investigation revealed additional irregularities. The Head Moderator failed to account for all of the absentee ballots received, failed to correctly tally and report the vote count, and failed to submit a timely Amended Head Moderator’s Return. The Hartford Registrars:

  • failed to provide the Secretary of the State (“SOTS”) with information about the polling place moderators ;
  • failed to file the final registry books with the Town Clerk by October 29
  • failed to timely prepare and deliver the final registry books by 8:00 p.m. on November 3, and thereafter failed to develop or implement a plan for delivering the books to the polling places before the polls opened at 6:00 a.m. on November 4;
  • failed to adequately prepare and open several polling places;
  • failed to maintain adequate communications among key election day personnel;
  • failed to provide the Head Moderator with the proper form to submit his Head Moderator’s Return in advance of the election;
  • failed to attend a statutorily required meeting to correct errors in the Head Moderator’s Return; and
  • failed to identify and correct discrepancies in the vote tallies reported by the Head Moderator, with the result that the final vote tally remains unclear, and no Hartford election official can explain what happened to approximately 70 absentee ballots reported as having been received

In short, multiple, serious errors plagued the administration of the 2014 General Election in Hartford. These errors appear to have resulted in the disenfranchisement of Hartford voters and, even several months later, a lack of an accurate vote count.

The Committee has determined that many of the Election Day problems are attributable to errors or omissions by certain Hartford election officials (as described in detail below); a dysfunctional working relationship among all election officials; a lack of leadership and accountability; and the absence of a clear, legally prescribed chain of command.

Once again, I recommend reading the entire report.  It really brings home the points made in the summary.

I add some additional thoughts:

  • Nobody seems interested in actually determining what happened to the “missing” ballots, or determining the actual vote count — a team could easily get all the numbers from the tape and at least determine votes for governor from the machines, which are very very likely to be less than the number of ballots counted by the machines — this report demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that people should not count anything alone, but should work together to verify addition and transcription. Double checking by “two eyes” works.
  • Some authority could also actually count all the ballots and votes by hand.  I will guarantee the number of votes per race will not exceed the number of ballots. (If the count is accurate)
  • Someone authority could actually count the number of envelopes for ABs.  Then count then number of ABs checked-off, then count the number returned on the Clerk’s log…then if there is a discrepancy, match the envelopes to the voter names on both those lists to help uncover the source of any differences.
  • How many other towns have check-in lists, or ballot counts that are way off from vote counts?  Does anybody check…or has this only surfaced because of the visible problems on election day? (We know some towns and moderators check and that others have at least sometimes not)
  • The official system has yet to a) recognize the actual counts in Bridgeport for Governor in 2010.  b) never audited the other towns in 2010 with many copied, hand counted ballots  c) Never checked other towns since then that that have had huge numbers of hand counted votes on copied ballots – even those that have chosen deliberately to forgo scanners in some elections. d) Never checked the discrepancies between voters checked-in in Bridgeport vs. ballots in 2010, or checked for such errors anywhere else!!!
  •  And, in Hartford, how about checking the reported counts that weren’t for Governor?

Make no mistake. We applaud the investigation as far as it went.  It provides plenty to consider and change.

Yet the Hartford Courant is dissatisfied with the report, apparently believes the investigation was unnecessary.  Reflection and deliberation, based on effective gathering of facts, in their opinion, seems a waste of time.  The Editorial Board would also apparently place the prime responsibility for choosing actions solely on the Mayor over the entire Council.

Thumbs down on lack of city plan to fix registrar mess-ups

Thumbs still down on Hartford’s handling of the registrar of voters mess. Mayor Pedro Segarra and city council president Shawn Wooden formed a council committee to investigate the registrars’ election day screw-ups. The committee reported Friday what everyone already knew — the registrars bungled things so badly that some polls were unable to open on time. The Friday announcement is full of indignant language — but not a peep about what the mayor plans to do about the situation. “That is being determined,” a spokesperson said. Lame.

As they and we often say,  “Diagnosis before cure”.  Lest the cure be ineffective or worse than the disease.

WNPR Where We Live: Inside Cyber Security

Yesterday, Where We Live, with John Dankowski, was a discussion of Cyber Security for consumers and business.

At about 17:49 into the show, I called in and reminded John Dankoski of the Secretary of the State’s Symposium on Online voting that he moderated just over three years ago. In response to my comment, Professor Bryan Ford of Yale, gave a very thorough summary of the potential risks of Internet voting.

Yesterday, Where We Live, with John Dankoski, was a discussion of Cyber Security for consumers and business.  Listen to the program here <podcast>

At about 17:49 into the show, I called in and reminded John Dankoski of the Secretary of the State’s Symposium on Online Voting that he moderated just over three years ago. The Symposium was intended for legislators. Only three actually attended.

To little avail, the legislature twice passed Internet voting for military and overseas voters – every time a business, government agency, or the Military is hacked it gets less and less believable that Internet voting is safe for democracy, less and less believable that the State or all of our 169 towns can defend Internet voting from attackers.

In response to my comment, Professor Bryan Ford of Yale, gave a very thorough summary of the potential risks of Internet voting.

The whole show is a great summary of the wide range of risks to consumers and the challenges to our infrastructure, specifically utilities.

Election Reformers as Entertainers?

Last week Paul Krugman had an interesting Economics editorial that by analogy can apply to some election reformers as well. In general, I agree with Mr. Krugman when it comes to Economics. Beyond that he has a skill making readable opinion pieces that make single points well, even if they are based on very detailed economic theory or analysis. This article is a little different in subject, yet makes an important, useful point that applies widely, including to election reformers

Last week Paul Krugman had an interesting Economics editorial that by analogy can apply to some election reformers as well: Economists as Entertainers <read>

In general, I agree with Mr. Krugman when it comes to Economics.  Beyond that he has a skill making readable opinion pieces that make single points well, even if they are based on very detailed economic theory or analysis.  This article is a little different in subject, yet makes an important, useful point that applies widely, including to election reformers:

According to researchers in Britain, more than half of the health advice that Dr. Oz gives is either baseless (there’s no evidence for his claims) or wrong (there is evidence, and it contradicts what he says). Julia Belluz at Vox tells us not to be surprised: “He is, after all, in the business of entertainment,” she wrote recently.

But the thing is, there are a lot of Dr. Ozzes out there, including in areas you might not consider the entertainment business…

But I now also suspect that the personality traits you need to be an effective entertainer working with not-so-much-fun subjects like health or monetary policy are inherently at odds with the traits you need to be even halfway competent.

If Dr. Oz were the kind of guy who pores over medical evidence to be sure he knows what he’s talking about, he probably couldn’t project the persona that wins him such a large audience. Similarly, a hired-gun economist who actually knows how to download charts from economic databases probably wouldn’t have the kind of blithe certainty in right-wing dogma that his employers want.

How does this apply to election reformers?

It seems to me, in my experience, that many reformers are always rational and scientific in their approach to any issue, even though they may have biases.  We try hard at CTVotersCount, in posts, and in testimony, to provide honest, accurate and comprehensive information about election issues even when the evidence hurts our case.  (Hopefully, if there is enough evidence against our position we will change our position, if the weight of accumulated evidence points away from our past position.)

Yet, we run into others who frequently tout things that are unproven, untrue, and contrary to evidence.  For example:

  • Legislators and advocates that ignore the evidence of electronic vulnerability to claim that Internet voting is safe. Despite of the evidence of hacking of business and government; despite the opposition of security experts and computer scientists, including those at Homeland Security, National Institute of Standards and Technology, and Department of Defense studies; despite the fact that online banking is safe only because banks pay billions annual to reimburse for theft.
  • Advocates that claim that early voting will increase turnout, when it actually decreases turnout. (There are reasons to be for and against early voting, but turnout is not a reason to be for it.)
  • Advocates for Voter ID who claim, despite evidence to the contrary, that there is a lot of votER fraud.  Despite several witch hunts after every election, votER fraud is very very low.
  • Advocates for absentee/mail-in voting that claim that no votER fraud means that such voting is safe. They ignore and deny the actual evidence of frequent multiple-ballot votING fraud, that is accomplished by mail.
  • Advocates for the National Popular Vote Agreement that claim, for no reason, that fraud and suppression will not increase in all states, just as we have seen in some swing states, if we go to a popular vote without a uniform, enforceable voting system to match.
  • Advocates for the National Popular Vote Agreement who claim there could be a recount after a popular vote, when half of states have no recount law, all laws are based on close state votes – not close national votes, and that there is no body to declare and manage a nationwide recount.

Just some of the examples analogous to Paul Krugman’s Economic Entertainers.  Yet, we have a hard time calling them Entertainers.  Some are incompetent, some deluded, and others we might call advocates or lobbyists for hire.